ML17252A582

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Summary of 840614 Meeting W/Util,Sargent & Lundy & Prof Loss Control,Inc Re Reasons for Missed Commitments,Util Compensatory Measures & Detailed Discussions of App R. Viewgraphs & Handouts Encl
ML17252A582
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/24/1984
From: Gilbert R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8407270228
Download: ML17252A582 (62)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 July 24, 1984 Docket No. 50-237/249 LICENSEE:

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CECo)

FACILITY:

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF MEETING HELD ON JUNE 14, 1984 The NRC staff held a meeting with representatives of CECo, Sargent and Lundy (S&L) and Professional Loss Control, Inc. (PLC) to* discuss issues relating to Appendix R (Fire Protection) compliance. A list of attendees is provided in Enclosure 1 and copies of the viewgraphs used by CECo and its contractors are presented in Enclosure 2.

Bob Rybak from CECo, using the above mentioned viewgraphs, first discussed the reasons for some missed commitments and also indicated that CECo will furnish information.on compensatory measures.

He pointed out that there had been a fundamental misunderstanding of Appendix R and that they had misinterpreted the rule on alternate shutdown.

He then presented a chronology of Appendix R correspondence and followed that with schedules for non-outage and outage related modifications.

CECo's contractors then discussed, in consfderable detail, an associated circuits analysis, an Appendix R reverification and interim compensatory measures including a justification for no additional loss of offsite power (LOOP) analysis.

Bob Rybak then summed up CECo's position.

Commonwealth Edison Company requested staff concurrence with the proposals presented. However, the staff indicated that formal transmissions of this material will be required and that compensatory measures such as fire watches will be needed where they won't meet schedules.

The staff also indicated that LOOP is still a concern since the rule assumes LOOP.

Bob Rybak indicated that CECo will make a submittal in one month and that schedular considerations regarding modifications will be furnished.

The staff indicated that brief discussions concerning Appendix R issues could be held by phone.

Enclosures:

1.

List of Attendees

2.

Viewgraph copies cc w/encl osure 1""'"

See next page 440'11 f

'--~>4-. AJJJ Robert A. Gilbert, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing

~-

-=--*,

Mr. Dennis L. Farrar cc Isham, Lincoln & Be~le Counselors at Law Three First National Plaza, Suite 5200

Chicago, Illinois 60602 Mr. Doug Scott Plant Superintendent Dresden Nuclear Power Station Rural Route #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors Office Dresden Station Rural Route *#1 Morris, Illinois 60450 Chairman Board of Supervisors of Grundy County Grundy County Courthouse Morris, Illinois 60450 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Federal Activities Branch Region V Office ATTN:

Regional Radiation Representative 230 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III 799 Roosevelt Street Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Mr. Gary N. Wright, Manager Nuclear Facility Safety

  • Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety 1035 Outer Park Drive, 5th Floor Springfield, Illinois 62704 July 24, 1984

,i

'L.--

-.~.i

e ATTENDANCE LIST Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos, 2 and 3 Name W. Pierce W. Koester J. Achterberg R. Christensen B~ Rybak J. Dingler C. Ruth M. Mowrer C. Ksobrech J. Wenniel J. Chandraseharan J. Stang R. Eberly T. Wambach R. Bevan R. Gilbert Meeting of June 14, 1984 Affiliation Commonwealth Edison Commonwealth Edison Commonwealth Edison Commonwealth Edison Commonwealth Edison Sargent and Lundy Sargent and Lundy Professional Loss Control, Inc.

Professional Loss Control, Inc.

NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC NRC

50-237

SUMMARY

OF MEET! NG vJ/UTIL ITV RE: REASONS FOR MISSED COMMITMENTS

._NOTICE -

THE ATTACHED FILES ARE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIVISION OF DOCUMENT CONTROL. THEY HAVE BEEN CHARGED TO YOU FOR A LIMITED TIME PERIOD AND MUST BE RETURNED TO THE RECORDS FACILITY BRANCH 016.

PLEASE DO NOT SEND DOCUMENTS CHARGED OUT THROUGH THE MAIL. REMOVAL OF ANY PAGE(S) FROM DOCUMENT FOR REPRODUCTION MUST BE REFERRED TO FILE PERSONNEL....tXJ"-~.,g ;:/

fa~ry DEADLINE RETURN DATE 3,,/C);;:,;; 7cJj?.,.?§ RECORDS FACILITY BRANCH

~--

ti*

~*

AGENDA

\\..

\\

.. J. I i~TRODUCT I ON B. RYBAK <CECo)

. A.

PURPOSE OF MEETING B.

GOAL OF MEET Ii~G

c.

CONTENT OF PRESENTATION.

~*- - *- -

I I. ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS MJALYSIS J. W. DINGLER (S&L)

=---: '---* -

A.

SYSTEMS B.

ESSENTIAL AND ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS IDEi~TI FI CAT ION

c.

COLD SHUTDOWN PHILOSOPHY D.

VALVE SPURIOUS OPERATIONS REVIEW I I I. APPENDIX R REVERIFICATION

' M.. w I MOWRER <PLC)

A.

METHODOLOGY*

B.

RESULTS

c. *PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS D.

PROPOSED EXEMPTIONS IV I INTERIM COMPENSATORY MEASURES W. D. PIERCE CCECo)

A.

JUSTIFICATION FOR NO LOOP B.

PROPOSED MEASURES

~

c.

INTERIM MEASURES.

v.

SUMMARY

B. RYBAK CCECo)

A.

NRC CONCURRENCE B.

SCHEDULE FOR MODIFICATIONS c. SCHEDULE FOR SUBMITTALS

f ~

  • OCTOBER 1983 HIRED PLC TO DO REVERIFICATION OF !PREVIOUS APPENDIX R WORK
  • STATUS OF REVERIFICATION o COMPLETED HOT SHUTDOWN REVIEW o NO MAJOR REDESIGN OF SYSTEM e NO CHANGE IN SHUTDOWN PATHS AND PHIILOSOPHY ADDITIONAL.MODIFICATIONS*

o ADDITIONAL SUPPRESSION AND DETECTIO~

o UPGRADE FIRE BARRIERS ALL NEW WORK IS NOi'FOUTAGE RELATED

t 1

NRC/CECo DRESDEN 2&3 APPENDIX R CORRESPONSENCE~POST JANUARY 1983 APPENDIX R SAFETY EVALUATION--~*---~-

REPORT BY NRP.

EXEMPTIONS GRANTED BY NRR NOTIFICATION TO NRR OF PROPOSED DATE FOR SUBMITTAL OF COMPLETION DATES AND ANY POSSIBLE APPENDIX R EXEMPTION REQUESTS REQUEST FOR SCHEDULAR EXEMPTIONS ASSESSMENT OF APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE UPDATE ON APPENDIX R MODIFICATIOf~S

\\.

