ML17249A264
| ML17249A264 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 10/23/1979 |
| From: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | White L ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| References | |
| TASK-06-04, TASK-6-4, TASK-RR NUDOCS 7911190048 | |
| Download: ML17249A264 (9) | |
Text
Imigag'I7 PIiflH FI"~ I~~
Docket No. 50>>244 Nr. Leon D. White, Jr.
Vice President Electric and Steam Production Rochester Gas and Electric Corporatfon 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 OCT 2,g Igyg
Dear ffr. Hhfte:
RE:
Containment, Purging and Venting During Normal Operation By letter dated November 29, 1978, the Commission (NRC) requested all licensees of operating reactors to respond to generic concerns about containment purging or venting during, normal plant operation.
The generic concerns were twofold:
(1.)
Events had occurred where licensees overrode or bypassed the safety actuation isolation signals to the containment isolation valves.
These events were determined to be abnormal occurrences and reported to Congress in January 1979.
(2)
Recent licensing reviews have required tests or analyses to show that containment purge or vent valves would shut without degrading con-tainment integrity during the dynamic loads of a design basis loss of coolant accident (DBA-LOCA).
The hRC position of the November 1978 letter requested that licensees take the followfng positive actions pending completion of the NRC review:
(1) prohibit the override or bypass of any safety actuation signal which would affect another safety actuation signal; the NRC Office of inspection and Enforcement would verify that administrative controls.prevent improper manual defeat of safety actuation signals, and (2) cease purging (or venting) of containment or limit purging (or venting) to an absolute minimum, not to exceed 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> per year.
Licensees were re'quested to demonstrate (by test or by test and analysis) that containment isolation valves would shut.
under postulated DBA-.LOCA condition.
The NRC positions wer e amplified by citation (and an attached copy) of our Standard Review Plan (SHP) 6.2.4 Revision 1
and the associated Branch Technical Posftion CSB 6-4, which have effectively classed the purge and vent valves as "active" invoking the operabi'Iity assurance program of SRP 3.9.3.
The NRC staff has made site visits to several facilities, has met with licensees at Bethesda,
- Haryland, and has held telecon conferences with many other licensees and met with some valve manufacturers.
During these BPFIQQ in th SURNAME OATE$..
d above..to.
qS event of a DB ure..t'In'.g.pp
-LOCA.
dinmont..f.ntt:g e ac Dll f.ty..woyld..be mu.
e a er ski.ntai oned....
..~.Aj.x.3LQ NRC FORM 318 (9.76) NRCM 0240
+U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979'2 369
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r OCT "23 ]97g fir. Leon D. Hhite, Jr.
As a result of these actions, we have learned from several licensees that at least three valve'endors have reported that their valves may not close against the ascending differentia'l pressure and the resulting dynamic loading of the design basis LOCA.
All identified licensees who are affected have proposed to maintain the valves in the closed position or to restrict the angular opening of the valves
~whenever primary containment integrity is required until a re-evaluation is provided which shows satisfactory valve performance under the DBA-LOCA condition.
- Recently, a report under 10 CFR Part Zl was received by the NRC from the rItanufaceurer of butterfly valves which are installed in.the primary containment at the Three Wile Island Unit 2 Nuclear Station.
These butterfly valves are used for purge and exhaust purposes and are required to operate during accident conditions.
The report discusses the use of an unqualified solenoid valve for, a safety-related valve function which requires operation under accident conditions.
The solenoid valve is'sed to pilot control the pneumatic valve actuators which are installed on the containment ventilation butterfly valves at this facility.
Your re-evaluation of valve performance for conditions noted in the previous paragraph must consider the concerns identified in IE. Bulletin 79-01A.
As the HRC review progresses, licensees which might have electrical override circuitry problems are being advised not to use the override and to take compensatory interim measures to minimize the problem.
In light of the information gained during our review of your submittals dated January 2, 1979, February 16,, 1979, March 30, 1979 and July 2,
- 1979, and the information cited above, we believe an interim commitment from you is required at this time.
Ttiis is the case, even though you may have proposed Technical Specification changes or other long or short-term measures, which )~e are reviewing.
For your use, we have provided as an attachment in interim HRC staff position.
In addition',
our recently developed "Guidelines for-Demonstration of Operability of Purge and Vent Valves" were provided by separate letter to licensees of each operating reactor.
This letter in no way relaxes any existing licensing requirements for your facility.
