ML17228B433
| ML17228B433 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1996 |
| From: | Barr K, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17228B432 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-96-02, 50-335-96-2, 50-389-96-02, 50-389-96-2, NUDOCS 9603260277 | |
| Download: ML17228B433 (23) | |
See also: IR 05000335/1996002
Text
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n
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIEITASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199
Licensee:
Florida Power
and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami,
FL
33102
,s
'.!
Report Nos.:
50-335/96-02
and 50-389/96-02
Docket Nos.:
50-335
and 50-389
Facility Name:
St.
Lucie Plant Units
1 and
2
Inspection
Conducte
February 5-9,
1996
License Nos.:
and
Inspecto
~
~
W.
M. Sartor Jr.
Accompanying Personnel:
K.
F.
J.
S.
,
Team Leader
Clark, RII
Kantor,
Kreh, RII
Sandin,
Resident
Inspector
te Signed
Approved by:
Kenneth
P.
Bar
,
ief
Plant Support
Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Date Signed
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
announced
inspection
involved the observation
and evaluation of
the annual
emergency
preparedness
exercise,
conducted
from 7:00 a.m. to
1:46 p.m.
on February
7,
1996.
The onsite inspection
focused
on the adequacy
of the licensee's
emergency
response
program,
the implementation of the
Emergency
Plan
and procedures
in response
to the simulated
emergency
conditions,
and the effectiveness
of the emergency
response
training program
as reflected
by the players'erformance
during the exercise.
Correlative
offsite activities involving State
and local
emergency
response
organizations
were evaluated
by the Federal
Emergency
Management
Agency.
Results:
In the areas
inspected,
violations or deviations
were not identified.
The
exercise
demonstrated
that the onsite
emergency
plans
were adequate
and that
the licensee
was capable of implementing them.
A significant observation
was
made
by the licensee
during its self-evaluation critique process.
The
observation resulted
from the exercise
process
rather than the exercise
itself.
The observation
consisted of licensee objectively questioning its
overall state of emergency
response
readiness
as
a result of the need to
9603260277
960318
ADCICK 05000335
8
Enclosure
conduct two practice drills prior to the graded exercise for management
to be
satisfied with the performance
observed.
Management's
response
to this
observation
provided
a potential for a significantly improved emergency
response.
Specifically,
management
indicated
a need to conduct periodic
drills or exercises
that focus
on verification of the emergency
response
organization's capability to respond
at any time vice the confirmation of this
capability just prior to
a graded exercise.
Additional observations
made
as
a
result of the exercise itself included numerous positive remarks
and
some
areas for improvement.
Two areas for improvement included:
the
need for
management
to become
more involved in assuring
the correctness
of information
being provided in the offsite notification forms (paragraph
7)
and the need to
refine the command/control
coordination
between the damage control
teams
dispatched
from the Operational
Support Center
and the operational
teams
dispatched
by the Control
Room (paragraph
10).
Encl osure
REPORT DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
- Bailey, P.,
Corporate Health Physics,
Master
Rad Controller
- Benken, E., Licensing Engineer
- Bohlke, B., Site Vice President
- Burton, C., Services
Manager
- Czarnicki, R., Security Operations
Supervisor
- Denver, D., Engineering
Manager
- Fincher, P., Training Manager
- Frechette,
B., Chemistry Supervisor
- Heffelfinger, K., Protective Services
Manager
- Lavelle, S., Non-licensed Operators'ontroller
- McCullers, R., Health Physics
Operations
Supervisor
- Hohindrou, K., Chief Site Engineer
- Hothena, D.,
Emergency
Preparedness
Manager
- Paduano,
H., Manager,
Licensing
and Special
Prog'rams
- Pennenga,
R., Simulator
Lead Controller
- guillen, T., Licensing Engineer
- Revell, J.,
Emergency
Preparedness
Coordinator
- Rogers, L., System
and
Component
Engineering
Manager
- Sager,
D., Vice President,
Nuclear Assurance
- Scarola, J.,
Plant General
Manager
- Walker, R. (Richard),
Emergency
Preparedness
Coordinator
- Walker, R. (Roger),
Licensed Operator Instructor
- Weinkam, E., Licensing Manager
- Welle, R., Nuclear Plant Supervisor
- West, J., Operations
Manager
- Whitwell, D.,
Emergency
Planner
Other licensee
employees
contacted
during this inspection
included
engineers,
technicians,
and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exercise Scenario
(82302)
The scenario for the emergency
exercise
was reviewed to determine whether
provisions
had
been
made to test the integrated capability and
a major
portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee,
State,
and
local
emergency
plans
and organization
as required
by 10
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph
IV.F, and specific criteria in
The scenario
was reviewed in advance of the exercise
and was discussed
with licensee
representatives.
The scenario
developed for this exercise
was adequate
to drill the onsite
and offsite emergency organizations of
the licensee.
