ML17195A757

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Summary of 850321 Meeting W/Util,Air Products & Chemical, Inc, & Stearns Catalytic Corp Re Placement of Liquid Storage Tank at Plant Site for Use in Hydrogen Water Chemistry Program
ML17195A757
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  
Issue date: 04/24/1985
From: Gilbert R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LSO5-85-04-034, LSO5-85-4-34, NUDOCS 8504300346
Download: ML17195A757 (21)
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Docket Nos. 50-237/249 LS05-85-04-034 UNITED STATES

  • NUC.LEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 Apri 1 24, 1985 LICENSEE:

Corrmonwealth Edison Company (CECo)

,1**

FACILITIES:

Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3

SUBJECT:

SUMMARY

OF MEETING HELD ON MARCH 21, 1985 The NRC staff held a meeting with representatives of CECo, Air Products and Chemical, Inc. and Stearns Catalytic Corporation to dis~uss issues relating to the placement of a liquid hydrogen storage tank on the Dresden site for use in the hydrogen water chemistry program.

A list of attendees is provided in Enclosure 1 and copies of the viewgraphs used by CECo durinq the meeting are presented in Enclosure 2.

While there was some discussion of the hydrogen water chemistry program and its effjcacy during its use at Dresden Unit.2,.the main. thrust of the dfscussions involved the pr~sent delivery system for the hydrogen (hydrogen tube trailers delivered one per day) an.d the replacement of this system with a liquid hydrogen tank which needs to be filled less often and which, according to CECo studies based on a 50.59 analysis, would be safe and more cost effective.

It is the staff's position that CECn's 50.59 evaluation is flawed and that a staff review of the factors involved with the tank placement is necessary since the CECo 50.59 analysis is done on a probabilistic basis and the staff uses a deterministic approach to analyze fixed sources of toxic, flammable and explosive materials on a site. Following discussions between the parties, it was agreed that, if the tank failed and explosion or ignition of the hydrogen occurred at the proposed site of the tank, there was no significant hazard to safety related structures. However, if explosion or ignition does occur at the tank ~ite and the hydrogen cloud drifts over the turbine building (TB) and then explodes, the overpressure developed would exceed the structural integrity of the TB and the control room could be rendered inoperahle.

J.:f '

  • ~

. Apri 1 24, 1985 It was agreed that attempts would be made to re-evaluate the.hydrogen evaporative conditions to.see if deterministic mitigation procedures exist which could reduce the amount of hydrogen volatilized such that the explosive potential of the drifting hydrogen would not exceed the structural integrity of safety-related structures.

Ad~itional discussions are planned.

Enclosures:

1. List o~ Attendees
2.

Viewgraph copies cc w/enclosures:

See next page DISTRIBUTION Docket NRC PDR

JZwolinski RGil bert CJamerson OELD EJordan BGrimes ACRS (10)

NRC *Participants HA l d.ermann DL:ORB#

CJamerson:, b

~ !p-185 DL:O~

RGil bert 4 !?'{ /85 Robert A. Gilbert, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing

'l(1 DL:ORB#5 JZwolinski Pi. /"v~/ 85

cc Robert G. Fitzgibbons Jr.

Isham, Lincoln & Beale T~ree First National Plaza Suite 5200 Chicago, Illinois 60602 Mr. Doug Scott

  • Plant Superintendent Dresden Nuclear Power Station Rural Route #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 U. S. Nucleo.r Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors Office Dresden Station Rural Route #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 Chairman Roard nf Suoervisors of Grundv County Grundy.County Courthouse Morris, Illinois 60450 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Federal Activities Branch Region V Office ATTN:

Regional Radiation Representative 230 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III 799 Roosevelt Street Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Gary N. Wriqht, Manager Nucleor Facility Safety

.Illinois Derrnrtment of.Nuclear Safety 1035 Outer Park nrive, 5th Floor Springfield, Illinois 62704 Apri 1 24, 1985 Dennis L. Farrar Director, Nuclear Licensing Commonv1ea 1th Edi son Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 ATTENDANCE LIST DRESDEN NIJCLEAR POl*IER STATION, UNIT NOS. 2 and 3 MEFTING OF MARCH 21, 1985 Nal'le Affil iatfon E. Mn rkee NRC

c. Ferre 11 NRC K. Carnpe NRC B. Rybak Commonwealth Edison E. Rowley Corrnnonwealth Edison
s. West*

NRC F. Witt MPC

v. Benaroya NRC R. Gilbert NRC R. Linney Air Products & Chem., Inc.

