ML17228B152
| ML17228B152 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1995 |
| From: | Landis K, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17228B151 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-95-09, 50-335-95-9, 50-389-95-09, 50-389-95-9, NUDOCS 9505310101 | |
| Download: ML17228B152 (25) | |
See also: IR 05000335/1995009
Text
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323-0199
Report Nos.:
50-335/95-09
and 50-389/95-09
Licensee:
Power
8 Light Co
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami,
FL
33102
Docket Nos.:
50-335
and 50-389
License Nos.:
and
Facility Name:
St.
Lucie
1
and
2
Inspection
Conducted:
April 2 through April 29
Inspectors:
R. L. Pr
atte,
Senior
esident
Inspector
M. S. Miller, Resident
Inspector
D
e Sig ed
Approved by:
e
K.
.
Lan is, Chief
Reactor Projects
Section
2B
Division of Reactor Projects
D
e
S gned
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine resident
inspection
was conducted
on site in the areas
of plant operations
review, maintenance
observations,
surveillance
observations,
plant support,
followup of previous inspection
findings,
and other areas.
Inspections
were performed during normal
and backshift hours
and
on
weekends
and holidays.
Results:
Plant Operations:
Operators
were well-prepared for,
and maneuvered
the plant without
incident during, the
down power and removal of the generator
from
the line to perform repairs
on
a digital electro-hydraulic
system
power supply.
The decision to perform this activity off-line
demonstrated
management's
conservative
approach
to safe operation.
Maintenance
and outage
management
planning,
scheduling,
and support
of this short outage
was excellent.
95053iOiOi 9505i9
ADOCK 05000335
Maintenance
and Surveillance:
Maintenance
performance
during the short outage
was excellent.
The
planned critical work activities were accomplished
ahead of schedule
and permitted
an orderly return to power.
No deficiencies
were
identified during the observation of maintenance
activities.
A late
surveillance
due to
a scheduling oversight resulted
in a non-cited
violation.
This was the first regularly scheduled
surveillance
not
accomplished
on schedule
since
1991.
Engineering:
Engineering
support for the short notice outage
was satisfactory.
Plant Support:
The plant continued to perform well in the Fire Protection,
Radiological Controls,
and Physical
Security areas.
Within the areas
inspected,
the following non-cited violation was
identified associated
with events
reported
by the licensee:
NCV 389/95-09-01,
"Hissed Surveillance of Unit 2 Personnel
Air
Lock", paragraph
4.b.
,
Persons
Contacted
REPORT
DETAILS
Licensee
Employees
R. Ball, Mechanical
Maintenance
Supervisor
W. Bladow, Site guality Hanager
W. Bohlke, Nuclear Engineering
and Licensing Vice
L. Bossinger,
Electrical Haintenance
Supervisor
H. Buchanan,
Health Physics Supervisor
C. Burton, St.
Lucie Plant General
Manager
R.
Dawson,
Licensing Manager
D. Denver, Site Engineering
Manager
J.
Dyer, Maintenance guality Control Supervisor
H. Fagley,
Construction Services
Manager
P. Fincher, Training Manager
R. Frechette,
Chemistry Supervisor
K. Heffelfinger, Protection Services
Supervisor
J. Holt, Plant Licensing Engineer
G.
Madden,
Plant Licensing Engineer
J.
Harchese,
Maintenance
Manager
W. Parks,
Reactor
Engineering Supervisor
C. Pell,
Outage
Manager
L. Rogers,
Instrument
and Control Maintenance
Sup
D. Sager,
St.
Lucie Plant Vice President
J. Scarola,
Operations
Manager
D. West, Technical
Manager
J.
West, Site Services
Manager
C.
Wood, Operations
Supervisor
W. White, Security Supervisor
President
ervisor
NRC Personnel
Other licensee
employees
contacted
included engineers,
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
security force members,
and office personnel.
- H.'iller, Resident
Inspector
- R. Prevatte,
Senior Resident
Inspector
S. Sandin,
Senior Operations Officer,
- Attended exit interview
2.
and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the
last paragraph.
Plant Status
and Activities
a.
Unit I operated
at essentially
100 percent
power for the reporting
period.
b.
Unit 2 main generator
was taken off line on April 25 to repair
a
faulty power supply in the
DEH system.
This and other miscellaneous
maintenance activities were performed
and the unit returned to power
C.
on the
same day.
Otherwise the unit operated
at essentially
100
percent
power for the reporting period.
NRC Activity
McKenzie Thomas,
Mechanical
Engineer,
NRC Region II; George
T.
HacDonald, Electrical
Engineer,
NRC Region II; and
Roy K. Hathew,
Electrical
Engineer,
NRR, were
on site during the weeks of March 20,
April 10,
and April 24 conducting
an inspection
in the Engineering
and Technical
Support areas.
The Resident
Inspector also assisted
in this inspection.
