ML17199U393
| ML17199U393 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Quad Cities, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1988 |
| From: | SARGENT & LUNDY, INC. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8802290304 | |
| Download: ML17199U393 (25) | |
Text
-*
~-
A SARGENT 8c LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO ATTA:CHMENT C EVALUATION OF ALTERNATE LPCI SWING BUS TRANSFER SCHEMES Dresden - Units 2&3 Quad Cities - Units 1&2 Prepared for:
Conunonwealth Edison Company Project No. 8194-00 Date: February 4, 1988 Revised:
- February 19, 1988
-i-
SARGENT & LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO Evaluation of Alternate LPCI Swing Bus Transfer Schemes Dresden - Units 2&3 Quad Citi~s - Units 1&2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I.
-Pu rpo*s e *********** ~ ********** ~ * * ** * *****.****** * ~ ********** -******** * * *
- 1
- II.
Failure Scenario **** ~ *********************** ~ ****************** ~ *** 1 III.
Existing Configuration ****************************************** * *** 1 IV.
Theory of Operation....................................... ~ ****..*.. 2 V.
Alternative Conceptual Design Changes ******* ; ***************** n*** 3.
VI.*
Reconunendations ****.*********************************************** s*
VII~
Material Requirements~ ******************** ~, ************** ~ **** ~*~* 5
- .VIII.
Equipment Schedule~ *********** ~ **************** -**********
--~.-.*.~ *****. 6
- IX.*
- Proje.ct* Schedule *********** * ** -*** -.********~****~* *** ~~~.-.* ** _~-.-.~-.:~-** ~ *** _.- 6*-_-'
. X
~ ~-.
Costs * ~-* ******* ~ ~ ****** * ***** * ********** * *.- ~ ********* *~ ****.*** *~ ** -**.* -* ** - 6 XI.
References ****.****.-*** ~ ** -********** ~ **** _ **.*.-** ~* *** _.; *******.*.*.**** 6 XII.
Figures:
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 -
Figure 5 Figure 6
- Figure 7 (Quad Cities-Unit 1) Existing Configuration (Dresden-Unit 2) Existing Configuration*
(Quad Cities-Unit 1) Alternate "Sketch fl" (Quad Cities-Unit 1) Alternate "Sketch #2" (Dresden-Unit 2) Alt~rnate "Sketch #1" (Dresden-Unit 2) Alternate"Sketch #2 11 (Dresden-Unit 2)~Alternate "Sketch #3 11
.;.fi-: -
- 1.
--~-
1,~
~- -
)
SARGENT 8c LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO I.
PURPOSE The purpose of our review is to develop and evaluate alternative transfer schemes for the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) swing
- bus to eliminate an identified design weakness. This condition was
- identified in a Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 87-045-00 dated October 8, 1987, filed by Detroit Edison for a reportable event that took place at the Enrico Fermi. Atomic power Plant ~ Unit 2.
II.
FAILURE SCENARIO The conditions which are assumed to exist are a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) coincident with a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) *and a specific single failure the complete loss of one division of de power. This event can lead to the loss of the LPCI swing bus which in turn prevents the automatic opening of the LPCI injection valves and recirculation values which are required for operation in the LPCI mode.
The result would be the loss of all four LPCl/RHR pumps to inject into the reactor vessel. If you had rapid vessel depressurization through a large pipe break, only one low pressure core spray pump would be inunediately available. If. the above scenario would happen at full power, the fuel cladding temperature design limits.
(2200°F) could be exceeded.
III.
EXISTING CONFIGURATION A.
- Quad Cities The Quad Cities Unit 1 (2) 480Vac LPCI.swing Motor Control Center (MCC) 18/19-5 (28/29-5) is normally fed from electrical Division II 480Vac bus 19 (29) via two in series interrupting devices. The first device is circuit breaker 1951 (2951) and the second device is an ac coil magnetic contactor 1952 (2952).
Upon loss of the normal feed, the MCC automatically transfers to its Division I standby feed 480Vac bus 18 (28), via circuit breaker 1851 (2851) and ac coil magnetic contactor 1852 (2852) *. Bus 19 (29) receives.
emergency power from Diesel Generator 1 (2) while bus 18 (28} *
- receives power from swing Diesel Generator 1/2.