Because of the potential adverse effects on the public health and safety which could result from the postulated, OSA-LOCA while operating with open purge or vent valves, we believe your prompt response to this letter is required.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.64(f), you are requested OFFICE P.
SURNAME DATEP.
NRC FORM 3 I8 (9 76) NRCM 02 IO NU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: l979 289 369
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OCT pg >gg to inform us in writing within 45 days of'eceipt of this letter of your commitment to operate in conformance with the enclosed interim position and to provide us with information Which demonstrates that you have initiated the purge and vent valve operability verification on an expedited basis.
The information provided in your response wi11 enable us to determine whether or not your license to operate R. E. Ginna should be modified, suspended; or revoked.
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'II Sincerely, 6W
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Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch'82
- Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosure:
Interim Position for Containment, Purge and Vent Valve Operation.
'cc:
w/enclosure See next page UTION NRC PDR Local PDR ORB 42 Reading NRRR Reading DLZiemann HSmi th JJShea EReeves'ELD OI&E (3)
GLainas JRBuchanan TERA ACRS (16)
DCrutchfield OFFICE)
SURNAME DATEI DOR'ORB 82 JJShea:ah ioijjj7o DOR:0 B 8 EARe e
0/g /79 DOR:ORB 82 DLZiemann lngP /7q NRC FORM 318 (9.761 NRCM 08<0
+ I,I.S. GOVERNh<ENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1979-289.369
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pt' Nr. Leon D. White, Jr.
October 23, 1979 cc w/enclosure:
Lex K. Larson, Esquire
- LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby E MacRae 1757 N Street, N.
W.
Washington, D. C.
20036 Hr. Michael Slade 12 Trailwood Circle Rochester, New York 14618 Rochester Committee for Scientific Information Robert E. Lee, Ph.D.
P. 0.
Box 5236 River Campus Station Rochester, New York 14627 Jeffrey Cohen New York State Energy Office Swan Street Building Core 1, Seco'nd Floor Empire State Plaza
- Albany, New York 12223 Director, Technical Development Programs State of New York Energy Office Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza A'.bany, New York 12223 Herbert Grossman, Esq.,
Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Rochester Public Library 115 South Avenue Rochester, New York 14604
INTERIM POSITION FOR CONTAINfKNT PURGE AND VENT VALVE OPERATION PENOING RESOLUTION OF ISOLATION VALVE OPERASILITY Once the conditions listed below are met, restr ictfons on use of the containment purge and vent system isolation valves wfII be revised based on our review of your responses to the November 1978 letter justifying your proposed operational mode.
The revised restrictions can be established separately for each system.
1.
Whenever the containment integrity is required, emphasis should be placed on oper ating the containment in a passive mode as much as possible and on limiting all purging and venting times to as low as achievable.
To justify venting or purging, there must be an established need to improve working conditions to perform a safety related surveillance or safety related maintenance procedure.
(Examples of improved working conditions would include deinerting, reducing temperature",
humfdity",
and airborne activity sufficiently to permit efficient performance or to significantly reduce occupational radiation exposures),
and Z.
f3afntafn the containment purge and vent isolation valves closed whenever the reactor is not fn the cold shutdown or refueling mode until such time as you can show that:
a.
All isolation valves greater than 3" nominal diameter used for containment purge and venting operations are operable under the most severe design basis accident flow condition loading and can close within the time limit stated in your Technical Specfffcatfons, design criteria or operating procedures.
The operability of butter-fly valves may, on an, inter im basis, be demonstrated by limiting the valve to be no more ttian 30'o 50'pen (90'eing full open).
The maximum opening shall be determined in consultation wfth the valve supplie'r.
The valve opening must be such that the critical valve=
parts v>ill not be damaged by DBA>>LOCA loads and that the valve will tend to close when the fluid dynamic forces are intr oduced, and b.
ltodfffcations, as necessary, have been made to segregate the containment ventilation isolation signa'ls to ensure that, as a minimum, at least one of the automatic safety injection actuati'on signals is uninhibfted and operable t6 fnftiate valve closure when any other isolation signal may be blocked, reset, or overridden.
Unly where temperature and humidity controls are not in the present desfgn.
OFFICEf SURNAMEP DATEP NRC FORM 3)8 f9.78) NRCV 82
- ',j.S QO~/ERN"'ENT +PINTING OFFlCE: 1979 289.369
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