ML17195A938
| ML17195A938 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 09/03/1985 |
| From: | Guldemond W, Ulie J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17195A936 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-237-85-28, 50-249-85-23, NUDOCS 8509090084 | |
| Download: ML17195A938 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000237/1985028
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report Nos. 50-237/85028(DRS); 50~249/85023(DRS)
Docket Nos. 50-237; 50-249
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
P. 0. Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60690
License Nos. DPR-19; OPR-25
Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3
Inspection At:
Morris, Illinois
1985
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Date
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Approved By: * . G. Gul demand, Chief
Operational Program3 Section
Inspection Summary
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Date
Ins ection on Au ust 13 and Au ust 29 1985 (Re art Nos. 50-237/85028(DRS *
50-249 5023 DRS
Areas Inspected:
Special, announced inspection conducted to perform a review
of Licensee Event Report No. 85-029-0 and the adequacy of corrective actions
related to the event.
The inspection involved a total of 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> onsite and
in-office reyiew by one NRC inspector.
Results:
One violation was identified in the one area inspected (failure
to establish a continuous fire watch patrol as required by Technical
Specification 3.12.H.2 - Paragraph 2) .
8509090084 850903
ADOCK 0:5000237
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DETAILS
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- J. Achterberg, Technical Staff Supervisor
- J. Brunner, Assistant Superintendent of Technical Services
M. Dillon, Station Fire Marshal
- R. Flessner, Service Superintendent
J. Lizalek, Techni~al Staff Engineer
- D. Scott, Station Manager
- Denotes persons attending the exit meeting of August 13, 1985 only.
- Denotes persons attending the exit meetings of August 13 and
August 29, 1985.
The following NRC individuals were also in attendance at the exit
meeting of August 13, 1985.
- L. McGreger, Senior Resident Inspector
- T. Tongue, Senior Resident Inspector
Followup on Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 85-029-0
The inspector performed a review of LER No. 85-029-0.
During steady-
state power operation (approximately 98% power), while performing the
manual/automatic Initiation Logic Test of the Auxiliary Electric
Equipment Room (AEER) Halon System (Special Procedure 85-5-88) on
June. 26, 1985, Electrical Maintenance personnel performing the test
observed that five out of six motor operated ventilation dampers
failed to operate properly.* Three of these five dampers failed in
the open position. These ventilation dampers are necessary to isolate
the AEER during a Halon System actuation.
The six,motor operated ventilation dampers are numbered 2/3-9472-001,
002, 003., 004, 005 and 006.
Ventilation dampers numbered 2/3-9472-001,
005, and 006 were found in the open position subsequent to the test.
Ventilation dampers numbered 2/3-9472-002 and 003 were found in a closed
position unable to open after the Halon System initiation signal was
cleared and. the system was reset. Although they failed in the closed
position\\i'~:these dampers were in the safe position, isolating the AEER
if the. Halon System was to actuate.
Damper 2/3-9472-004 was the only
damper found to operate properly.
The investigation conducted by the licensee revealed that dampers
2/3-9472-001 and 002 failed due to the sticking of a motor control limit
switch located on the ventilation damper operators.
These control limit
switches provide an interlock function within each damper circuit.
In
the case of damper 2/3-9472-001, the control limit switch was stuck in
a position that sealed the damper circuitry in the open position.
Regarding damper 2/3-9472-002, the control limit s.witch was stuck in
the opposite position sealiQg the damper circuit in the closed position.
In'>both::-ca~es,,~/:;a,'relaxed spring on the limit switch actuating arm return
mechan:i:sm'.i{;Wa's.: determined ta be the actua 1 cause of fa i 1 ure.
The cont ro 1
switctie~s1~;w~Y\\~_.,Y,ep~fred and the dampers were cycled to demonstrate
operatii:l~ififfr:.~<lnvestigation of damper 2/3-0472-003 discovered a ground
in the damper operator motor.
An electrical lead in the damper control
panel was found lifted. The wire was lifted to protect .the damper
circuitry from the grounded motor although the lifted lead was not
tagged with a caution card and had not been listed in the control
room jumper logs. This damper has been left in the closed (safe)
position until a replacement motor is received and the work request
completed.
