ML17229B075
| ML17229B075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 03/22/1999 |
| From: | Wert L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Plunkett T FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9904050014 | |
| Download: ML17229B075 (35) | |
Text
March 22, 1999 Florida Power and Light Company ATTN:
Mr. T. F. Plunkett President - Nuclear Division P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420
SUBJECT:
PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW - ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT
Dear Mr. Plunkett:
On February 3, 1999, the NRC staff completed a Plant Performance Review (PPR) of the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance.
The results are used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resources.
PPRs provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC's senior management meeting (SMM) reviews.
PPRs examine information since the last assessment to evaluate long term trends, but emphasize the last six months to ensure that the assessments reflect current performance.
The PPR for the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant involved the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period of June 1998 through January 1999. The NRC's most recent summary of licensee performance was provided in a letter of August 11, 1998, and was discussed in a public meeting with you on August 27, 1998.
As discussed in the NRC's Administrative Letter 98-07 of October 2, 1998, the PPR provides an assessment of licensee performance during an interim period that the NRC has suspended its Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program.
The NRC suspended its SALP program to complete a review of its processes for assessing performance at nuclear power plants. At the end of the review period, the NRC willdecide whether to resume the SALP program or terminate it in favor of an improved process.
During the last six months, Unit 1 operated continuously at full power, except for several short periods of lower power levels. The power decreases were caused by jellyfish intrusions into the intake canal, and two nonsafety-related equipment problems.
Unit 2 operated at full power before shutting down for a scheduled refueling outage on November 9, 1998.
Unit 2 returned to full power operation on December 11, 1998, and continued to run at full power.
Overall performance at St. Lucie was acceptable.
Plant staff continued to make progress in enhancing overall station performance.
Management has effected improvement in several performance areas including communications and coordination between work groups.
Implementation of corrective actions for identified problems was not always complete.
For example, reactor building sump screen deficiencies were not fullyresolved and post-fire safe-shutdown procedural deficiencies identified in 1995 fire protection audits were not addressed in a timely manner.
Operations performance was consistent.
The conduct of operations and control of outage activities were professional and demonstrated a conservative operating philosophy.
Efforts to address past challenges regarding inconsistent control room operations and equipment clearance control were effective. Due to the limited number of licensed operators, Operations 9904050014 990322 PDR ADQCK 05000335 G
FPBL equipment clearance control were effective.
Due to the limited number of licensed operators, Operations continued to rely on routine use of overtime during normal operations and extensive use of overtime during outages.
No operator performance issues have been identified associated with the use of overtime. The initial licensed operator training program was not effective and did not adequately prepare candidates for the recent examination.
Core inspection is planned for initial and requalification examinations.
A regional initiative inspection is planned for the operator training program.
Maintenance performance was consistent.
Predictive maintenance and inservice inspection programs were well implemented.
Equipment issues were identified, trended, and evaluated appropriately.
Corrective maintenance and surveillances were performed well. Instrumentation and Control departmental initiatives to improve performance were effective. Quality verification of maintenarice activities was effective. Core inspection is planned.
Engineering performance was consistent.
In the Engineering area, several deficiencies were observed in problem resolution.
Deficient reactor building sump conditions were not effectively resolved during a review in 1997 and corrective actions were not timely for inadequate post-fire safe-shutdown procedures identified during fire protection audits in 1995.
Engineering performance was effective in the areas of design and engineering support as demonstrated by clear and accurate design stress calculations for modifications, appropriate engineering support in assessing failures, and good support of Critical Maintenance Management (CMM) evolutions.
Operability assessments were detailed, technically sound, and timely. Regional initiative inspections are planned for followup of the fire protection issues.
Plant Support performance was consistent.
Reduced effluent releases, reduction of onsite low-level radioactive waste, and reduced dose expenditure indicated sound Radiation Protection program implementation.
Plant staff monitored and controlled operational chemistry, effluents, and source terms to maintain occupational and population doses within acceptable regulatory and procedural limits. Planning and coordination between health physics and other functional groups was effective. The emergency preparedness (EP) program continued to maintain the site in a state of operational readiness to respond to emergencies.
Security officers were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities.
Testing, maintenance, and general operability of security equipment was a strength.
Compensatory measures continue to be appropriate and the number of compensatory hours has declined.
Former access control problems have been corrected.
The Fire Protection Functional Inspection (FPFI) identified numerous deficiencies in the fire protection program.
Several violations involving the design of fire protection systems, fire fighting strategies, and features supporting Appendix R were identified. Apparent violations were identified involving Appendix R cable separation issues and post-fire safe shutdown procedures.
Your detailed self-assessment conducted prior to the FPFI and corrective actions were extensive.
As noted above, regional initiative followup fire protection inspections are planned.
Core inspections are planned in the radiation protection and security areas, including an Operational Safeguards
Response
Evaluation.
Enclosure 1 contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of licensee performance trends.
The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Florida Power and Light. The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of licensee programs and performance that may be functioning
FP&L appropriately.
Rather, the NRC only documents issues that the NRC believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.
This letter advises you of'our planned inspection effort resulting from the St. Lucie PPR review.
It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite.
details our inspection plan for the next eight months.
The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas.
Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.
We will inform you of any changes to the inspection plan.
If you have any questions, please contact me at 404-562-4540.