1/19/83 2/2/83 2/25/83 5/19/83 12/23/83 3/30/84

APPENDIX R FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS COMMITMENTS STATUS S.lii~MARY

  • NON-OUTAGE RELATED MODIFICATIONS DESCRIPTION FIRE DOORS SW PUMP LOCAL CONTROL AND ISOLATION iDDITIONAL FIRE DETECTION AND WATER SUPPRESSION COMM I TMGII DATE 4-1-34 1-1-85 CURRENT STATUS COMPLETE
  • coMPLETE ON SCHEDULE

APPENDIX R EIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS COMMITMENTS STATUS

SUMMARY

OUTAGE RELATED MODIFICATIONS DESCRIPTIONS cm1~11I~E~I D8IE CU88ENI SI8IUS ALTERNATE FEED TO INBOARD 1986 OUTAGE (UNIT 2)

ON SCHEDULE

  • ISOLATION CONDENSER VALVES 1985 OUTAGE <UNIT 3)

ON SCHEDULE

___ -::a........:...

-~** ~.

ACCESS TO OUTBOARD 1986 OUTAGE (UNIT 2)

AHEAD OF SCHEDULE ISOLATION CONDENSER VALVES 1985 OUTAGE (UiHT 3)

COMPLETE CONTROL ROD DRIVE HEADER 1984 OUTAGE (UNIT 2)

ON SCHEDULE *.

CROSS-TIE PIPING 1983 OUTAGE (UIHT 3)

COMPLETE*

2/3 DI~SEL MODIFICATI~NS 1985 OUTAGE (UNIT 3)

ON SCHEDULE AUXILIARY COOLING WATER 1984 OUTAGE CUNIT 2)

ON SCHEDULE

  • SUPPLY TO THE CRD PUMPS

.. 1985 OUTAGE (UNIT 3)

ON SCHEDULE DG 3 FUEL OIL TRANSFER 1983 OUTAGE <UNIT 2)

COMPLETE*

PUMP MODIFICATIONS LOCAL REACTOR PRESSURE 1984 OUTAGE (UNIT 2)

ON SCHEDULE

  • INDICATION 1983 OUTAGE (UNIT 3)

COMPLETE *

~COMPLETED <OR WILL BE COMPLETED) WITHIN THE COMPLIAi'JCE PERIOD.

\\..

1 1 l 1

1

~

9 l

I,

I S&L ECAO FILE1 DREBIO.I 1-1301-ll VENT

[1RC, AC t*llM-20 DRESDEN UNIT-2 ISOLATION CONDENSER UNIT 3 SERVI C( 'IA TER PUlf'S 2-4102

[lo!ERC, AC SERVICE

'IATER PUlf' 213-3901 SERVICE WATER PUW' 2-8-3901 SERVICE WATER PUW' l*A-3901

,._..,..,-Oo"Cll..,..,---!STRAINER'-"...1!--~--------------------.1..-------------------'

28-HOI CONOENSATE TRANSFER P'Jlf'S 2/38-3303 CCJITAlll HA TED CCU!EHSATE STORACE TANI\\

150,000 GALLONS CONDENSATE TRANSFER PUW'S t/38-3303 CCJIT AM I HA TEO CONOEH5ATE STORAGE T AHK 250,000 CALLOHS FIGURE 3-1

. TO UNIT 3 11..o.i-ISOlATION COHOE HS ER U2}TO HPCI PUlf'S U3 z.. 1301-4 AC TOO VESSEL 2-201 2-1301-!

06-1 o-ei

S&L ECAO FILE: DREBID.1

/

CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK ROD DRIVE WATER PUMP 2A-302-3 ROD ORIVE WATER PUMP 26-302-3 TO REACTOR 11----raz-.. VIA CONTROL ROD DRIVES CROSS TIE TO UNIT 3 FIGURE 3-3 DRESDEN UNIT-2 CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC PUMPS 06-10-82

...------------------------~--------**. -***--*-**

S&L ECAO FILEI DREBIO.I

/

2-2301*6 2-2301

-48 2-2301

  • 15 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANI\\

213 B-JlOJ TO SBCT SYSTEM 2-2301

-10 FROM FEED WATER HEATERS 2-2301 2-2301

-9

-8 2*2JOl*JS FIGURE 3-6 2-2301-J 2*2301*36 2*2301

-4 2-2301

-5 DRESDEN UNIT-2

.~*-**

H.P. COOLANT INJECTION 06* I 0*8;'.l

S&L ECAD FILEI OREBIO.I FROIA CRIB HOUSE

/

20-1503 CONTA I !Af:NT COOL ING HEAT EXCHANGER CCSW PUMP

i;;J-1501-44 2-5700-JOA 2-5700-JOB CCSfl PUMP COOLER

>'Sllf PUMP cC.*1501-44 2-1501-IBB 2-1501-19B 2-1501 2-1501

-~18

-386

-208 2-ISOl -J2B 2-1501-138 2C*l502 LP COOLANT INJECTION PUMP 2-1~;;;1-110 20-1502 LP COOLANT 2*1501*JB INJECTION PUMP

--.-.).__ _ _,)To cw DISCH.HOR.

1*

DRESDEN UNIT-2 L.P. COOLANT INJECTION TORUS COOLING MODE 2-1501-SC 2*1501-50 2-1501-50 2*1501 *SA FIGURE 3-7 FROIA CRIB HOUSE 2*1501*19A CCSW PUMP 2A*l501 *44 2*5700-JOC 2*5700-JOO CCSW PUMP COOLER CCSW PUMP 28-1501-44 2*150l*IBA 2-1501 2-1501

  • JBA
  • 21A 2*1501*J2A 2*1501-IJA 2B-I 502 LP COOLANT INJECTION PUMP 2-1501-llA 2A* l 502 LP COOLANT INJECTION PUMP 2*1501*JA TO CW DISCH.HOR.

2A-l 50J CONTAINMENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGER 0~*10-92

y y

. ASSOCIATED.CIRCUITS

  • \\

NRC CLARIFICATION COMMON POWER SOURCE tOMMON ENCLOSURE SPURIOUS OPERATION DRESDEN 2/3.

--CIRCUITS ARE ISOLATED FROM ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT BY BREAKERS, FUSES, OR OTHER ISOLATION DEVICES.

--CIRCUITS THAT SHARE A COMMON ENCLOSURE WITH ESSENTIAL CIRCUITS WILL NOT ALLOW PROPAGATION OF A FIRE OUT OF A ZONE SINCE THE ZONE IS GENERALLY ENCLOSED BY FIRE BARRIERS OR CLEARLY SEPARATED.FROM OTHER ZONES DUE TO OTHER FEATURES

--CIRCUITS MAY AFFECT THE NORMAL

.AUTOMATIC OPERATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT DUE TO FIRE INDUCED FAULTS WERE CONSIDERED IN THE ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS REPORT.

--ELECTRICALLY OPERATED VALVES WHOSE SPURIOUS OPERATION COULD ADVERSELY.

AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN 'IDENTIFIED. A STUDY TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE IS IN PROGRESS.

TYPES OF SOLUTIONS

---LOCAL CONTROL AND ISOLATION CAPABILITY

---LOCAL MECHANICAL INDICATORS

~

---MECHANICAL PIPING CROSS TIES

---MANUAL VALVE OPERATION

---ALTERNATE POWER FEEDS FOR INACCESSIBLE VALVES

\\.