Investigation of dampers 2/3-9472-005 and 006 determined their local
manual damper operators were in a position forcing the dampers full
open (metal plate on the operator positioned so as to prevent closure
of the damper).
On June 26, 1985, the Electrical Maintenance personnel notified the
Station Fire Marshal at approximately 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> of the ventilation
dampers* failure to operate properly; however, they failed to notify
the Shift Supervisor as required by test procedures.
Technical
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Specification 3.12.H.2 requires that a continuous -fire watch with
backup fire suppression equipment be established within one hour
after the AEER Halon System is discovered to be inoperable.
Failure-
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of the three AEER ventilation dampers rendered the system inoperable
in that the Ha 1 on gas discharged into the room wo.ul d be lost through
the ventilation system ductwork.
The failure of the dampers is
significant in that redundant safety-related equipment for Units 2
and 3 are located in the AEER.
Also, safety-related cable is contained
in cable trays in this area.
The- smoke detection and Halon Systems were
operational and would have taused an alarm in the control room.
The
inspector reviewed the annunciator alarm procedure that requires
11 Immediately striking fire with all available equipment.
11
According
to the licensee staff, this would include assembly of the fire brigade.
AdditioQally, any of the-failed open dampers could have been manually
closed by Operating* personnel from a remote location outside the AEER.
On July 9, 1985, dampers 2/3-9472-001, 002, 005, and 006 were declared
operable following a successful test using Special Procedure 85-7-127.
Although~the Station Fire Marshal was notified of the failed ventilation
dampers on June:26, 1985, he did not notify the Technical Staff of this
problem.un'til July l, 1985, at 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br />.
The Shift Engineer was then
notified immediately and by 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br /> on July 1, 1985, five days after
the Halon System had been discovered inoperable, a continuous fire watch *
was posted with backup fire suppression equipment available.
Failure to
establish a continuous fire watch as required by Technical Specification 3.12.H.2 is considered a violation (237/85028-0l(DRS); 249/85023-0l(DRS)).
During the inspector 1s inspection visit of August 13, 1985, the inspector
examined the licensee 1s corrective action for the ventilation damper
failures and the personnel error of failing to establish a continuous
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These corrective actions planned or completed included:
(l)~d~tt¢:<mP:9.r.a.t:i_n.g. Special Procedure 85*7-127 (used to functionally test
tt)~,,,~Af:~.~tf,~;Ton>Sy,s,~~m) into a permanent . .Dresden Fi re Protect ion Procedure
w-i.,~lj\\i:ryS:~yt:qc1ti:(>.,ns;,,to immediately inform the Shift Supervisor and Station
F1*n~;;:M~r}$~'ll:Fw~en:'.':any system discrepancy*is found; (2) locking the local
manuaFope~atorson the AEER isolatton dampers in a neutral position so
as to prevent isolating electrical control of the dampers (The inspector
verified the locks have been installed); (3) posting of 'signs by each
local control operator warning personnel of proper operation and
precautions; (4) establishing a second Dresden fire protection procedure
to demonstrate operability of all ventilation dampers on a quarterly
frequency including a locked damper checklist (Implementation of this
procedure is planned for November 30, 1985); (5) initiating additional
training on the Halon System and damper operation for operations personnel
during their six week training schedule; and (6) making station personnel
aware of LER No. 85-029-0 11Tailgate Meetings.
11
Included in this tailgate
session was a review of OAP 7-4,
11Control of Jumpers or Lifted Leads,
11 and
OAP 15-1,
11Work Requests. 11
Licensee corrective actions are considered
adequate and no reply to the violation is required.
Followup of the
longer term corrective actions will be performed by the resident
inspectors.
Exit Meeting
The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in
Paragrapn 1) on August 13 and August 29, 1985, and summarized the
scope and findings of the inspection.
The inspectors also discussed
the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard
to documents reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.
The
licensee did not identify any of the documents as proprietary .
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