Sincerely,
( Origina1 signed by L. Wert
)
Leonard D. Wert, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 License Nos. DPR-67, NPF-16
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Issues Matrix
- 2. Inspection Plan cc w/encls: (See page 4)
FP&L cc w/encls:
J. A. Stall Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957 R. G. West Plant General Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957 E. J. Weinkam Licensing Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant 6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957 John Gianfrancesco, Manager Administrative Support & Special Projects Florida Power & Light Company P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 Rajiv S. Kundalkar Vice President - Nuclear Engineering Florida Power & Light Company P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 M. S. Ross, Attorney Florida Power & Light Company P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420 William A. Passetti Bureau of Radiation Control Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2020 Capital Circle SE, Bin ¹C21 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1741 Joe Myers, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 J. Kammel Radiological Emergency Planning Administrator Department of Public Safety 6000 SE Tower Drive Stuart, FL 34997 Douglas Anderson County Administrator St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue Ft. Pierce, FL 34982
FPBL Distribution wiencls:
S. Collins, NRR J. Zwolinski, NRR W. Dean, NRR T. Boyce, NRR W. Gleaves, NRR C. Thomas, NRR G. Tracy, EDO J. Lieberman, OE L. Wert, Rll S. Rudisail, Rll PUBLIC NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 6090 Jensen Beach, FL 34957-2010
- (See previous concurrence)
OFFICE SIGNATURE Rl~l'DRP SRudlsall RII:DRS ABollslo RII:DRS KLandls RII:DRS Hc Istonson RII:DRS GKuzo DATE COPY?
3/ >"/99 YS No 3/
/99 3/
/99 3/
/99 YES No YES No YES NO OFFICIALRECORD COPY DOCUMENTNAME: GAST IHPPRtFEB99.WPD 3/
/99 YES No 3/
/99 YES No
FPS,L Distribution w/encls:
S. Collins, NRR J. Zwolinski, NRR W. Dean, NRR T. Boyce, NRR W. Gleaves, NRR C. Thomas, NRR G. Tracy, EDO J. Lieberman, OE fiscal L. Wert, Rll S. Rudisail, Rll PUBLlc NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 6090 Jensen Beach, FL 34957-2010 RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:
S RII:DRS RII:DRP OFFICE SIGNATURE KLandls Hchrlstonson 3/
/99 YES NO SRudlsall NAME lo GKU20 DATE 3/
/99 YES NO 3/ t
/99 ES.
NO
/ os /99 ES NO
/99 COPY?
ES NO OFFICIALRECORD C P
DOCU NAME: GASTLUCIHPPRIFEB99.WPD 3/
/99 YES No 3/
/99 YES NO
Page:
1 of 7 Region II ST LUCIE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template ID Type Codes Item Description Date: 02/01/1999 Time: 09:22:23 12/12/1998 1998011 Pri: MAINT NRC
'OS Pri: 2B Quality Assurance Audit QSL-ISI-97-14 was detailed, well Performed. and contained meaningful findings. Appropriate corrective actions were taken for adverse audit findings. (Section M1.8)
Sec:
Sec: 5A Ter: 5B 12/12/1998 1998011 pri: MAINT NRC STR Pri: 2B Inservice inspection activities were performed in accordance with requirements with strong licensee direction and oversight of contract personnel.
Overall, the licensee's Inseivice Inspection program was considered to be a strength.
Sec:
Sec: 4C (Section M1.8)
Ter: 3B 12/12/1998 1998011 pri: MAINT NRC STR pri: 3A Maintenance outage activities were conducted professionally.
Procedural compliance, worker knowledge, and pre-job briefings were strong.
Coordination between different work groups and supervision of testing activities were effective.
Sec:
Sec: 2B (Sections M1.1 - M1.7)
Ter. 3B 12/12/1998 1998011 Pri: OPS NRC POS Sec:
pri: 1A The power reduction, shutdown, and cooldown for the planned refueling outage were professionally conducted.
Supervisors ensured that the control room was maintained quiet. The operators were attentive and knowledgeable of Sec: 3C their tasks.
Consistent use of three part communications and strong teamwork were observed (Section 01.2).
Ter: 3A 12/12/1998 1998011 Pri OPS NRC POS Prl 1A The reactor startup was well conducted Supervision maintained quiet conditions in the control room and a professional attitude was exhibited throughout the critical evolutions. Reactor Engineering interacted frequently with the Sec:
Sec: 3C Reactivity Manager and the Reactor Control Operator.
Reactivity manipulations were properly controlled and the expected response was verified by the operator. (Section 01.5)
Ter: 3A 12/12/1998 1998011 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: 1C Sec:
Sec: 3A Ter:
The licensee was properly monitoring and controlling personnel radiation exposure during the Unit 2 Refueling Outage and posting area radiological conditions in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20. The licensee had implemented an effective shutdown chemistry control plan and dosely monitored primary coolant chemistry during the shutdown for the Unit 2 Refueling Outage.
(Section R1.2) 12/12/1998 1998011 pri: PLTSUP NRC POS prl: 1C Health Physics technicians observed by the inspectors were aware of plant status and provided good coverage for the work for which they were responsible, ensuring that personnel exposure was controlled in accordance with the Sec:
Sec: 3A licensee's ALARA(As Low As Reasonably Achievable) program. (Sections R1.1 and R4.1)
Ter: 3B 12/12/1998 1998011 prl: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 2B A detailed flowaccelerated corrosion program was in place and was being implemented in accordance with procedural requirements by knowledgeable licensee personnel. (Section M1.9).
Sec: ENG Sec: 3B Ter: 4C 12/12/1998 1998011 Pri: MAINT NRC STR Prl: 5A Quality Control inspections, surveillances, and spot checks conducted during the refueling outage were proactive and induded insightful observations (Section 07.2).
Sec: OPS Sec: 5B Ter:
Item Type (Compliance,Followup,other), From 06/28/1998 To 01/31/1999 Enclosure l
Page:
2of7 Region II ST LUCIE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template ID Type Codes Item Description Date: 02/01/1999 Time'9'22'23 12/12/1998 1998011 Pri: OPS Sec: ENG NRC POS Prl: 1B Sec: 2A Ter: 5B Shutdown cooling operations were impacted by seat leakage of the shutdown cooling heat exchanger bypass valves.
Operators were attentive to plant conditions and expeditiously identified the reactor coolant system heatup as shutdown cooling flowwas decreased during reduced inventory conditions.
Recovery actions were appropriately conservative and procedures were adequate.
