ML17250A354
| ML17250A354 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 06/03/1980 |
| From: | White L ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8007020018 | |
| Download: ML17250A354 (6) | |
Text
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ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
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89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER,.N.Y. 14649 LEON D. WHITE. JR.
VICE PRCSIOCNT TCLEPHONE Alaicooc vle 546-2700 June 3,.1980 Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director U.'S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Subject:
IE BuQetin No. 80-'06, "Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Cbntrols" R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit $ 1 Docket No. SO-244
Dear Mr. Grier:
In response to Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 80-06 dated March 13, 1980, concerning return of ESF equipment to normal mode upon resetting, a review has been completed at Ginna Station for all systems serving safety-related functions.
This review was conducted at the sche-matic level to determine whether all associated safety-related equipment would remain in its emergency mode upon the reset of an engineered safety feature actuation signal.
In May during the recent annual refueling main-tenance shutdown these systems were tested by qualified personnel using approved procedures to verify that actual installed instrumentation and controls were consistent with the schematics reviewed.
The following summarizes the results of this review and testing.
1.
Safety Injection Circuit:
This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operator the means of resetting safety injection one minute or longer after initiation. Actua-tion of the reset switch in itself does not change the state of any equip-ment, but permits the operator to place the equipment affected by safety injection to the position desired.
Motor operated valves MOV-841, MOV-878A, MOV-878B, MOV-878C, MOV-878D and MOV-86S response to a safety injection signal are not verified by a test procedure.
These valves are positioned t ir emergency mode position per Precritical Technical Speci. cati Sheet Procedure 0-1.1C and their Breakers placed in the OFF with control fuses left in for valve position indication.
ns Check I
position I
8 OOVOSODI'F.
ROCHESTER CAS AND ELECTRIC
'P.
DA7E June 3, 1980 To Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director SHEET NO.
2 2.
Containment Ventilation Isolation Circuit; This circuit has just been modified (SM 80-2605) to ensure that no equipment changes state upon the actuation of the containment venti-lation isolation reset switch.
Once the reset switch has been actua-.
ted the operator must then operate the control module switch/indicator on the containment i.solation reset pushbutton panel for equipment requiring change of state.
3.
Containment Isolation Circuit:
This circuit has just been modified (SM 80-2605) to ensure that no equipment changes state upon the actuation of the containment isola-tion reset switch.
Once the reset switch has been actuated the opera-tor must then operate the control module switch/indicator on the con-tainment isolation reset pushbutton panel for equipment requiring change of state.
4.
Containment Spray Circuit:
This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operator the means of resetting containment spray.
Once the reset switch has been actuated the spray additive tank discharge valves willreturn automatically to the position called for by their controllers.
The containment spray pumps and their discharge valves would require operator action to change state.
This capability is necessary so the operator has the flexibilityin deal-ing with post accident conditions within containment (i.e., LOCA or steam line break).
5.
Peedwater Isolation Reset:
This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operator the means. of resetting the isolation signal to the feedwater bypass valves only.
Once the reset switch is actuated the feedwater bypass valves will assume the position called for by their control circuit.
The main feedwater valves willremain closed until the isolation logic clears, and then they willautomatically assume the position called for by their control circuit.
It should be noted that a safety injection signal also causes the main feedwater pumps to be tripped and their discharge valves automatically close; therefore, closing the feedwater valves on a safety injection signal is redundant.
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-.-. 4 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC P.
DATE June 3, 1'980 To Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director SHEET HO.
3 Based on the, results of this review and testing, no inconsistencies were found between schematics and actual installations and no areas were identified that require modification or design change.
Very truly yours, Subscribed and sworn to me on this8~(day of tuna 1980.
S H A R 0 I'I G.
C A VA L E R I IlGTAI'tYPVDI!C, State of H. Y., Monroe County My Cornrnieeion ixpires March 30, 19..&/
cc:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Washington, D. C.,
20555