ML17195A782

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Insp Rept 50-237/85-14 on 850320-23 & 0404.Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Have Prescribed Stds & Procedures for Accomplishing Class 1E Cable Field Splicing & Failure to Assure That Design Basis Requirements Translated
ML17195A782
Person / Time
Site: Dresden Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/24/1985
From: Gautam A, Williams C
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML17195A780 List:
References
50-237-85-14, NUDOCS 8505080032
Download: ML17195A782 (10)


See also: IR 05000237/1985014

Text

..

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-237/85014(DRS)

Docket No. 50-237

License No. DPR-19

Licensee:

Commonwea 1th Edi so_n Company

P. 0. Box 767

Chicago, Illinois 60690

Faci 1 "ity Name:

Dresden Nuclear Power Station

Inspecti"on At: .Mo"rris, Illinois (March 20-23, 1985)

Glen Ellyn, lllinois (April 4, 1985)

1nspection Conduc~ed1 March 20-23 and April 4, 1985

\\_~~.

.

.

<FU . . fu"

Inspector:

A.

S~ Gautam

~t~

Approved By:

C. C. *Williams, Chief

Plant Systems Section

Inspection Summary

w~~ht*

Date

4/;;i#P

Date*

Inspection on March 20-23 and April 4 1 1985 (Report *No. 50-237/85014(DRS))

Areas Inspected:

Routine, announced inspect ion by regiona 1 inspector of *

measures taken by licensee to replace an existing Unit 2 125V DC battery

.

power supply with l2~V DC power from the Unit 1 HPCI battery.

The inspect.ion

involved a total of 30 fospector-hours onsite and .3 *i.nspector-hours offsite

by o.ne NRC i nspe.ctor:

Results: *of the areas inspected, two i terns of noncompliance were i dent if.fed

(failure to have prescribed standards and procedures for accomplishing

Class lE cable field .splicing and cable -installation - Paragraphs 3.d(2) and

3. d(3); failure to take measures to assure .. that desi.gn basis .requirements are

trans 1 ated into spec Hi cat ions'; *drawings, procedures and i nslruct ions -

Paragraph 3.f(l)).

  • .i.

,..

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/:

-* .. ,.
  • 1.

2.

DETAILS

Persciris Contacted

Commonwealth.Edison Coriipany (CECo)

~L. Q .. bel Ge~rge, Assistant Vice President

J. Wujciga, -Administrative Assistant Superintendent

  • J. Brunner, Te.chnical Staff _Supervisor
  • 0 R. Rybak, Nuclear Licensing Administrator
  • E. Armstrbng, Techni~al Staff Supervisor

J. *Doyle,* QC Supervisor

M. Loma, QA Supervisor

_ .

.

J. Jurecki, Staff Assistant Engineer

  • R. Deobler, Modification Group Engineer .
  • J. O'Neal; 'Modification Group Engineer

F. Petrusich, QC Engineer

0 G*. L. Smith, T. s

~ . Gro_up te'a'der ~ Dresa~n * .

0 E. D. Eenigenburg, Maintenance Manager; CECo.NSD

-.~D. Farrafr Nuclear Licensing

  • 0w. Worden, Opet'.'ations Manager, .BW.R

_,.. , .. *

0 D. k .. Wi_nche.steh Quality A'ssuranc*~,: Dresden . . ,: ;

~ *

. 0 M. S. Tucker;' Electrical Engfneer, SNED1. '.'.*. ":,

.. , ,

0 W. . B .. Gane her, Lead Engineer*, SNED

. .

. .

0 J. _E .. Hausman, Dresden/Quad ProJect Engineer, SNED

. 0 A.* P. B:ielaaski, Isham, Lincoln & _Beale, Attorne_y

Sargent and -Lundy

°F. W. Fi sher; Sehior El ectri ca l"Project Engi nee~

NRC

0J. Streeter, *Technical A§sfstant, DRS

.* -°C. 'C .. Williains, Chief, Plant Systems Section

  • *0A. S. Gautam; Reactor Inspector*

0 R.

Landsman~ P~bject Manage~ .