Analyses of the incident were thorough. The final resolution adequately addressed all technical and administrative issues (Section 01.3).
12/12/1998 1998011 Pri: OPS Sec: MAINT POS
- pri: 2A.
Prior to restart, the inspectors conducted comprehensive tours of Systems, Structures, and Components inside Unit 2 containment.
Overall, the containment was dear and clean. The Structures, Systems. and Components appeared to Sec: 3C be good condition (Section 02.3).
Ter: 2B 12/12/1998 1998011 pri: OPS NRC STR pri: 1A The overall conduct of operations was professional and safety~nscious.
Operations control of outage activities was strong (Sections 01.1 - 01.5).
Sec: MAINT Sec: 3A Ter: 2B 12/12/1998 199801141 Pri: ENG NRC Sec: MAINT VIOIV Prl: SC Sec: 5A Ter. 2B Insufficiently comprehensive inspections during the 1997 Unit 2 refueling outage resulted in a failure to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality. Aviolation was identified.
The inadequate corrective actions resulted in inaccurate information being provided to the NRC in that the sump was not restored to design requirements as was indicated.
Initial inspections conducted this refueling outage were not adequate.
After additional discrepancies were identified by NRC inspectors and licensee personnel, licensee management recognized that a detailed inspection of the sump was necessary.
The licensee consequently identified that the corrective actions had not been adequate.
Thorough corrective actions were subsequently coinpleted and a detailed report was submitted.
(Section E8.2) 11/06/1998 1998014-01 prl: PLTSUP NRC VIOIV Pri:
Aviolation of procedural requirements was identified for not managing the use and temporary storage of transient combustibles in safety-related areas. (Section F8.2).
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
11/06/1998 1998Q14-02 pri: PI.TSUP NRC VIOIV Prl:
Aviolation was identified for failure to maintain the fire fighting strategies to reflect the requirements of the approved Fire Protection Program and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R. (Section F8.4).
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
11/06/1998 1998014+3 pri: PLTSUP NRC NCV prl:
A nonsked violation was identified for the failure to conduct timely corrective action for identified post-fire safe-shutdown procedures. (Section F8.7)
Sec:
Sec:
Ter.
11/06/1998 19980144)4 pri: PLTSUP NRC FEI pri:
An apparent violation was identified for failure to implement and maintain in effect the provisions of the NRC approved Fire Protection Program and Appendix R Sections III.L.2.e and III.L.3. (Section F8.8.a).
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
11/06/1998 19980144)5 prl: PI.TSUP NRC EEI prl:
An apparent violation was identified for failure to implement and maintain in effect the provisions of the NRC approved Fire Protection Program and Appendix R for Fire Area N. (Section F8.8.b).
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 06/28/1998 To 01/31/1999
Pr
Page:
3 of 7 Region II ST LUCIE United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Date: 02/01/1999 Time: 09:22:23 Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Description 11/06/1998 1998014-06 Pri: pl.TSUp NRC EEI Prl:
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
An apparent violation was identified for failure to implement and maintain in effect the provisions of the NRC approved Fire Protection Program and Appendix R for Fire Area J. (Section F8.8.c).
11/06/1998 1998014-07 Pri: PLTSUP NRC EEI Sec:
Sec:
Ter.
An apparent violation was identified for failure to implement and maintain in effect the provisions of the NRC approved Fire Protection Program and Appendix R, Sections III.G.1.a and III.L.7. (Section F8.8.d).
11/06/1998 1998014-08 Prl: PLTSUP NRC NCV Sec:
Sec:
Ter.
A nonwted violation was identified for the failure to provide emergency lighting and post-fire safe-shutdown communications that meet the requirements of the NRC approved Fire Protection Program and Appendix R Section III.J. (Section F8.8.h) 11/06/1998 1998014-09 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NCV Sec:
~
Sec:
Ter.
A nonmted violation was identified for failure to implement and maintain in effect the provisions of the NRC approved Fire Protection Program for fire hose stations. (Section F8.9) 10/31/1998 1998010 Pri: ENG Sec:
NRC POS Prl: 4B Sec: 4C Ter: 4A Plant Change/Modification (PC/M) 976-031
~ Generic Letter 9646 Thermal Pressurization Relief Valves had good 'pre-planning.
The package was detailed and complete, incfuding the justification for the modification, and post-installation testing requirements.
Pipe stress calculations were dear and accurate.
Allassumptions and references were dearly stated (Section E1.1).
10/31/1998 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Sec:
Prl: 3A Sec: 2B Ter. 3C In general
~ Critical Maintenance Management (CMM)evolutions were well planned and executed.
Maintenance pre-job briefs were thorough, focused on safety, and took advantage of prior operating experience events.
Operations, maintenance and engineering personnel worked together well to successfully accomplish CMMactivities.
Supervisory and/or engineering personnel provided consistent oversight and support.
Maintenance activities were conducted in accordance with applicable instructions and procedures. and appropriately documented (Sections M1.2 and 1.3).
10/31/1998 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC Sec:
pOS Pri: 3B Sec: 3C Ter. 3A Maintenance and surveillance testing activities were performed in accordance with work instructions, procedures, and applicable dearance controls. Work performed during these activities was accomplished by knowledgeable and experienced personnel who exhibited familiaritywith their specific tasks.
The work package or procedure was routinely present and in active use at the work site. Maintenance supervision and site engineering staff were closely involved with the maintenance work. Good interface between maintenance and operations personnel was observed, particularly during the feedwater maintenance evolutions.
Work activities were properly documented and problems were appropriately resolved (Section M1.1).
10/31/1998 1998010 Pri: OpS Sec:
NRC MISC Prl: 6C Sec: 1A Ter. 2B The licensee has implemented extensive corrective actions to prevent recurrence of past clearance-related problems.
Equipment clearance orders were being processed in accordance with program requirements and management expectations.