The scenario
also prompted
a range of response activities
sufficient for local government
agencies
and the State of Florida to
exercise
the various facets of their respective
emergency
response
plans
during this full-participation exercise.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Enclosure
,
2
Assignment of Res pons ibi 1 ity (82301)
This area
was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for
emergency
response
by the licensee
had
been specifically established
and
whether adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency
as
required
by 10
CFR 50.47(b)(l)
and
Paragraph
IV.A.
The inspectors
observed that specific assignments
had
been
made for the
licensee's
ERO and that there
was adequate staff available to respond to
the simulated
emergency.
The initial response
organization
was
augmented
by designated
licensee
representatives.
The capability for long-term or
continuous staffing of the
ERO was discussed,
and planning for relief was
initiated at each of the
ERFs.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
4,
Onsite
Emergency Organization
(82301)
The licensee's
onsite
emergency organization
was observed to determine
whether the responsibilities for emergency
response
were defined,
whether
adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident
response
in key functional
areas
at all times,
and whether the interfaces
were specified
as required
by 10
CFR 50.47(b)(2)
and
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph
IV.A.
The inspectors
determined that the licensee's
onsite
emergency
organization
was well defined
and was generally effective in dealing with
the simulated
emergency.
Adequate staffing of the
was provided for
the initial accident
response
,
and the interfaces
between the onsite
organization
and offsite support
agencies
were adequate
to ensure
prompt
notification and support from offsite agencies
as required.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
5.
Emergency
Response
Support
and Resources
(82301)
This area
was observed to determine
whether arrangements
for requesting
and effectively using assistance
resources
were made,
whether arrangements
to accommodate
State
and local personnel
in the
EOF were adequate,
and
whether other organizations
capable of augmenting
the planned
response
were identified as required
by 10
CFR 50.47(b)(2)
and
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph
IV.A.
The licensee's
Emergency
Plan provided information regarding additional
support
and resources
that
may be called
upon to assist
in an emergency.
The inspector
observed that representatives
of the State of Florida were
readily accommodated
at the
EOF,
and that arrangements
for requesting
offsite assistance
resources
were in place.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Enclosure
3
6.
Emergency Classification
System
(82301)
This area
was observed to verify that
a standard
emergency classification
and action level
scheme
was in use
by the licensee
as required
by
10
CFR 50.47(b)(4)
and Paragraph
IV.C of Appendix
E to 10
CFR Part 50.
Licensee
procedures
provided for off-normal events to be classified into
one of the four emergency classification categories.
The licensee's staff
made the following emergency classifications
during the exercise:
A Notification of Unusual
Event was declared
at 7:40 a.m.
based
on
an
unidentified Reactor Coolant System leakage of five gpm and proceeding
with plant shutdown.
An Alert was declared
at 9:20 a.m.
based
on
an increase
in
RCS leakage
to greater
than
20 gpm.
It was not clear to the inspector whether the
Alert classification
was anticipatory to the
leakage greater
than
50 gpm", or whether this information was simply
erroneous
and should
have stated
50 gpm.
The leakage
had
been
programmed into the simulator
as
a step function increase
to
approximately
65 gpm.
The 20 gpm entry was not
a significant issue
because
the leak rate
was increasing rapidly and the declaration
was
conservative.
A Site Area Emergency declaration
was
made at 10: 18 a.m.
based
on
a
rapid decrease
in
RCS pressure
and Safety Injection actuated
and
flowing to the
RCS.
A General
Emergency
was declared
at ll:06 a.m.
based
on no emergency
core cooling available.
The inspector
concluded the licensee satisfactorily classified exercise
events
in a timely manner.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
7.
Notification Methods
and Procedures
(82301)
This area
was observed to determine
whether procedures
had
been
established
for notification by the licensee of State
and local response
organizations
and emergency
personnel.;
whether the content of initial and
follow-up messages
to response
organizations
had
been established;
and
whether
means to provide early notification to the populace within the
plume exposure
pathway
EPZ had
been established
as required
by
10
CFR 50.47(b)(5)
and
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph
IV.D.
The inspector
observed that notification methods
and procedures
had
been
established
and were used to provide information to the offsite government
agencies
in a timely manner.
Several
inconsistencies
were observed
in the
use of the State of Florida Notification Message
Form.
Although none were
considered debilitating, they indicated that improvements
in training of
communicators
and
a better review of the notification forms by management
would be
a significant improvement.
Enclosure
Separately
from the exercise,
the inspector
reviewed the testing of the
siren system
used to alert the public if offsite protective actions
were
ordered
by governmental
authorities.
The full network of 85 sirens
in the
ten-mile
EPZ was tested quarterly, at noon
on the first Thursday of Harch,
June,
September,
and December.
The responsibility
and physical capability
to actuate
the sirens rested with St. Lucie and Hartin Counties,
whether
for a test or an actual
emergency.
Prior to each quarterly test involving
a full sounding of the sirens,
the licensee
and counties
released
statements
to the
news media (radio, television,
and print) to advise
residents
of the test.