0 T. Tongue, Senior Resident,_ Dresden

.

  • ..
  • Denotes those who .attended the interim e~it meeting on March 23! 1985.

0 Denotes those who attende~ the exit meeting on April 4, 19~S.

Review of Dresden Unit -2 Battery Replacement Submittal

During_thi Unit 2 refueling outage of October 5, 1984 through April 14,

  • 1985, *commonwealth Edison (CECo) discovered a potentially significant

degradation of the Unit 2 125V DC battery, and made written notification

bf the problem via a Part 21 report dated March 4, .1Q85.

Pursuant to a

_March 13, 1985,- letter. to .Reg.i.on III, the 1 icens_ee initiated activ.iti~s.

for substituting the power .from the degraded Unit_-~ battery with power

2

from an existing 125V Gould FPS""'.23, 60 cell, Plante battery located in

the Unit 1 HPCI building.

The licensee plans to continue to use the

Uriit 2 battery chargers but switch the existing 125V DC supply from the

Unit 2*batteryto the Unit 1 batte.ry. This Unit 1 power source will be

connected to DC 1 oads by running twe*1 ve. new 600V, 500 KCMI L cab 1 es

and splicing them to two existing 3/C 5KV, 500 KCMIL cables.

The NRc* inspector reviewed the 1icensee 1s letter dated March .13, 1985,

describing the engineering evaluation and field.activities associated *

with .this temporary modification.

This review was performed at the

Region III *office prior to field review.

The licensee's submittal

was found acceptable as stated, and appeared to address all relevant

issues -0f this modiffcation.

3.

  • Review of Field Activities Regarding Unit 2 125. DC Batter.y Replacement

The NRC* inspector reviewed the licensee's field modification instruc-

tions prescribed by Engineering Chang~ Notice (ECN) No. D-85E-Ol, dated.

February 28, 1985, and the implementation of the March 13, 1985, safety*

.*evaluation and 'ECN D-85P*Ol by Station Traveller Work Request (WR)

D42720, Rev. 0, approved March 19, 1985.

The scope of the. licensee's field modificatiOn activities primarily

included:.

  • .

0

0 .

0

0

Installation of .conduit and supports in Unit 2

Testing *of Unit :l battery

.

.

.

Installation* of (12) *- *11c 500 KCMIL 600V cables

.

Splicing o.f ne_w 600V cables to existing (2) - 3/C 500 KCMIL

  • 5KV cables *

Te~ting of.cables and splices

0 * *

. Placing Unit 1 battery into Unit 2 service*

The 1nspettorreviewed the status of the* above activities in the field

for the followi~g areas ..

a. * .Evaluatfon of Battery Loa.ds

th~ inspector reviewed sin~le line wiring and schematic drawings

12E-232281, *Rev. 8, 12E-1396, Rev. H, lZE-2322,* Rev. VJ 12E-1485D,

Rev. A, and 12E-2685A, Rev. AG, ~s referenced in ECN D-85E~o1, for

verification of. new and ~xisting wiring connections and loads to

the Unit 1 battery. * *

The Unit 1 battery currently feeds Unit 1 125V D"C .D:istribution

Panel No.- 5 through cables 11000 and 11001 that-*connecf to a 600

ampere circuit breaker in Unit 1 Compartment Cl.

The Unit 1. battery

loads.are to be removed by mafntaining the Compartment Cl 600A

.breaker,.*open.

The.existing 125V DC feeq,Jrom.the Unit 1 battery*

charger ~C t6 th_e* Unit 1 battery will be d,isco_nnected.

The Unit 1

battery *wi1'1 be connected to-Unit .2 oc* loads. via *new .cables 67662(.+)

3

  • --

and 67663(~) that tap off the two input terminals of the Compart-

ment Cl breaker and are*spliced to one end of existing cables 11082

and 11083.