L. Doelp Air Products & Chem., Inc.

W. Paulson MRC M. Strait Corrnnonwealth Edison P. Reichert Stearns Catalytic Corp.

T. Seeley Stearns Catalytic Corp.

D. He lwi q Philadelphia E1ectric Co.

L. Gifford General Electric Co.

E. Kearney Boston Edison Co.

P. Leech NRC.

PURPOSE The pur~ose of this meeting is to review the process and

~6nclusions~Teached in the Safety Evaluation perfofmed by Commonwealth Edison for the Hydrogen Water Ch~mistry Modifications and attempt to resolve the NRC concerns.

AGENDA*

~ History of HWC at Dresden Unit 2

  • Safety Evaluation

.2

c *.

HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY PROGRAM Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSSC) of Recirculation and other piping systems has had a significant impact on B~~ plant availability.

Numerous remedies including alternate pipe alloys and stress improvement treatment that put the pipe welds in compression have

~een developed and implemented.

More recently, Hydrogen Water Chemistry (HWC) has gotten attention as an alternative means of

.providing protection against IGSCC.

Three conditions promote IGSCC.

Th~se conditions are:

Stress - Normally found at welded joints

.~ *.i;,,;** **

Environment - High electrochemical potential on metal surfaces Susc~ptable Materials - Type 304 Stainless Steel Recirculation Piping is an example Laboratory tests have shown *that an environment with a con:rolled impurity concentration and a low dissolved oxygen con:entration will reduce the ECP on a metal surface, and below a certain ECP stressed specimens of susceptable materia*ls are immune to IGSCC.

The purpose of the HWC Program is to create this environment in an operating BWR and det~rmine the parameters that would create IGSCC ir.imunity.

3

History of HWC at Dr~sden Unit 2 The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) initiated a contract with Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) and General Electric (G.E.) to implement a one month HWC test at Dresden Unit 2 in 1982.

In order to implement this test, a temporary hydrogen supply line was run from behind the turbine building to the condensate booster pumps.

Laboratory grade instrumentation manned by experts from G.E. was connected to temporary sample lines in order to monitor the important process parameters.

This test system was eauipoed with a number of different automatic isolation features which provided assurance of fail-safe operation.

A temporary Technical Specification change for the MSLRM setpoints was requested for the duration of this test.

The results of this test showed that creating an environment.

that provided immunity from IGSCC was tethnically feasible.

Based on the positive results of the one month test, EPRI decided to negotiate a second contract with ComEd to implement a long term HWC Program.

These negotiations took place during the Spring 1982 Dresden Unit 2 refueling outage.

Due to the time constraints of the outage, upgrades to the temporary test system could not be completed before start-up.

The decision was made to use the labor intensive temporary sy~tem for one cycle then install an industtial grade HWC system during refueling outage (Winter 84/85),

4 History of HWC at Dresden Unit 2 The single largest problem with the temporary HWC System is that hydrogen tube trailers had to be delivered at a rate of one per day to maintain the hydrogen flow requirements.

An economic feasibility study concluded that a liquid hydtog~n storage system would be the most cost-effective means of meeting the high hydrogen flow req~irements.

A modification was initiated to upgrade the HWC system and to install a liquid hydrogen storage system during the Winter 84/85 refueling outage.

5

Sub sy,s tern #1 Liquid H2 Storage Control Re 1 ev.ant Issue #1 Structural v

List of Pertinent Questi~ns Answers for the 3 Questions e

e HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY SAFETY EVALUATION

SUMMARY

10CFR50~59 Safety Evaluation 3 Questions HWC System

~

~

'11 Subsystem #2 Subsystem #3 H2 Supply Oxygen Supply lV Relevant Issue #2 Relevant Issue

  1. 3 Mechanical Fire Protection

'Y Checklist

1.
2.
3.

J.

List of List of Pertinent Pertinent Questions Questjons

>¥ Hork Sheets For each Subsystem J,

I Answers Answers for the for the 3 Questions 3 Questions 6

Subsystem #10 Radiological

-~--a, Relevant Issue #6 Electrical I&C Issue~

I List of Pertinent Questions.

Answers for the 3 Questions

SAFETY EVALUATION:

1.

Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report increased?

2.

Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report increased?

3.

Is the margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, reduced?

7

HYDROGEN WATER CHEMISTRY SYSTEM BREAKDOWN FOR SAFETY EVALUATION

1.

Hydrogen Storage and Vaporization System

2.