The Clearance Center was at first reconfigured, and then incorporated into the One Stop Shop, to provide a controlled environment conducive to generating quality. Responsible personnel were knowledgeable and sensitive to the critical importance of an effective dearance process for ensuring personnel, equipment and nuclear safety (Section 08.2).
10/31/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS Sec:
NRC, POS Prl: 1A Sec: 3A-Ter.
An infrequent evolution to shift main feedwater flowcontrol from the 1B main feed regulating valve to the bypass valves to allow for online repairs was well controlled and accomplished without incident. Operating crew preparation, briefing, and performance were exemplary (Section 01.2).
Item Type (Compliance,Followup.Other), From 06/28/1998 To 01/31/1999
0
r 4j Page:
4 of 7 Region II ST LUCIE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template ID Type Codes Item Description Date: 02/01/1999 Time: 09:22:23 10/31/1998 tgg8010 pri PLTSUP NRC POS prl: 1C Security and plant personnel performed their responsibilities in a manner consistent with site security plan requirements.
Overall, security facilities and equipment were operating well and maintained in a condition to ensure physical Sec:
Sec: 3A protection of the plant (Sections S1.1 and S2.1).
Ter.
10/31/1998 1998010 pri: PLTSUP NRC POS pri: 1C The licensee's first emergency planning drillof their newly developed Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) was a useful training experience for the emergency response organization.
Recommendations were properly reviewed, Sec:
Sec: 3B ctarifying details were requested, corrections made as necessary, and proper authorization was granted to implement them (Section P1.1).
Ter:
10/31/1998 1g98010 PH: PLTSUP NRC POS prl: 3A Overall coordination and control of the Unit 2 spent resin transfer activities by Health Physics (HP) were very effective and exhibited a high degree of attention to all details of this evolution. Numerous radiological precautions were taken Sec:
Sec: 3B during the preparation phase to prevent inadvertent spills and limitpersonnel exposures.
Personnel from HP and Operations organizations worked closely together to ensure a successful transfer (Section R1.1).
Ter.
10/31/Igg8 1gg8010-02 pri: FNG Licensee NCy Prl: 4C TS 4.3.2.1 required that all FSFAS subgroup relays not specifically exempted in FSAR table 7.3-9a shall be tested semi-annually.
The licensee failed to test these two relays at this interval frominitialstartup until June 30, 1997.
Sec:
Sec:4B Ter: 2B 10/31/Igg8 tgg8010 pri. OPS NRC POS prl: 1A Safety-related systems were properly aligned, including valve and breaker positions, and maintained consistent with applicable drawings, procedures, and Technical Specifications.
Equipment operability, material condition, and Sec: MAINT Sec: 3A housekeeping were acceptable (Sections 02.2).
Ter: 2A 0g/1 g/1gg8 19g8009 prl ENG NRC POS prl: 4B The operability assessment of a containment vacuum relief valve issue was detailed and technically sound. The assessment was timely and an unnecessary shutdown was appropriately averted. (Section E2.1)
Sec:
Sec: 5A Ter. 1A 09/19/1998 1998009 pri: MAINT NRC NFG pri: 2B The licensee's program did not provide meaningful trending of overdue preventive maintenance (pM) tasks.
Recorded overdue PMs for 1998 did not include any PMs required by regulations. Weaknesses were identified in the PM change Sec:
Sec:
process relative to documentation ofjustification for extending PM due dates and proper signatures on PM Change Request forms. (Section M3.1)
Ter:
09/19/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Prl: 3A Sec:
Sec: 2B Ter: 5A Corrective, preventive and predictive maintenance, and surveillance activities were performed in a quality manner with appropriate documentation.
Procedures were in place and being conscientiously followed by qualified personnel.
The interface between maintenance and operations personnel worked well. Applicable foreign material controls, measuring and test equipment controls, postmaintenance testing requirements, and quality control hold points were accomplished in accordance with requirements. (Section M1.1) 0g/1g/1gg8 1gg800'g prl MAINT NRC STR prl: 5A Quality control (QC) surveillance inspections were being accomplished by knowledgeable and thorough inspectors utilizing established guidelines, dose observation and detailed questioning techniques.
Daily quality summaries were a Sec:
Sec: 5B valuable communication tool and indicative of a strong QC surveillance program. (Section M7.1)
Ter:
Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other)
~ From 06/28/1998 To 01/31/1999
Page:
5 of 7 Region II ST LUCIE United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Date: 02/01/1999 Time: 09:22:23 Date Source Functional Area Template ID Type Codes Item Description 09/19/1998 1998009 Prl: OPS Sec:
NRC POS Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter. 3B Non-licensed operators were knowledgeable of equipment and work occurring at their watch stations.
They were thorough in their tours, gave appropriate attention to system details, and reported deficiencies to the control room with follow-up actions taken.
(Section 04.1) 09/19/1998 1998009 Pfi: OPS Sec:
NRC POS Prl: 1A Sec: 3A Ter. 3C Control Room conduct was professional and demonstrated good team work. Three part communications were consistently used. Operators demonstrated a high level of control and awareness of plant status. Attentiveness to annunciator alarms and response to changing plant conditions were prompt and effective. Command and control and Operations supervisory oversight were dearly evident. Management demonstrated increased interest and efforts to reduce the number of control board deficiencies.
(Section 01.1) 09/19/1998 1998009 Prl: OpS NRC POS Pri: 1C Sec:
Sec: 3A Ter: 1B Timely preparations for hurricane weather conditions were made by the licensee consistent with their program and measures were in place to ensure a continued state of readiness. (Section 01.3) 09/19/1998 1998009 Prl: OPS NRC POS Pri'A Sec:
Sec: 3B Ter:
Unit 2 new fuel receipt inspection, fuel handling operations, and transfer to new fuel storage were conducted in a smooth and orderly manner. (Section 01.2) 09/19/1998 1998009 Prl: OPS NRC POS pri: 5A Sec:
Sec: 5B Ter. 5C The Condition Report (CR) program for identifying and resolving plant problems remained effective. Plant personnel and management exhibited an appropriate threshold for identifying problems. initiating CRs, using root cause analysis, and assigning Event Response Teams.