Each quarterly test
began with an announcement,
using the public-address
capability of the sirens,
stating,
"The following
will be
a test of the Outdoor Warning System."
This announcement
was
made
with the siren horns fixed and pointed,
in turn, in each of eight compass
directions.
The sirens
were then
sounded
at full volume (rated at
123
dB
at
100 feet) for two minutes with continuous
horn rotation.
This alerting
signal
was followed by a closing announcement
(made in the
same
manner
as
the pretest
announcement)
stating,
"This concludes
the test of the Outdoor
Warning System."
This testing regime required
about
15 minutes,
according
to a licensee representative.
On
a annual
basis,
a booklet
on Safety Planning Information for the
St. Lucie Power Plant was mailed to each residence
in the ten-mile
EPZ.
In that booklet, residents
were told that if they hear
an outdoor warning
siren, they should promptly tune to
a designated
local radio or television
station for instructions.
The public-address
capability of the siren
system,
used only during tests,
was not intended to be used in the event
of an actual
emergency
and was not part of the FEHA-approved
prompt
notification system.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Emergency
Communications
(82301)
This area
was observed to determine
whether provisions existed for prompt
communications
among principal response
organizations
and emergency
personnel
as required
by 10
CFR 50.47(b)(6);
Paragraph
IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.F.
Communications
among the licensee's
emergency
response facilities and
emergency organization
and between
the licensee's
emergency
response
organization
and offsite authorities
were good.
No communications
related
problems
were identified during this exercise.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Public Education
and Information (82301)
This area
was observed
to determine whether information concerning the
simulated
emergency
was
made available for dissemination
to the public as
required
by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph
IV.D, and specific
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
Enclosure
Information was provided to the media
and the public in advance of the
exercise.
During the exercise,
the
ENC was established
and the licensee
demonstrated
the capability to perform
a timely and accurate
response
to
news inquiries.
The licensee
also effectively demonstrated
the ability to
coordinate the preparation,
review and release
of public information with
State
and local government
agencies.
The licensee's
public spokesperson
demonstrated
the capability to brief the media in a clear,
accurate
and
timely manner.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
10.
Emergency Facilities
and Equipment
(82301)
This area
was observed
to determine
whether adequate
emergency facilities
and equipment to support
an emergency
response
were provided
and
maintained
as required
by 10
CFR 50.47(b)(8);
10. CFR Part 50, Appendix
E,
Paragraph
IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,
Section II.H.
The inspectors
observed
the activation, staffing,
and operation of
selected
and evaluated
equipment provided for emergency
use during
the exercise.
a.
Control
Room Simulator - The
CRS staff operated
as
an effective team
in its response
to,
and management
of, the simulated
emergency.
The
NPS/EC demonstrated
able
command
and control during the portion of the
exercise
observed
in the
CRS by the inspector.
The
EC correctly
classified the conditions that initiated the emergency
as
a
NOUE,
and
notified designated
State authorities within 15 minutes.
The
inspector
noted that crew briefings by the
EC would have
been helpful
in ensuring that all personnel
were fully aware of changing plant
conditions.
b.
Technical
Support Center - The inspector
observed
the latter stages
in
the process of activating the
TSC following the Alert declaration.
The
ED declared
the
TSC operational
at 10:06 a.m.,
about
45 minutes
after the Alert declaration.
TSC personnel
appeared
to understand
their emergency duties
and responsibilities,
and executed their
functions in an organized
manner.
The staff's
demeanor
and the EC's
command
and control in the
TSC were very good.
Half-hourly briefings
in the
TSC were concise
and informative, although
some personnel
used
more abbreviations
and acronyms
than actual
words in their briefings.
The
ERDADS printers in the
TSC produced
a very high noise level which
was unnecessarily
obtrusive.
When those printers were not running,
the
TSC noise level
was quite low.
Communications
systems
appeared
to function properly.
Status
boards
were updated at least every
15 minutes
and were well maintained
throughout the exercise.
The functional
and operational
adequacy of
the
TSC were demonstrated
in this exercise.
Enclosure
c
d.
Operations
Support Center
- The inspectors
observed
the activation
and
staffing, establishment
of communications,
briefing and dispatch of
in-plant repair teams,
radiological controls,
and operation of the
facility.
The
OSC was activated in a timely manner.
The requirements
on the
OSC were not very challenging during this exercise
as only five
teams
were dispatched.
However, this was due in part to the non-
licensed operators
not being dispatched
from the
OSC.
The inspector
accompanying
one of the repair teams
noted confusion
as to who had
primary control of the repair mission
when repair personnel
from both
the
from the Control
Room were at the
same location.
Although this did not have
a negative
impact, the
licensee
was going to review this for possible refinement of the
command/control
of damage repair teams.
- Emergency Operations Facility
Activation of the
EOF was not an objective for this exercise.
Although the scenario
showed activation of the
EOF as
an objective,
the team was informed at the scenario briefing that the
EOF staff
would be prestaged.
