ML17252A902
| ML17252A902 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/29/1973 |
| From: | Caldwell W Consolidated Edison Co of New York |
| To: | O'Leary J US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) |
| References | |
| 3-2-6 | |
| Download: ML17252A902 (2) | |
Text
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DOCKETED USAEC Williarrl._E. Caldwel *.
Vice President Consolidated Edison Company of _!:j.N~.l.QLl~
4 Irving Place. New York. N O 9.
Telephone (212) 460-518 FU.a cy~
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- May 29, 1973 MAY 31 1973 Indian Point Unit No. 2 AEC Docket No. 50-247 Facility Operating License DPR-26 John F. O'Leary, Director Directorate of Licensing U. S. Atomic Energy commission Washington, D. C. 20545 Dear f1.r. O'Leary The following report of Abnormal Occurrence No. 3-2-6 is provided purs~ant to the requirements of Section 6.6.1.B of the Technical Specifications to Facilitx *operating License*No. DPR-26.
On May 19, at 0215 hours0.00249 days <br />0.0597 hours <br />3.554894e-4 weeks <br />8.18075e-5 months <br />, No. 23 High Head Safety Injection Pump was started.in order to add water to the Safety *Injection System Accumulators. *within a few minutes after starting the pump, and after first observing, normal pumping characteristics, it was noted that the accumulator level was not changing*and that the pumps discharge pressure had decreased tot.hat exist-.
ing in the Reactor coolant System. Safety* Ing*~etion Pump No. 23 was thereupon shut down.
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Investigation revealed that a motor-operated valve, (MOV) 1810, in the commbn suction line from the Refueling Water Storage Tank to the.. High Head Pumps was closed. The motor operated valve was opened and a re-start of the pump was *attempted with-
- out success. Apparently, the *pump had seized as a result of having been operated without a source of water. Safety Injection Pump No. 23 was then replaced with an identical pump which was tested satisfactorily.
Investigation into the cause of the improper valve'"lineup revealed that several key operations personnel had assumed that MOV 1810 was in its normal position, i.e., open and deenergized as required by the Technical Specifications which
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~r. John F. O'Leary May 29, 1973 define prerequisite conditions for -reactor criticality, and did not obtain verification of the valve status prior to starting the pump. In fact, the valve was shilit in order to facilitate maintenance work which had been performed on the l
system. The occurr~nce, therefo.re, was the direct result o:f;
'standard operating procedures not being followed by the operating personnel prior to starting this high head pump.
Safety implications attendant to the *occurrence are non...,
existent. This evaluation is based on the fact that the l)'nit No. 2 reactor had not yet been brought to initial criticality, and completion of the required precriticality check-off list would have assured the proper position of MOV 1810 before reactor startup even if pump failure had not occurred. Further-more, the subject check-off list is required to be completed prior to reactor startup at any time, regardless of the reason for shutdown, or its duration. For this reas:on, we. consider it extremely unlikely that the Unit No. 2 reactor would ever *be brought to operating status while MOV 1810 ~s in the closed position. We wish to note that Technical Specification 3.3.A.l specifically requires that MOV 1.810 be in the *open, deenergized positiov while the reactor is' in service.
Very truly yours I*,
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