DRESDEN UNITS 2&3 HOT SHUTDOWN PATHS

SUMMARY

FEATURES S H U T D 0 W N P A T H S A Al A2 B Bl B2 c D E F ISOLATION co:rn.

x x x x x x x x HPCI/LPCI x x SHUTS DOWN U~~. 2 x

x x

x x

SHUTS DOWN mi. 3 x

x x

x x

UNIT 2 POWER x x x x

x

°'

UNIT 3 POWER x x x x

x DIVISION I x x x x x *x DIVISION II x x x x ELECTRICAL VLV. OP.

x x

x x x x MANUAL VLV. OP.

x x x x "X" MEANS THE PATH DESCRIBED BY THIS COLUMN HAS THE FEATURE DESCRIBED BY THIS ROW.

FOR EXAMPLE:

PATH A USES THE ISOLATION CONDENSER TO SHUT DOWN UNIT 2 VIA THE UNIT 2 POWER TRAINJ DIV. IJ WITH ALL REQUIRED VALVES ELECTRICALLY OPERATED VIA NORMAL CONTROL CIRCUITS.

PATHAl USES THE ISOLATION CONDENSER TO SHUT DOrJN UNIT 3 VIA THE

. UNIT 2 POWER TRAINJ DIV. I. CTHIS REQUIRES THE USE OF MECHANICAL INTER-UNIT CROSSTIES FOR REACTOR VESSEL MAKEUP AND ISOLATION CONDENSER MAKEUP).

THE OUTBOARD ISOLATION CONDENSER VALVES REQUIRE MANUAL OPERATION.

/

NRC GUIDANCE REACTOR WATER LEVEL Ai*m PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION ISOLATION CONDENSER METHOD

---LOCAL INDICATIOf{ AT 2202(3)-5, 2203(3)-6, 2202(3)-7, 2202(3}-8

~~-CONTROL ROOM INDICATION SUPPRESSION POOL LEVEL

---NOT NEEDED AND TEMPERATURE ISOLATION CONDENSER LEVEL ---SIGHT GLASS BY OPEiHNG MANUAL VALVES

---CONTROL ROOM INDICATOR HPCI/LPCI METHOD

---SAME AS FOR ISOLATION CONDENSER METHOD I

~

---LOCAL WATER LEVEL INDICATOR ON TORUS

---CONTROL ROOM LEVEL INDICATION

---TEMPERATURE INDICATION IS AVAILABLE IN THE CONTROL ROOM

---NOT NEEDED

l.NSTRUMENTAtroN (CONTINUED) -

NRC GU I DANCE I SOLA TI ON CONDENSER METHOD

  • DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMEN-

---LOCAL PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE TAT ION INDICATION

---CONTROL ROOM INDICATORS

  • CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

---LOCAL INDICATION LEVEL

---CONTROL ROOM INDICATION HPCI/LPCI METHOD

---LOCAL PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE:

INDICATION

---CONTROL ROOM INDICATORS

. ---SAME AS FOR ISOLATION CONDENSER METHOD

COLD SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS SHUTDOWN COOLING SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM

. RBCCW SERVICE WATER LPCl/CCSW DIVISION I LPCl/CCSW DIVISION II PHILOSOPHY

---ENSURE MAJOR COMPONENTS <PUMPS, VALVES, ETC.) FOR ONE TRAIN ARE FREE OF FI RE DAMAGE

---IDENTIFY CABLE REPAIRS, TEMPORARY POWER CONNECTIONS, AND MATERIALS NEEDED

---DEVELOP PROCEDURES

---PROVIDE MATERIALS AT STATION

Reactor Vessel SRV MSIV MO I

Reactor Vessel

~

Isolation Valves DRESDEN ST A TION UNITS 2 & 3 Valves Whose Spurious Operation Could Cause Loss of Reactor Inventory

/

Reactor I

Vessel MO DRESDEN STATION UNITS 2 & 3 Valves Whose Spurious Operation Could Degrade Operability of Safe Shutdown ~ystems MO

"'-""- M 0 HX

TYPES OF RESOLUTIONS FOR SPURIOUS MALFUNCTIONS

---REDUi~DAfff SYSTEM IS ADEQUATELY SEPARATED

---DETAILED CIRCUIT REVIEW DETERMINES THAT SPURIOUS ACTUATIONS CAN BE DISREGARDED

---CIRCUITS MODIFICATIONS:

o PROTECT A MINIMUM NUMBER OF AFFECTED CABLES o REROUTE A MINIMUM NUMBER OF AFFECTED CABLES e REPULL THE CABLE IN METALLIC SHEATHED FLEXIBLE CONDUIT SO THAT HOT SHORT CAN NOT OCCUR

~--EXEMPTION REQUEST FOR COMPONENTS OR CABLES BASED ON SEPARATION AND LOW INTERVENING COMBUSTIBLES

---PREFIRE ACTIONS o MANUALLY LOCKING VALVES IN DESIRED POSITION e DEENERGIZE THE MOTIVE POWER TO COMPONENT

---POSTFIRE ACTIONS o USE OF ISOLATION DEVICES TO ISOLATE POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUITS o BLEEDING AIR FROM AN AIR OPERATED COMPONENT

  • o BY TIME SEQUENCE ANALYSISJ SHOW THAT STATION PERSONNEL HAVE ADEQUATE TIME TO MANUALLY DEFEAT.THE SPURIOUS OPERATION

APPENDIX R *RE-ANALYSIS A. METHODOLOGY

-*--*. -- - I.

FIRE ZONE vs. FIRE AREA

-REALIZE FEW COMPLETE-* FIRE AREAS I

I I

- REALISTIC BASIS FOR ZONES

- IDENTIFIED CLEAR SAFE SHUTDOWN PATH

- ZONE INTERACTION ANALYSIS

- DEMONSTRATE EQUIVALENCY OF PROTECTION

2.

FIRE HAZARDS

- COMBUSTIBLE LOADING RECALCULATED

- DISTRIBUTION EVALUATED

3.

TIME LINE FOR ACTIONS

4.

MANPOWER. REQUIREMENTS VERIFIED

5., EMERGENCY LIGHTING

- ILLUMINATION LEVELS ESTABLISHED FIELD EVALUATED MODS GENERATED

c- '.

.'!I

6.

REVIEWED INSTRUMENTATION

7.

FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES

- FIRE DETECTION-~-~,..

-FIRE SUPPRESSION

-BARRIERS

-SPAT-IAL SEPARATION

8.

CABLE MAPS

9.

F-DRAWINGS

SUMMARY

OF APPENDIX R *RE-ANALYSIS I.

PREVIOUS MODS ARE STILL APPROPRIATE

2. DETECTION IS PROVIDED TO SATISFY NRC CLARIFICATIONS ON ALTERNATE SHUT-*

DOWN

3. MINOR SUPPRESSION AND BARRIER UP-GRADES ARE TO ENSURE ADEQUATE SEPARATION OF ZONES

DRESDEN UNITS

  • 2 a 3 -

HOT

  • S-H.UTDOWN PATHS

SUMMARY

FEATURES ISOLATION COND.