The design of the automatic transfer scheme is such that. cfrcuit..
breaker 1951 (2951) and contactor.1952 (2952) have to be open to.
allow circuit breaker 1851 (2851) and contactor 1852 (2852) *
- respectively to close.
(See attached Figure 1, 11Existing
- Configuration for Quad Cities Unit 1 Swing Bus.
11 ) ;..
SARGENT Be LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO B.
Dresden The Dresden Unit 2 (3) 480Vac LPCI swing MCC 28/29-7 (38/39-7} is normally fed from electrical Division II 480Vac bus 29 (39) via two in series circuit breakers 2971 (3971) and 2972(3972). Upon loss of the normal feed, the MCG automatically transfers to its*
Division I standby feed 480Vac bus 28 (38) via circuit breakers 2871 (3871} and 2872 (3872}.
Bus 29 (39} receives emergency power.
from Diesel.Generator 2 (3) while bus 28 (38) receives emergency,
- power from swing Diesel Generator 2/3.
The design of the automatic transfer scheme is such that circuit breakers 2971 (3971) and 2972 (3972) have to be open to allow breakers 2871 (3871) and 2872 (3872) respectively to close.
(See attached Figure 2, "Existing Configuration for Dresden Unit 2 Swing Bus.")
IV.
THEORY OF OPERATION The LPCI swing bus was designed to automatically transfer from its normal.480Vac source to its backup 480Vac source upon sensing undervoltag~ from the normal source for greater than 15 seconds.. (See attached. Figures 1 and 2.)
This auto~atic tr~nsfer is accomplished on Quad Citie~ Unit 1 (2) as follows:
A.
Normally closed contactor 1952 (2952) opens on sensing.
undervoltage from 480Vac bus 19 (29).
B.
Normally.closed breaker 1951 (2951) is tripped** open upon sensing undervoltage on feed from 48QVac bus 19 (29) for more than 15 seconds.
C.
Normally open breaker 1851 (2851) is closed upon sensing undervoltage from 480Vac busl9 (2~) for more than..15 seconds.
and sensing that circuit breaker 1951 is open~
D.
Normally open contactor 1852 (2852) is closed when the voltage is establlshed on feed from bus 18 (28) andcontactor 1952 is open.
This.automatic transfer is accomplished on Dresden Unit 2 (3) as
- follows:
- A.
Norritally closed circuit breaker 2971 (3971)-- is tripped. open
- upon sensing undervoltage on 480Vac bus*29 (39) for mor.e than 15 seconds.
- . B.
Normally closed circuit breaker 2972° (3972}
i~ tripped open*
upon sensing that circuit breaker 2971- (3971) is open~* * -~- *-.
~.. -
~.. __. -
(
~-
... -~- *. - :.. '.-_
7-* **
\\
--~,.
SARGENT Be LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO C.
Normally open circuit breaker 2871 (3871) is closed upon sensing undervoltage on 480Vac bus 29 (39} for more tbtg 15 seconds and that circuit breaker 2971 (3971) is open.
D.
Normally open circuit breaker 2872 (3872) is. closed*** by sensing that circuit breaker 2871 (3871) is closed and circuit breaker 2972 (3972) is open.
NOTES:
15 seconds is time allowed for the emergency power supply (diesel generator) to reestablish voltage to the bus.
- Requires 125Vdc.from Division II batteryto accomplish tripping function.
- Requires 125Vdc from Division I battery to accomplish closing function.
From the above, it is evident that the design of the transfer scheme circuitry requires 125Vdc control power to function properly.
Loss of the control power will block the automatic transfer.
V.
ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUAL DESIGN CHANGES
/
A.
Quad Cities Unit 1 Alternative No. 1 (see Figure 3) requires. only a simple rewire of the circuits utilizing existing spare contacts of interposing
- relay HMA 1851.
Under the postulated sequence of events (i.e.,
LOOP, LOCA, battery failure) the automatic transfer is accomplished as follows:
Loss of 125Vdc Division II control power to breaker 1951 will deenergize relay HMA 1951. This in turn will provide a permissive to close for breaker 1851. Contactor 1952 will open when it senses undervoltage from 480Vac bus 19. After 15 seconds, breaker 1851 will close, then contactor 1852 will close completing the transfer.
Alternative No. 2 (see Figure 4) provides for an automatic switchover from a primary to a backup source of 125Vdc control power.
