ML17216A430
| ML17216A430 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 02/07/1986 |
| From: | Bibb H, Crlenjak R, Elrod S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17216A428 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-85-36, 50-389-85-36, NUDOCS 8602180137 | |
| Download: ML17216A430 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000335/1985036
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-335/85-36
and 50-389/85-36
Licensee:
Florida Power
and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami,
FL
33102
Docket Nos.:
50-335
and 50-389
Facility Name:
St.
Lucie
1 and
2
License Nos.:
and NPF-16
e
Inspection
Conducted:
December
Inspectors:
'~
10,
1985
January
13,
1986
H.
E. Bibb,
esident
Inspector
Approved by:S..
Elrod, Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
R.
V. Crlenjak,
Se ior Resident
Inspector
Dat
igned
Zq P
Dat
igned
z p/C
D te Signed
Scope:
This
inspection
involved
224
inspector-hours
on site in the
areas
of
Technical
Specification
(TS)
compliance,
operator
performance,
overall
plant
operations,
quality'ssurance
practices,
station
and
corporate
management
practices,
corrective
and
preventive
maintenance
activities,
site
security
procedures,
radiation control activities, surveillance activities,
and Inspection
and Enforcement
Information Notice review.
Results:
In the areas
inspected,
one violation was identified (paragraph
6).
8602l80137
860210
l
ADOCK 05000335
'
I
$
REPORT
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
K. N. Harris, St.
Lucie Site Vice President
- D. A. Sager,
Plant Manager
- J.
H. Barrow, Operations
Superintendent
"T. A. Diliard, Maintenance
Superintendent
"L. W. Pearce,
Operations
Supervisor
R. J. Frechette,
Chemistry Supervisor
C.
F. Leppla, Instrumentation
and Control
( I&C) Supervisor
P.
L. Fincher, Training Supervisor
"C. A. Pell, Technical Staff Supervisor (Acting)
E. J. Wunderlich,
Reactor
Engineering Supervisor (Acting)
H.
F.
Buchanan,
Health Physics
Supervisor
G. Longerhouser,
Security Supervisor,
J.
Barrow, Fire Prevention
Coordinator
J. Scarola,
Assistant Plant Superintendent
Electrical
C. Wilson, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- Mechanical
"N. G.
Roos, guality Control Supervisor
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
security force members,
and office personnel.
"Attended exit interview
Exit Interview
The inspection
scope
and findings were
summarized
on January
10,
1986, with
those
persons
indicated'in
paragraph
1 above.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary
any of the materials
provided
to or reviewed
by the inspectors
during this inspection.
Licensee Action on Previous
Enforcement Matters
(Closed)
Unresolved
Item (UNR) 335/85-26-02
Too
Few Shutdown Cooling Loops
in Operation.
The
inspectors
have
completed
a
review of the
shutdown
cooling
requirements
when
in
mode
5
(cold
shutdown)
with the
reactor
coolant
loops
drained.
This
item is
resolved
as
a violation
and is
addressed
in paragraph
6.
This
UNR is considered
closed.
(Closed)
UNR 335/85-26-01 - Failure of Reactor
Vessel
Internals Lifting Rig.
This
item
has
been
determined
to
be
a violation
and is
addressed
in
Inspection
Report 50-335/85-29.
This
UNR is considered
closed.
'I
4.
Plant Tours (Units
1 and 2)
The
inspectors
conducted
plant tours periodically during
the
inspection
interval
to verify that monitoring
equipment
was
recording
as required,
equipment
was
properly
tagged,
operations
personnel
were
aware
of plant
conditions,
and plant
housekeeping
efforts were
adequate.
The inspectors
also
determined
that
appropriate
radiation
controls
were
properly
established,
critical clean
areas
were
being controlled in accordance
with
procedures,
excess
equipment or material
was stored properly and combustible
material
and
debris
were
disposed
of expeditiously.
During tours,
the
inspectors
looked for unusual fluid leaks,
piping vibrations,
pipe
hanger
and
seismic
restraint
settings,
various
valve
and
breaker
positions,
equipment
caution
and
danger
tags,
component
positions,
adequacy
of fire
fighting
equipment,
and
instrument
calibration
dates.
Some
tours
were
conducted
on backshifts.
The
inspectors
routinely
conducted
partial
walkdowns of
Emergency
Core
Cooling
Systems
(ECCS).
Valve,
breaker/switch
lineups
and
equipment
conditions
were
randomly verified both locally
and
in the
control
room.
