ML17252A862
| ML17252A862 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1973 |
| From: | Caldwell W Consolidated Edison Co of New York |
| To: | O'Leary J US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) |
| References | |
| Download: ML17252A862 (2) | |
Text
William E. Caldw *.
Vice President Regulatory.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York. Inc.
4 Irving Place. New York. N Y 10003 Telephone (212) 460-5181 Mr. John.F. O'Leary, Director Dire.ctorate of' Licensing May 2l, 1973 Re Indian Point Unit No. 2 AEC Docket No. 50-247 Facility Operating License DPR-26 DOCKCTED
. USAEC MAY 24 1973 r>
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C.
20545
-s REGULATORY MAIL SECTION AaJ "-.
DOCKET CLERK '1":)/
Dear Mr. O'Leary In accordance with the requirements of' Technical Specification we wish to.inform you of' an abnormal occurrence which was "'identified on May 11, 1973 at 2230 hours0.0258 days <br />0.619 hours <br />0.00369 weeks <br />8.48515e-4 months <br />.
During pressurization of' the reactor coolant system preparatory to starting reactor coolant pumps f'or the performance of' a hydrostatic leak test of' the Reactor Coolant System, prior to initial criticality, a leak was observed in valve number 204B which is located in the charging line to Loop 2l.
Subsequent investigation indicated that the leakage *was apparently due to a defect in the area of' the stud holes permitting reactor coolant makeup to seep into two of' the stud holes and from there into the containment atmosphere.
Valve No. 204B has been replaced.
The replacement valve meets the require-ments of codes and standards applicable to the desJ;gn and procurement of equipment as outlined in the Indian Point Unit No.*2 FSAR.
A hydrostatic test of the reactor coolant system was performed to insure the integrity of the new valve and associated welds.
Mr. A. Fasano of the Region I Regulatory Operations office of the U. S.
~tomic Energy Commission was notified by telephone on May 12, 1973 of the occurrence.
In addition, a letter was telecopied to the Director of the Region I Office, Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, on May 14, 1973.
The. valve that experienced the leakage will be subjected to analysis at
- the Westinghouse Research Lab. to identif'y the specific cause and nature of the defect.
This investigation will include:
(a)
Compilation of' a history of the valve after its installation in Unit No. 2.
(b)
Photographs and physical measurements of' the valve.
(c)
Radiographs of' the valve body.
3390 1-r~>-->*..
- . *J -
Mr. John F. O'Leary (d)
Dye p*enetrant inspection.
- *May 21., 1973
- Re Indian Point Unit No. 2 AEC Docket No. 50-247 Facility Operating License DPR-26 (e)° Fractography on specimens in the area where leakage occur~d.
(f) A chemical analysis of the valve body material.
Following the completing of this program, results of the investigation will be made available at the site for review by the Regulatory Operations inspect0r.
For a number of reasons, the safety implications of the occurrence are considered slight.
The *first of these considerations.is that the leak was of a very minor rate and was well within t):ie make-up capability of the Chemical and Volume Control System.
Secondly, a check valve is located downstream of.valve 204B and this would prevent leakage directly out of the Reactor Coolant System had the valve leakage Jn some way be-come excessive.
A further consideration with regard to the safetyim-plications i$ that the leakage, had it been radioactive, which it was not, was into the containment atmosphere and therefore would not have resulted in any danger to the health and safety of the public.
Further-more, the leakage would have been detected and identified by one of the four methods for monitoring leakage in containment as specified in Technical Specification 3.1.F had the plant been in operation.
- Finally, the plant was in a cold shutdown condition with the system pressure below 500 psig at the time of the occurrence.
Consequently, the occurr-ence does not represent a significant hazards consideration.
Our Nuclear Facilities Safety Committee has reviewed the circumstances of this occurrence and concurs that it dcies not represent a significant hazards consideration.
ds
- yice
- Copy to James P. O'Reilly (AEC)