. -: HPCI I LPCI SHUTS DOWN UN. 2 SHUTS DOWN UN. 3 UNIT 2 POWER UNIT 3 POWER IVISION I

  • DIVISION H ELECTRICAL VLV. OP.

MANUAL VLV. OP.

i r

i

REACTOR BUILDING OVERVIEW.

A.

INDEPENDENT SHUTDOWN PATHS ISO-CONDENSER OR HPCl/LPCI..

  • .... B.

SEPARATION OF PATHS-SPATIAL/BARRIERS

__ C.

EXISTING PROTECTION

,...... :. D.

PROPOSED MODS DETECTION I UPGRADED BARRIERS/ SPRINKLERS E.

BASIS FOR EXEMPTIONS I. EQUIVALENT 3 HR. BARRIERS

2. SUPPRESSION NOT NEEDED

4330-1 0~64-274 0

1. 1.2.6

© Access from Unit 3 up ladders from 570 ft~

@)

9.C DG2/3

© HPCI 11.2.3 1.1.2.5.A 8

1. 1.2.4 e
1. 1.2.3

.. e 11.2.1 LPCI Unit 2 Elevation

~

  • Hot Shutdown RX Building (Similar path for Dresden Unit 3)

ISO-COND

"~'© 1.1.2.5.B

© 1.1.2.5.C e

1.1.2.2 e

1. 1.2.1 8
1. 1.2.5.D e*

e Instrumentation

..-- (typical of four)

© SCP 1.3.2

--.:.:..:.....-:-.-~

e 11.2.2 LPCI 613' 589' 570' 545' 496' Basement DRESDEN STATION UNITS 2&3 PROPOSED APPENDIX R SHUTDOWN PATHS FOR DRESDEN UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING

-

  • REACTOR BUILDING* EXEMPTION

SUMMARY

I. COMPLETE,. SMOKE DETECTION EXCEPT FOR:

A. REFUEL FLOOR (NONE)

B. TORUS LEVEL (THERMAL NEAR TRAYS)

C.

  • ZONES 1.1.1.5.D. 8 I. l.2.5. D {PARTIAL)

D.

ISO-CONDENSER PIPE CHASE (NONE)

2.

COMPLETE 3HR. BARRIER AROUND EACH UNIT EXCEPT FOR:*

A.

OPENING AT TORUS LEVEL

8.

BETWEEN* UNITS ON REFUEL FLOOR C~

TURBl~.E BUILDING AT REFUEL. LEVEL

3.

WATER CURTAIN TO PROTECT HATCH 8 STAIR OPENINGS IN 3HR. BARRIER **TO 589 1-0" ELEVATl"ON.

4.

LOCAL INSTRUMENTATION FOR REACTOR LEVEL 8 PRESSURE

5.

GENERAL SUPPRESSION NOT NEEDED BECAUSE OF BARRIERS a DETECTION (PREVIOUSLY GRANTED FOR MOST ZONES).

t

  • TURBINE BUILDING OVERVIEW A.

INDEPENDENT SHUTDOWN PATHS FOR THREE BUILDING SECTIONS~.~

B.

SEPARATION OF PATHS SPATIAL/BARRIERS/SPRINKLERS C.

EXISTING *PROTECTION D..

PROPOSED MODS DETECTION/CABLE PROTECTION/ SPRINKLERS E.

BASIS FOR EXEMPTIONS I. SUFFICIENT PARTIAL BARRIERS

2. COMPLETE DETECTION a SPRINKLERS NOT NEEDED

ii:*

4330-2 05-84-225 A/B 8.2.8 Turbine Operating Floor A1 A2/B2 8.2.6.D and E 8.2.6.C A1 A2/B2 8.2.5.D and E l

8.2.5;C A1 Unit 3 Cable Tunnel Units 2 & 3 Elevation Hot Shutdown Turbine Building (B1 7.0.A

-561'6" B1 Battery -549' 8.2.6.A and B A2/B2 2.0 C.R.

-534' A2/B2 B1 6.2 I

8.2.5.A and B AEER

-517'6" 8.2.4 502'6" DRESDEN STATION UNITS 2&3 PROPOSED APPENDIX R SHUTDOWN PATHS FOR DRESDEN UNITS 2&3 TURBINE BUILDING

~

fl I

TURBINE BUILDING! EXEM.PTION

SUMMARY

I.

INCOMPLETE 3HR. BARRIERS FOR SEPARATION 4--4* ¥"-.*

4

2.

DETECTION OR SUPPRESSION IS PROVIDED THROUGHOUT (EXCEPT~~ ABOVE. 5fil 1-6 11 EL., IN ZONE 8.2.2.B, a PARTS OF ZONES 8.2.5.C.

  • a 8.2.6.C)

(EXEMPTION. FOR SUPPRESSION IN SOME ZONES PREVIOUSLY GRANTED)

. 14 CRIB HOUSE OVERVIEW A.

ENSURING AVAILABILITY OF TWO SHUT-DOWN FUNCTIONS REQUIRED B.

SEPARATION OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SPATIAL/SUPPRESSION/CURBS/WRAPS C.

EXISTING.PROTECTION D.

PROPOSED MODS SUPPRESSION/DETECTION/CURBS/WRAPS E.

BASIS FOR EXEMPTIONS MODS COMPENSATE FOR LACK OF BARRIERS l

l

r:i.. *.

CRIB HOUSE

  • EXEMPTION

SUMMARY

I.

UPPER LEVEL A. SPATIAL SEPARATION. a CURBS COMPEN-SATE FOR *LACK OF I HR. BARRIERS B.

COMPLETE SPRINKLERS COMPENSATE FOR LACK OF COMPLETE DETECTION

2. LOWER LEVEL A.

SPOT WATER SPRAY a SPRINKLER PRO-TECTION PROPOSED TO COMPENSATE

. FOR LACK OF I HR. BARRI ER B.

LOCAL SUPPRESSION FOR. MAJOR HAZARDS 1*

COMPENSATES FOR COMPLETE SUPPRESS-ION

SUMMARY

OF NEW DRESDEN MODS I.

EXTENSIVE REACTOR BUILDING DETECTION

  • 2.

SUPPLEMENT TURBINE BUILDING DETECTION

3.

ADD DETECTION a SPRINKLERS IN CRIB HOUSE

4. PROTECT OPENINGS IN* WALLS OF CONCERN
5.

MINOR SUPPRESSION FOR

. A. REACTOR BUILDING HATCH a STAIR B.

CENTRAL AREA TURBINE BUILDING

6.

MI NOR CABLE WRAPS

DR~SDEN STATION -

UNITS 2&3 Reactor B.uilding Summary Each Reactor Building will be a separate fire area.

Three hour rated fire barriers separate each Reactor Building from the other and the Turbine Building.

The Turbine and Reactor Buildings are not separated at the refuel floor level, however.

Two alternate hot shutdown paths are available in each Reactor

.. Building.

These are the !so-condenser Method (Bl/Al} and HPCI/LPCI (C/~} Method.

