ML17207A675
| ML17207A675 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/1979 |
| From: | Pearson O FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912270098 | |
| Download: ML17207A675 (12) | |
Text
UNITED STATFS OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
FLORIDA POMER 5 LIGHT COMPANY
)
)
(St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Unit No. 2)
DOCKET NO. 50-389 FLORIDA POlJER 5 LIGHT COMPANY'S ANSlJERS TO INTERVENORS'NTERROGATORIES TO FLORIDA POllER 5 LIGHT COMPANY
0 1.
How may system wide power failures or major electrical blackouts have occurred in the FPL system during the past 10 years?
For purposes of evaluation, please list any electric system disruptions that were either system wide, were considered major outages, consisted of so many scattered blackouts in close time sequence that constituted a substantial system disruption, involved tripping off line of one or more power generating stations in the FPL system or resulted in the failure of on site power to any FPL generating plant.
Please provide the date of the occurance or sequence of occui ances, the duration of the outage and the location of the affected areas.
The following is a
summary of major disturbances on the FPL system'uring the past ten years:
Date 1/28/69 8/05/69 8/18/71 4/03/73 4/04/73 6/23/73 12/08/73 3/01/74 4/25/74 6/28/74 5/16/77 5/14/78 3/17/79 4/04/79 5/04/79 6/21/79 8/03/79 Duration 1 hr.
08 min.
5 hr.
22 min.
17 min.
6 hr.
33 min.
3 hr.
36 min.
1 hr.
45 min.
2 hr.
22 min.
2 hr.
04 min.
1 hr.
39 min.
56 min.
4 hr.
36 min.
8 min.
20 min.
20 min.
43 min.
17 min.
18 min.
FPL Load Shed 255 N1J 568 NlI 131 NH 1230 I'll'I 1330 NH 2190 MH 216 NH 197 MH 850 NH 2250 MH 1544 NH 180 Ml'I 105 NH 470 Nll 250 NH 128 NH 240 NlJ Area Affected SH (system wide)
SF (South Florida)
SF SF SF SH SF SH SW SF SF SF SH SH SH SF SH=
2.
(Interrogatory f2 treats off site power failures with emphases on their effect on FPL power generating plants.)
Please list all electric blackouts or power failures in the past ten years that caused an interruption in the flow of offsite power to any FPL electric generating plant site, whether operational at the time or under construction, repair, or in cold shutdown or standby condition.
Identify with particularity, the date of the occurance, the identity of the plant so affected, the duration of the outage and the scope of the power 'failure in the FPL system as related to outage at the other FPL plants.
The following is a list of the disturbances which resulted in the loss of oft-site power to power plants together with the restoration times, in minutes,
. encountered, in each instance.
Power Plant Disturbance 4/3/73
~44/73
/16/77 5/14/78 Cutler Ft. Lauderdale Pt.
Everglades Riviera 30 17 22 40 13 318(98(20 43
'5 8( 17 30 32 5 1.7 St.
Lucie 1* 8 17 Turkey Point 20*
23 8( 43 53 8( 77
- Restored off-site power to station bus though Plant Operator elected to remain on diesel power.
3.
Please
- state, why, in its efforts to achieve greater system reliability the Florida Power and Lioht Company fails to provide a 500 kv intertie or greater to the Georgia Power Corporation and the eastern United States electrical grid system.
Would such an intertie or system of interties provide greater system reliability in the FPL system?
If not why not?
A 500 kV tie with Georgia is still in the planning stages.
A 500 kV intertie or system of interties would not provide greater system reliability in the FPL system until additional transmission expansion now under way and planned is completed.
Transmission expansion now under way and scheduled for completion in 1980, includes a 230 kV tie to Georgia and 500 kV lines from Levee in the Miami area northerly through Andytown and l3artin (the sites for two new fossil generators) to Yiidway.
These 500 kV lines will closely tie the entire South Florida area from our St. Lucie Plant to Dade County-into a strong, tightly integrated network with further improvement in system reliability.