The inspection results
are documented
in IR
335)389/95-05.
3.
Plant Operations
a
~
Plant Tours
(71707)
The inspectors periodically conducted plant tours to verify that
monitoring equipment
was recording
as required,
equipment
was
properly tagged,
operations
personnel
were
aware of plant
conditions,
and plant housekeeping
efforts were adequate.
The
inspectors
also determined that appropriate radiation controls were
established,
critical clean
areas
were being controlled in
accordance
with procedures,
excess
equipment or material
was stored
properly,
and combustible materials
and debris
were disposed of
expeditiously.
During tours,
the inspectors
looked for the
existence of unusual fluid leaks,
piping vibrations,
pipe hanger
and
seismic restraint settings,
various valve and breaker positions,
equipment caution
and danger tags,
component positions,
adequacy of
fire fighting equipment,
and instrument calibration dates.
Some
tours were conducted
on backshifts.
The frequency of plant tours
and control
room visits by site management
was noted.
The inspectors
routinely conducted
main flow path walkdowns of ESF,
ECCS,
and support
systems.
Valve, breaker,
and switch lineups
as
well as equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally and
in the control
room.
The following accessible-area
ESF system
and
area
walkdowns were
made to verify that system lineups were in
accordance
with licensee
requirements
for operability and equipment
material
conditions
were satisfactory:
~
Unit
1 and
2 Control
Room Ventilation and Air Conditioning
System
~
Unit
1 and
2 Shield Building Ventilation System
~
Unit
1 and
2 Containment
Isolation System
The following list of deficiencies
were provided to the licensee for
corrective action:
Unit
1 Control
Room
Location:
Fan
& Chiller Room
1)
Damper D-21 on HVA-38 shows
a large area of either soot or
spray lubricant.
2)
Insulation
on ductwork above
HVA-3A is not properly
attached.
3)
Numerous
sample port plugs
on air handlers
were loose.
4)
Switch and/or indicator light nameplates
do not match the
description in ONOP 1900030,
Rev 20, for FCV-25-14,
FCV-
25-16,
HVE-13A, HVE-13B and
TSC exhaust
fan.
Location:
Electrical
Equipment
Room
1)
Fan control switch nameplates
do not match description
in
ONOP 1-1900030,
Rev 20, for RV-1, RV-2, RV-3, RV-4.
Unit
1 Shield Building Ventilation System
Location:
Control
Room
1)
Switch and/or indicator light nameplates
do not match
description in Table
2 of Emergency
Procedure
1-EOP-99,
Rev 14, for FCV-25-1,
FCV-25-3,
FCV-25-5,
FCV-25-2,
FCV-
25
4
FCV 25
6
V6301 )
V6302
V2505
1
01
1
V6741 >
V2516,
V2515.
Unit 2 Control
Room
Location:
Control
Room
1)
HVAC panel
nameplates
do not show auto
mode for spring
return center position per
OP 2-1900020,
Rev 5, for 2HVE-
10A,
Spot checking confirmed that
approximately
50 percent of the fan motor control switches
do not indicate auto
mode.
2)
HVAC panel
nameplates
do not match description in OP 2-
1900020,
Rev 5, for 2HVA-3A, 2HVA-38, 2HVA-3C, HVE-9A,
3)
HVAC panel
nameplates
do not match description in ONOP 2-
1900030,
Rev 16, for HVE-13A, HVE-13B.
4
Location:
Chiller Room
1)
Compressor
gages
on HVA/ACC-3A and
HVA/ACC-3C not labeled
similar to HVA/ACC-3B, i.e., disch temp, inlet temp, disch
press,
inlet press;-
2)
The handwritten reference
"set
head at 225 lb" appears
to
be
an improperly placed operator
aid on HVA/ACC-38.
3)
The placard
"leave condenser
water flow controller in
manual
and
open to prevent lifting freon safeties"
appears
to be
an improperly placed operator workaround
on HVA/ACC-
3A,
B 5 C.
Unit 2 Shield Building Ventilation System
Location:
Control
Room
1)
Indicator bulb cover for HVE-6A Shield Exhaust
Fan taped
on with scotch tape,
2)
Switch and/or indicator light nameplates
do not match
descriptions
in OP 2-2000024,
Rev 9, for HVE-6A, FCV-25-
29,
FCV-25-34.
3)
Label
FIC-25-20B
(SBVS Exh Flow) incorrectly identified as
F IC-25-201B.
Unit 2 Containment Isolation Actuation Signal
Location:
Control
Room
1)
SIAS operator aid missing
on 1-SE-03-2B.
2)
CIAS operator aids missing
on V6342,
D-17A, D-18, D-178,
D-19,
FCV-25-33.
3)
Nameplates
do not match description in Table
2 of
Emergency
Procedure
2-EOP-99,
Rev 10, for V6342,
V6741,
V2516,
V2522.
The above
systems
were verified to be aligned correctly for normal
plant operation.