The equipment and cablirig associated with the HPCI/LPCI Method are located below the 589' ele~ation.

The iso-condenser, valves, equipment and cabling for the iso-condenser path are located on the 589' elevation, in the !so-condenser Pipe Chase on the 545'-6" and 570' elevations and in the Turbine Building.

The zones which contain this iso-condenser equipment i? the Reactor Building will b~ separated from~djacent zones by 3-hour rated barriers.

Automatic water suppression will be provided around the stairway and 20'x20' operi hatch which connect the zone containihg the'Unit 2 iso~condenser (Zone 1.1.2.5.A, ~levation 589'} and the zone below (Zone 1.1.2.4, elevation 570'} and also around the 20'x20' open hatch which connects the zone containing the Unit 3 iso-condenser (Zone 1.1.1.5.A, elevation 589'} and the zone below it (Zone 1.1.1.4, ~leVation 570'} to provide an equivalent level of protection to a 3-hour barrier between these zones.

The Unit 2 and 3 Shutdown Cooling Pump Rooms (Zones 1.3.2 and 1.3.l} and the Unit 3 TIP Room (Zone 1~4.1} on the 517'-6" elevation will be upgraded to fire areas.

These areas contain necessary cabling to valves for the iso-condenser path outside of Zones 1.1.2.5.A, B. and C and 1.1.l.5.A, Band C.

A 3-hour rated fire enclosure around these areas will protect the power feeds to operate the inboard iso-condenser valves located in the drywell.

These fire areas do not contain any equipment or cabling associated with the HPCI/LPCI path.

A fire resistive wrap is proposed to protect the alternate power feed to these valves routed through the 496' elevation. for each respective unit.

DRESDEN STATION UNITS 2&3 Reactor Building Sum.111ary Cont'd

  • The* iso-condensei path will be available in every zone in the Reactor Building except those zones containing associated iso-condenser equipment and cabling (1.1.1.5.A, B, C and 1.4.1/

1.1.2.5.A, B, C and 1.3.2).

In these zones, the HPCI/LPCI path will be available.

Fire detection currently exists locally above MCC's and in the areas at the ceiling in the direct vicinity of 4-kV and 480V switchgear.

Smoke detection throughout the Reactor Building~ except on the refuel floor and in the torus, will be provided.* The torus will be provided with detection in the corner rooms and linear thermal detection on HPCI/LPCI cable trays in the area.

The combustible loading in this area is extremely low.

Additional detection is not needed for Zones 1.1.1.5.D.and'. 1.1.2.5.D since no safe shutdown cabling or equipment is located in these zones.

Remote reactor level and pressure instrumentation will be provided outside the fire area (Reactor Building}.

A fire in an iso-condenser equipment area will allow reactor and torus readings to be taken either in the control room or local1y.

The Refuel Floor (613'} is open to the iso-conclenser floor (589'}

below for each unit by way of the open 20'x20' hatch.

The Refuel Floor is common for Units 2 and 3 on 613° elevation.

Automatic water suppression will be provided around the hatch.

These will separate the zon~s with a barrier having an equivalent level of protection to a 3-hour barrier.

The Refuel Floor contains no equipment or cabling associated with safe shutdown.

~

\\

i Dresden 2 Reactor Building Modifications Modification Provide fire detection.

Applicable Fire Zone(s) 1.1.2.2 1.1.2.3 1.1.2.4 1.1.2.5.A

1. 3. 2
11. 2.-r-~~-****
11. 2. 2 Proviqe an alternate power 1.1.2.l feed to the inboard iso-condenser valve and protect the cable with a one-hour fire rated wrap through Zone 1.1.2.1.

Seal all penetrations to

.area 1.3.2 to 3-hour -

.rating.

Provide linear therm?l detectors (thermostatic cable) along cable tray.

Install a Class A fire door on the access to the DG 2/3 room~ from Unit 2.

Protect openings in the iso~condenser pipe chase by providing 3-hour rated penetration seals.

Install a fire damper (3-hour) in duct penetration to Zone 1.3.2 (column line H/39-).

1.1.2.1 1.1.2.2 1.1.2.3 1.1.2.1 1.1.2.2 1.1.2.3 1.1.2.4 1.1.2.3 Modification Identified in 1982 Associated Circuits Report x

Dresden 2 Reactor Building Modifications Modf iciation Seal all mechanical pene-trations to Zone 1.1.2.5.A for a 3-hour resistance.

Provide automatic water

.supptession around the 20'x20' hatchway and south-west stairway at ceiling level.

Applicable Fire Zone(s) 1.1.2.4 1.1.2.4 1.1.2.5.A Protect HVAC duct penetration 1.1.2.4 at H/40.5 with a 3-hour rated fire damper.

Provide 3-hour protection for the doorway to Zone 1.1.2.5.n in the north~ast corner of this zone.

rovide protection for the adder opening on the.east wall.

Provide emergency lights in the* zone.

1.1.2.5.A 1.1.2.5.A

.1.1.2.5.B 1.1~.2. 5. c Provide access through the 1.1.2.5.B grating from the floor.below and platforms for manual valve operation.

Provide a 3-hour fire damper 1.1.2.5.D in HVAC duct penetrating north wall at column line H/44.

Seal all penetrations in the 11.2.3 wall between this zone and Zone 11.2.1 to provide complete 3-hour barrier.

Modification Identified in 1982 Associated Circuits Report x

Dresden 2 Reactor Building Exemptions Exemption Justify use of one-hour wrap for auxiliary power source to inboard iso-condenser valve.

- Justify lack of detection throughout.

Justify lack of suppression throughout.

Justify. iack ot'. complete 3-hour barrier between alternate shutdown paths.

Justify instrumentation separation.

Applicable Fire Zone(s) 1.1.2.1 1.1.2.1 1.1.2.5.B 1.1.2.5.C 1.1.*2.6 1.1.2.l 1.1.2.2 1.1.2.3 1.1.2.4 1.1.2.5.A

1. l*. 2. 5. B 1.1.2.5.C 1.1.2.5.D 1.1.2.6
1. 3. 2 11..2.1
11. 2. 2 1.1.2.l 1.1.2.2 1.1.2.3 1.1.2.4 1.1.2.5.A 1.1.2.5.B 1.1.2.5.C 1.1.2.6
11. 2. 1
11. 2. 2
11. 2. 3 1.1.2.2 1.1.2.3 Exemption Previously Granted in 1983 x x x

Dresden 3 Reactor Building Modifications Modification

. Provide fire detection.

.Applicable Fire zone(s) 1.1.1.2 1.1.1.3 1.1.1.4 1.1.1.5.A

1. 3.1
1. 4.1 11.1.1 11.1. 2 Provide an alternate power 1.1.1.1 feed to the inboard iso-condenser valve and protect the cable with a one-hour fire rated wrap through Zone 1.1.1.1.

. Seal all open penetrations to areas 1. 3.1 and 1. 4*. l "to 3-hour rating.

Provide linear thermal detectors (ther~ostatic cable) along cable tray.