Implementing this alternative would require the *addition*
of a relay, two fuses, and a feed cable from the backup:source.
- Under our postulated events, the automatic transfer is accomplished as follows:
Loss of 125Vdc Division II control power to breaker *l95i wilf deenergize relay HFAl which will close in the backup 125Vdc Division I contra l power.. Thus, breaker 1951 wi 11. be ab 1 e to trip open upon loss of 480Vac bus 19 and the transfer will take place as origi~ally intended. ****-**.::I)
". -:- ',, ;1
.... - l
.. I I
SARGENT & LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO A disadvantage of Alternative No. 2 is that the circuitry is automatically transferred between de divisions, through a single component (i.e., relay HFAl).
This is a deviation from the -- - -
current criteria on separation and independence of redundant sources as presented in IEEE 384-1981 and Regulatory Guide 1.75.
(Note:
Quad Cities Unit 2 is simila~. in.design-to Quad Cities Unit 1 and both of the above discussed alternative design changes can be implemented on Unit 2 as well.)
B.
Dresden Unit 2 Alternative No. 1 (see Figure 5) changes the concept from a time delay on~~nsrgizing to a time'delay on deenergizing which will
- therefore allow breaker 2871 to receive a permissive to close upon loss of 125Vdc Division II control power.
In this scheme, breaker 2972 receives its control power from 125Vdc Division I instead of Division II. Under the postulated sequence of events, the automatic transfer is accomplished as follows:
Loss of 125Vdc Division II control power will deenergize interposing relay Aux 1/HMA.
This in turn will trip breaker 2972.
It will also provide a permissive to breaker 2871 to close~ After a 15 second time delay, breaker 2871 will close, then breaker 2872 will close com~leting the transfer.
A drawback to this scheme is that the transfer w~ll take place on loss of 125Vdc Division II control power, irregardless of whether or not there is a 480Vac undervoltage condition on the bus.
In addition, we have Division I 125Vdc control for a Division II 480Vac breaker.
Alternative No. 2 (see Figure 6) provides for an automatic switchover from a primary to a backup source of 125Vdc contrcrl power.
Implementing this alternative would require the addition of three relays, six fuses, and new cabling from the backup source of power to breaker 2971, breaker 2972, and 480V bus 29 undervoltage logic circuitry.
Under our postulated events,_the __ *-*-
~~tomatic transfer is accomplished as follows:
Loss of 125Vdc Division II-control power to breaker 2971, breaker 2972, and 480V bus 29 undervoltage circuitry will deenergize relays HFAl, HFA2, and HFA3 which will close in the backup 125Vdc Division I control power.
Thus, breaker 2971 and breaker 2972 will be able to trip open upon loss of 480V bus 29 and the transfer will take place as originally~~~
intended.
A disadvantage of this alternative, as was discussed previously on Quad Cities, is that the circuitry is automatically transferred between de divisions.
SARGENT Be LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO Alternative No. 3 (see Figure 7) replaces breakers 2972 and 2872 with ac contactors and modifies the transfer scheme to operate identical to the Quad Cities Alternative No. 1 previously discussed.
(Note:
Dresden Unit 3 is similar in design to Dresden Unit 2 and all of the above alternative design changes can be implemented on Unit 3 as well.)
VI.
RECOtl4ENOATIONS All of the above alternate conceptual designs would automatically transfer upon the conditions of LOCA, LOOP, and loss of Division II 125Vdc control power.
But we are of the opinion that the best solution is Alternative Design No. 1 for Quad Cities and Alternative Design No. 3 for Dresden. This decision is based upon the following selection factors:
A. Maintains original electrical separation criteria.
B.
Redundant de divisions are not crosstied.
C. Maintains original operational philosophy {i.e., to automatically transfer only on 480V bus undervoltage).
D.
Satisfies licensee commitments VII.
MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS*
A.
Quad Cities Alternative Design No. 1 (per u*nit):
One or two new control cables to rewire existing devices (obtain from on site wire and cable supplies).
B.
Dresden Alternative Design No. 3 (per unit):
- 1.
One or two new control cables (obtain from on site wire and cable supplies).
2~ 0 Two-3 phase, 3 pole, Size 5 full voltage non-reversing magnetic motor starters (460Vac 60HZ coil with at least 2 N.O.
and 2 N.C. auxiliary contacts and without overload heaters).