Considerable management attention was focused on any CR open for longer than thirty days to ensure timely resolution. (Section 07.1) 09/19/1998 1998009 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
Pri: 1C Sec:
Ter.
Chemistry technicians performed well in use of the Unit 2 post-accident sampling system as demonstrated by their familiaritywith the system, dose adherence to applicable procedures, and the consistency of their results compared to the daily sample.
The sampling was unnecessarily complicated by a known equipment deficiency that had not been addressed in the procedure. (Section R4.1) 09/19/1998 1998009 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Sec:
Prl: 1C Sec: 2B Ter:
Quarterly integrated emergency preparedness drills were being conducted to enhance the quality of Emergency Response Organization (ERO) training. (Section P5.1)
The licensee successfully demonstrated its ability to adequately staff all emergency response facilities in a timely manner during an unannounced, off-hours drill. (Section P1.1) Quarterly integrated emergency preparedness drills were being conducted to enhance the quality of Emergency Response Organization (ERO) training. (Section P5.1) 09/19/1998 1998009 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 1C
- Sec:
Sec: 3A Ter.
Security personnel performed their duties in a deliberate and conscientious manner consistent with the site security plan. Security facilities and equipment were operating well and in proper condition to ensure physical protection ofthe plant. (Sections S1.1 and S2.1) 09/19/1998 1998009 Pri: pl.TSUp NRC pOS Prl: 1C Sec:
Sec: 3A Ter. 3B Chemistry technicians demonstrated good sampling and analytical techniques as evidenced by procedural adherence, knowledge level ~ and a questioning attitude regarding unexpected results. (Section R4.2)
Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 06/28/1998 To 01/31/1999
Page:
6of7 Region II ST LUCIE Date Source Functional Area United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Template ID Type Codes Item Description Date: 02/01/1999 Time: 09:22:23 09/19/1998 1998009 pri: PLTSUP NRC POS prl: 1C The transition of security force contractors went very smoothly with no apparent degradation of security program effectiveness.
The transfer occurred without incident due to considerable preparation and management attention.
Sec:
Sec: 3C (Section S6.1)
Ter.
09/19/1998 19980094)1 Pri: OPS NCV pri: 1A A Nonited Violation was identified for one licensee-identified instance in which an Equipment Clearance Order was not properly released due to personnel errors. Other selected Equipment Clearance Orders were inspected and verified Sec:
Sec: 3A to have been prepared, implemented, and released in accordance with program requirements. (Section 01.4)
Ter.
09/19/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC POS pri: 2B Goals and monitoring criteria were being established as required by the Maintenance Rule. Monitoring of the instrument air system was appropriately identified as needing to be upgraded to (a)(1) requirements.
(Section E4.1)
Sec: MAINT Sec: 4B Ter: 2A 09/19/1998 1998009 pri: ENG NRC POS prl: 4B The plant change/modification package for the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator governor was sufficiently detailed and was properly reviewed and approved. (Section E1.1)
Sec: MAINT Sec: 4C Ter: 2B og/1g/1gg8 1gg8009 pri: MAINT NRC STR prl: 2B A strong predictive maintenance program was in place and was effectively identifying and trending equipment problems.
(Section M1.1)
Sec: ENG Sec: 2A Ter:
09/19/1998 19980094)2 pri: pLTSUP NRC URI pri: 1C NRC inspectors identified one instance of improperly stored combustible materials.
Additionally, proper attention was not provided regarding a Hot Work Permit for work involving an open flame. (Section F1.1)
Sec: OPS Sec: 3A Ter:
Item Type (Compliance,Fo! Iowup,Other), From 06/28/1998 To 01/31/1999
Page:
7 of 7 United States'Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSuE MATRIX By Date Date: 02/01/1999 Time: 09:22:23 Type Codes:
BU Bulletin CDR Construction DEV Deviation EEI Escalated Enforcement Item IFI Inspector follow-up item LER Licensee Event Report LIC Licensing Issue MISC Miscellaneous MV MinorViolation NCV NonCited Violation NEG Negative NOED Notice of Enforcement Discretion NON Notice of Non-Conformance P21 Part21 POS Positive SGI Safeguard Event Report STR Strength URI Unresolved item VIO Violation WK Weakness Legend Template Codes:
1A Normal Operations
=
1B Operations During Transients 1C Programs and Processes 2A Equipment Condition 2B Programs and Processes 3A Work Performance 3B KSA 3C Work Environment 4A Design 4B Engineering Support 4C Programs and Processes 5A Identification 5B Analysis 5C Resolution ID Codes:
NRC NRC Self Self-Revealed Licensee Licensee Functional Areas:
OPS Operations MAINT Maintenance ENG Engineering PLTSUP Plant Support OTHER Other EEls are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action"(Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEIs and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.
URls are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likelyto be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
Item Type (Compliance,Followup,Other), From 06/28/1998 To 01/31/1999
'0
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUES MATRIX by SALP Functional Area ST. LUCIE 01-Feb-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMNI CODES 8/1/98 753 8/1/98 752 Positive 7/24/98 725 Positive 7/24/98 724 Positive 7/23/98 762 Negative 7/23/98 Weakness 761 Negative MAINT IR 98418 IR 984IS IR 9847
'R 9847 IR 98-301 IR 98-301 NRC Housekeeping and configuration control for AFWsystem was adequate.
- However, poor communications among departments delayed resolution of an identified deficiency involving FME control. (Inadequate communication) Open pressure well on suction of 28 MDAFWwas left uncapped for five days after discovery and notification.
NRC Conduct of control room operations were professional, safety conscious and well controlled. Operator trainees were effectively supervised.
NRC The inspector observed portions of six Non-Licensed Operator rounds.
The inspector verified that the operators were knowledgeable of equipment on their watch stations, appropriately identified deficiencies to the control room with followup actions taken, and followed approved procedures for other assigned tasks.