Seal all openings to *unit 2 Reactor Building for a 3-hour fire resistance.

1.1.1.1 1.* 1.1.2 1.1.1.3 1.J..1.1 1.1.1.2 1.1.1.3 Reroute Unit 2 power and 9.0.C*

control feeds to *nG 2/3 and its auxiliaries, including cooling water, and protect 4-kV bus duct to switchgear with 3-hour fire barrier.

Electrical isolation for 9.0.C*

local operation of DG 2/3 and new 4-kV breaker installed.

Local isolation switches for 9.0.C*

DG 2/3 auxiliaries, including the cooling water pump.

Modification Identified in 1982 Associated Circuits Report x

  • x x

x

Dr~sden 3 Reactor Building Modifications

\\

Applicable Fire Zone(s)

Modifications Provide 3-hour rated pene-tration seals for pipe openings into the Unit 3 iso-condenser pipe chase.

Protect one level and pres-sure instrument to a point outside the Unit 3 Reactor Building.

1.1.1.3 1.1.1.4

1. 1. :i_. __ ~L ___,..

Cables affecting control 9.0.c*

and excitation of DG 2/3 to be isolated in DG room~

Local pressure indicators 1.1.1.3

  • .. w:ill be installed ind_ependent of zone.

Seal all mechanical pene-trations to zone 1~1.1.5.A for a 3-hour resistarice.

.£rovide automatic water

.suppression around* 20' x20'

.hatchway at ceiling level.

Protect HVAr, duct penetra-tions at column line H/47.5 with a 3-hour rated fire damper.

Provide 3-hour protection for the doorway to Zone 1.1.1. 5. D.

Provide protection for the ladder opening on the

    • west wall.

Install 3-hour fire damper in HVAC ceiling penetration at column line M/50.

Provide emergency lights.

1.1.1.4 1.1.1.4 1.1.l. 5.A 1.1.1.4 1.1.1.5.A 1.1.1.5.A 1.1.1.5.A 1.1.1.5.B 1.1.. 1.5.C

1. 4.1 Modification Identified in 1982 Associated Circuits Report
  • x x

Dresden 3 Reactor Building Modifications

\\

Modification Applicable Fire Zone(s)

Provide access through the 1.1.1.5.B grating from the floor below and platforms for manual valves in the zone.

Provide a 3-hour fire damper in HVAC duct penetrating north wall at column line H/44.5.

Install a 3-hour rated fire damper in the HVAC ceiling level duct penetration.

Seal all penetratio*ns

between Zone 11.1.2 and

.Unit 2 and 3 HPCI rooms 1Zones 11.1.3 and 11.2.3) to provide a 3-hour fire bar*rier.

Provide a Clais A f iie door in the entiance to

  • 'HPCI Zone 11. 1. 3.

1.1.1.5.D

1. 3.1 11.1. 2 11.1. 3
11. 2. 3 11.1. 2 Modification Identified in 1982 Associated Circuits Report x

..... ~

  • Credit in the is t~ken in other fire zones for this modification as noted 1982 Associated Circuits Report.

t Dresden 3 Reactor Building Exemptions

\\

Exemption Justify use of one-hour wrap for auxiliary power source to inboard iso-condenser valve.

Justify lack of detection

throughout J~stify lack of suppression throughout.

- Justify lack of :*~omplete 3-hour barrier.between alternate shutdown paths.

Justify instrumentation

  • separation.
  • Applicable Fire Zone(s) 1.1.1.1 i.1.1.1 1.1.1.5.B 1.1.1.5.C

- 1.1.1.6 1.1.1.1 1.1.1.2 1.1.1.3 1.1.1.4 1.1.1.5.A 1..1. 1. 5. B 1.1.1.5.C 1.1.* 1. 5. D 1.1.1.6

1. 3.1

.1.4.1 11.1. 1 11.1.2 1.1.1.1 1.1.1.2 Ll.1.3 1.1.1.4 1.1.1.5.A 1.1.1.5.B 1.1.1.5.C 1.1.1.6 11.1.1 11.1. 2 11.1. 3 1.1.1.2 1.1.1.3 Exemption Previously Granted in 1983 x x x

\\

Dresden 2&3 Reactor Building Clarifications Clarification Justify lack of fire doors b~tween units at center line G/44 on the torus elevation.

Torus leyel indication needed only when the fire is in *the

iso-condenser path zones.

The iso-condenser path zones are independent pf the torus elevation where local level can be read.

Applicable Fire Zone(s) 1.1.1.1 1.1.1.1

-~

\\

DRESDEN STATION -

UNITS 2&3

  • Turbine Building Summary The Turbine Building is typical of configur~tions found in all BWR's.

The building is subdivided by extensive shield walls but formal fire walls are limited to very few building sections which ~nclude the Control Room, Turbine Oil Stor~ge and Auxiliary Electric Room.

The turbine operating floor (Zone 8.2.8) does not contain any

_safe shutdown cablipg or equipment.

In addition, fixed water suppression systems are provided to protect the major-hazards in the zone which include recirc MG sets and turbine bearings.

Th~ remainder of the turbine building (with the exception of Zones 2.0 and 6.2) have been conbined into three groups of zones.

All floors of the *ea'stern group of turbine. building zones contain Unit. 2 cabling a:~d equipment.

If a fire were to occur in this po_rtion of.the plant, simultaneous with a loss of off site power, only Unit 2* would be affected.

Shutdown of this uqit would be accomplished by utilizing the.Bl path (Zones 8.2.1.A, 8.2.2.A, 8.2.~.A, 8.2.5.B, 8.2.6.A, 8.2.6.B, 8.2.7, 7.0.A.l, 7.0.A~2,*

and 9. O.A)

  • The central portion of th~ ground and mezzanine floor levels of the turbine building contain some cabling related to both Units 2 and 3 (Zones 8.2.5.C and 8.2.6.C).. Necessary cabling and equipment related to shutdown path B2 for Unit 2 and path
  • A2 for Unit 3 are unaffected, however.

Power from the swing diesel generator 2/3 supplies the minimal unit specific equipment required.

The western portion of th~ turbine building contains Unit 3 cabling and equipment on all elevation {Zones 8.2.1.B, 8.2.2.B, 8.2.4, 8.2.5.D, 8.2.5.E, 8.2.6.D,

~.2.6.E, 6.1, 7.0.B, and

DRESDEN STATION -

UNITS 2&3 Turbine*Building Summary Cont'd 9.0.B).

A fire in these zones will only impact Unit 3 shutdown so shutdown path Al was selected for shutdown f0*'l[" a fire in these zones.

Fire Zones 2.0 (Control Room) 6.2 (Aux Electric Room) and 8.1 (dirty and clean turbin~ lube oil storage room}

will be separated from the eastern group of zones by complete 3-hour

. fire barriers.

The eastern fire zones are separated from the central zones by complete shield walls on both. elevations with the exception of one corridor on the*517'-6" le~el at column

~

line G/43.

The shield walls are not specificaI]_y fire rated but are substantial reinforced concrete with cable penetrations sealed with noncombustible penetration seals.