The initial
EOF staff comes
from the plant while
the majority of the
EOF staff is from FP8L corporate offices in Juno
Beach.
It is the latter staff that was prestaged.
The prestaging,
while well meaning in intent to assist
the State
and counties in
achieving their objectives,
introduced
an air of artificiality into
the exercise
play and interfered with the
TSC in fully achieving
some
of its objectives.
The initial EOF staff from the site were notified to report to the
following the declaration of the Alert at 9:20 a.m. in accordance
with
EPIP-1102.
The minimum staff needed
for
EOF operation is specified in
EPIP-1102
and includes the Recovery Hanager
(RH),'the
RH Operations
Advisor,
an
ERDADS operator,
two dose
assessment
coordinators,
and
a
communicator.
The
RH declared
the
EOF in standby
mode (per EPIP-1102)
at 0956.
The decision
was
made by the Emergency Control Officer (ECO)
to fully activate the
EOF with the corporate
emergency
response
organization shortly after the declaration of the Alert.
As indicated
in the emergency
plan
and EPIP-1101,
the activation of the
EOF at the
Alert stage is optional
and the
ECO was requested
by the controllers
to activate the
EOF to maintain the scenario timeline.
At the time
the
ECO was under the mistaken
impression that the leak rate which
caused
the Alert was
20 gpm due to an erroneous
message
from the
Control
Room when in actuality the leak rate
was
65 gpm.
The
RH
declared
the
EOF operational
at 1006 at which time the
EOF assumed
responsibility for offsite communications
and
PARs.
Offsite organizations
represented
in the
EOF included the State of
Florida Division of Emergency
Hanagement
Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services
(DHRS) which included
dose
assessment
personnel
and field team controllers,
and St. Lucie
County and Hartin County emergency
response
personnel.
The senior
person in the
EOF was the Governor's Authorized Representative
(GAR)
who along with the senior St. Lucie and Hartin County representatives
had decisionmaking authority.
This is
a unique arrangement
to have
Enclosure
onsite
and offsite decisionmakers
both in the
EOF and it greatly
facilitated the exchange
on information and the development of
protective actions for the public.
As plant conditions deteriorated,
the
RH made effective use of his
staff and consulted frequently with the Emergency Coordinator
(EC) in
the TSC.
The
RH and his Operations
Advisor frequently referred to the
EALs in the site emergency
plan
and the
PAR flowchart in the plan
and
EPIP-1102.
The
PAR flowchart is consistent with current
NRC guidance
and properly emphasizes
the development of PARs based
on plant
conditions for severe
core
damage accidents.
The Site Area Emergency
(SAE) was declared
at
1018
and the General
Emergency
(GE) at 1106.
Following the declaration of the
GE by the
EC in the TSC, the
staff quickly developed
PARs using the
PAR flowchart.
The
declaration
and the
PARs were based
on plant conditions prior to the
release of any radioactive material
from the .plant.
The licensee's
PARs, to evacuate
0 to
2 miles in all directions
and
2 to 5 miles in
the downwind direction,
were given to the
GAR and County
representatives
in the
EOF.
The
GAR in coordination with the
DHRS and
Count representatives
in the
EOF concurred
in the
PARs upon
confirmation from the County
EOCs that there were
no impediments to
evacuation
in any of the offsite evacuation
areas.
A release
occurred
about
1100
and
began to increase
in severity.
The
EOF dose
assessment
staff developed
dose projections utilizing the
FP8L dose
model in accordance
with EPIP-3100033E.
Based
on monitor
readings
from the plant stack
and plant information from ERDADS and
other sources,
the Health Physics
Hanager
recommended
at about
1215
that the
be expanded
in accordance
with the
PAR flowchart to
include evacuation to 5 miles in all directions
and
5 to
10 miles in
the downwind directions.
The
RH concurred
in the recommendation
and
the
PARs were given to the
GAR and subsequently
issued to the public.
The decision to expand the
PARs was
based
on calculated thyroid doses
which in turn were based
on
a default iodine to noble gas ratio in the
dose model.
Although the development of the expanded
PAR based
on
dose projections
was in accordance
with procedure,
in retrospect it
would have
been prudent for the staff to acquire
more information on
plant conditions
and the composition of the release prior to modifying
the
PARs.
From a programmatic standpoint,
the
EOF staff adequately
demonstrated
the capability to perform dose
assessments
and met their
exercise objective in this regard.
The
EOF staff performed core
damage
assessment
in accordance
with
EPIP-1302,
a comprehensive
procedure for assessing
core
damage
under
emergency
response
conditions.
The
EOF staff's understanding
of the
core status
and their eventual
estimate of the extent of core
damage
agreed
reasonably
well with the scenario. value of core
damage.
The
EOF staff met their objective to perform core
damage
assessment.
The
RH exhibited
good
command
and control in the
EOF, effectively
directed
and utilized his staff,
and provided periodic briefings to
the general
EOF staff as the accident
progressed.
