ML17216A583

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Confirms Interpretation That Plant Operation in Mode 5 W/Two Reactor Coolant Loops Partially Drained,Two Shutdown Cooling Loops Operating & Only One Component Cooling Water HX Operable in Noncompliance W/Tech Spec 3.4.1.4.2
ML17216A583
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/04/1986
From: Miraglia F
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Reyes L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
NUDOCS 8606110687
Download: ML17216A583 (6)


Text

June 4, 1986 Docket No. 50-335 MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Luis A. Reyes, Acting Director Division of Reactor Projects, Region II Frank J. Miraglia, Director Division of PWR Licensing-B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INTERPRETATION - ST.

LUCIE UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM OPERABILITY (TIA-86-5FM)

In your April 21, 1986 memorandum to me on the above subject, you requested that we confirm that the operability statement of TS 3.4. 1.4.2 includes support systems.

TS 3.4. 1.4.2 requires two shutdown cooling loops to be operable and at least one shutdown cooling loop to be in operation in Mode 5 with the reactor loops not filled.

Operation in Mode 5 with loops partially drained relies on operability of the shutdown cooling loops and their support systems to remove decay heat.

The staff requires redundancy for protection against single failures to assure decay heat removal for all modes of operation.

This policy was stated in the enclosure to a letter to pressurized water reactor licensees dated June ll, 1980 from Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing.

In the St.

Lucie Unit No.

1 case, one train of component cooling water (CCW) was out of service and one train of CCW was in service on October 28, 1985.

Protection against single failure was not assured and failure of the one CCW heat exchanger in service would have prevented decay heat removal.

Based upon the above, we confirm Region II s interpretation that operation in Mode 5 with two reactor coolant loops partially drained, two shutdown cooling loops operating and only one CCW heat exchanger operable is in noncompliance with TS 3.4.1.4.2.

This completes our work under the above subject TIA.

Origiaal sigae6 bp Prank J. Miragli8, Frank J. Miraglia, Director Division of PWR Licensing-8 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DISTRIBUTION Docket File NRC PDR Local PDR PD¹8 Reading E. Tourigny P. Kreutzer S.

Elrod J. Kingler G.

Holahan H.

Thompson R.

Ber nero E. Butcher D. Crutchfield J. Miller W.

Regan "See previous concurrence page.

"DPLB:PD¹8:

~DPLB:PD¹8:

"DPLB:PD¹8:D PKreutzer ETourigny:jch AThadani 5/

/86 5/

/86 5/

/86 WRe an 6/

/86 6/

aglia 86 860bliOb87 860604 PDR ADOCK 05000335 P

PDRl

'~ r.

~

~5 ~

Docket No. 50-335 MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

Luis A. Reyes, Acting Director Division of Reactor Projects, Region II Frank J. Miraglia, Director Division of PWR Licensing-B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INTERPRETATION - ST.

LUCIE UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM OPERABILITY (TIA-86-5FM)

In your April 21, 1986 memorandum to me on the above subject, you requested that we confirm that the operability statement of TS 3.4.1.4.2 includes support systems.

TS 3.4. 1.4.2 requires two shutdown cooling loops to be operable and at least one shutdown cooling loop to be in operation in Mode 5

with the reactor loops not filled.

Operation in Mode 5 with loops partially drained relies on operability of the shutdown cooling loops and their support systems to remove decay 'heat.,

The staff requires redundancy for protection against single failures to assure'ecay heat removal for all modes of operation.

In the St. Lucie Unit No.

1

case, one train of component cooling water (CCW) was out of service and one,,

train of CCW was in service on October 28, 1985.

Protection against single failure was not assured and failure of the one CCW heat exchanger, in service would have prevented decay heat removal.

Based upon the above, we confirm Region II's interpretation that opera'tion in Mode 5 with two reactor coolant loops partially drained, two shutdown cooling loops operating and only one CCW heat exchanger operable is in noncompliance with TS 3.4. 1.4.2.

This completes our work under the above subject TIA.

Frank J. Miraglia, Director Division of PWR Licensing-B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DISTRIBUTION

~n

~

NRC PDR Local PDR PDk'8 Reading E. Tourigny P. Kreutzer

  • See previous
  • DPLB:PD88:

PKreutzer 5/

/86 D. Crutchfield J. Miller S. Elrod J. Kingler G. Holahan H. Thompson R. Bernero E. Butcher concurrence page.

DPLB:

DPLB:PD88:D

.DPLB:D ETou

jch AThadani FJMiraglia 5/P4/86 5/K/86 5/

/86

4

, ~ t I

0 J

4

'1

~ 4 1))

i 4

4 4: ftt )

<<4 4'I 4 ~'I

'~4 tlfl4 L 'I 4

II I' N

I I

4( / l jt 44 l

Docket No. 50-335 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Luis A. Reyes, Acting Director Division of Reactor Projects, Region II FROM:

SUBJECT:

Frank J. Miraglia, Director Division of PWR Licensing-B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INTERPRETATION - ST.

LUCIE UNIT 1 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM OPERABILITY (TIA-86-5FM)

In your April 21, 1986 memorandum to me on the above subject, you requested that we confirm that the operability statement of TS 3.4.1.4.2 includes support systems.

TS 3.4. 1.4.2 requires two shutdown cooling loops to be operable and at least one shutdown cooling loop to be in operation in,Mode 5',

with the reactor loops not filled.

Operation in Mode 5 with loops partially drained relies on operability of the shutdown cooling loops and their support systems to remove decay heat.

The staff requires redundancy for protection against single failures to assure decay heat removal for all modes of operation.

In the St. Lucie Unit No.

1

case, one train of component cooling water (CCW) was out of service and one train of CCW was in service on October 28, 1985.

Protection against single failure was not assured and failure of the one CCW heat exchange in service would have prevented decay heat removal.

Based upon the above, we confirm Region II's interpretation that operation in Mode 5 with two reactor coolant loops partially drained, two shutdown cooling loops operating and one one CCW heat exchanger operable is in noncompliance with TS 3.4.1.4.2.

This completes our work under the above subject TIA.

Frank J. Miraglia, Director Division of PWR Licensing-8 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DISTRIBUTION Doc et Fi e

NRC PDR Local PDR PD¹8 Reading E. Tourigny P. Kreutzer S. Elrod J. Kingler G. Holahan H. Thompson R. Bernero E. Butcher D. Crutchfield J. Miller DPLB'¹8'/g

/86 DPLB:PD¹8*:

DPLB:PD¹8:D DPLB:D ETourigny:jch AThadani FJMiraglia 5/

/86 5/

/86 5/

/86

'J

)

i r

8

,)

f

'1 a

~