E::Xtensive $prinkler protec::=tion is provided in the eastern zone group which further ensures that a fire will not propagate between 1t.1he central and eastern zone groups.

Personnel access through 1Uhe shield walis is through.substantial unlabeled doors.*

The central two turbine building zones (8.2.5.C and 8.2.6.C) are separated from the east and west zone groups by complete shield walls on the mezzanine and ground floor ievels.

Only two corridors pierce these comprehensive barriers on the 517'-6" elevation at column lines 43 and 46/G.

Automat.iLc detection and w~ter suppression are utilized to prevent fire spread down the corridors.

In addition, cables which are a. concern are to be enclosed.with a one hour barrier for approximately 75 feet at the junction between the central and western zone groups.

The provision of the fire detection, sprinklers and cable barriers will ensure that a fire in either of the zone groups could not possibly affect the adjacent zone group.

A fire spread from the central zone group into the eastern group is also pr~vented by the detection and water suppression systems~

The Unit 2 cables of concern are widely ~eparated from this *boint by one

  • )' '

... ~*

~.

~--*

DRESDEN STATION -

UNITS 2&3 Turbine Building Summary Cont'd floor elevation and approximately 100 feet horizontal separation.

The central zone is completely sprinklered on the mezzanine level and will be protected by a combination of automatic spri.nklers and/or fire detection on the ground floor.

Cable penetrations in the shield wall are sealed with noncombustible materials and personnel access is through substantial unlabeled doors.

The western zone group is. well separated from the central zone group by substantial. shield walls, extensive sprinkler protection, fire detection, wide spatial separation and partial cable barriers for particular cables of concern.

It should be noted that the Unit 3 cable tunnel is-consid~red a part of this zone group (Zone 8.2.4).

This tunnel passes from the western zone group beneath the c~ntral and eastern zone groups.

The tunnel and* central zones are separated by a checkered plate hatch and reinforced concrete.

Automatic detection and sprinklers are provided above the hatch access.

The tunnel has also been protected by complete fire detection and closed head water spray.

This protection adequately ensures separation of the two zone groups.

Only a manhole is provided for access between the Unit 3 cable tunnel and the eastern zone group near column line G/40.

The tunnel detection and water spray system will prevent fire spread into the eastern zone group.

Fire detection and sprinkler will

  • be provided at the 517'-6" elevation for additional protection
  • y *

-.J Dresden 2&3 Turbine Building Modifications

' \\

Modification Applicable Fire Zone(sj Add smoke detection to all 8.2.6.E portions ot the east and west 8.2.6.A mezzanine floor areas not now protected by fire detection and/or suppression.

Add ~moke detection and sprinkler protection to the ground floor level in the

~rea o~ column lines 43-45/

F-H, west in the corridor to column line 47.5 and east in the corridor to column line

40.

Provide one-hour fire resistive enclosure of cable trays on giound floor level fr.om column*line H/45 to G/47.5 8.2.5.C 8.2.5.C 8.2.5.D to prevent cable damage from an

  • posure fire to important 2/3 cables (30627 to J06JO) an~ 480V Mee 38-l cables (31371 to 31374) and to supplement separation of zones 8.2.5.C and 8.2.5.D.

~

Supply a secondary CRD cooling water supply through a manual valve from the ~ervice water-system.

Add emergency lighting Seal all penetrations to 3-hour rating.

Seal all penetrations in wall to a 3-hour rating.

Local isolation and control for service water pumps.

Replace all fusible links on HVAC dampers with electro-thermal links actuated upon eration of the fire detection stem.

2.0 2.0 6.2 9.0.A 9.0.B 2.0 6.2 Modification Identified in 1982 Associated Circuits Report x

Dresden 2&3 Turbine Building Modifications Modification

  • Provide electrothermal fusible links for all fire dampers to ensure closure priof-to suppression system actuation.
  • Provide non-combustible seal for opening in the east wall
  • barrier.

Fire detection is to be added near column line G-H/43-45 on the mezzanine floor level.

Applicable Fire Zone(s) 9.0.A 9.0.B 9.0.C 8.. 2. 6. c Modification Identified in 1982 Associated Circuits Report

\\

Dresd~n 2&j Turbine Building Exemptions Exemptions Justify lack of complete automatic suppression.

Justify the lack of complete 1-hour fire barriers.

Justify lack of labeled fire doors.

Justify lack of complete detection.

Applicable*

Fire Zone(s) 2.0 6.1

7. O.A 7.0.B 8.2.1 8.2.2 8.2.5 8.2.6 8.2.7 6.1 7.0~A 7.0.B 8.2.1 8.2.2 8.2.5 8.2.6 8.2.7 9.0."A 9.0.B 9.0.C 2.0 8.2.1 8.2.2 8.2.5 8.2.6 8.2.7 Exemption Previously Granted in 1982 x x x x

DRESDEN. STATION -

.UNITS 2 & 3 Crib House Summary The crib house consists of two primary floor elevations with no subdividing walls.

The* building on the ground floor is approximately 180 feet in length, and *as lon91 as a fire does not damage the service water pumps at opposite ends of the floor, safe shutdown is n.o.t~,.impacted.

These pumps are separated by more than 100 feet and only one pump is needed to support safe shutdown of }?oth. uni ts.

Fire protection is to be provided in the fo)n:m of automatic sprinklers throughout the upper building level.

Curbs are.

are also to be provided to prevent any combus:tible liquid from spreading beyond the center of the floor.

Combustibl~s are limited and consist of oil contained in a total of eleven separate circulating water pump motors and service water pumps.

Cabli~g is very limited in this Area, and the cabl-

. ing to the service water pumps of concern is near the floor level.

A diesel fire pump and very short and

.a iked day tank if all of the are also located on this floor level.

Even cabling, diesel fuel and all of the lube oi1 in every pump were consumed, an average of only 13,800 BTUi/:ift2.combus.tible loading is available on *this floor, further supporting the improbability of a

major fire occurinq~

(The cabling relates to 3100 BTU/ft2 of this combustible loading on this level.)

~

Cabling to both the service water pumps and the diesel gen-erator cooling water pumps are located on the lower building level.

By protecting the cabling at th is level with automatic water spray for at least one d~vision of

cabling, necessary service water will be preserved.

Providing curbing, and water spray for the DG 2/3 1

~cooling water pump will prevent any fire on the lev~l from damaging the pump while passive protection of the related power supply will ensure pump operability.

These same pro-tective features will prevent a fire initiated in the pump from endangering the other two DG cooling water pumps.

For a fire involving the swing DG 2/3 cooling wat~r pump, shut-down paths E and F are utilized which. require one service water pump a~d.DG cooling water pumps 2 and 3 to support shutdown.

Paths A and B are used to shutdown both units for a fire in any other po.rtion of the crib house and require only one service water pump and DG 2/3 cooling water pump to support that shutdown.

A total of only 11, 000 BTU/ft2 of fixed combustibles is located BTU/f t2 BTU/f t2 on the lower crib house elevation.

Of this, 5300 is associated with cabling plus a total of 5700 average distribution of the combustible loading relateq to the oil contained in all six of the separate circ water pumps.