Oxygen Storage and Vaporization

3.

Hydrogen Injection

4.

Oxygen Injection

5.

Sampling (Offgas)

6.

Sa~pling (Recirc Line to Autoclaves)

~

7.

Fire Protection (Including Hydrogen Detectors)

8.

Instrumentation and Control (Including Panel and System Isolation/Shutoff)

9.

Radiological Control

10.

Hydrogen Deliv~ry

  • 8

RELEVANT ISSUES Site-Related Issues Mechanical Issues Structural Issues Electrical/l&C Issues Fire Protection Issues Radiological Issues 9

Relevant

~ Issues

  • 1

~ 5

"'* 6 i'I 8 M 9 M 10 l'I 11 l'I 12 l'I 13 v'

SAHTY EVALUATION GUI DEL INES CHECKL !ST

~ECHAN!CAL ISSUES High energy line [$.,_...._Fie r... e to u,....... CC.I t'\\.v <: -;)

Internally generated missiles) lpn rh..,f CC:-;"-1 4..A.-+oc..lc. v <-

Externally generated missi_les [i.,rod... cc-d l:>j

+o.1-..\\....~~r1.;~:,,... er Jr:c~.i..... re.)

Loose particles within piping systems or components Deformation or catastrophic structural failure that could impair the safety function of the system, components or

. structures beino modified, or other surrounding safety related systems Safety classification, compatibility of appendaoes or penetrations of safety related-components such as vessels, or containments(~.!..-plc 1.;..c t-.., c.<u.fv-c..lc. vC)

Double isola~ion where flow systems-change safety classification (-;....... ~1~

r.... ~ to a...... ~c..\\(I \\iE:'.>)

Fail safe protection - safety function of the interfacing safety systems.

preserved upon failure (~>L-t'lc l*nc.

~nc../c..--:;

Redundancy of existing systems reduced Environmental Qualification (environmental Qualification requires a separate evaluation) ll..,;,~, "1c**c.)

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~vme. ~~*'1\\ev..t '" i-\\)..rec...

Seismic qualification Cp~'f\\....1 o-.f.. I~)

Co:::;iatibility of rnaterials (co.,..b..i..;-

T\\\\,\\~~J f"t..~:l 1';*.*

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W....ii. Oi. ~c:,.vicc) le..._;

~ec!c\\,.J<> ~.. r o._)

1-;..., I<:. *h *~...,... b-11..... c.e:' c..ci-. J ~.,~.. + e h'jJrc:>jc?"'

li"c~* *J lc.-..+r.,,1

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_K_E_Y_W_O_RO_S ___________ Justification if not relevant jet impingement, pipe whip pump rotor breakup, valve stem ejection tornado driven object, airplane Thermowell, heat exchanaer plugging, flow maldistri-but ions flow* forces on valve stem causing maioperation, valves won't close, equipment support failure results in degradation of safety system S'{s~e""'. fc:..;J.,.re..

Cl1"' VIO r p.-=xi.

(I. M1'1$/ ]c.

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+'~*"'S G.r<.. "o+ *c.o.o"*ciwc...;.* h>

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change of RCIC (BWRl from non-I safety related to safety related at containment penetration.

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backup system in FSAR affected f l"<>

n:.c!u.c..n.:.On r~u." do.nC ot ""'"~-n:.lc..td ')';l~~e.~

temperature, humidity, radiation environment maintain structural integrity; operate during, afte~ seismic event prohibited materials; excessive com~ustible~. sealants, coatings, insulation, effect of radiation, aiuminum in containment restricted 1.:....p":c..f-i:l~

II.WC.

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"DON'T LIMIT YO'J:i ':O~iSIOEP.ATIOll) ll~m Tlll~i>:ING TD Tll( 15SIJES IDEliTIFl(O !II THIS C1t(Cl<LIST.

THIS LIST IS TO s::w.*~ AS I\\ GUI!;~ A:10 Ml /\\JU IN YOU!{ EVliLUl\\TIOfl."

,0

SAFETY EVALUATION WORK SHEET STATE THE ISSUE

1.

Identify and list modification interfaces/interaction.

2.

Define interfaces/interactions of mod with FSAR single failure a~ents and DBAs

3.

Are initial conditions and assumptions of FSAR accident analysis chan~es?

4.

Are consequences bounded?

5.

List failure modes and effect.

6.

Are failure effects bounded or mitigated?

7.

List Technical Specification interfaces/interactions with modification.