A further expansion of the 500 kV grid in Florida is presently scheduled for coripletion.in 1985.
A new 500 kV line will tie our Midway station to'a new'-
500'V station.'to be built around Lake Poinsett.
4.
Would provision of the 500 kv intertie to the Eastern U. S. electrical grid obviate the need for any additional generating capacity in the FPL system.
If the answer is affirmative, in increments of 250 kv per interties, how many megawatts of base load generating capacity in the FPL system would be obviated or a 250 kv interties, a 500 kv interties, a 750 kv interties?
Objection.
This question appears to relate to the issue of need for power, which has been previously decided in these proceedings and is not presently pending before the Board.
5.
The testimony of NRC Staff witness R. Fitzpatrick indicates the startup record of auxiliary diesel generators to provide emergency on site power at the St.
Lucie Unit 1 Power Plant is sub-standard.
What reasons are known to the FPL Company for the existence of this sub-standard startup record.
To what extent does the plants proximity to the oceanic marine environment affect the perfor-mance reliability of these diesel generators and what if any protective or remedial measures are being taken by the utility company?
The testimony of Robert G. Fitzpatrick does not indicate that the St. Lucie Unit 1 diesel generator startup record is "sub-standard".
The testimony stated that the unavailability of the Unit 1 onsite systems had been greater than that considered acceptabl'e by NRC staff guidelines which had been developed subse-quent to the licensing review of Unit 1 (Fitzpatrick Affidavit June 12, 1978,
- p. 6).
Seven (7) failure to start incidents at St'. Lucie Unit 1 are described in FPL prefiled testimony (Flugger P. 21).
The reasons for each of these incidents include a clogged air solenoid valve and air line, incorrect air valve alignment, turbocharger malfunctions (2),
dirty fuel rack linkage, overspeed trip not reset by operator, and dirty tie breaker relay contacts.
There have been no performance problems with the Unit 1 diesels as a result of proximity to a marine environment.
The same type of engine is routinely used in marine service.
6.
1lhile Hurricane David approached South Florida, Charles
- Scheer, FPL corporate spokesman is reported in the press to have stated "the Company would continue to operate the plants during a hurricane".
(See Palm Beach Post,
- Thursday, August 30, 1979 P.
C 2).
Yet, during the pre-dawn hours as the hurricane approached, the Hutchinson Island site, FPL personnel decided to shut down the St. Lucie Unit 1 reactor.
Hhy did this discrepancy in FPL point of view exist.
Has the company changed or established policy such that it will shut down reactors during hurricanes?
What is the FPL policy concerning reactor operation during passage of a major hurricane where landfall is projected to be in close proximity to the plant site?
Specifically, why did the company shut down St. Lucie Unit 1 during the passage of Hurricane David?
FPL bases its decision on whether or not to operate its nuclear plants during a hurricane upon an evaluation of the storm's path and the forecasted grid load.
Nr. Scheer's statement was reported on August 30, 1979, before the path of the storm had been evaluated.
A subsequent evaluation indicated the desirability for low generating capacity with the flexibilityto accept rapid load changes and that these requirements could be better met by the fossil plants.
Therefore, the nuclear plants were placed in cold shutdown.
- 7. It is reported in the Palm Beach Post of September I, 1979, that during the passage of Hurricane David at the St. Lucie site on Hutchinson Island, a
construction crane segment toppled from the Unit 2 containment building and knocked out Unit I's lead-in auxiliary transformer line.
llh'at are the implications of this event as relates to plant safety and availability of on site power?
~
On September 3,
1979 during the passage of Hurricane David, a cable from the Unit 2 construction crane fell across the lines between the "B" startup transformer and the switchyard.
St. Lucie 1 is equipped with two startup transformers so offsite power was not lost.
At the time of these events the plant was in a cold shutdown condition (See response.
to question 6).
A sticking relay did not allow the "B" diesel generator to start automatically.
An immediate manual start could have been effected but was not required.