During the inspection
period,
the inspectors
conducted
a complete
walkdown
in the accessible
areas
of the Unit
1 High Pressure
Safety Injection System
and the Unit 2
Component
Cooling Water
(CCW), Diesel
Generator
and
AC/DC
Systems
to verify that the lineups were in accordance
with licensee
require-
ments
for operability
and that
equipment
material
conditions
were satis-
factory.
Additionally,
flowpath
verifications
were
performed
on
the
following systems:
High Pressure
and
Low Pressure
Safety Injection (HPSI
and
LPSI)
Coolant Charging
Diesel Generator
Fuel Supply and Air Starting
Plant Firewater Supply
5.
Plant Operations
Review (Units
1 and 2)
Periodically during the inspection
interval,
the inspectors
reviewed shift
logs and operations
records,
including data
sheets,
instrument
traces,
and
records
of equipment
malfunctions.
This review included control
room logs
and auxiliary logs,
operating
orders,
standing
orders,
jumper
logs
and
equipment
tagout
records.
The
inspectors
routinely
observed
operator
alertness
and
demeanor
during plant tours.
During routine
operations,
operator
performance
and response
actions
were observed
and evaluated.
The
inspectors
conducted
random
off-hours
inspections
during
the
reporting
interval to assure
that operations
and security
remained
at
an acceptable
level.
Shift turnovers
were observed to verify that they were conducted
in
accordance
with approved
licensee
procedures.
Technical Specification
Compliance (Units
1 and 2)
During thi s reporting
interval,
the
inspectors
verified
compliance
with
limiting conditions
for operation
(LCOs)
and
the
results
of selected
surveillance
tests.
These
verifications
were
accompli shed
by direct
observation
of
moni toring
instrumentati on,
valve
posi tions,
and
switch
positions,
and by the review of completed
logs and records.
The licensee's
compliance with LCO action
statements
was
reviewed
on selected
occurrences
as they happened.
On October
28,
1985, it was noted that the Unit
1 Train "B" of
CCW was out
of service for repairs.
The Train "B" CCW heat exchanger
end bells (intake
cooling water side) were
removed
and the heat
exchanger
was isolated;
other
Train "B"
CCW components,
including valves,
piping,
and
seismic
supports
were
also
undergoing
maintenance.
The
inspector
did
not specifically
evaluate
these
other
components
and their effects
on Train "B" operation.
However,
with the
heat
exchanger
out of service,
CCW Train "B" was not
capable
of rejecting
heat
to the intake cooling water
system.
Unit
1 was
shutdown in mode 5, with the reactor coolant loops partially drained.
Technical Specification 3.4. 1.4.2 requires
that
two shutdown cooling loops
be operable
when in mode
5 with the reactor coolant loops not filled.
Each
loop of shutdown cooling contains
one heat
exchanger
which is cooled
by its
respective train of
CCW.
The
CCW system
removes this heat
and rejects it to
the
intake
cooling water
system.
With the
CCW Train "B" heat
exchanger
the respective
loop of shutdown
cooling
was
also
The failure to maintain
two operable
loops of shutdown
cooling while in
mode
5 is
a violation
(335/85-36-01).
This
position
was
confirmed
by
consultation with NRC Region II and the Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
The
Technical
Specification
was
intended
to
address
not only
shutdown
cooling itself, but also the support heat
removal
systems
including
CCW and
intake cooling water.
The
licensee
performed
an
extensive
review prior to arriving at
the
conclusion that removing
one train of
CCW under
these
plant conditions
was
permissible
under
the Unit
1
TS.
Therefore, it is the licensee's
position
that both loops of shutdown
cooling were operable,
as required
by the
TS.
Additionally, the licensee
points out that Unit
1
TS 3.7.3. 1, requires
two
loops of
CCW onl'y while in modes
1 through
4
not in mode
5.
Maintenance
Observation
Station
maintenance
activities
on
selected
safety-related
systems
and
components
were
observed/re'viewed
to ascertain
that they were conducted
in
accordance
with requirements.
The following items
were considered
during
this
review:
LCOs
were
met, activities
were
accompli shed
using
approved
procedures,
functional testing
and/or calibrations
were
performed prior to
returning
components
or
systems
to service,
quality control
records
were
maintained, activities were
accomplished
by qualified personnel,
parts
and
materials
used
were
properly certified,
and
radiological
controls
were
4
4
t
implemented
as
required.
Work requests
were
reviewed
to determine
the
status
of outstanding
jobs
and
to
assure
that priority was
assigned
to
safety-related
equipment.