Identification of controls
was verified using the
respective
Operating,
Off-Normal and,Emergency
Operating
Procedures.
Two areas that
need additional licensee
attention
were identified:
1)
Procedure
nomenclature
was not always consistent
with control
board nameplate
labels
(examples
above).
2)
Operator aids (color-coded
"doughnuts"
around
main control
board indicating lights),
used to identify system
response
following ESFAS,
were not installed
as per procedure.
Although
there is no legal requirement that these
be utilized,
one
operator
when questioned
remarked that in addition to the
EOPs,
he routinely uses'this
indication.
The largest
number of these
problems
were identified on Unit 2 (examples
above).
b.
Plant Operations
Review (71707)
The inspectors periodically reviewed shift logs
and operations
records,
including data sheets,
instrument traces,
and records of
equipm'ent malfunctions.
This review included control
room logs
and
auxiliary logs, operating orders,
standing orders,
jumper logs,
and
equipment tagout records.
The inspectors
routinely observed
operator alertness
and
demeanor
during plant tours.
They observed
and evaluated
control
room staffing, control
room access,
and
operator
performance
during routine operations.
The inspectors
conducted
random off-hours inspections
to ensure that operations
and
security performance
remained
at acceptable
levels.
Shift turnovers
were observed
to verify that they were conducted
in accordance
with
approved licensee
procedures.
Control
room annunciator
status
was
verified.
The posting of required notices to workers
was reviewed
and found to meet applicable
requirements.
No significant
deficiencies
were identified.
Minor deficiencies,
when indicated,
were corrected
in a timely manner.
c.
Plant Housekeeping
(71707)
Storage of material
and components,
and cleanliness
conditions of
various
areas
throughout the facility were observed
to determine
whether safety and/or fire hazards
existed.
It was noted that the
licensee
was performing extensive
cleanup,
painting,
and metalizing
of corroded
components
and supports
in the Units
1 and
2
CCW areas.
This action is in response
to deficiencies identified by
NRC
inspectors
in the past several
months.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
d.
Clearances
(71707)
During this inspection period,
the inspectors
reviewed the following
tagouts
(clearances):
~
2-95-03-123
on Unit 2A
ICW pump motor which has
been
removed
for repair.
All tags
were verified to be in place
and all
switches/breakers
and fuses
were found to be in the correct
position.
e
1-95-04-069
on Unit
1 hold
up drain
pump
1A.
This clearance
was placed to permit replacement
of the
pump seals.
The
inspector
observed
mechanical
maintenance
work in progress
and
verified that all tags
were in place
and valves
and breakers
were in the correct position.
~
1-95-04-093
HOV 09-13.
All tags
were in
place
and the components
were in the correct position.
e.
Technical Specification
Compliance
(71707)
Licensee
compliance with selected
TS
LCOs was verified.
This
included the review of selected
surveillance test results.
These
verifications were accomplished
by direct observation of monitoring
instrumentation,
valve positions,
.and switch positions,
and
by
review of completed
logs
and records.
Instrumentation
and recorder
traces
were observed for abnormalities.
The licensee's
compliance
with LCO action statements
was reviewed
on selected
occurrences
as
they happened.
The inspectors verified that related plant
procedures
in use were adequate,
complete,
and included the most
recent revisions.
No deficiencies
were identified.
f.
Followup of Operations
LERs (92700)
(Closed)
Rev
1, Inadvertent
Containment Isolation
Signal
Caused
by Failure of the
B Instrument Inverter Concurrent
with Channel
D CIS in Tripped Condition.
This event occurred while
the Unit was in Node 6.
The loss of the
B instrument inverter with
channel
D in a tripped condition created
the logic for an
actuation.
The licensee's
corrective actions
on this item included:
Verification that all components
functioned correctly
Reset of the CI signal
Performance
of a
10 CFR 50.59 evaluation to permit placement of
multiple
ESFAS channels
in bypass
during modes
5 and
6 to
prevent spurious
ESFAS actuations
Placing the channel
in bypass,
as permitted
by TS while in Node
6
Revision of Reactor Plant
Cooldown - Hot Standby to Cold
Shutdown
OP 1-0030127 to place tripped
ESFAS channels
in bypass
as permitted
by TS to prevent inadvertent actuation
Replacement
of the failed channel
B component
Revision of Administration Procedure,
Conduct of Operations
0010120 to verify proper operation of .actuated
components prior
to reset
The inspector
reviewed the licensee
corrective actions
and concluded
that they were adequate
for this event.
He additionally reviewed
the above
10 CFR 50.59 evaluation
and agreed with the licensee's
conclusion.
The required
changes
to the above procedures
were also
verified to have
been
implemented.
These actions
appear
adequate
to
address
this item and prevent repetition.
g.
