ML17256A320

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Proposed Change to Tech Spec Page 3.6-6 Re Containment Isolation Boundary Table.Safety Evaluation Encl
ML17256A320
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/28/1982
From:
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17256A317 List:
References
NUDOCS 8210040288
Download: ML17256A320 (6)


Text

Attachment A

1.

Replace Technical Specification page 3.6-6.

82i0040288 820928 PDR ADOCK 05000244

'~.P.. ',

PDR

0 I

PENT NO.

IDENTIFICATION(DESCRIPTION ISOLATION BOUNDARY MAXIlIUlI ISOLATION ISOLATION TIIIE *(SEC) BOUNDARY MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME *(SEC) 204 205 206 206 207 207 209 Purge Supply Duct Hot leg loop sample Przr liquid space sample "A" S/G sample Przr.

Steam space sample "B" S/G sample Reactor Compart. cooling Units A & B 210 Oxygen makeup to A & B recombiners 300 (p

301 303 304 305 305 g

305 Purge Exhaust Duct Aux. steam supply to containment Aux. steam condensate return "A" Hydrogen recombiner (pilot-and main)

Radiation Monitors R-ll, R-12 & R-10A Auto Inlet Isol.

R-ll, R-12 & R-10A Outlet Post Accident air sample (containment) 307 Fire Service Water 203 Contain. Press.

transmitter PT-947

& 948 203 Post accident air sample to "B" fan PT 947 PT 948 MV 1563 MV 1566 AOU 5870 AOU 966C AOV 966B AOV 5735 AOU 966A AOV 5736 MV 4758(16)

MV 4635(16)

MV.1080A AOV 5878 MV 6151 MV 6175 MV 1084A MV 1076A AOV 1597 AOV 1599 MV 1554 MV 1557 MV 1560 CV 9229 NA NA NA NA 5

60 60 60 60 60 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 60 60 NA NA NA NA MV 1819C MV 1819D MV 1565 MV 1568 AOV 5869 MV 956D(14)

MV 9seE(14)

MV 5733(7)

MV 956F MV S734(7)

(11)

(11)

SOV IV-2A SOV IV-2B AOV 5879 MV eles(ls)

MV 6152(15)

SOV IV"5A SOV IV-3A MV 1596 AOV 1598 MV 1556 MV 1559 IIV 1562 AOV 9227 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Normally Closed NA Normally Closed 5

NA NA Normally Closed NA Normally Closed NA 60 NA NA NA (18)

0

'I 4

1 h

Attachment B

Safety Evaluation The proposed Technical Specification change affects the containment isolation boundary for a single containment penetration, penetration 305, the containment radiation monitor return line.

A chronic problem with the existing containment isolation check valve has necessitated a modification to this line.

The existing check valve will be replaced by a new air-operated valve outside containment but close to the containment wall.

The modification will improve the containment isolation valve reliability.

As a result of the modification, both automatic valves for isolation of this line will be outside containment.

This type of arrangement has previously been evaluated to be acceptable in the Ginna SEP integrated Plant Safety Assessment, NUREG-0821.

The piping design pressure between the containment and the isolation valves is at least equal to the containment design pressure.

The isolation valves are designed to function against containment pressure.

The modified piping run between the containment and the new valve is as short as possible, approximately 3 feet, and is Seismic Category X.

The piping supports for the new valve and piping between it and the containment wall are designed to subsection NF of the ASME code..

The NRC PRA study reported in NUREG-0821 found that the risk resulting from two valves outside containment is about the same as the risk resulting from one valve inside and one valve outside containment.

The modified piping configuration outside containment will not be susceptible to an event which could also cause a LOCA or event inside containment that would require containment isolation.

Conversely, an event inside containment will not result in damage to the.isolation piping outside containment.

The new valve to be.installed will close on the same isolation signals as other valves in this radiation monitor system.

Resetting of the containment isolation signal will not cause the valve to automatically reopen.

The new valve will operate and reopen in conjunction with existing valve 1597, another valve in the same system and in a line within the same penetration, which allows passage of air from the containment to the radiation monitor.

Electrical independence and single failure protection will be maintained.

Ganged reopening of two valves within the same system and performing a single function meets the intent of NUREG-0737.

Based upon these

reasons, the proposed modification is acceptable under General Design Criterion 56 on an "other defined basis" as permitted by the GDC.

Therefore, the piping modification and the Technical Specification change will not xesult in any undue risk to public and safety.

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