NRC The Unit 2 power reduction on May 21 involved dear three-part communication, and effective control by shift supervision.
Operators used appropriate procedures and reactivity changes were well controlled. Overall ~ the inspector concluded that the evolution was performed effectively.
NRC The examiners conduded that the SRO candidate performance on the written examination was weak. Overall performance on the operating test was satisfactory with some significant weaknesses noted in the areas of reconizing adverse plant parameters, understanding system response, and taking manual control of the equipment when automaitic actions fail to occur.
NRC The NRC noted that confusion existed among the candidates with regards to the expectations of performing the immediate operator actions in the standard post-trip actions of the EOPs.
Training on the implementation of the standard post-trip actions together with insufficient procedural guidance led to poor candidate performance.
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FROM: 6/28/98 TO: 1/31/99 Page1of 9
Last Updated:
8/1/98
ST. LUCIE 01-Feb-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 7/23/98 759 Positive IR 98-301 7/18/98 NCV 751 IR 9848 NINTENANCE~~+@~~~~~-
7/23/98 Negative IR 98-301 760 NRC The NRC conduded that inadequate administration of security precautions led to the packaging of exam materials in a single envelope which was delivered to the NRC in an opened condition.
NRC The NRC noted the quality of the licensee's proposed examination was satisfactory and had significantly improved as compared to the previous examination submittal.
LICENSEE Nudear Watch Engineer on shift exceeded TS 6.2.2.f overtime limits by working 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> in a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period. (Personnel error) NWE did not use the overtime tracking computer program properly.
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C 12345 CIOQQ 0 00000 CI 000 12345 A OOQOCI~
B OQCICIOW c 0 CICIQ 12345 A QOHOO B 0000 0 c 0 000 8/1/98 757 8/1/98 755 Positive 8/1/98 754 Positive 7/24/98 LER 729 ENG Positive SAQV IR 98-08 IR 98-08 IR 98-08 IR 9847 NRC Human factors review team conducted a thorough investigation of the inadvertant start and realignment of the FHB and Shield Building Ventilation systems due to personnel error.
NRC Troubleshooting activities to resolve problems with the AuxiliaiyFeedwater Actuation System "D"channel and 1A Emeregency Diesel Generator were well coordinated and timely.
NRC Routine maintenance and surveillance activities were satisfactorily performed.
Additionally, the AuxiliaryFeedwater Actuation System "D"channel troubleshooting activities were well coordinated.
LICENSEE LER 50-389/98403-00, "Containment Pressure Instrumentation Design Single Failure Vulnerability,"was dosed. Aviolation of Criterion IIIofAppendix B to 10 CFR 50 was identified. However; consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy guidance of Section VII.B.3,the NRC has chosen to exercise enforcement discretion.
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FROM: 6/28/98 TO:1/31/99'age2of 9
Last Updated:
8/1/98
ST. LUCIE 01-Feb-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s) 7/24/98 Positive IR 984I7 728 ID'd ISSUE(s)
NRC Adetailed Maintenance Rule structures inspection and monitoring program was in place and inspection results were well documented.
SMM CODES 12345 7/24/98 727 7/24/98 726 7/23/98 756 Negative Positive Negative ttt~.
IR 98-07 IR 98-07 IR 98-08 NRC The inspectors identified a general deficiency in the use of three part communications by maintenance personnel.
NRC Maintenance activities were generally conducted thoroughly and professionally. The technicians observed by the inspectors were knowledgeable about the equipment they were working on, and about their assigned job tasks. Allprocedures were followed appropriately and test equipment was properly calibrated.
LICENSEE During a periodic calibration of Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool radiation monitors, l&C technicians inadvertantly started the Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System and caused the Shield Building Ventilation System to realign. (Personal error) l&C technicians plugged test adaptor into wrong outlet causing a momentary low voltage condition on the common power power supply for RIM-26-7, 9 and 11.
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A OOHQCI B HOOQQ C 0 ClCIQ 7/24/98 731 7/24/98 730 Positive Positive IR 98-07 IR 9847 NRC NRC The inspectors conduded that the licensee was actively engaged in se! f-assessments and that the assessments were identifying program enhancements, which the licensee was implementing. These assessment activities were viewed as a strength by the inspector.
Based on reviews conducted during this inspection, the inspectors determined that licensee engineering personnel are experienced and possess good technical and plant knowledge. This personnel knowledge indudes a good understanding of the engineering processes and organizational interfaces involved in controlling, maintaining, and supporting the operating plant.
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Last Updated:
8/1/98
ST. LUCIE 01-Feb-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SIIM CODES 7/9/98 750 URI IR 98-201 NRC Multipleexamples ofdesign conditions where a fire mitigation system design does not meet plant licensing basis requirements or commitments to minimum industry codes and standards FPL's.
- The team noted numerous missed opportunities (e.g., main control room ceiling tiles, annunciator level) to recognize problems associated with the detection system.
tn addition, it was not dear that the licensee has demonstrated that the system design deficiencies willnot have an impact on the system's defense-in4epth ability to rapidly detect a fire.
- FPL's procedures for testing the preaction sprinkler system's deluge valve do not meet the National Fire Protection Association Standard 25 or the vendor's requirements for testing the automatic water-based fire suppression systems.
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- The results of the licensee's recent self-assessment identified problems with the Unit 1 cable spreading room Halon 1301 system.
However, the question of the minimum required concentration and the minimum soak time has not been addressed by the licensee.
The licensee considers the system to be "operable;"
however, the licensee could not produce design-basis tests for the concentrations and soak times of the system, nor could it demonstrate operability to the inspectors.
This issue was considered significant since the system was not designed to extinguish the expected hazard (i.e., a "deep-seated" cable fire).
7/9/98 749 URI IR 98-201
- Problems were discovered by FPL with the standpipe and hose stations. Allareas of the plant are required to have a minimum of two hose stations accessible to them.