Followup on Previous
Operations
Inspection
Findings
(92901)
1)
(Closed)
VIO 335/94-22-01
"Inadequate
Corrective Action to
NRC
Violation Regarding
Emergency Diesel
Generator Operability".
The inspector, reviewed the licensee's
corrective actions for
the subject violation.
The violation was the result of
inadequate
information, transmitted
from Operations
management
to operators
via Night Order, regarding the effects of IA3 bus
alignment
on
1A
EDG operability.
The inadequate
information
resulted
in operators
placing the Unit
1 electrical plant in
a
condition for which
1A
EDG load shed testing
had not been
performed.
The licensee's
corrective actions
included:
Declaring the
1A
EDG inoperable while the
1AB bus 'was
aligned to the
1A3 bus.
This action
was taken at the time
the improper electrical
alignment
was noted
and is
documented
in IR 94-20.
Realigning the
1AB bus to the
1B3 bus
and declaring the IA
This action was taken the next day.
Issuing
a new Night Order which correctly described
the
impact of the 1AB-to-1A3 electrical
bus alignment
on
1AEDG
operability.
This was issued
on August 31,
1994,
and
was
reviewed
and documented
in IR 94-20.
Performing
a safety evaluation to satisfactorily
demonstrate
the ability of the
1A
EDG to assume all auto-
connected
loads with the
1C
ICW pump
on the zero
second
load block (the condition that might have occurred in the
noted electrical lineup).
Satisfactorily testing the load-shedding capabilities of
the
1C
ICW pump with the
IAB bus aligned to the
1A3 bus.
This was reviewed
and discussed
in IR 94-22.
gI 16-PR/PSL-2,
"St. Lucie Action (STAR) Program,"
was
revised to require
a technical
subcommittee
review of TS
non-compliance
issues
to ensure
an adequate
review of such
events
in the future.
The inspector verified that this
revision was incorporated.
The inspector
concluded that the licensee's
corrective actions
were adequate.
This item is closed.
2)
(Closed)
VIO 335/94-22-02
"Improper Modification of Control
Room Logs."
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
corrective actions to
this violation, which occurred
when
a peak-shift
ANPS modified
the logs of a previous shift to include
an entry into a
TS AS
and the completion of required actions.
The licensee's
corrective actions
involved the counseling of the individual
involved, the issuance
of a Night Order reiterating
management's
expectations
for log entries,
and
a modiFication
of AP 0010125,
Rev 63,
"Conduct of Operations,"
Appendix F,
"Log Keeping," to include
a requirement that
no blank lines
be
left between entries
or after
a shift's log is complete.
The
inspector verified that the items
had
been
completed
and
had
found, since the event, that control
room chronological
logs
have
been maintained
in this way since the event.
This item is
closed.
4.
Maintenance
and Surveillance
a.
Maintenance
Observations
(62703)
Station maintenance
activities involving selected
safety-related
systems
and components
were observed
and reviewed to ascertain
that
they were conducted
in accordance
with requirements.
The following
items were considered
during this review:
LCOs were met; activities
were accomplished
using approved
procedures;
functional tests
and
calibrations
were performed prior to returning components
or systems
to service; quality control records
were maintained; activities were
accomplished
by qualified personnel;
parts
and materials
used
were
properly certified;
and radiological controls were implemented
as
required.
Work requests
were reviewed to determine
the status of
outstanding
jobs
and to ensure that priority was assigned
to safety-
related
equipment.
Portions of the'following maintenance activities
were observed:
1)
NPWO 66/0909 Periodic Maintenance of HV 21-2
The inspector witnessed
portions of the periodic maintenance
performed
on valve
HV 21-2, the
2B
ICW to TCW/blowdown
isolation valve.
Activities were performed in accordance
with
the subject
NPWO and maintenance
procedure
"Preventive
Maintenance of Non-Environmentally qualified Limitorque Motor
Operated
Valve Actuators"
HP 0940069,
Rev 12.
The inspector
verified that the
PM was performed within its maintenance
interval.
Activities included sampling grease,
inspection,
and inspection
and verification of wiring.
The
work was performed in accordance
with the subject procedure.
2)
Unit 2 was taken off line on midshift April 25 to replace
a
failed
48VDC
DEH Power Supply per
PWO ¹4403.
The unit remained
at
7 percent reactor
power feeding both
SGs via the
15 percent
bypasses
using the "A" Hain Feedwater
Pumps
The feedwater
block valves were shut to eliminate leakage
past the
allowing for better control of SG water level while at low
power.
The steam
dump
and bypass
system
was in service with one
bypass
valve open.
- The failed power supply was
removed
and field inspected.
A
connector
which supplies
power to the module
was found loose.
The licensee later
the failed power supply
and
found
a failed resistor
which reduced
the overvoltage
protection device setpoint
from 53
VDC to 44
VDC.
This was
below the required output voltage of 48.7
VDC.
This hardware
fault precluded
energizing the power supply.
The replacement
power supply module
was installed,
energized,
and adjusted
to
approximately 48.7
VDC.