The other ends of ~xisting cables 11082 and 11083 are

spliced to new cables 67660{+) and 67661(-).

The new cables 67660

and 67661 are in the Unit 2 Turbine Building and are connected to

terminals L1 and L2 of a 400 Amp circuit breaker in Compartment 4

of the 125V DC Mai.n Bus Distribution .Panel 2A-1.

Review of ECN D-85E-.01 indicated no new loads.

The existing Unit 2

battery has a rated eight hour capacity of 498 ampere hours whereas

the Unit 1 battery has a .rated eight hour capacity of .913 amper.e

hours.

Unit 2 battery chargers wi 11 continue to be in service and

feed the Unit 1 battery.

During the inspector's review, the following ~bservations were made:

(1) Since there is no apparent change 1n the Unit 2 load profile,

the Unit 1 battery which has a 1 arger capacity wi 11 be adequate

  • tor Unit 2 DC loads.

The.licensee's safety evaluation stated

the equalizing charge of the Unit 1 battery to be .27 MA for

100 ampere hours of capacity, and apparently the voltage drop

due to the new 1 ong Gab 1 e run wi 11 not a f feet the equa 1 iz i ng

charge.. The licensee reported that the Unit 1 battery wi 11

maintain the technical spec.ification charge limit at Bus 2A-l

for a longer time than the Unit 2 battery for the same load

p~tiffl~ and increased voltage drop ih the cable.

The licensee's

. evaluation for maintaining the technical specification limit

could not be verified during thi~ inspectioh.

An NRC *review of

the licensee's documented load pfofile evaluation is planned

for a subsequent inspection.

The 1 i censee *.agreed to review

the provisioMs of IEEE 450-1975 in regard to performing a

service test which determines if a battery can meet the de*sign

r~quirements of connected DC loads.

Pending furth~r review

this is .an open item (235/8~014:-01): * _ .

1.*

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.

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. (2) *The inspector informed 'the *1 i ce'nsee that the inadvertent

~losing of the*Unit.l 125 DC Panel 5, Compartment Cl, 600 Amp

.breaker could affect. the, Unit. 2 ESF -Division_ 1 emergency .DC

.: power* supply* from the Unit lb?ttery ... Tne. l.icen~ee ,was* re-.

'quested to establisn*a f:i'rm.phy'sical control such as a lockout

of this breaker to avoid any such accident .. The 1 i censee

  • agreed to review a physical control, beyond a planned *out of

ser~ice

1 label on this breaker, to prevent the breake~ from

inadvertently being closed. However, with the Compartment Cl

.breaker locked open, there is a resultant potential problem

with the lack of circuit fault protection for the Unit 1

  • .battery during any shorts in the 125V DC cab 1 e runs.

Pending

review of licensee actionJ the use of the Compartment Cl

breaker is an open item (235/85014-02).

4

.* '

b.

Conduit and Supports

ECN D-85~-0l, pages 14, 16, 21, 22 and 23 were reviewed for pre-

scribed size~ material, bends, length, routing and supports for

two Division 1 4

11 aluminum conduit runs at elevation 534' of the

Unit ~Turbine Bui)ding.

Conduits and supports h~d not been

installed at the time of inspection.

There appeared to be no

.potential for a separation conflict with the Division 2 raceway.

Severa 1 co.ndui ts without tags, reported by the 1 i censee to be

'Ba 1 ance of Pl ant' conduits, were .observed at the proposed 1 ocat ion *

of the new. 4

11 conduits.

It appeared an adequate (greater than 1

11 )

separation would be maintained between these conduits and the new

proposed Division 1 conduits .. Eight proposed hangers, WCN"".19

through 26, specified in ECN.D.;85E-Ol, Page 6, had been adequately

prescribed in terms of type and size of mempers; attachments,

1-0ading and seismic configuration.

c ... Unit 2 Battery Bank Mai'ntenance and Testing

The inspector reviewed the l~censee's special procedure SP85-3-25;

Rev. 0, for a battery acceptance t~st to verify battery capacity.