A conservative procedure was followed to place the "B" diesel back in service.
The sticking relay was subsequently replaced.
Sufficient AC power was available onsite at all times via the "A" startup transformer.
The "A" diesel generator was available but was not required to start since offsite power had not been lost.
8.
Please provide the test results and performance records of the St. Lucie Unit 1 auxiliary diesel generators for startup reliability up to the present date.
Please provide results originating from the first in-service date and notate-all relevant date.
Objection.
The terms "test results and performance records" are not defined.
The information to which they apparently refer is reflected in a substantial amount of material, some maintained at the plant'site and some in Miami.
These include Licensee Event Reports, records of. surveillance tests, and logbook entries.
Provision of "test results and performance records",
as
'requested, would therefore require the compilation of a substantial amount of material.
Licensee Event Reports are available for inspection in the local Public Document Room.
FLORIDA POWER 8( LIGHT COMPANY By
(
-:GM Orln F. Pearson, Director Licensing and Environmental Planning STATE OF FLORIDA
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)
ss..
COUNTY OF DADE
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Orin F. Pearson, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he is Director of Licensing and Environmental Planning of Florida Power 5 Light Company, the Permittee herein; That he has executed the foregoing document; that the statements made in this said document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information'nd belief, and that he is authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Permittee.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 1979
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NOTARY PUBLIC, in and for the County of D~ge, State of Florida l
il ~
L, FlOTAllY PUGLlC STATE OF FLORIDA ~~4 LARGE h1Y COMMISSION EXPIRES AUCVST 2()iI'l&l My COmmiSSiOn eXPireS:
RohDFD'HRD hlATlAnD Dc:!D't'G AGEYcY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY 5 LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Hatter of:
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)
FLORIDA PONER 8( LIGHT COMPANY
)
)
(St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Unit 2)
)
Docket No. 50-389 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that true and correct copies of the foregoing have been served this 7th day of December,
- 1979, on the persons shown on the attached service list by deposit in the United States mail, properly sta ped an d addressed y/-
NO N N A.
COLL STEE HECTOR 5 DAVIS 1400 S.E. First National Bank Building l'miami, Florida 33131 Telephone:
(305) 577-2863 December 7,
1979
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY 5 LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of:
FLORIDA POWER 8( LIGHT COMPANY (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2)
Docket No. 50-389 SERVICE LIST Mr. C.
R. Stephens Supervisor Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary of the Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Michael C. Farrar, Esquire Chairman Atomic Safety 8 Licensing Appeal Board Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Dr.
WE Reed Johnson Atomic Safety 5 Licensing Appe'al Board Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Richard S.
- Salzman, Esquire Atomic Safety 8 Licensing Appeal Board Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Alan S. Rosenthal, Esquire Chairman Atomic Safety 5 Licensing Appeal Panel Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Edward Luton, Esouire Chairman Atomic Safety 8 Licensing Board.Panel Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Michael Glaser, Esquire Alternate Chairman Atomic Safety 8 Licensing Board 1'150 17th Street, NW Washington D.
C.
20036 Dr. Marvin M. Mann Technical Advisor Atomic Safety 8 Licensing Board Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 Dr. David L. Hetrick Professor of Nuclear Engineering University of Arizona
- Tucson, AZ 85721 Dr. Frank F. Hooper Chairman Resource Ecology Program School of Natural Resources University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48104
Hr. Angelo Giambusso Deputy Director for Reactor Projects Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 William D. Paton, Esquire Counsel for NRC Regulatory Staff Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555 tlartin Harold Hodder, Esquire 1130 NE 86 Street Miami, FL 33138 Harold F. Reis, Esquire Lowenstein,
- Newman, Reis, Axelrad 5 Toll 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.
C.
20036 William J.
- Olmstead, Esquire Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Local Public Document Room Indian River Junior College Library
. 3209 Virginia Avenue Ft. Pierce, FL 33450 James R. Tourtellotte Counsel for NRC Regulatory Staff Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C.
20555