The
RH was assisted
in his decisionmaking efforts by the
ECO who is
a member of senior
Enclosure
corporate
management.
The support for and coordination with the State
and county representativ'es
in the
EOF was excellent.
At all times the
RH and his staff maintained
an awareness
of the need to coordinate
closely with the offsite representatives
in the
EOF.
Communications with the other response facilities including the
Emergency
News Center which is co-located with the
EOF was good.
messages
to the offsite response
organizations utilizing the State of
Florida notification form were issued within the prescribed
time
limits. Some minor discrepancies
were noted in the information on the
forms.
A discrepancy
involving the
PARs at the General
Emergency
stage
was identified and corrected
by the licensee.
This error had
no
adverse
impact
as the correct information was given to the State
and
county representatives
in the
EOF.
Overall the
EOF staff adequately
demonstrated
their~ capability to
perform their assigned
emergency
response
functions in a manner
consistent with program requirements
and guidance.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
11. Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's
critique of the emergency
exercise
was observed to
determine whether deficiencies identified as
a result of the exercise
and
weaknesses
noted in the licensee's
emergency
response
organization
were
formally presented
to licensee
management
for corrective actions
as
required
by 10
CFR 50.47(b)(14);
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Paragraph
IV.E; and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee
conducted player critiques following termination of the
exercise.
A detailed controller/evaluator critique was conducted
on the
day after the exercise.
A formal presentation
of the licensee's
critique
conclusions
was
made
on February
9,
1996, with exercise controllers,
licensee
management,
and
NRC personnel
attending.
The licensee
reviewed
the exercise objectives
and evaluated
the performance of the emergency
organization in meeting the objectives.
It was during this process that
the licensee
acknowledged
the basis of the results
paragraph
of the
summary portion of this report.
i.e.,
Licensee
management
objectively
questioned its overall state of emergency
response
readiness
as
a result
of the need to conduct two practice drills prior to the graded exercise
for management
to be satisfied with the performance
observed.
As a
result,
management
identified the
need to consider conducting periodic
drills or exercises
that focus
on verification of the emergency
response
organization's
capability to respond
at any time vice the confirmation of
this capability just prior to a graded exercise.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Encl osur e
Review of UFSAR Commitments
A recent discovery of a licensee
operating its facility in a manner
contrary to. the
UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special
focused review that compares
plant practices,
procedures,
and/or
parameters
to the
UFSAR descriptions.
While performing the inspection
discussed
in this report, the inspectors
reviewed the applicable portions
of the
UFSAR that related to the areas
inspected.
The inspectors verified
that the
UFSAR wording was consistent with the observed plant practices,
procedures,
and/or parameters.
The
UFSAR contains specific references
to the site emergency
plan.
However, the site
Emergency
Plan is maintained
as
a separate
document
from
the
13. Exit Interview
14.
The inspection
scope
and results
were summarized
on February
9,
1996, with
the persons
whose
names
are listed in Paragraph
1.
The Team Leader
described
the areas
inspected
and discussed
observations
made during the
inspection.
Licensee
management
was informed that the
NRC considered
the
exercise to have
been successful.
The
Team Leader acknowledged
the
licensee's
comments
made regarding doing periodic drills.
Dissenting
comments
were not received
from the licensee.
Proprietary information was
reviewed during the inspection
but none is contained
in this report.
Federal
Evaluation
Team Report
The report by the Federal
Evaluation
Team (Regional
Assistance
Committee
and Federal. Emergency
Management
Agency,
Regions
IV staff) concerning the
activities of offsite agencies
during the exercise will be forwarded
by
separate
correspondence.
18.
Index of
CFR
dB
EC
ECO
FEHA
GAR
Abbreviations
Used in This Report
Code of Federal
Regulations
Control
Room Simulator
decibel
Division of Emergency
Management
Emergency Action Level
Emergency Coordinator
Emergency Control Officer
Emergency Operations
Center
Emergency
Plan Implementing Procedure
Emergency
Planning
Zone
Emergency
Response
Data Acquisition Display System
Emergency
Response
Facility
Emergency
Response
Organization
Federal
Emergency
Management
Agency
Florida Power
and Light
Governor's Authorized Representative
General
Emergency
Enclosure
10
gpm
NRC
gallons per minute
Non-licensed
Operator
Notification of Unusual
Event
Nuclear Plant Supervisor
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Operations
Support Center
Protective Action Recommendation
Recovery
Manager
Site Area Emergency
Technical
Support Center
Updated Final Safety Analysis Review
Attachment
(10 pages):
Scope
and Objectives,
and
Narrative
Summai"y and Timeline
Enclosure
e
FLORIDAPOWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
ST. LUCIE PLANT
1996 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE
FEBRUARY 7, 1996
2.1
SCOPE
To assure that the health and safety of the general public is protected in the event of an
accident at St. Lucie Nuclear Plant (PSL), it is necessary for Florida Power and Light
Company (FPL) to conduct an annual emergency preparedness
exercise.