- 3. Two-150VA, 480/120Vac control transformers. *
- 4. Four-auxiliary relays (115Vac 60HZ coil with at least 2 N.O.
and 2 N.C. contacts~ two relays to have contacts with adequate rating for 480V service).
- s. One-time delay relay (115Vac 60HZ coil with T.D.O.D., and 2.
N.O. and 2 N.C. contacts).
- Material to be qualified per environmental and seismic requirements of IEEE 323 and 383 *
,_ ~....
SARGENT & LUNDY ENGINEERS
- CHICAGO VIII.
EQUIPMENT SCHEDULE (PER SUPPLIER)
Delivery dates for the above components were requested from the following firms:
A.
General Electric:
to weeks A.R.O.
B.
Nutherm:
10 to
. 11 weeks A.R.O.
- Unknown at this time.
IX.
PROJECT SCHEDULE Commonwealth Edison. Company has indicated that modification work resulting from this evaluation should be targeted to be installed at the following outages:
A.
Quad Cities Unit 2 - April 1988 B.
Dresden Unit 2
- September 1988 C.
Quad Cities Unit 1 - June 1989 D.
Dresden Unit 3
- December 1989 X.
COSTS XI.
We have estimated the engineering services and new equipment costs to implement the recommended design changes to be as fol_lows:
Engineering Equipment Labor REFERENCES Drawing No.
Rev.
4E-1318B c
4E-1328 D
4E-1660B w
4E-1661B R
4E-1661C H
Quad Cities
$30,000 N/A
$10,000 Dresden
$35,000
$50,000
$40,000 Title Overall Key Diagram 125Vdc Distribution Centers (Critical Control Room Drawing).
Single Line Diagram Emergency Power
. System Units 1&2 (CritiCal Control Room Drawing).
Wiring Diagram-480V SWGR. bus is:..
- Secs. 184, 185, and 186.
- Wiring Diagram-480V SWGR. bus 19-
SARGENT & LUNDY e
ENGINEERS CHICAGO Drawing No.
Rev.
Title 4E-1681G AE Wiring and Schem. Diagams-Reactor Bldg. ESS Serv. 480V MCC 18/19-5 Pt.
- 1.
- 4E-1681H p
- Wiring and.Schem. Diagrams-Reactor Bldg. ESS serv. 480V MCC 18/19-5 Pt.
- 2.
4E-2373B J
Schem. Control Diagram-480V Misc.
Auxiliaries Part 2 Unit 2.
4E-2660B s
Wiring Diagram-480V SWGR. bus 28-Secs. 284, 285, and 286 Part 2.
4E-2661B L
Wiring Diagram-480V SWGR. bus 29-Secs. 294, 295, and 296 Part 2.
Wiring and Schem. Diagrams-Reactor Bldg. ESS Serv. 480V MCC 28/29-5 Part
- 1.
4E-2681H J
Wiring and Schem. Diagrams-Reactor Bldg. ESS Serv. 480V MCC 28/29-5 Part
- 2.
4E-1373B K-Schem. Control Diagram-Misc. Aux *.
Part 2 Unit 1.
12E-2328 c
Single Line Diagram Emergency Power System (Critical Control Room Drawing).
12E-2374 s
Schem. Control Oiagram-480V Misc.
Auxiliaries Part 2.
Wiring Oiagram-480V SWGR. bus 28 Secs. 284, 285, and 286.
Wiring Diagram-480V SWGR. bus 29 Secs 294, 295, and 296.
Wiring and Schem. Oiagram-480Vac Reactor Bldg. MCC 28-7 Part 2.
Wiring and Schem. Oiagram-A.C.
Reactor Bldg. MCC 29-7 Part 2.
12E-3374 N
Schem. Control Diagram-480V Misc.
Auxiliary Part 2.
Wiring Diagram-480V SWGR. bus 38 Secs. 384, 385, 1 and 386 *.
Wiring Diagram-480V SWGR. bus*39 Secs. 394 and 395.
. 12E-3662A y
Wiring and Schem. Diagrams~480Vac Reactor Bldg. MCC 38-7 Part 1.
-12E-2661A AO Wiring Diagram-480V SWGR. bus 29 _
Secs. 291, 292, and 293.