Replacement
of the failed power supply
was accomplished
without complication.
The work direction
and
engineering
support provided
by the Supervisory
I&C Engineer
was excellent.
While the generator
was off line, the
observed
a slow increasing
trend in steam flow on the feed
flow/steam flow recorder.
Another operator
responded
to the
turbine control
system
and switched from automatic to manual
control after observing the intercept valves cycling and
turbine
speed
slowly increasing
from 1800
rpm to 1819 rpm.
An
unsuccessful
attempt
was
made to return the system to
automatic,
however, turbine speed
was at
1854
rpm and
increasing
when
a high turbine vibration alarm was received.
The
NPS directed the operator to manually trip the turbine.
The subsequent
evaluation of the turbine
speed
control problem
revealed that one of three
speed
sensors
supplying input to the
turbine supervisory control
system
had failed and the turbine
governor valves, with zero
demand,
were off their main seat
admitting steam to the main turbine.
The licensee
believed
that since the governor valves
were calibrated
cold during
an
outage,
the zero
demanded
position corresponding
to -3% of full
stroke valve position did not maintain the valves shut
when
hot.
The governor valves
were fully shut after being
recalibrated
hot per
-18C 1400174,
Rev 6, "Turbine Governor
Valve Calibration Unit 2".
The above work activity was completed
and all equipment
post
maintenance
tests
were performed satisfactorily.
The turbine
was placed
on line at 11:45
am and the unit returned to full
power on the night of April 25.
During this short outage
condenser
cooling water side cleaning
and several
other maintenance activities were accomplished.
Operations
control of power maneuvers
was performed well and
excellent support of the work activities by other organizations
was also noted.
The decision
by management
to accomplish this
repair off line demonstrated
a conservative
approach to safety.
b.
Surveillance
Observations
(61726)
Various plant operations
were verified to comply with selected
TS
requirements.
Typical of these
were confirmation of TS compliance
for reactor coolant chemistry,
RWT conditions,
containment
pressure,
control
room ventilation,
and
AC and
DC electrical
sources.
At 11:00
am,
on April 10, the licensee's
technical staff
organization
discovered that the six month surveillance
on Unit 2
containment
personnel
airlock was not conducted within the
periodicity required
by TS 4.6. 13.
The
25 percent
allowable
extension of TS 4.0.2 did not apply to this test.
The air lock test
10
had
been tested
on October
28,
1994,
and the next test
was
due
on
March 28,
1995.
The airlock was declared
out of service
as required
by TS 3.6. 1.3 the
24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> action statement
was entered.
The
surveillance test
was completed satisfactorily at 3:00
pm returning
the airlock to service.
The root cause of this event
was weak controls in the scheduling of
technical staff surveillances.
The administrative
procedure for
scheduling technical staff surveillance
AP 001041,
Rev 12, did not
require
independent
review of future surveillance
dates.
It only
required review of completed tests.
This procedure
did not provide
a formal
means or checklist for documenting
when the next
surveillance
was due.
This error resulted
when the person
tasked
with scheduling
and completing the test
made
a mathematical
error
when scheduling this test
and since it did not receive supervisory
or independent
review it was not detected.
The existing scheduling
and tracking mechanism
consisted
of a notebook of scheduled
tests
maintained
on
a technical staff supervisor's
desk.
Licensing
oversight of the surveillance
existed
and that individual was
aware
that the surveillance
was missed
but he was under the false
perception that
a
25 percent
extension
was allowed
and being used.
The licensee's
corrective actions
included issuing
STAR 950394 to
determine
the root cause
and required corrective actions.
They also
formed
a Technical
Subcommittee
to review this issue,
identify root
cause
and underlying issues,
and
make recommendations
for
improvements to correct this weakness
and prevent repetition.
This
cross-functional,
multi-disciplined committee held meetings
on April
13 and
19 to cover this issue.
The inspector
attended
the April 13
meeting at which the probable
causes,
countermeasures,
and interim
action plan were developed.
Each probable
cause
and required
countermeasure
was discussed
in detail
by the committee
and
assignments
were
made for investigation
and followup of identified
items.
The inspector
was very impressed
with the depth
and
scope of
discussion
on this issue
and the interim and long range corrective
action plans that were developed.
The team developed
an extensive corrective, action plan which was due
to be submitted to management
around the first of May.
They
additionally are preparing
LER 389-95-03
on this item.
This
LER
will be reviewed
by the inspector for any additional licensee
corrective action.
This is the first routinely scheduled
surveillance
missed
by the
licensee
since
1991.
This violation will not be cited because
the
licensee's
efforts in identifying and correcting the violation meet
the criteria specified in Section VII.B of the
NRC Enforcement
Policy.
It will be identified as
NCV 389/95-09-01,
"Missed
Surveillance of Unit 2 Personnel
Air Lock".
11
c.