This procedure and associated acceptance test reports met the

general requirements of IEEE 450-:1975 which were referenced

in procedure.

The licensee *tested and documented,the Unit 1

HPCI battery to hav.e a C?pacity of 110 .. 4% of the manufacturer's ..

rated. 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, capacity o,f 913 ampere ho*urs.* The .test required .a:n

8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> rated discharge current of 114 Amps.

No deficiencies were

  • found ..

.

.

.

.

  • The inspector reviewed the Unit. 1. HPCI battery.cells, racks,

. enclosur'e*and.associated* b~t~ery Chargers*~ *This review* included**

.checking for* f.loat"voltage; cell, cracks; 'electrolyte' leakage:; plates

  • .*.of C:ells for' buckling, cracks or plate gro.wth; ambient temperature
  • -and ventil?t ion; cap at ity of two. ceJ ls, s~ 1 ected at random; and . .

terminals and. connectors' for* evidence of corrosion.. The .inspector

. m~de th,e. fall O\\ofi ng obs.erVat iori.S: .

, .. .-..

  • ~: : ~ ..

- *

. . " - " *'

(1) The .fl .oat vo 1 tage on the 125V .DC HPCLbattery cell~ was

verified on the :battery chargers to be 130 *. 2VDC and the rated

  • equali.ze charge voltage to be 139.SV DC (applied for 24 hou.rs

when required per IEEE 450-1975).

Both voltages were. within

limits .

. (2) Selected Unit 1 battery *cells were. inspected and were apparently

undamaged, without cracks or electrolyte leakage, plate damage

or plate growth.

No sediment was visible at bottom of cells

and* there was no .evidence of corrosion on terminals .

5

(3) The inspector witnessed testing of voltage, specific gravity

(SG), temperature and electrolyte levels of cells 44 and 48.

The following results were observed:

Cell

44

48

SG

1. 231

1.219

Temp.

69°F

68°F

Volt

2.22

2.22

Level

High

.High

In accordance with the li cen$ee Is spec:; al procedure SP85-J-25,

Rev.O, for an applied float voltage of '130.2V on the battery,

the flbat voltage per cell was required to be above 2.17V and

the no.rmal SG fo. be 1. 2+0 (IEEE 450-1975) at 77°F.

Applying

a <:,orrectio*n factor of{-) .. 001 for each 3°F variation beldw

77°f, the SGs o*f' both cells 44 and "48 were found to be wi tlii n

limits.

Electrolytes were at-acceptable levels.

(4) The i~spector revjewed the ventilation of the Unit 1 HPCI

battery room and observed .that no instrumentation was i nsta 11 ed

to measure air flow in the room. whereas the Unit 2 battery r.oom

was observed to have a fl ow switch 2-9441...;100 for monitoring

air flow, measured iri inches of water.

The inspector ques-

tioned this apparent lack of instrumentation for ensuring that

the .battery *area vent i 1 at ion was adequate and operable during

operation.

The licensee stated that an alarm existed for damper

position which* causes a control room typewriter alarm when the

    • .The tnspector alsp questioned if the power supply for the Unit 1

battery room ventilation was safety-related. The 1 i censee

. stated that hei ther the Unit 1 nor Unit 2 battery .room vent i-

. 1 at ion power supplies were safety-rel ~ted. * The Unit 2 battery

ventilation power.supply is not considered safety-related based

on an analysis in NUREG...;0823, Section 4-29.1, whith indicates

the maximum hydrogen buildup during a loss of ventilation to be

. below combustible limits.