SARGENT Be LUNDY ENGINEERS CHICAGO Commonwealth Edison Company Dresden/Quad Cities Stations - Units 2&3/1&2 Evaluation of Alternate LPCI Swing Bus Transfer Schemes MEH:ddg NBl/RDQZ-EP195 XII.
FIGURES
IOA 0
u 480V !OIV.I~US 19 125V 6) 1951
. DIV.II N.C.
cs c
HMAl851 b
cs ~
1851 T ~
~
Cl -
>I I
~ : ClOSE TRIP I I
I
_____ _J cs 0
TOOO SWING MCC 18/19-5 Cl
(.)
Cl U'1 N
IOA
. cs c
I
. 480V !DIV. I> BUS 18 125V 6) 1851 DIV.II N.O.
N.O.
1852 cs ST cs 0
TDOO HMAl951 b
cs ~
1951 T ~a I.
I CLOSE TRIP I I
I
---.:....----~
~
.... -------BREAKER 1951 ___
__,,~~1
,.,.....___....___BREAKER 1851-----1.,~
TO BKR.
1951 AC LINE Ml9
'° FEED MIS b
Ml9
-a CRl9.
TDOD
.115 SEC.>
TO BKR.
1851 AC LINE MIS
. FEED.
- Ml9 * '.
b_'
CRIS'*.
. TO MCC 18/19-5.
J *
~I 1o11411------ CONT ACTOR 1952-------l~~I w
TO**. MCC 18/19-5 *
._. _____ CONTACTOR 1852---..... *-_...... q--i t:
~ Note: Schematic Diagrams have been simplified.
(QUAD CITIES-I>
EXISTING CONFIGURATION
.F.IGURE
- 1.
. r
o:,.
I IOA 480V <DIV. I> sea 125V !) 2871 DIV.I 1 N.Q.
125V
) 2872 DIV. I ~ N.O.
1 l
SWING MCC 28/29-7 IOA e 480V <DIV. 11 l BUS 29
. 125V b) 2971 ~
DIV.II I N.C.
125V
) 2972 DIV. II*~
N.C.
cs c
cs ST cs 0
cs f 2971 cs
): c 0
(.)
0 11'1 N
T J e TOCE
,.........,.._ __ BREAKER 2871 __
_,..,~
Cl
(.)
Cl 11'1 N
IOA 2972 b
I I
I CLOSE TRIP I LI I
ti j!i
""r-~-- BREAKER 2872 ----1*~~
- w
~. Note: Schematic Diagrams
~
have been simplified.
Cl
(.)
Cl 11'1 N
12871 CS ~
2871 TOCE
~ b T ~ e
- -I------ -,
I CLOSE TRIP I I
I L.-
TOCE C 15 SEC.>
,..,.4~----- BREAKER 2971 ------t~~f Cl
' (.)
Cl 11'1 N
IOA
~2971
- }/. 8 2872 b
r, I
I CLOSE
.TRIP I I
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.. ~~* '.;. :...
..,.,~.,._ ___ BREAKER.2972 ----11"-f-.t CDRESDEN-2l EXISTING CONFIGURATION
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a
.:i i...I*.,._ _______ 480V BUS UNOERVOLTAGE REL. <AT SWGR. > ------__.;..---1--f..i *
~
~ Note: Schematic Diagrams
-~
have-been simplified.
~--
CDRESDEN-2 J EXISTING CONFIGURATloN*
~ *: - '
~~...
IOA 0
(..)
cs 480V (QIV.ll~S 19 125V !) 1951 DIV.II N.C.
c HMAl851 b
0
>I I
~ : CLOSE TRIP I I
u------<
I
_____ _J SWING MCC 18/19-5 REVISE IOA cs 0
TOCO f 1951 0
(..)
0 Ja 11'1 N
cs c
I 480V (QIV.ll BUS 18 cs ST cs 0
TOOO 125V !) 1851 DIV. I 1 N.O.
N.O.
1852 cs T
HMA1951 b
I CLOSE TRIP I
L --------...J REt.llVE l..,.4.,_ ____ BREAKER 1951 -----1~~
- l..,.41----- BREAKER 1851 --------t1*-.tj TO BKR.