This is the
1996 Evaluated Exercise at St. Lucie Nuclear Plant.
This exercise involves mobilization of
FPL, State of Florida and Local Government Agency personnel and resources to respond to
a simulated accident scenario.
The exercise willbe observed and evaluated on-site by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). An FPL Controller/Evaluator organization will
control, observe, evaluate and critique the PSL portion of the exercise so that the emergency
response capabilities of the utility may be assessed.
The exercise willbe observed and
evaluated off-site by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). A State of
Florida and Local Government Agency Controller/Evaluator organization willcontrol,
observe, evaluate and critique the off-site portion of the exercise so that the emergency
response capabilities of the off-site agencies may be assessed.
Due to the compressed timeline of the exercise, some portions of the FPL Emergency
Response
Organization may be prepositioned.
Allon-site Emergency Response Facilities
(ERFs) willbe activated in accordance with simulated conditions and appropriate emergency
response procedures for the exercise.
Exercise participants ("players" ) willnot have any prior
knowledge of the simulated accident events, operational sequence,
radiological effluents or
weather conditions.
The operations portion of the exercise willbe performed from the Plant Simulator.
Operations data willbe generated
and supplied real-time by the Plant Simulator.
State and Local Government Agencies willparticipate in the off-site portion of the exercise.
The fonowing drills are incorporated into the exercise scenario and willbe demonstrated
concurrently in the course of the exercise:
Radiological Monitoring Drill: Both on-site and off-site teams willbe dispatched during the
drill to obtain required air samples and measurements
associated with a simulated off-site
release of radioactivity and communicate these results to the appropriate Emergency Response
Facility (ERF).
(Field monitoring team protective clothing and respiratory protection willbe
simulated in the field.)
Health Physics Drill: Involves the response to and analysis of simulated elevated activity
airborne or liquid samples, radiation exposure control, emergency dosimetry and the use of
protective equipment on-site.
FPL/PSL
2.1-1
96.EEX, Rcv. 0, 10-11-95
FOR PRO1ECTION SERVICES USE
ATTACHMENT
2.1
SCOPE
(continued)
Communications DriH: Actual usage and demonstration of the integrity of emergency
response communications links and equipment between St. Lucie Plant and the FPL off-site
Emergency Response
Organization (ERO) and off-site response
agencies.
Since the details
of the exercise are held confidential, this drill also satisfies the annual Unannounced
Communications Drill.
Medical Emergency Drill: Demonstrates
the ability of the off-site medical support facility
(Martin Memorial Medical Center) to treat an injured and contaminated individual.
The overall intent of the exercise is to demonstrate that the FPL staff assigned responsibilities
in an emergency situation are adequately trained to perform in accordance with emergency
preparedness
plans and procedures.
2.1-2
96.EEX. Rcv. 0, 10-11-95
FOR PROTECTION SERVICES USE
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY
ST. LUCIEPLANT
1996 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATEDEXP&CISE
FEBRUARY 7, 1996
2.2
~OB
CTIVRS
The St. Lucie Plant (PSL) 1996 emergency preparedness
exercise objectives are based
upon Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements provided in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E,
Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities and
inspection criteria listed in the NRC Inspection Manual. Additional guidance provided in
NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of
Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness
in Support ofNuclear Power
Plants, was utilized in developing the objectives.
The exercise willbe conducted and evaluated using a realistic basis for activities.
Scenario
events may escalate to a release of radioactive material to the environment.
The following objectives for the exercise are consistent with the aforementioned
documents:
A.
Accident Assessment and Classification
1.
Demonstrate the ability to assess
accident conditions.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to identify initiating conditions, review conditions
against the Emergency Action Level (EALs), and correctly classify the
emergency throughout the exercise.
B.
Notification
1'.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and mobilize Florida Power and Light
(FPL) emergency response
personnel.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to alert and notify non-emergency
response personnel.
3.
Demonstrate appropriate procedures for both initial and follow-up notifications.
4.
Demonstrate the capability to promptly notify the State of Florida and Local
Authorities of an emergency declaration or change in emergency classification.
5.
Demonstrate the capability to promptly notif'y the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) of an emergency declaration or change in emergency
classification.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and timely information to State,
Local and Federal Authorities concerning class of the emergency plant
status/conditions
and whether a radioactive release is in progress,
as appropriate.
Demonstrate the ability to provide periodic plant status updates to State,
Local and Federal Authorities.
FPIJPSL
22-1
96.EEX, Rev. 0, 10-11-95
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CTIVIH
C.
Communications
1.
Demonstrate the availability and operability of emergency communications
equipment for notification of State, Local and Federal Authorities.
2.
Demonstrate the means to provide follow-up information to State, Local and
Federal Authorities.
3.
Demonstrate the availability and operability of communications equipment in
the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) for interfacility communications.
4.
Demonstrate the availability and operability of emergency communications
equipment necessary for off-site monitoring activities.
5.
