ML17212B435
| ML17212B435 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17212B433 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8203120083 | |
| Download: ML17212B435 (10) | |
Text
ae e.v ENCLOSURE CONTAIN!'1ENT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.7 The containment. purge supply and exhaust iso1ation valves may be open for safety-related reasons l:or shall be locked closedl.
The containment vent line isolation valves may be open for safety-related reasons [or shall be locked closed].
APPLICABILITY:
NODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
tro~ slants with valves c1osed by technica1 speci'vication)
With one containment purge supply and/or one exhaust isolation valve
- open, close the open valve(.s) within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
(For plants with valves that may be opened.by technical'specifications) l.
iAith one containment purge supply and/or one exhaust isolation or vent.
valve inoperable, close the associated OPERABLE valve and either restore.
the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or lock the OPERABLE valve closed.
2.
Operation may then continue until performance of the next required valve test provided that the OP" RABL=- valve is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days.
3.
Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next six hours and in COLD SHUTDOMN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
4.
The 'provisions of Speci,fication 3.0.4 are not applicable.
'URYEILLANCE REQUIREhENTS 4.6.1.7.1 7he
-inch containment.
purge supply and exhaust isolation valves and the
-inch vent line isolation valves shall be determined locked closed at least once per 31 days.
4.6.1.7.2 The valve seals of the purge supply and exhaust isolation Valves and the vent, line isolation valves shall be replaced at least one per years.
3/4 6-10 8203120083 820223 PDR,ADOCK 05000335 P,,
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CONTAIHMEHT SYSTEMS 3/4 4.6.3 COHTAIHMEHT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITIHG CONDITiON FOR OPERATION 3.6.3 The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-1.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
With one or more of the isolation valves(s) specified in Table 3.6-1 inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and either:
a.
Restore the inoperable valve{s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or J
b.
Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of 'at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or c
d.
Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one closed manual val,ve or blind flange; or j
Be in at least HOT STAHDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLO SHUTDOWN within the foTlowihg 30 Cours.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
.4.6.3.1 The isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated
- actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isola-tion time.
3/4 6-14'
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREh1ENTS (Continued) 4.6.3.2 Each isolation valve specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOMN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:
a.
Verifying that on a Phase A containment isolation test signal, each Phase A isolation valve actuates to its Nolation posi'tion.
b.
Verifying that on a Phase B containment isolation test signal, each'hase B isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.
4.6..3.3 The isolation time of each power operated or automatic valve of Table 3.6-1 shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
4.6.3.4 The containment pur ge and vent isolation valves shall be demonstated OPERABLE at intervals not to exceed months.
Valve OPERABILITY. shall be determined by verifying that when the measuued leakage rate is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2.d for all other Type B and C penetration, the combined leakage rate is less than or equal to 0.60La..
However, the leakage rate for the containment purge and vent isolation valves.
shall be compared to the previously measured leakage rate to detect excessive valve degradation.
3/4 6-15
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FEB 18 1982 Docket No. 50-335 Dr. Robert E. Uhrig Yice President Advanced Systems 8 Technology Florida Power II Light Company P. 0.
Box 529100 Miami, Florida 33152
Dear'Dr. Uhrig:
Docket File NRC PDR Local POR ORB Rdg DEisenhut JHe ltemes, CNe lson OELD IRE-1 NSIC RAClark ACRS-10 PggzqukcQ,< ~
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Based on our review of your submittals regarding NUREG-0737 iteq II.E.1.1.
Auxiliary Feedwater System Evaluation, we have determined that additional information is necessary to complete the system portion of our evaluation.
The information needed has been discussed with your staff and is identified in the Enclosure.
Me hope to complete our evaluation of this subject by the end of March-1982.
Therefore you are requested to provide this information by March 15. 1982.
Reporting and record keeping requirements associated with this request have been authorized by OMB clearance 83150-0065 which expires May 31, 1983.
Sincerely,'rigina) sjg)- d by Robing ~ gawk Robert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch jI'3 Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated cc:
See next page 203i 00035 820218 DR ADQCK 05000335 PDR 9 -'45+i g P~ua
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Florida Power
=& Light Company CC:
Harold F. Reis, Esquire Lowenstein,
- Newman, Reis
& Alexrad 1025 Connecticut
- Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
20036
-Norman A. Coll, Esquire McCarthy, Steel, Hector
& Davis 14th Floor, First National Bank Building Miami Florida 33131 Indian River Junior College Library 3209 Virginia Avenue Fort Pierce, Florida 33450 Administrator Department of Environmental Regulation Power Plant Siting Section State of Florida 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Weldon B. Lewis County Administrator St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue, Room 104 Fort Pierce, Florida 33450 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region IV Office ATTN:
Regional Radiation Representative 345 Courtland Street, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Mr. Charles B. Brinkman Manager - Washington Nuclear Operations C-E Power Systems Combustion Engineering, Inc.
4853 Cordell Avenue, Suite A-1
- Bethesda, Maryland 20014 Mr. Jack Schreve Office of the Public Counsel Room 4, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Resident Inspector/St.
Lucie Nuclear Power Station c/o U.S.N.R.C.
P. 0.
Box 400 Jensen Beach, Florida 33457 Bureau of Intergovernmental Relations 660 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RE UEST ST.
LUCIE UNIT 1 NUREG-0737 ITEM II.E.1.1 This request relates to staff recommendations GS-4 and "long-term" as contained in NUREG-0635.
The bases for these recommendations can be found in Appendix III of NUREG-0635.
It is the staff's position that emergency procedures for transferring to alternate sources of AFW supply should be available to the plant operators.
These procedures should include criteria to inform the operator
- when, and in what order,. the transfer to alternate water sources should take place.
The following cases should be covered by the procedures:
- The case in which the primary water supply is not initially available.
The procedures for this case should include any operator actions re-quired to protect the AFW system pumps against self-damage before water flow is initiated; and,
- The case in which the primary water supply is being depleted.
The procedure for this case should provide for transfer to the alternate water sources prior to draining of the primary water supply.
FPL indicated in letters dated December 21, 1979 (L-79-364) and September 10, 1980 (L-80-296) that the present emergency operating procedures available to the plant operators at the St.
Lucie plant provide i.nstructions regarding alternate sources of AFW.
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~ h All alternate sources utilize the primary source flowpath, which is from the condensate storage tank (CST).
The CST is designed according to seismic
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Category I criteria, however it is not tornado missle proof.
Two alternate
- sources, ie, the water treatment plant and the city water storage tanks are non-safety
- designed, and are basically alternate ways of providing makeup flow to the CST.
While the licensee did not provide details regarding the installation
~ of these a1ternate water sources to the CST we-were 1ed to believe that installation requires on the order of three hours.
In their letter dated September 10,
- 1980, FPL indicated that theyintended to connect the Unit I and Unit 2 condensate storage tanks to provide an additional source of AFW for St.
Lucie Unit 1.
FPL stated that this additional source could supply water to the Unit 1 AFW system within 30 minutes per staff criteria.
I, FPL is requested to describe the connection between the condensate storage tanks and-to verify that failure of the Unit 1
CST will not cause the loss of the water supply from the Unit 2 CST.
2.
FPL is requested to verify that procedures for transferri ng to the Unit 2 CST, as an alternate source of AFW, have been implemented at Unit 1.
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