Pending an NRC review of a similar

  • .analysis by the licensee for the Unit 1 battery room ventilation,*

this is an unresolved item (235/85014-03);

(5) The inspector reviewed the seismic mounting of the battery racks

and cells. Station Traveller WR D42720, Rev. 0, page 8~r~l0,

Operation 28, defined activities regarding mounting of *rack and

  • cells. *It was observed that no specification/standard or vendor

drawing .was specified on the tr~veller for verification of cell

rack requirements.

Activities described in the traveller did

not address spacing and material between cells. It was also

observed in various cases that cell spacing material was missing

in the field.

The licensee .. reported this. activity to be incom-

plete and that a standard existed and would be available* at* the

time of completion of this activity.

Pending review of completion

of this activity., this .is an open i.tem (235/85014-04).

6

d.

Installation of Class lE C~bles, Field Splices and Connections

The inspector reviewed installation activities ass6ciated with

the following DC .feeder cables to Unit 2 125V DC Distribution

Panel Main* Bus 2 in the Unit 2 Turbine Building:

Cables 67662 and 67663 - 600V, 3 l/C 500 KCMIL, 60 1 length, ESF

Division 1, EPR insulatidn, neoprene jacket. *

Routed from:* Splice ~f cables-11082 and 67662, and splice of

cables 11083 and 67663, in cable *tray sections 1541A and 1549A

located in Unit 1 HPCI Building; To:

Unit 1 125V Distribution

Panel 5, Compartment Cl.

Status:

New, installed March 20, 1985.

Cables 11082 and.11083.;. 5KV, 3jc 500 .KCMIL, 930 1 length.ESF

.Division 1, EPR insulatfon, CSPE jacket.

Routed from:

Splice of cables 67662 and*11082~ and splice of

.cables 67663 and 11083, .in Unit 1 HPCI Bui 1 ding tray 1541A and

1549A; To:

Splice bf cables 67660 and 11082," and splice of

cables 67661 and 11083 in Unit 2 Turbine Building tray 12E-2057.

Status:

Installed October 3, 1979.

Cables 67660 and 67661 - 600V, 3 l/C 500 KCMI L, 150 1 length, ESF *

Division 1, EPR in$ulation, .neoprene jacket.

Routed from:. Splii:e of cable~ 11082 an.d 67660, and _splice of

  • cables* 11083 and 67661 in Unit _2 Turbine Building tray 12E-2057; ..

To:

Unit 2 Turbine Building 125V DC Distribution Panel *Main

Bus 2, cubicle BOl.

Status~ Not pulled as of March 23, 1985.

The following ireas w~r~ reviewed:

(1) The inspector examined cables for type, size, insulation,

markings on jacketJ ends sealed with heat shrink tubing,

(2)

. el~ctrical ch~racteristi~s, bend radi~s and manufacturer

  • class lE-.qualiftcation testtng.

No defic,ie'ncies were 'found.

'

.~ -

.. * .

  • Field. cable spl'ic.ing activities were 'reviewed 'on Station

Traveller WR 042720, Rev. o, Operations 9.,* 10 and 12.

Six

spli~e~ had 5een completed bh cabl~~.67662 and 11082~.~nd

cables* 67663 arid .11083. , The inspectbr r~~iewed* ECN o~85E~o1

  • and=~WR*D42720 to *identify any specificatiOn or standard

.

pre~cribing instructioris for*perfor~ing the butt splices.

The. *licensee v.ie~ed the spliC:ing activity to be within craft

capabi 1 i ty and had. not i s*sued a speci fi cation or standard

for the six splices.

The lack of instructions or specifi-

.catioris for accomplishing the splicing of safety-related

cables is an example of a violation of* 10 CFR 50, Appendi~ Bi .*

Criterion V (2~5/85014-04a).

7

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._.

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(3) During review of cable installation activities, it was observed

that cables 67662 and 67663 .had been installed .on March 20,

1985, as confirmed .by Stat ion Traveller WR D42720, Ope rat ion 11.

There was no QC witness of this activity.