/

~

2

.J DRESDEN 2&3 CRIB HOUSE MODIFICATIONS Fire Zone 11.3 l~

An automatic transfer switch enclosed in a 1-hour rated barrier should be provided to ensure power to DG 2/3 cooling water pump from either unit.

The conduit to the pump should be protected by a 1-hour wrap as well.

2.

Ceiling level sprinklers in lower elevation at column lines 3.5 and 4.5.

3.

Curb the cooling water pump 2/3.

4.

Provide general smoke detec-t1on throughout the lower elevation.

5.

Provide an automatic, open head water spray over cooling water pump 2/3.

  • 6.

Provide an open head water spray syst~m actuated by linear thermal detectors protecting the cable trays*and conduits along the north, east and west basement walls of the Unit 2 and 3 power supplies to the service water and 2/3 cooling water pump power supply.

7.

Provide a curb along the entire column line B at the.517'-6" level to prevent any oil spill from exposing the service water from above.

Similarly provide a ramped curb near column lirie 3. 7 on the 517'-6" and 509 1 -6 11 levels to 'limit any liquid ~pill.

8.

Add wet pipe sprinkler system for the upper elevations of the crib house (from A to* the traveling screens).

    • Modification identifed in 1982 Associated Circuits Report.

DRESDE~ 2&3 CRIB HOUSE ~XEMPTIONS.

  • Fire Zone 11. 3
1.

Justify the lack of fire barriers between redundancy.

2.

Justify the use of partial suppression systems.

GOOOINGS PONTIAC

  • ELECTRIC GROVE MIDPOINT JUNCTION AUX. PWR.

136 KV BUS RES.

TR.31 AUX. PWR.

. TR.32

-*1*

POWERTON GOOOINGS ELECTRIC GROVE JUNCTION BLUE 345KV SWYD f l6. U: fJ t-I AUX. PWR.

TR.21 Tll.10

  • 345 KV TR. 81 WILMINGTON KANKAKEE BRMLE'i AU~~~WR.-- -..--L_J--* INDUSTRIAL TR. 22 CUSTOMERS 8U51 JOLIET WILL COUNTY MAZON JOLIET 138KV SWYD SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM 345 KV, I 38KV SWY0 1S

(...

I 0

FROM 3CS KV

~.._...I!~

l>

~I.___'--=----.

i

  • I

__ l l

4.16 KV BUS ll 4.16 KV BUS 32

)

~) BUS 34

,----~)

4.16 KV BUS :SJ

~JDG

}

)

i ),>

    • "KV 11us;;u 1 4.16 KV BUS 33*1 UNIT 3 FROM 138 KV

~**

t> T22

'-16 KV BUS 21 4.16. KV BUS 22

)

4.16KV°)

Bus 23 4.16 KV Bus 24 {. )

213 DG

2 _DG-~)

I) 4.16 KV DUS U 1 4.16 KV BUS 24-1 UNIT 2 DRESDEN STATION UNITS 2 & 3 Auxiliary Electrical System

- 4160 Volt f J. (j.c-t r;>i; J...

ELECTRIC JUNCTION WILL COUNTY JOLIET MAZON*

\\.,

POWE RT ON PONTIAC MIDPOINT FI6' u./( e::... 3 WILMINGTON KANKAKEE TRANSMISSION SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS BRADLEY 345 KV LINE 138 KV LINE

~*

MODIFICATION FIRE DETECTION-FIRE WALLS-SUPPRESSION -

ALTERNATE POWER TO INBOARD ISOLATION CONDENSER VALVES 8 -

HOUR EMERGENCY LIGHTlNG LOCAL PRESSURE GAUGE ACCESS THROUGH ISOLATION CONDENSER

  • 'PIPECHASE ISOLATE 2/3 DIESEL GENERATOR CABLES 2 & 3 REACTOR BUILDING LOCATION CORNER ROOMS (El. 496' -

0")

TORUS BASEMENT (El. 496' - 0")*

GROUND FLOOR (El. 517' -

6 II)

MEZZANINE FLOOR (El. 545' -

6 II)

MAIN FLOOR (El. 570' 0")

ISOLATION CONDENSER AREA (El. 589' -

O")

  • LINEAR DETECTION OVER THE CABLE TRAYS ONLY.

PENETRATIONS (CABLES, CONDUITS, DUCTS, DOORS, PIPES, ETC.) WILL BE SEALED TO A SUITABLE RATING.

AROUND HATCHWAY AND STAIRS AT FLOOR AND.

CEILING LEVELS OF ISOLATION CONDENSER FLOOR TO ACHIEVE AN EQUIVELANT J~HOUR BARRIER.

INCLUDES A 1-HOUR "WRAP" OF THE NEW CONDUIT TO ACHIEVE SEPERATION IN TORUS BASEMENT AND CORNER ROOMS.

IN ISOLATION CONDENSER PIPECHASE AND VARIOUS ACCESS/EGRESS AND OPERATIONAL AREAS AS NEEDED.

GROUND FLOOR TO ACHIEVE "TEMPORARY" SEPERATION ISOLATION FLOOR AND PIPECHASE.

ISOLATE OR REROUTE CABLES.

  • I

)

.:)-

FIRE DETECTION -

SUPPRESSION -

ELECTROTHERMAL LINKS -

FIRE WALLS -

~8-HOUR EMERGENCY

  • ,LIGHTS LOCAL CONTROL AND ISOLATION OF THB SERVICE WATER PUMPS 1-HOUR WRAP OF CABLES (2/3 DIESEL GENERATOR AND MCC 38-3)

TURBINE BUILDING LOCATION GROUND FLOOR (EL. 517'- 6")

IN COMMON AREA AND DOWN CORRIDORS (EAST -

WEST)

MEZZANINE FLOOR (EL. 538'- O")

COMPLETE AREA WIDE DECTECTION IN COMMON AREA AND UNIT 2 & 3 AREAS.

GROUND FLOOR (EL. 517' -6")

IN-*COMMON AREA AND DOWN CORRIDORS (EAST -

WEST)

AUXILIARY ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT ROOM (EL

  • 51 7 I

- 6 " )

DIESEL GENERATOR ROOMS (EL

  • 51 7 1 -6 " )

CONDUITS AND MECHANICAL PENETRATIONS IN AUXILIARY ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT ROOM (EL. 517 I -6")

DIESEL GENERATOR ROOMS(EL. 517i -6" &

504' -6") AND CONTROL ROOM (EL. 534' -0")

CONTROL ROOM (EL. 534' -0")

AND AS NEEDED FOR ACCESS/EGRESS AND OPERATIONAL AREAS MEZZANINE FLOOR (EL. 538' -0")

GROUND FLOOR (EL. 517' -6")

'r.!I

_r'f".

)'-*'I J S-

  • ~.

/

~::

SUMMARY

e CONCURRENCE ON ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY CONCURRENCE ON EXEMPTION REQUESTS e

AGREEMENT ON SCHEDULING FUTURE SUBMITTALS AGREEMENT ON SCHEDULE FOR MODIFICATIONS

'*

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