The inspectors
observed
maintenance
activities
on
the following components:
Unit
1
1A Charging
Pump
1B Diesel Generator Air Compressor
1A Chemical/Volume Control
System
Ion Exchanger
Unit 2
Main Generator Exciter Turbine Cooling Water
Leak
Inspection
and Enforcement
Information Notice (IEIN) Review
The inspectors
completed
a review of IEIN 85-94, which covers the potential
for disabling
ECCS due to the failure or loss of
pump
minimum flow paths.
At St. Lucie,
none of the
pump
minimum flow paths
penetrate
contain-
ment,
therefore,
no possibility exists
for loss of the
minimum flow path
during
a containment isolation.
The inspectors
also reviewed the design
and
positioning of the remotely operated
valves
located
in the
minimum flow
paths.
Unit
1 was found to have
one
common flow path for the
two LPSI
pumps
and the three
pumps.
Two motor
operated
valves
(MOVs), in series,
provide automatic isolation of the
minimum flow line on
a containment
recirculation actuation
signal
(RAS).
The
two
MOVs are
normally open with
control
power de-energized,
fail "as is"
on
a loss of power
and
can
be
controlled remotely from the control
room.
Unit 2 has
two separate
minimum
flow paths,
one for each train of ECCS consisting of a LPSI
pump
and
a HPSI
pump.
Each
minimum flow path contains
two isolation valves,
one
MOV and
one
solenoid-operated
valve.
The
MOV fails "as is"
and the solenoid-operated
valve fails shut
on
a loss of electrical
power.
A single failure of
a
solenoid-operated
valve would result in a loss of the minimum flow path for
only one train of
ECCS.
In
summary,
a single failure of
a
power
supply
would not affect
more than
one train of
ECCS for either unit provided the
proper
valve
lineups
are
maintained.
The
inspectors
were
continuing
to
review this area.
The inspectors
have
reviewed the licensee's
actions
in response
to IEINs
85-82,
83,
and 84.
With regard to IEIN 85-82,
the licensee
has
determined
that the subject General
Electric (GE) differential relays
are installed
on
both Units
1 and
2 Emergency
Diesel Generators.
Plant change/modifications
(PCMs)
187-184
and
188-284
have
been
issued
to replace
the existing
differential
relays
with
type
IJD relays.
The
work
has
not
been
completed
as of this report.
IEIN 85-83 is currently under
review by the
licensee.
However, it has
been determined that
none of the subject
GE test
bl ocks
are
instal l ed
in
the
pl ant'
IKC systems.
IEIN 85-84 i s
al so
currently under review by the licensee.
Their initial review indicates that
the installed
main
steam
isolation
valve
(MSIV) air accumulators
are of
sufficient volume to ensure
MSIV closure
under
low flow/no flow conditions.
9.
Physical
Protection (Units
1 and 2)
The inspectors
verified by observation
and interviews during the reporting
interval
that
measures
taken
to
assure
the
physical
protection
of the
facility met current requirements.
Areas
inspected
included the organiza-
tion of the
security
force,
the establishment
and
maintenance
of gates,
doors,
and isolation
zones
in the proper conditions, that access
control
and
badging
was proper,
and procedures
were followed.
10.
Surveillance
Observations
During the inspection
period,
the inspectors
verified plant operations
in
compliance with selected
TS requirements.
Typical of these
were confirma-
tion of compliance
with the
TS for reactor
coolant chemistry,
refueling
water tank,
containment
pressure,
control
room ventilation,
and
AC and
electrical
sources.
The inspectors
verified that testing
was performed in
accordance
with adequate
procedures,
test
instrumentation
was calibrated,
LCOs
were
met,
removal
and restoration
of the affected
components
were
accomplished,
test results
met requirements
and
were
reviewed
by personnel
other
than
the
individual directing
the test,
and that
any deficiencies
identified
during
the
testing
were
properly
reviewed
and
resolved
by
appropriate
management
personnel.
The inspectors
observed all aspects
of the following survei llances:
Unit 2
2-0110057 - Periodic Surveillance of DNB (Departure
from Nucleate
Boiling) Margin
2-1400052
Engineered
Safeguards
Channel
Functional
Test
The
indicated
portions
of
the
following surveillance
test
were
also
observed:
Unit 1
AP 1-0010125
Schedule of Periodic Tests,
Checks,
and Calibrations
Data Sheet
6 - Control
Room Emergency Ventilation
Data Sheet
7
Containment Isolation Valves quarterly Cycling
Data Sheet
12
lA Boric Acid Pump - Monthly Code
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