These problems have not been addressed by the licensee and was considered significant since the "primary protection" hose stations have been determined to possess certain design weaknesses.
This issue brings into question the ability of the "backup" hose station (i.e. ~ second hose station) to provide adequate coverage.
NRC FPL Thermo-Lag fire testing demonstrated that the upgraded fire wall would provide a fire-resistive rating for 1-hour and 48 minutes.
However. this qualification rating may be questionable considering the failed hose stream testing.
The FPL engineering evaluation of the cable loftwall could not adequately demonstrate to the team that it could protect one train of post-fire safe-shutdown capability and keep it free from fire damage.
In the case of the Unit 1 cable loft, the evaluation was further weakened by the lack of any automatic fire suppression. These fire barriers walls are not qualified to meet the plant's licensing basis and the requirements.
12345 A CIOOOO g CICICIHCI c O OOO FROM: 6/28/98 TO: 1/31/99 Page4of 9
Last Updated:
8/1/98
ST. LUCIE 01-Feb-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 7/9/98 747 URI IR 98-201 NRC The inspectors identified multiple examples offailures of the fire protection program and post-fire safe shutdown analysis to demonstrate compliance with Appendix R.
- Section III.LofAppendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 states that support functions shall be capable of providing the process cooling necessary to permit the operation of equipment used for safe-shutdown functions and that alternative shutdown capability shall accommodate post-fire conditions when offsite power is and is not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Not including heating, ventilation, and air conditioning for the hot-shutdown control panel room re presents a lack of incorporation of Appendix R fire effects in the safe-shutdown required analyses.
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- For the sample of circuits selected by the team for review during the inspection, the FPFI team found that the level of protection provided for redundant trains of post-fire shutdown systems did not satisfy the technical requirements of Sections III.G and III.LofAppendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
- The licensee had not developed a controlled procedure to govern the replacement of fuses.
Additionally, the licensee's reliance on generic procedural guidance that directed operators to restore operability of power sources that may be lost as a result of fire-induced high-impedance faults did not satisfy Section III.Gof Appendix R or the guidance contained in Generic Letter 86-10.
- The licensee's analysis and method of protection for fire-induced spurious equipment operations does not satisfy 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G or III.L.
- The licensee found that the oil collection system for the reactor coolant pumps was not catching and collecting oil leaking from the reactor coolant pump motor's lubrication system as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.O.
7/9/98 745 7/9/98 743 URI Weakness IR 98-201 IR 98-201 NRC NRC
- As part of its ongoing safe-shutdown analysis revalidation effort, FPL has identified deficiencies in Appendix R emergency lighting and the post-fire safe-shutdown communications system.
Corrective Actions for weaknesses identified by QAwere performed slowly by the PSL Engineering Department.
On the basis of a review of the PSL Fire Protection Plan and the licensee's identified weaknesses associated with the SSA and its translation into post-fire safe-shutdown procedures and operator actions, it was not dear who was fundamentally responsible for overall compliance with fire protection requirements.
This lack of program ownership was viewed by the inspection team as a significant contributor to the fire protection and post-fire safe-shutdown program weaknesses identified by the PSL reevaluation.
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A OCIOQ CI B OCIOH CI c Q CIHO FROM: 6/28/98 TO: 1/31/99 Page 5of 9 Last Updated:
8/1/98
ST.
I UCIE 01-Feb-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 7/9/98 742 URI IR 98-201 NRC On the basis of a review of the PSL Fire Protection Plan and its referenced procedures, the team determined that no specific criteria or guidelines had been established for determining when either the plant fire protection or the post-fire safe-shutdown features are inoperable or outside their design basis.
In addition. the plan does not establish controls that govern the operability or availability of post-fire safe-shutdown equipment such that power operations can be conducted with the assurance that a train of systems needed for safe-shutdown willbe free of fire damage, or when conditions of inoperability exist, the plan does not ensure that appropriate measures have been established to compensate for the post-fire safe-shutdown system deficiency. The fire protection plan failed to address Appendix R post-fire safe-shutdown capability and govern its operability.
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8/I/98 758 7/24/98 734 7/24/98 733 7/24/98 732 7/9/98 748 Positive Positive Positive Positive Weakness ENG IR 9848 IR 98-07 IR 98-07 IR 98%7 IR 98-201 NRC Compensatory measures in place at the time of the inspection were in compliance with the Physical Security Plan. The licensee's access control program had been modified and was improved. Records reviewed met the requirements specified in the PSP. The licensee was conducting testing and maintenance for security related equipment as required by the PSP and implementing procedure. Both passive and active barriers of the VBS were in place and operational as required by the PSP.
NRC Licensee efforts in reducing and controlling the quantity of contaminated materials on site following the steam generator replacement project were good. Radioactive waste streams were properly characterized.
NRC NRC The licensee's planning and coordination for the transport and isposal of the original steam generators were good. The staff responsible for the preparation and transportation of radioactive materials and radioactive waste were knowledgeable of the applicable transportation requirements.
Radioactive waste and radioactive material shipping documentation and records papers met applicable requirements and were properly completed.
Post-fire safe-shutdown procedures 1-ONOP-100.01 and 1-ONOP-100.02 exhibited omissions in that they did not properly address isolation of the main feedwater system and its regulating valves, the main steam bypass valves, and the reactor head vent valves.
NRC Licensee appropriately notified individuals who tested positive for drugs and alcohol of their appeal rights and followed the implementing as required by 10CFR26.28 A
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.QQCI 12345 FROM: 6/28/98 TO: 1/31/99 Page6of 9
Last Updated:
8/1/98
ST. LUCIE 01-Feb-99 7/9/98 744 Positive IR 98-201 7/9/98 741 URI IR 98-201 7/9/98 740 URI IR 98-201 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s) 7/9/98 Weakness ENG IR 98-201 746 ID'd NRC NRC NRC NRC ISSUE(s)
The lack of onsite Appendix R fire protection engineering expertise in the PSL Engineering Department has become apparent to the team. This was supported by the identified concerns in the modification review process Wea to focus on maintaining the post-fire safe-shutdown design.
