ML17244A353

Responds to Requesting Verification of Data Submitted by Util.Forwards Comments & Addl Info Re Isolation of Low Pressure Sys from Reactor Coolant Sys

ML17244A353
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna, Sterling
Issue date:	01/25/1979
From:	White L ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TASK-05-11.A, TASK-5-11.A, TASK-RR NUDOCS 7902020176
Download: ML17244A353 (10)

Text

SUBJECT-'esponds to 781221 1tr request ing verification of data submitted by util.Forwards comments 8, addi info re isolation 0

of low pressure sys from reactor coolant sys.

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02020176 DOC -DATE: 79/01/25 NOTABI7ED:

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FACII 244 Bob.rt Emmet Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Rochester Gas 05000244 Sterling Power Project, Nuclear-l, Rochester Gas 05000485 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFF I LI ATION 0

HHITE, L. D.

Rochester Gas 8, Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFII IATION ZIEMANN,D.L.

Operating Rectors Branch 2

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0.1 12 15 17 19 21 EXTERNAL: 03 23 FG F

CORE PEBF BR ENGR BB PLANT SYS BB EFLT TBT SYS LPDR ACBS I

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LTTB 38 ENCL 38

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January 25, 1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN:

Mr. Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch 52 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

VERIFICATION OF PLANT INFORMATION ON SEP TOPIC V-11.A, "REQUIREMENTS FOR ISOLATION OF HIGH AND IOW PRESSURE Your letter of December 21, 1978 rerequested that we verify the s

o a a on a table which you provided concerning E

lo d

dtabl ion o ow pressure systems from the tional information on th ise e which rovides o

p 'r comments and addi-on e separation of these systems.

Sincerely yours,

PLAHT:

R.

E. Ginna Evaluation of Isolation of Low Pressure Systems From Reactor Coolant System Normal 3)4 eets e un ancy esa e

0{rect Interfaces 'sol atfoII of Type 8etween Criteria Isolation Valves Valves Oca ion 0 eto o

HP/LP Check Valve Pressure Method of Interface Orientati on Reducti on I so 1 ati on Remarks Mater Cleanup System Inlet A,C

'."des AOV 202 180V(427)

NA8 NA Xmi.de containment Operator Action FSAR Section 9.2.2 Orifice control Room FSAR Figure 9.2-1 Discharge BaC Yes 2-Check NA NA horizontal HA Check valves Automatic ystem downstream of gos.-

~sp.

pumps designed For z n-ress..

Seal Inj et/on Syyten '

Yes AOVs270 A,B.

MOV 313 'Yes 8

Xnside.cv NA RCP seal and bypass orifice FSAR Pig. 9.2-1 KCCS*

Low Pressure In)ection Yes 1Check 1MOV No Inside containment horizontal HA NOY opens on SI signal.

PSAR Pigures 4,2-1 and 9.3-1 Accumulators

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Sampling System RHR System Suction Side GaC Yes Yes 2AOV.'Z.2 NA.

manual per sampling line HA-1AOV 6 1 manual inside containment 1AOV a 1 manual outside containmentF Manual Throttling valve 2-check Yes Inside containment HA vertical designed for zero flow closure May be testable thru accumulator test orifice (Fig. 6,2-1) but not reguired 3 sampling lines (pressuri '.

steam

& liquid space

& hotlog)

Drawing 33013-422 The evaluation of this issue has been completed in the safe shutdown review.

Discharge Side The evaluation of this issue has been completed in the safe shutdown review.

• HPSI design press is 1750 psig

. for pumps and 1500 psig for piping.

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~. ~ e>>4 NOTE:

1.

PWRs only 2.

BMRs only

3. Only direct interfaces considered service water and component cooling water systems not evaluated

4. High pressure systems (i.e., control rod drive hydraulic, isolation condenser, standby liquid control, high pressure injection, 8

RCIC) connected to reactor coolant pressure boundary not evaluated

5. Inadvertent overpressurization of makeup tank due to reactor coolant pump seal leak off 6.

Reactor water cleanup system for BWRs and CVCS or Letdown System for PWRS 7.. Isolation requirements for ECCS specified in SRP 6.3 {Section III), for RHR system in BTP RSB 5-1 attached to SRP 5.4.7 and for water cleanup and sampling system in GOC 55 8.

NA - Not',Applicable

E k

7 7 o>o>o(7Q

RV 203 provides relief to the PRT and can pass full flow from all three letdown orifices at the design pressure d'or the letdown line downstream of the orifices (see Figure 2 oi Appendix A to response to NRC from L.

D. White, RGGE, dated February 24, 1977 ).

System integrity will not be compromiseo even without operator action to close AOV's 200 A or b or AOV 202 or AOV 427.

Xn addition to the two check valves inside containment, the system outside containment is closed between the containment and the charging pumps.

All three charging pumps are positive displacement pumps.

The piping between the pumps and RCS is designed for 2500 psig operation.

Thus, failure of one or more of the check valves will not compromise the integrity of the CVC system.

Because this system is designed for high pressure operation it need not be included in this evaluation.

The isolation criteria for water cleanup systems (CVCS) and sampling systems given by NRC in the December 21, 1978 letter from Dennis Ziemann are those found in SRP 6.2.4 and GDC 55.

These criteria are containment isolation criteria and are imposed to prevent the release of fission products from the containment following certain postulated accidents.

They are neither applicable nor necessarily sufficient to prevent overpressurization of a low pressure system connected to the reactor coolant system.

Overpressure protection of a low pressure system connected to the reactor coolant system may be provided by devices apart from the containment isola-tion system and by devices which limit the pressure in the low pressure system without "isolating" it.

Relief valves are provided for the low pressure portions of the system both inside containment and on the volume control tank.

These valves discharge to the pressurizer relief tank and waste holdup tanks respectively.

The pressurizer sample lines AOVs are normally maintained closed.

The hotleg sample line AOVs are normally open to allow operation of the failed fuel detector.

The hotleg sample line is normally isolated by 2 additional normally closed manual valves downstream of the failed fuel detector.

The failed fuel detector is manually throttled to the volume control tank.

The air operated valves may be closed by operator action from the control room or the remote operation station and close on a containment isolation signal.

Sample lines are for the most part 3/8" SS tubing.

A sample line from the A loop hot leg is connected to the loop B hot leg sample line between AOV 955 and AOV 966C.

The A loop line, however, contains three normally closed manually operated valves.

A relief valve is provided for the low pressure portions of the system on the volume control tank to maintain system integrity in tne event of operator error.

J.

AOV 270A, AOV 270B and AOV 386 are controlled by operator action in the control room.

MOV 313 is closed by operator action in the control room or by a containment.isolation signal.