- 1951 AC LINE Ml9
. FEED TO NCC.I 8/19*5 REVISE Ml9
-a TO BKR.
1851 AC LINE*
MIS FEED
. TO MCC 18/19-5 Ml9 b
CRIS **
- ~. *.. :
~
f-..
CONT ACTOR 1952 ----t*
.... j f.... 4it-----CONTACTOR 1852-----,--ti~-.t *. -"***.
~
Note: Schemati~ Diagrams
~
- have been.simplified.
CQUAD CITIES-I l ALTERNATE *SKETCH #I*.
FIGURE. *3
.!~:
~.. -
480V fDIV.II~S 19
,/~~57" 125V !)
I DIV.I -- DIV.II 1951 BACK-UP NORM N.C.
\\
/-' IOA HFAl'--
1
>-..---REVISE c;o uU 00 in in N~
\\ '
I IOA I
\\
I cs ~
1851 T ~ a SWING MCC 18/19-5 A
480V fDIV. I> BUS 18
b--
cs c
125V
) 1851 DIV. I I H.Q.
N.Q.
0 I
I
- I
. I i
- i I I
\\____
HFAI BREAKER 1951 --------1
....... jJ
~.._. ___ BREAKER 1851 -----t*~I TO BKR.
1951 AC LINE Ml9 FEED TO MCC 18119-5 MIS b
Ml9
-a CRl9 TDOO fl 5 SEC. l TO BKR.
1851 AC LINE
,.... _...,_ ____ CONTACTOR 1952----4~
S Note: Schematic Diagrams w
have been simplified.
~
C QUAD CITIES-I J ALTERNATE *SKETCH #2*
MIS FIGURE *4 Ml9 b
,.. - -~:.::..
~*-~::~
".1'. - :> *,
0
(..)
0 ltl N -
~
.1 IOA cs -c I'
(
I.
480V (DIV.I> BUS 28~
I 25V 6) 2871 DIV.JI N.O.
I 25V
) 2872 DIV.I1 N.O.
cs ST cs
-0 TDOD REVISE AUXI~
HMA ---
J I CLOSE TRIP I
IOA L
_J Cl
(..)
Cl ltl N
~ov (DIV.JI) BUS 29 l
l SWING MCC 28/29-7 IOA cs I
~ c 125V !) 2971 [ili DIV.II I N.C.
/ 12sv' \\
) 2912 *
(
DIV.If?
N.C.
I 12a11
~ 1: 20111
~ b T ~ a I TDOD
,r----- _
1 \\
i2~71 OPENS ON BUS 29 u.v.
I CLOSE TRIP I I
I
\\
L ---"----J
\\
\\
\\
AUX I J.. _L. J._ _L HMA tTtT.
TODD ff:
C 15 SEC. l - ~
l+---------------~~~--~---------..J r-~----- BREAKER 2871-I ----.i ~-------- BREAKER 2971 -------:_i
.. ~ 1~
0
(..)
0 ltl N
IOA 2972 b ________ _,
I.*
I I. CLOSE-TR IP I I
. I L
__ _:.._ __.;_ __ _J
~
~
,...,~11---- BREAKER 2872 ----t~..i
> I 0
I
(..)
0 I
> I ltl N '
I I
I I
IOA
.REVISE ---
r---
1 I CLOSE.
I AUXI
\\
HMA I
I'
. TRIP I I
L'---,-
_J
BREAKER 2972 -----.--11-..~1
~ Note: Schematic Diagrams have been simplified.
u..
~
w IDRESDEN-2>
ALTERNATE #SKETCH #IN
' ' w;.:* !*-
- FH~llRF I\\
- 3
- .&1 Cl u
Cl
. ln N
480V (DJV.Il BUS 28~
125V !) 2871 IOA 17 cs
-c DIV. I I N.O.
I 25V
) 2872 DIV.I 1 N.O.
cs
~2971 2
ST cs -
.cs21 T ~
~
0 TDOE
$2~71 1-* _____ I I CLOSE TRIP 1.
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~:-
ATTACHHBNT D DC POWER FAILURE LPCI (RHR) SWING MCC MODIFICATIONS DRESDEN AND QUAD CITIES STATIONS This at.tachment addresses the followng specific areas: evaluation of potential modifications,.implementation.schedules, historical background, discussion of \\fault coordination, and description of a Battery system Review and a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FEMA), both of which are being performed by Sargent and Lundy (S&L).