1 1

ISSUES:

SAFETY EVALUATION WORKSHEET HYDROG~N STORAGE

~ VAPORIZATION.

S4:

Protect1on of safety class st~uctures from natural phenomena and meteorolog1cal condit1ons {tornados, ra1n loads, snow loads)

ST3:

Degradation of structural 1ntegr1ty of the ex1st1ng structure (explos1ve load on structures)

S6:

Add potent1al hazards 1n the s1te or exclus1on area (stored hydrogen)

ST1:

Se1sm1c class1f1cat1on {panel and tank)

Mll:

Se1sm1c Qual1f1cat1on (panel and tank)

IDENTIFY ANO LIST MODIFICATION INTERFACES/INTERACTION:

Impact of potent1al failure on safety-related structures and equ1pment.

!11TERFACES/INTERACTIONS of mod w1th FSAR s1ngle fa11ure events and OBAs:

No 1mpact on FSAR s1ngle failure events and DBAs.

Are 1n1t1al cond1t1ons and assumpt1ons of FSAR accident analys1s changed?

NA Are consequences bounded?

NA

  • .L1st fa1lure modes and effects:

Tank fa1lure 1s 11miting event.

fa1lure modes:

l. Weld fa11ure.
2.

Overpres.sure fa1 lure

  • J.

Natural phenomena (tornado missile 1s only design bas1s phenomenon capable of tank breach)

Are fa11ure effects bounded or m1t1g~ted?

Yes.

Based on probability and consequences of failure modes.

See Refs. l, 2..

L1st Techn1cal Spec1f1cat1on 1nterfaces/1nteract1ons w1th modH1cation:

No Technical Spec1f1cation changes beyond those completed prev1ously for the hydrogen mini-test are required.

Is Technica*l Spec1ficat1on margin of safety reduced?

No.

Does an unreviewed safety question exist?

No.

I '2.

SAFETY EVALUATION WORKSHEET HYDROGEN STORAGE

~ VAPORIZATION ISSUES:

SB:

Stab111ty of subsurface mater1a1s or foundat1ons for class I structure (exp1os1on causes s~1sm1c type force~ through so11/rock to safety related structures)

ST3:

Oegradat1on of structural 1ntegr1ty of the ex1st1ng structure (explos1ve load on structures)

IDENTIFY AND LIST MODIFICATION INTERFACES/INTERACTION:

Impact of potent1al fa1lure on safety-related structures.

INTERFACES/INTERACTIONS of mod w1th FSAR s1ng1~ fa1lure events and DBAs:

No 1mpact on FSAR s1rig1e fa1lure ev~nts and OBAs.

Are 1n1t1a1 cond1t1ons and assumpt1ons of FSAR acc1dent analys1s changed?

NA Are consequences bounded?

NA l1st fa1lure modes and effects:

Tank fa1lure by explos1on could 1mpart a se1sm1c-type mot1on 1nto so11 and subsurface rock, wh1ch m1ght be transrn1tted to safety-related structures.

Are fa1lure effects bounded or m1t1gated?

Yes.

L1 st Techn1ca1 Spec 1f 1cat1on 1nterf aces/1 nteract1 ons w1th modH1cat1on:

No Techn1cal Spec1f1cat1on changes beyond those completed prev1ously for the hydrogen m1n1-test are requ1red.

Is Techn1cal Spec1f1cat1on marg1n of safety reduced?

No.

Does an unrev1ewed safety quest1on ex1st?

No.

13

HYDROGEN STORAGE AND VAPORIZATION SUBSYSTEM (HSVS)

Might the probability or consequences of accidents or malfunctions previously evaluated in the FSAR be increased?

No.

HSVS does not imP.act assumptions of any accident or single failure analyzed in the Dresden FSAR.

Might an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR be created?

No.

The limiting pot~ntial concerri is liquid hydrogen tank failure.

This tank is capable of withstanding tornado winds and SSE loads.

  • The limiting design basis external

~vent is tornado.. missile.

Overp~essure protection devices~

Weld failure/tank operating conditions/fabrication QA Low probabjlity breach by a tornado mi~sile, plus conservative vaporization, dispersion, and detonation assumption equals blast pressures below the-structural design bases.

Negligible probability of blast effects beyond the plant design basis.

Ground motion negligible.

~~ight the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification be reduced?

No. The liauid hydrogen storage subsystem does not interact with any of the systems described in the technical specifications.

14

Conclusion It should be apparent after going through this process that it was logical to conclude that an unreviewed Safety question did not exist.

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