Demonstrate the means to acquire meteorological data necessary for emergency
response.
D.
Emergency Response
1.
Demonstrate staffing of Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs).
2.
Demonstrate planning for 24-hour per day emergency response capabilities.
Demonstrate the activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC) and
Operational Support Center (OSC).
4.
Demonstrate the activation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
Demonstrate the functional and operational adequacy of the Emergency
Response
6.
Demonstrate the ability of each Emergency Response Facility Manager to
maintain command and control over the emergency response activities
conducted within the facility throughout the exercise.
7.
Demonstrate the ability of each facility manager to periodically inform facility
personnel of the status of the emergency situation and plant conditions.
8.
Demonstrate the transfer of Emergency Coordinator (EC) function from the
Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS) to designated senior plant management
and
transfer of Emergency Coordinator responsibilities [(1) off-site notification to
the State and Local Authorities and (2) recommending protective actions] to
the Recovery Manager (RM).
22-2
96-EEX, Rcv. 0, 10-11-95
FOR PRGIECrioN SERVICES USE
22
~OB
C11VtJI
/
Emergency Response
(continued)
9.
Demonstrate the ability to promptly and accurately transfer information
between Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs).
10.
Demonstrate the ability of the TSC to request and prioritized Emergency
Response
Teams (ERTs) in a timely manner.
11.
Demonstrate
the ability of the OSC to assemble,
dispatch and control ERTs in
a timely manner.
12.
Demonstrate the capability for development of the appropriate Protective
Action Recommendations
(PARs) for the general public within the 10 Mile
Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
13.
Demonstrate that the appropriate PARs can be communicated to State and
Local Authorities within the regulatory time constraints.
14.
Demonstrate the activation, staffing and control of the Emergency News'enter
(ENC).
E.
Radiological Assessment and Control
1.
Demonstrate the capability to provide radiological monitoring for people
evacuated from the site.
2.
Demonstrate the coordinated gathering of radiological data necessary for
emergency response, including collection and analysis of in-plant surveys
and samples,
as applicable.
3.
Demonstrate
the capability to calculate radiological release dose projections and
perform timely and accurate dose assessment,
as appropriate.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to compare on-site and off-site dose projections to the
EPA protective action guidelines and determine and recommend the appropriate
protective actions.
5.
Demonstrate the ability to provide dosimetry to emergency response personnel
as required and adequately track personnel exposure.
6.
Demonstrate the capability to confirm and periodically assess
the habitability of
the on-site Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs).
FPIJPSL
2.2-3
96-EEX, Rcv. 0, 10-11-95
FOR PROTECriON SERVICES USE
22
~OB
C11VM
E.
Radiological Assessment and Control
(continued)
7.
Demonstrate the capability for on-site contamination control.
8.
Demonstrate the ability to adequately control radiation exposure to on-site
emergency workers, as appropriate to radiological conditions.
9.
Demonstrate the decision making process for authorizing emergency workers
to receive radiation doses in excess of 10 CFR Part 20 limits, as appropriate.
10.
Demonstrate
the ability to control and coordinate the flow of information
regarding off-site radiological consequences
between radiological assessment
11.
Demonstrate the ability of field monitoring teams to respond to and analyze
an airborne radiological release through direct radiation measurements
in the
environment,
as appropriate.
12.
Demonstrate the means to determine the necessity of and the capability 'for
decontamination.
13.
Demonstrate the ability to assemble
and dispatch field monitoring teams.
14.
Demonstrate the collection and analysis of air samples
and provisions for
effective communications and recordkeeping,
as appropriate.
15.
Demonstrate the ability to control and coordinate the flow of information
regarding off-site radiological consequences
with State radiological assessment
personnel in the EOF.
F.
Public Information Program
1.
Demonstrate the timely and accurate response
to news inquiries.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely
manner.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the preparation, review and release of
public information with State and Local Government Agencies, as appropriate.
96-EEX, Rcv. 0, 10-11-95
FOR PROTECTION SERVICES USE
22
~OB
C11VES
6.
Medical Emergency
1.
Demonstrate the ability to respond to a radiation medical emergency in a
timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the capability of the First Aid and Personnel Decontamination
Team to respond to a medical emergency, administer first aid and survey for
contamination on a simulated contaminated injured individual.
3.
Demonstrate the capability to arrange for and obtain transportation and off-site
medical support for a radiological accident victim.
4.
Demonstrate the ability of Martin Memorial Medical Center personnel to treat
an injured and/or contaminated patient.
H.
Evaluation
1.
Demonstrate the ability to conduct a post-exercise critique to determine areas
requiring corrective action or improvement.
I.
ClariTications/Exemptions
Areas of the PSL Emergency Plan that willNOT be demonstrated during this exercise
include:
1.
(E.1) Actual radiological monitoring of evacuated personnel (off-site HP
monitoring resources willbe identified and allocated to the off-site Assembly
Area).
2,
(E.9) Credit willbe taken for discussion of the decision-making process during
evaluation of the need for dose extension(s).