Followup on Previous Surveillance
Inspection
Findings
(92902)
(Closed)
VIO 335,389/94-12-01,
Inadequate
Corrective Action for a
Previous Violation for Inadequate
Surveillance Testing of the
C
ICW
Pump.
This violation was the result of incomplete corrective action
on
a
violation identified in IR 92-05 in April 1992.,
The licensee's
corrective action to violation 92-05-04 failed to provide steps
in
the Integrated
Test for Engineered
Safety Features
to test the load
shed
and sequencing
functions
when the
C train of ICW and
CCW was
powered
from their alternate
power supply busses.
The licensee,
in
a letter dated
June
15,
1994,
responded
to this
item.
In their corrective action they agreed to revise the
Integrated
Test for Engineering Safety Features
for Unit 1,
OP 1-
0400050,
and Unit 2,
OP 2-0400050,
and test these
features
at the
next refueling outage.
These
procedures
were revised
and the
testing
was conducted satisfactorily
on Unit 2 in April 1993.
This
testing
was observed
by the
NRC and documented
in IR 94-12.
The
procedures
were also revised
and testing
was conducted
satisfactorily
on Unit
1 in October
1994.
This was reviewed
and
observed
by the
NRC and documented
in IR 94-22 also in October
1994.
Based
on the above,
the licensee
corrective actions
have
satisfactorily resolved this item.
d.
Followup of Maintenance
LERs
(92700)
1)
(Closed)
Rev 1, Inadvertent
B Train Engineered
Safeguards
Features
Actuation Signal
(ESFAS)
due to
a Deficient
Instrument
and Control Test Procedure.
This event occurred during response
time testing of pressurizer
pressure
instrumentation
during
a refueling outage.
The
A
train of SIAS and CIS was in block as required
by the procedure
and did not activate.
The response
time test determines
the .time interval from when
a
monitored input exceeds its trip setpoint until the protective
system activates.
During testing
a single channel
is tripped
while the other three channels
are
bypassed
by removing their
bistables.
In the above
case
one of the bistables
had not been
sufficiently withdrawn from the cabinet
drawer to bypass
the
trip input signal.
This resulted
in activation of two, vice
one,
channels
when the test signal
was inserted.
The licensee's
corrective actions for the
above
included
resetting
the tripped unit, performance of a
evaluation to permit bypassing all four channels of ESFAS while
in mode
5 and
6 as permitted
by TS, revising procedures
to
permit bypassing
these
channels
and providing keys to permit
this bypassing
during mode
5 and 6.
12
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
10 CFR 50.59 evaluation
and agreed with their evaluation.
He verified that the
applicable
procedure
change
had
been
implemented.
It was also
verified that strict administrative controls, with key custody
by
PGH,
has
been
placed over these
bypass
keys to prevent
inadvertent
use.
The licensee's
corrective actions
appear
adequate
to prevent repetition of this event.
2)
(Closed)
Rev 1, Inadvertent Safety Injection
Actuation Signal/Containment
Isolation Signal
due to an Invalid
High Pressurizer
Pressure
Signal.
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
findings and corrective
actions related to this
LER revision,
issued
when
a failure
mechanism
was conclusively established
for two pressurizer
pressure
instruments.
The original event
was described
in IR
94-24
and
was updated
in IR 94-25.
Additionally, the issue
became
the subject of NRC Information Notice 95-20, "Failures
in Rosemount
Pressure
Transmitters
Due to Hydrogen
Permeation
into the Sensor Cell."
The inspector verified that the licensee's
corrective actions
have
been completed,
or were being tracked to completion,
as
stated
in the
LER revision.
Five subject transmitters
have
been
removed
from applications
in the
RCS.
Of the remaining
transmitters
in service,
which require replacement,
STAR 950400
has
been initiated to accomplish
replacement
as spares
arrive
on site.
Corrective Action 14, which required
gC to verify
sensing cell diaphragm material
on receipt,
has
been
performed
satisfactorily
on
5 transmitters
received
since the issue
arose,
although the actions
were taken in response
.to direction
by the
gA Hanager,
as
opposed to
a procedural
requirement.
The
inspector
reviewed the receipt inspection reports for P.O.
C94935
91145
(RIR IK-0372), which accompanied
one transmitter,
and found that the tests
were documented
adequately.
6.
Plant Support
(71750)
a.
Fire Protection
During the course of their normal tours,
the inspectors
routinely
examined facets of the Fire Protection
Program.
The inspectors
reviewed transient fire loads,
flammable materials
storage,
housekeeping,
control
hazardous
chemicals,
ignition source/fire risk
reduction efforts, fire protection training, fire protection
system
surveillance
program, fire barriers, fire brigade qualifications,
and
gA reviews of the program.
No deficiencies
were identified.
b.
Physical
Protection
During this inspection,
the inspector toured the protected
area
and
noted that the perimeter
fence
was intact
and not compromised
by
13
erosion or disrepair.