The Quality Assurance Department at PSL has been conducting detailed, critical, and insightful quality assurance audits in the fire protection and post-fire safe-shutdown areas.
The team noted that the fire brigade did not fullyuse the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) during the drill. The partial use of the SCBA did not expose the fire brigade personnel to the stresses and limitations created by its fulluse. The team concluded that the importance of the fulluse of the SCBA was not recognized.
This has been identified as a failure to perform fire brigade drillin accordance with the requirements of the approved fire p'rotection program and Appendix R.
The licensee has developed firefighting strategies for all Unit 1 and Unit 2 fire areas.
However, these strategies, which provide important fire and smoke control information to the fire brigade, do not reflect (1) manual actions to ensure ventilation requirements as specified by the SSA, (2) radiological controls for firefighting water runoff, and (3) manual smoke removal methods for maintaining the post-fire operator habitability of shutdown-related spaces adjacent to the fire area of concern.
These are examples of a failure to update the firefighting strategies to reflect the requirements of the approved fire protection plan and Appendix R. This has been identified as an unresolved item.
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7/9/98 739 7/9/98 738 URI Positive IR 98-201 IR 98-201 NRC NRC Two examples of fire protection surveillance program prob'lems were identified during the inspection: (1) the failure to include any administrative requirements governing surveillance testing, operability, and compensatory measures for the Appendix R post-fire safe-shutdown equipment and features in the fire protection program, and (2) the failure of the fire hose station surveillance program to confirm coverage in accordance with requirements of the UFSAR. These examples are considered to be failures of the licenses's fire hose station surveillance program to confirm hose station coverage in accordance with the UFSAR and have been identified as an unresolved item.
Generally, the licensee's fire protection surveillance and inspection requirements (for fire protection systems selected by the team) were found to be satisfactory and properly implemented.
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A 00000 8 OHCIO 0 cQ 000 FROM: 6/28/98 TO: 1/31/99 Page7of 9
Last Updated:
8/1/98
ST. LUCIE 01-Feb-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 7/9/98 737 7/9/98 736 7/9/98 735 MISC URI Positive ENG IR 98-201 IR 98-201 IR 98-201 NRC NRC NRC Backup (emergency) lighting was not provided by the licensee for the fire brigade equipment and dressout lockers. This situation, under certain conditions, could delay the response of the fire brigade and the logistics for deployment of its equipment. The licensee evaluated this situation during the inspection and took corrective actions to establish backup lighting in these areas.
The personal protective firefighting equipment provided to the brigade and used to cope with onsite fire emergencies did not provide the level of safety needed to protect fire brigade members from being exposed directly to the hazards associated with interior firefighting.
The various plant departments had not consistently implemented their responsibilities, as specified by these procedures, for the control of combustible fire hazards. The plant departments'mplementation of the combustible control procedures and operational practices were not consistent with the PSL fire protection program in that plant personnel failed to followcombustible control procedures used to manage temporary storage of transient combustibles in safety-related areas.
The licensee's administrative combustible control procedures adequately implemented the approved fire protection program.
Implementation of the fire inspection program by the Protection Services Department was good.
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A QOOOO B OOOO CI CH QQO FROM: 6/28/98 TO: 1/31/99 Page8of 9I'ast Updated:
8/1/98
ST. LUCIE 01-Feb-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SALP Functional Areas:
ID Code:
1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 3A 3B 3C 4A 4B 4C 5A 5B 5C OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Normal Operations OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Operations During Transients OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Programs'and Processes MATERIALCONDITION-Equipment Condition MATERIALCONDITION-Programs and Processes HUMANPERFORMANCE - Work Performance HUMANPERFORMANCE - KSA HUMANPERFORMANCE-Work Environment ENGINEERING/DESIGN - Design ENGINEERING/DESIGN - Engineering Support ENGINEERING/DESIGN -
Programs and Processes PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION& SOLUTION - Identification PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION& SOLUTION - Analysis PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION& SOLUTION - Resolution ENG ENGINEERING MAINT MAINTENANCE OPS OPERATIONS PLT SUP PLANTSUPPORT SAQV SAFETY ASSESSMENT 8 QV LICENSEE LICENSEE
. NRC NRC SELF, SELF-REVEALED EEls are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEls and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee willbe provided with an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecisional enforcement conference.
URls are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question Is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation.
However, the NRC has not reached its fiinal conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
FROM: 6/28/98 TO: 1/31/99 Page 9of 9 Last Updated:
8/1/98
ST. LUCIE INSPECT(ON PLAN MARCH 15 THROUGH NOVEMBER 30, 1999 INSPECTION PROCEDURE/
TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION PROGRAM DIRECTIVE-NUREG-1021 IP 41500 IP 71001 TITLE/PROGRAM AREA OPERATOR - INITIAL EXAMS OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM INSPECTION OPERATOR-REQUALIFICATIONS NUMBER OF INSPECTORS OPERATIONS PLANNED INSPECTION DATES 6/99 3/1999 11/1 999 TYPE OF INSPECTION-COMMENTS INITIALEXAMS REGIONAL INITIATIVE CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM IP 73753 MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE 9/1 999 CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM - ISI
INSPECTION PROCEDUREI TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION TITLE/PROGRAM AREA NUMBER OF INSPECTORS ENGINEERING PLANNED INSPECTION DATES TYPE OF INSPECTION-COMMENTS IP 92904 ENGINEERING-FOLLOW-UP FIRE PROTECTION 8/1 999 11/1999 REGIONAL INITIATIVE IP 84750 IP 86750 RADIOACTIVEWASTE TREATMENT, AND EFFLUENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT AND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS PLANTSUPPORT 5/1999 11/1999 CORE INSPECTION PROGRAM
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