The inspector was

c*oncerned that proper procedures may not have been fo 11 owed

during installation.

On further review it was reported by the

licensee that no c~ble installation procedures had been pre-

scribed for cable installation .activities associated with this

modification.

The licensee was informed that the manufacturer's

Class lE qualification of these cables was maintained through

assurance that tt:ie Class lE integrity would not .be compromised

in the field during in~tallation. Adequate controls, outlined

in cable installation procedures, must therefore be maintained

to avoid any fie 1 d stresses o.r other damage to cable conductors,

insulation a~d jackets during installation of cable~ The

licensee was informed that failure to prescribe documented

instructions, procedures and controls for installation of

safety-related cables was an example of '.a violation of 10 CFR

50, Appendix B, Criterion V (235/85014-05b).

(4)

The inspector was concerned that since no specification/

standard or procedure currently prescri.bed instructions for

i nsta 1l i ng fie 1 d sp 1 ices and cab 1 es, the -1 i.censee** s craft and

i nspector.s may not be trained to-satisfactorily accomp 1 i_sh

these activities.* 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion II requires

thE! licensee's Quality AsstJrance p~ogram to provide for.indoc"'

fri na'tj On'. an{! tra.i ning :Of personne 1 .. performing acti Vi t l es

~- affec,t~ng quality: :10 :CFR.50,_Appendix B~ *c,riterion.XVII,

"Quality Assurance Records~" requires licensees to maintain

records on qualifications of personnel; . Documented evidence

of such qualifications were not confirmed by the licensee*

during this inspection.

Pending further review this is an

unreso 1 ved i tern '(235/85014~_06).

e.

Testing of Cables

Tt was qetermined that the licensee plans* to perform megger and

  • continuity tests oh completed lengths of tables, after .splicing,

, as identified in Sta ti on Trave 11 er WR D42720, Ope rat ions 13, 14,

15and1&.

The inspector ~as ~oncerned that since both.930' 5KV

cab 1 es . 11082 and 11083 had been i nsta 11 ep s i nee October 1979, and

sintefield splicing was being performed on these cables, megger

and continuity tests may not be adequate tests to verify the pe.r- *

formance of these cables.

The inspector review.ed the CECO 600V EPR Cable Standard EM-29105

dated January 30 ,* 1981, s_pecifyi ng qua 1 i fi cat ion testing for the

ins ta 11 ed 600V tab le.

Si nee the 5KV cab 1 es 11082 and 11083 a re

now being used for a 600V DC rated application, this standard was

considered adequate .for the 5KV cables for the present 600V DC

  • application ..

8

' .......

'...

~.,-.

According to Standard EM-29105, Section 8.1, each length of cable

is to be subjected to a high voltage test prescribed in !CEA

S~68-516, which in turn refers to !CEA S-19-81, Paragraph 6.22,

for voltage tests on each length of completed cable.

s~19-81,

Paragraph 6.22.3, requires a DC voltage test of not greater than

3 times the rated AC voltage for 5 consecutive minutes.

IEEE 383-1974, Paragraph 1.3 and 2:2, requires qualification testing

to be done on a completed cable, which includes any field splices.

Since the.manufacturer's qualification did not include these splices,

the license~ ~as requested to review the adequacy of current planned

tests in view of the concerns identified above.

The NRC realizes

that this is a temporary modification and that in the event of a

loss of the Division I 125V DC battery, Division II emergency power

would be av.ail able. However, since the existing length of cable in

the duct run has been exposed to flooding in the past and since two

sets of splices are being made on the completed run ofthis safety

shutdown cab 1 e, it is necessary in accordance with 10 CFR 50,

Criterion XI that an appropriate test program be established to

assure that a.11 tes_ting required to demonstrate that these cables

will performsatisfactorily is *identified and perform~d. Pending

further*review this is an 6peri item (235/85014-07).

f. * Review of Cables Associated with Field Splic~s

.*'I

buring ~:p~iot mee~~ng with'th~-~egi~n, t~e liceniee ~a~ bee~

questioned concerning the acceptability of proposed cal:>le field

splicing.* During a review of the safety evaluation, th'~ inspector

observ~d that _the licensee had 9ddressed the regional question

regarding splicing in the evaluation by stating, " ... Splicing the

cables in the table pans is acceptable as all -0ther cables in these

pans .. are not in serv-i ce and wi 11 never be used.