The fence fabric was secured
and barbed wire
was angled
as required
by the licensee's
PSP.
Isolation zones
were
maintained
on both sides of the barrier
and were free of objects
which could shield or conceal
an individual.
The inspector
observed that personnel
and packages
entering the
protected
area
were searched
either
by special
purpose detectors
or
by
a physical
patdown for firearms,
explosives
and contraband.
The
processing
and escorting of visitors was observed.
Vehicles were
searched,
escorted,
and secured
as described
in the
PSP.
Lighting
of the perimeter
and of the protected
area
met the 0.2 foot-candle
criteria.
In conclusion,
selected
functions
and equipment of the security
program were inspected
and found to comply with the
requirements.
c.
Radiological Protection
Program
Radiation protection control activities were observed to verify that
these activities were in conformance with the facility policies
and
procedures,
and in compliance with regulatory requirements.
These
observations
included:
Entry to and exit from contaminated
areas,
including step-off
pad conditions
and disposal
of contaminated
clothing;
Area postings
and controls;
Work activity within radiation,
high radiation,
and
contaminated
areas;
RCA exiting practices;
and,
Proper wearing of personnel
monitoring equipment,
protective
clothing,
and respiratory
equipment.
The inspectors verified that the Notice to Employees
was posted
at several
locations to inform employees
of their rights.
These posting
areas
included
- site access
training area,
site
access
areas,
and entrances
into the
RCA.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
d.
Effectiveness
of Licensee
Controls in Identifying, Resolving,
and
Preventing
Problems
(40500)
QA Audit Review
1)
The inspector
reviewed
QA audit report QSL-OPS-95-04,
dated
March 30,
1995.
This audit evaluated
the site's
implementation
of the offsite dose calculation manual,
process
control
program,
and radioactive effluents.
It included
a review of
existing procedures;
changes
made to these
procedures
in the
past year;
an analysis of inhouse
and industry events
and data;
self assessment
activities; performance
monitoring activities;
0
14
NRC reports;
and corrective action documents
on the above
areas.
In addition to
a review of the above records
and
documentation
the audit included field observations,
walkdowns
of plant areas,
inspections,
and interviews.
The audit identified three minor findings that were
administrative
in nature
and did not indicate
any significant
program weaknesses.
The audit also contained
three technical
recommendations
that if implemented
could result in program
improvement.
The inspector
found the audit to be thorough
and well-written.
It used field observations
to strengthen
the report's
creditability.
The inspector
noted that the audit also
conducted
a followup on past identified weaknesses
to ensure
that corrective actions
had
been fully implemented
and were
still effective.
The inspector
reviewed the
gA audit,
gSL-OPS-95-05,
performed
in the Security
and Safeguards
area
in February through April
1995.
This audit assessed
the adequacy
and implementation of
activities associated
with;
~
The Site Physical
Security Plan
~
The Site Contingency
Plan
~
The Security Training and gualification Plan
~
Nuclear Safeguards
Information Control
The audit examined
records
and logs,
observed activities
and
training in progress
and included physical
walkdowns in the
plant.
The audit identified
a strength
in the Security Department's
routine self-assessments
including the use of outside
agencies
such
as the
FBI to conduct specialized training,
and the use of
the site
STAR program to document
and resolve
problems.
Two
negative findings were identified involving the lack of current
addresses
for some
badged
personnel
and the need for
improvements
in transmitting safeguards
information.
The inspector
found the audit to be detailed
and thorough.
Based
on the audit report it appears
that the security
department
continues
to effectively implement the site Security
Plan
and provide for the control of Safeguards
Information.
The inspector
reviewed the licensee
gA performance
monitoring
activities completed in March 1995
and documented
in gSL-OPS-
95-06 dated April 14,
1995.
Performance
monitoring activities were conducted
in the areas
of.
15
~
Key control during bypass of ESFAS channels
while in Mode
5 and
6
~
Train swap activities during
CCW system
on line
maintenance
~
VOTES testing of ECCS valves
~
Preventive
maintenance
on
2B LPSI circuit breaker
~
An evaluation of high radiation area
requirements
and
postings
~
LPSI expanded
surveillance testing
~
In-plant clearances
The audits
appeared
to be detailed
and
no significant
deficiencies
were identified.
4)
Licensee Self Assessment
(40500)
The licensee
met with the
NRC in the Region II office in
Atlanta on April 10 and provided the results of their
assessment
of overall plant performance
during the past year.
This assessment
indicated that they are
aware of their
strengths
and areas that need additional attention,
They
additionally discussed
the challenges
and plans for the next
several
years.
This meeting
was attended
by the majority of
site senior managers
and senior Region II staff members.
The
licensee
was responsive
to 'questions
asked
by the
NRC.
The
meeting
was beneficial to the licensee
and the
NRC.
7.