3.
Site evacuation of non-essential personnel.
4.
On-site personnel accountability.
5.
Availability and operability of backup communications equipment.
FPL/PSL
22-5
96-EEX, Rev. 0, 10-11-95
FOR PROTECrioN SERVICES USE
CONFIDENTIAL(unta 2-7-96)
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY
ST. LUCIE PLANT
1996 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE
FEBRUARY 7, 1996
3.1
NARRATIVESUMMARY
Unit 2, which is operating at 100% power, has a Health Physics (HP) team performing a
containment entry.
When the team is notified to leave containment due to the initiation of a
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak, the utilityworker, in his haste, trips and falls in the
airlock. The Radiation Protection Man (RPM) assists the utilityworker out of containment
and secures the personnel hatch.
The contaminated injured utilityworker is transported
offsite for medical treatment.
The Operators have commenced
a downpower when the RCS leakage increases
to greater
than 10 gallons per minute (gpm) and an (Notification of) Unusual Event is declared.
The RCS leakage continues to increase to greater than 50 gpm and an Alert is declared.
Operators increase the rate of the downpower.
When the Operators trip the Unit, or shortly thereafter, a large break occurs in the "2A1"
Cold Leg. As the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) is initiated the 2B3 4.16 KVbus
experiences
a differential current fault which disables all B side safety systems.
A Site Area
Emergency is declared at this time.
The Control Room (Simulator) receives an inadvertent Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS)
which results in the isolation of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), the RWST
Suction Valve fails to reopen.
Both trains of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)
are lost and cause the declaration of a General Emergency.
ECCS willbe reestablished
but not until after Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) temperatures
exceed 700 degrees Fahrenheit and a core melt sequence
is initiated.
Tire radiological release,
monitored by the plant vent, requires a recommended protective action of evacuation out to
five miles downwind of the release.
3.1-1
CONFIDENTIAL(unto 2-7-96)
96-EEX, Rcv. 0, 10-11-95
FOR PROTECTION SERVICES USE
CONFIDENTIAL(~ca ~7-9@
FLORIDA POWER ANDLIGHTCOMPANY
ST. LUCIE PLANT
1996 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE
FEBRUARY 7, 1996
3.2
SCENARIO TIMELINE
TIME
(all times approximate)
EVENT
Scenario
Clock
00/00
00/30
0700
0730
Shift Turnover - Initial Conditions.
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage increases to greater than
1 gallon per minute (gpm).
00/45
01/00-
0745
0800
Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS) should declare an (Notification of)
UNUSUALEVENT due to RCS leaka e GREATER THAN
allowed b
Technical S ecifications.
Operators initiate a downpower.
A Medical Emergency is reported to the Unit 2 Control Room
(Simulator).
01/05
01/50
02/15
0805
0850
0915
Contingency Message for the Unusual Event
The First Aid/Personnel Decontamination Team is activated to
respond to the injured person.
The contaminated injured person leaves the Radiation Controlled
Area (RCA) and is taken to Martin Memorial Medical Center.
RCS leakage increases to 65 gpm.
The Emergency Coordinator (EC) should declare an ALERT due
to RCS leaka
e GREATER THAN 50
m.
02/45
0945
Operators increase the rate of the downpower.
Contingency Message for the Alert
(Depending on rate of downpower, Operators take Unit offline.)
FPL/PSL
32-1
CONFIDENTIAL(uatil 2-7-96)
96-EH4 Rcv. 0, 10-11-95
FoR pRGIEcrION sERYIcEs UsE
CONFIDENTIAL(~at 2-7-W
32
SCENARIO TIMELINE (continued)
TIME
(all times approximate)
Scenario
Clock
03/15
1015
A large break occurs on the 2A1 Cold Leg resulting in a Loss of
Coolant Accident (LOCA).
The 2B3 4160 volt Bus is lost due to a differential current fault.
The EC should declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY due to
LOCA GREATER THAN ca aci
of char in
um s.
03/45
1045
Operators trip the Unit, ifthe Unit is not already offline.
On the unexplained A side Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS),
the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Suction Valve fails
closed, but the Containment Sump Suction Valve fails to open.
AllEmergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) capability is lost.
The EC should declare a GENERAL EMERGENCY due to
Emer enc
Coordinator's 'ud ement that
lant conditions exist
that make release of lar e amounts of radioactivi
in a short
riod a
ear
ossible or likel . (Any core melt situation)
04/15
1115
Contingency Message for Site Area Emergency
Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) temperatures
exceed 700 degrees
Fahrenheit.
04/15
04/45
07/00
1115
1145
1400
A release of radiation is initiated.
Contingency Message for General Emergency
ECCS is restored and radiation levels start to diminish.
Exercise is terminated.
FPL/PSL
32-2
CONFIDENTIAL(untii 2-7-96)
96.EEX, Rcv. 0, 10-11-95
FOR PROIECTION SERVICES USE