A ~opy of marked-up drawings indicating the conceptual design of proposed modifications is also *attached.
For four of the items that _follow (see 1.B, 4, 5, and 6 below) CECo has requested S&L to review specific aspects of the concerns and provide a written summary of their conclusions.
- Estimated completion schedules for these items are provided below.
- 1.
Evaluation of Potential Modifications:
A.
This information is contained in S&L's study report which is Attachment c.
B.
An.additional option, that of providing a second contractor (similar to that employed as the corrective measure for Detroit Edison) in series with the existing breaker and contractor (at Quad Cities) *or the existing two breakers (at Dresden), was not addressed in the S&L study.
However, it is being reviewed by S&L, with results due March 18, 1988. It is anticipated that such an addition will not be considered necessary or appropriate, for reasons that follow.
This information is provided only as an indication of CECo's present opinion of this concern, and further design review may alter this opinion.
(1)
The Detroit Edison units' configuration differs from that of the Dresden and QUad Cities units, in that they employ a DC contractor in series with the feed breaker.* Loss of DC control power not only prevents transfer of the Swing MCC, but also removes power from the MCC.
Their solution was to add a second DC contractor, and.delete use of the breaker from the transfer logic.
Then their MCC would transfer on loss of DC control power, regardless of whether normal AC power was available to the HCC.
This solution could not be applied to the Dresden and Quad Cities units,... because of our use of AC contractors, which share a power feed with the Swing MCC.
ATT. D 2 -
(2) It is believed that the reason for installing two isolation devices in series (breaker*and contractor or two breakers) was related to prevention of non-synchronous connection of divisional power through the MCC's transfer mechanism.
Both normal side isolation devices must open (in the present configuration) before either of the alternate side isolation devices close.
Double breaker isolation, as such, was not a design requirement for the Dresden and Quad Cities plants.
Addition of a third isolation device would therefore neither enhance nor restore the original designed intent for this equipment.
- 2.
Implementation Schedule:
The target dates for installation are:
Quad Cities Unit 2 Dresden Unit 2 Quad Cities Unit 1 Dresden Unit 3
- 3. Historical
Background:
April '88 Outage
.September '88 outage June '89 outage December '89 outage Please refer to the S&L study report (Attachment C).
- 4.
Fault coordination:
Three questions have been raised:
First, would a fault of the swing MCC itself cause an overcurrent trip of the normal feed, then a routine transfer to the alternate power source, and finally a trip of the alternate feed?
The answer is "Yes".
But this is common for automatic transfer devices.
Furthermore, few manual transfer devices have any method of advising the operator that the reason for loss of its normal feed was a fault trip, so that he should not attempt to select the alternate feed.
Secondly, are the feed breakers to the RHR valves from the Swing MCC properly coordinated with the breakers feeding this MCC (e.g., from buses 18 and 19).
That is, would a fault on one valve result in loss of power to other valves?
ATT. D 3 -
Thirdly, are the feedbreakers to these buses properly coordinated with their feeds (e.g., from 4160V SWGR 13-1)? That is, would a fault on the Swing MCC result in loss of bus 18?
The second and third questions are being reviewed by S&L, with results due on March 18, 1988.
- 5.
Description of S&L Battery System Review:
The purpose of the review is to determine whether loss of one division of any other DC system (24/48V, 125V, 250V) would result in degradation of ECCS availability.
If so, ECCS equipment remaining under.such scenarios would be compared to minimums required under Tech Spec, FSAR, or other commitments.
The initial review is limited to Quad Cities Unit 1, and the ability to extend the results to other units will be evaluated next.
The schedule for completion of this task is June, 1988.
- 6. Description of S&L Failure Modes and Effects Analysis:
The purpose of this analysis is to review all aspects of the Swing MCC transfer device's control logic, both before and after the proposed modification, under various modes of operation. It is intended to serve as an input fo the 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation, in the sense of ensuring that a new failure mechanism is not being introduced.
The scheduled completion date is March 18, 1988.
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ATTACHNENT E G E N E R A. L E L E C T R I C C 0 H P A N Y AFFIDAVIT I, B. Wolfe, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:
- 1.