11

.During review in.

the field, the inspector made the following findings~

(1) * The inspector observed that some cables* in cab 1 e trays

1541A and 1549A containing the cables having the six field

splices were entering Motor Control Center (MCC) 115 located

below the cable trays and were apparently feeding the main

bu~ of this MCC. * One compartment of th~ MCC had a lighted

pilot lamp which indic~ted power for the HPCI building

  • 1ightfng and the* HPC~ Building lighting was on.

The inspector

informed the licensee that its Ma~ch 13, 1985, ~ubmittal tQ the

NRC:indicated that all cables installed in the same pan as

c'ables having sp 1 ices were de..;energi zed .. The licensee per-

formed a further r~view and identified a total Of 7 energized

cables.

These cables*were 10873, 10874, 10878, 10879, 10880,

10927 and 11348.

~he inspector rev1ewed ECN b-~5E-Ol and WR D42720 fbr

prescribed instructions and field activities associated

with this field modification, but found no requirement for

placing the above seven cables out of service .. The in~pector

informed the licensee that failure to take measures to assure

9

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' .*

~**

~

_.,

. . ., ....

that design.basis requirements, as outlined in the March 13,

1985,_ safety evaluation were correctly translated into speci-

fications, drawings, procedures and instructions was in .

. v.i9lation of 10 CFR _50, App*endix. B, Criteribn Ill (235/85014-08).

(2)

Bas~d on.the in~pec~or's firiding (235/85014-67) described

  • in Paragraph 3.f(l) above, the NRC informed the licensee

that the statement regarding cables tnstal1ed in the same

tray with field splices being 'out of service'* was cons1dered

a false statement.

The licensee stated in the April 4, 1985,

meeting that all cables currently in service and associated

with the splices would be placed out of service prior to

energizing the new 125V DC ~ables. The licensee also stated

cjuri ng the meeting that a 11 statements made in the SER were

intehded to reflect pl~rit ~onditions after the new cables

and splices were energiied; however, as discussed in

Paragraph 3. f (l) the 1 i censee did not have any documented.

evidence of .provisions t6 ~ssure the disconnection of the

subject cables prior to placing* the Unit 1 battery into

Unit 2 serv.i ce.

(3) The NRC identified- concerns regarding effects on splices due to

thermal degradatipn and maintenance:

The licensee issued*

restrictions orr .work in cab 1 e pans to avoid damage to sp 1 ices

during maintenance. *

4.

Open Items

Open i terns are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which

will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which* invo*lve some action

on the part of .the NRC or lic:erisee or both.* Open* items disc.losed during

. the tn~pection are discussed in Paragraphs ~.a(l), 3.a(2), 3.c(5) and

3.e.

5.

Unresolved Items

Un re so 1 ved i-tems are matters about which more i nformati.on is required

in order to ascertain whether they.are acceptable items, *items of non-

compliance, or deviations~ Unresolved items disclosed durihg the.

inspection are discussed in Paragraph 3.c(4) and 3.d(4).

6.

Exit Interview

The inspectors met with the 1 i censee .-s representatives.* (denoted under

  • ~aragraph 1) on March 23 and Apri 1 4, 1985, and summarized the scope and

findings of th~ inspection.

The licensee acknowledged the statements

made by the inspectors and agreed to take corrective action on all of

  • the outstanding items of concern.

The licensee did not identify-any

documents or processes in this inspectio.n as proprietary.

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