Other Areas
Maintenance
Rule Industry Meeting
The inspector
attended
a two day licensee
sponsored
meeting
on the
maintenance
rule
on April 5 and
6 at Jensen
Beach,
The
meeting
was attended
by representatives
from eleven plants
and
NRC
representatives
from Headquarters,
Region II, and Region IV.
The
agenda for the first day consisted
of utility presentations
on
performance criteria.
The second
day consisted of presentations
in
the areas of on line maintenance;
observations
and expectation
from
the pilot inspections;
goal setting of (a)(l) systems
and goal
monitoring; MPFF'identification;
and resolutions
and periodic
assessments.
Panel
discussions
and audience
questions
and answers
followed each of the
above topics.
The inspector
was impressed
with the, progress
that have
been
made to
date
on rule implementation
by some utilities.
Attendance
at this
meeting
was to gain
a better
knowledge of the maintenance
rule and
the licensee's
process
and steps
in implementation.
The information
presented
was found to be very beneficial.
16
8.
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were summarized
on April 28,
1995, with
those
persons
indicated in paragraph
1 above.
The inspector described
the areas
inspected
and discussed
in detail the inspection results listed
below.
Proprietary material is not contained
in this report.
Dissenting
comments
were not received
from the licensee.
~T
e
Item Number
S<<D~i
50-389/95-09-01
Closed
"Hissed Surveillance of Unit
2 Personnel
Air Lock",
paragraph
4.b.
50-335,389/94-12-01
Closed
"Inadequate
Corrective
Action for a Previous
Violation for Inadequate
Surveillance Testing of the
C
ICW Pump",
paragraph
5.a.
50-335/94-22-01
50-335/94-22-02
Closed
Closed
"Inadequate
Corrective
Action to
NRC Violation
Regarding
Emergency
Diesel
Generator Operability",
paragraph
3.h. 1.
"Improper Hodification of
Control
Room Logs",
paragraph
3.h.2.
LER
50-335,94-008,
Rev
1
Closed
LER
50-335/94-009,
Rev
1
Closed
LER
50-335/94-010,
Rev
1
Closed
"Inadvertent
Containment
Isolation Signal
(CIS)
Caused
by Failure of the
B
Instrument Inverter
Concurrent with Channel
D
CIS,in Tripped Condition,
paragraph
3.g.
"Inadvertent Safety
Injection Actuation
Signal/Containment
Isolation
Signal
due to an Invalid
High Pressurizer
Pressure
Signal", paragraph
4.c.2.
"Inadvertent
B Train
Engineered
Safeguards
Features
Actuation Signal
(ESFAS)
due to
a Deficient
Instrument
and Control Test
Procedure",
paragraph
4.c. 1.
17
Abbreviations,
and Initialisms
ANPS
ATTN
CFR
CI
CIAS
CIS
CIS
ICW
IR
JPE
JPN
LCO
LER
MV
NPWO
NRC
ONOP
OP
PGM
PWO
QI
Rev
Alternating Current
Analysis
and Evaluation of Operational
Data, Office for (NRC)
Assistant
Nuclear Plant Supervisor
Administrative Procedure
Attention
Cubic Centimeter
Component
Cooling Water
Code of Federal
Regulations
Containment Isolation
Containment Isolation Actuation Signal
Containment Isolation Signal
Containment Isolation System
Direct Current
Digital Electro-Hydraulic (turbine control
system)
Emergency
Core Cooling System
Emergency
Diesel
Generator
Emergency Operating
Procedure
Engineered
Safety Feature
Engineered
Safety Feature Actuation System
Federal
Bureau of Investigations
Flow Control Valve
The Florida Power
3 Light Company
Regulating
Valve
Heating, Ventilation,
and Air Conditioning
Instrumentation
and Control
Intake Cooling Water
[NRC] Inspection
Report
(Juno
Beach)
Power Plant Engineering
(Juno
Beach)
Nuclear Engineering
TS Limiting Condition for Operation
Licensee
Event Report
Low Pressure
Safety Injection (system)
Motor Operated
Valve
Maintenance
Preventable
Functional Failure
-Motorized Valve
NonCited Violation (of NRC requirements)
Nuclear Plant Supervisor
Nuclear Plant Work Order
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Off Normal Operating
Procedure
Operating
Procedure
Plant General
Manager
Preventive
Maintenance
Physical
Security
Plan
Plant
Work Order
Quality Assurance
Quality Instruction
Radiation Control Area
Revision
RII
rpm
SBVS
St.
TCW
TS
VDC
VOTES
18
Region II - Atlanta, Georgia
(NRC)
Reactor [licensed] Operator
Revolutions per Minute
Refueling Water Tank
Shield Building Ventilation System
Safety Injection Actuation System
Saint
St.
Lucie Action Request
Turbine Cooling Water
Technical Specification(s)
Technical
Support Center
Vo'its Direct Current
Valve Operation Test Evaluation
System
0
0