I am Vice President and Chief Scientist of Nuclear Systems Technology Operation, General Electric Company, and have been delegated the function of reviewing the information described in paragraph 2 which is sought to be withheld and have been authorized to apply for its withholding.
- 2.
The information sought to be withheld is contained in "Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Units 1 & 2 SAFER/GESTR-LOCA Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis," NEDC-31345P, June 1987.
- 3.
In designating material as proprietary, General Electric utilizes the definition of proprietary information and trade secrets set forth in the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts, Section 757.
This definition provides:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it....
A substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by the use of improper
- means, there would be difficulty in acquiring information....
Some factors to be considered in determining whether given information is one's trade secret are: (1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him ~o guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expanded by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with the which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others."
- 4.
Some examples of categories of information which fit into the definition of proprietary information are:
- a.
Information that discloses a process, method or apparatus where prevention of its use by General Electric's competitors without license from General Electric constitutes a
competitive economic advantage over other companies;
- b.
Information consisting of supporting data and
- analyses, including test data, relative to a
- process, method or apparatus, the application of which provide a competitive economic advantage, e.g.,
by optimization or improved marketability;
- c.
Information which if used by a competitor, would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality or licensing of a similar product;
- d.
Information which reveals cost or price information, production capacities, budget levels or commercial strategies of General Electric, its customers or suppliers;
- e.
Information which reveals aspects of past, present or future General Electric customer-funded development plans and programs of potential commercial value to General Electric;
- f.
Information which discloses patentable subject matter for which it may be desirable to obtain patent protection;
- g.
Information which General Electric must treat as proprietary according to agreements with other parties.
- 5.
Initial approval of proprietary treatment of a
document is typically made by the Subsection manager of the originating component, who is most likely to be acquainted with the value and sensitivity of the information in relation to industry knowledge.
Access to such documents within the Company is limited on a "need to know" basis and such documents are clearly identified as proprietary.
- 6.
The procedure for approval of external release of such a document typically requires review by the Subsection Manager, Project manager, Principal Scientist or other equivalent authority, by the Subsection Man~ger of the cogpizant Marketing function (or delegate) and by the Legal Operation for technical content, competitive effect and determination of the accuracy ot the proprietary designation in accordance with the standards enumerated above.
Disclosures outside General Electric are generally limited to regulatory bodies, customers and potential customers and their
- agents, suppliers and licensees then only with appropriate protection by applicable regulatory provisions or proprietary.
agreements.
- 7.
The document mentioned in paragraph 2 above has been evaluated in accordance with the above criteria and procedures and has been found to contain information which is proprietary and which is customarily held in confidence by General Electr~c.
- 8.
The document mentioned paragraph 2 above is classified as proprietary because it contains important input parameters and analysis results of the SAFER/GESTR-LOCA analysis methodology, as well as d~tails of current fuel designs that are not available to other parties.
- 9.
The information to the best of my knowledge and belief has consistently been held in confidence by the General Electric
- Company, no public disclosure has been made, and it is not available in public sources.
All disclosures to third parties have been made pursuant to regulatory provisions of proprietary agreements which provide for maintenance of the information in confidence.
- 10.
Public disclosure of the information sought to be withheld is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the General Electric Company and deprive or reduce the availability of profit making opportunities because it would provide other parties, including competitors, with valuable information regarding analysis inputs and results using the SAFER/ GESTR-LOCA methodology, which were obtained at considerable cost to the General Electric Company.
In addition, this document contains details, not available to other parties, of the thermal limits for the current General Electric multiple-lattice fuel designs.
The lattice-specific thermal limits are proprietary to the General Electric Company since valuable design information could be derived by competitors with knowledge of the lattice specific thermal limits.
Although it is necessary to include some thermal limits information in plant Technical Specifications, thus making this information available to competitors, it is important to limit the amount of information available to the maximum extent possible.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
)
) ss:
B. Wolfe, being duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he has read the foregoing affidavit and the matters stated therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.
Executed at San Jose, California, this /< --of'-
General Electric Company
-,;t...
/i..,..,,J:f Subscribed and sworn before me this/4day of~
1987.
No~WuBL~ ~IFORNIA OFFICIAL SEAL**
MARY L KENDAL'L.
NOTARY PUBLIC - CALIFORNIA SANTA C~RA COUNTY My comm. expires M~R 13, 1989.