ML17194A543
| ML17194A543 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1982 |
| From: | Jordan M, Reimann F, Tongue T, Walker R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17194A541 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-010-81-21, 50-10-81-21, 50-237-81-38, 50-249-81-31, IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8203250577 | |
| Download: ML17194A543 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000010/1981021
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports No. 50-010/81-21; 50-237/81-38; 50-249/81-3l(DPRP)
Docket Nos.50-010, 50-237, 50-249
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
P. O.Box 767
Chicago, IL
60690
Licenses No. DPR-02, DPR-19, DPR-25
Facility Name:
Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3
Inspection At:
Dresden Site, Morris, IL
Inspection Conducted:
December 31, 1981 through January 29, 1982
Inspectors:
T. M. Tongue
M. J. Jordan
~µ:.~~~~~-
F W. Reimann*
Approved By:
R. D. Walker
Inspection Summary
Inspection from December 31, 1981 through January 29, 1982 (Reports
No. 50-010/81-21, 50-237/81-38, 50-249/81-31(DPRP))
Areas Inspected:
Routine *unannounced resident inspection of Followup on
Previous Inspection Findings, Operational Safety Verification, Monthly
Maintenance Observation, Monthly Surveillance Observation, Unusual Events,
Plant Training, Plant Trips, Refueling Activities, Refueling Surveillance,
Refueling Maintenance, Inspection During Long Term Shutdown, Regional
Requests, Licensee Identified Items, and Bulletin Review.
The inspection
involved 202 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors, including 42
inspector-hours during offshift.
Results:
Of the 14 areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were
identified in 13 areas; one item of noncompliance was identified in one
area(inadequate housekeeping - Paragraph 3).
8203250577 820309
PDR ADOCK 05000010
Q
'*
DETAILS
SECTION 1
1.
Persons Contacted
- D. Scott, Station Superintendent
- R. Ragan, Operations Assistant Superintendent
J. Eenigenburg, Maintenance Assistant Superintendent
- D. Farrar, Administrative Services and Support Assistant Superintendent
J. Brunner, Technical Staff Supervisor
J. Wujciga, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
J. Almer, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
M. Wright, Unit 3 Operating Engineer
T. Ciesla, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
D. Adam, Waste Systems Engineer
D. Sharper, Radiliogical Waste Foreman
- G. Myrick, Rad-Chem Supervisor
B. Saunders, Station Security Administrator
- B.Zank, Training Supervisor
- E. Wilmer, QA Coordinator
- R. Stobert, QA Engineer
The inspector also talked with and interviewed several other licensee
employees, including members of the technical and engineering staffs,
reactor and auxiliary operators, shift engineers and foremen, electrical,
mechanical and instrument personnel, *and contract security personnel.
- Denotes those attending one or both exit interviews conducted on
January 22 and 29, 1982.
2.
Followup on Previous Inspection Findings
3.
(Closed) Inspection Item 50-249/81-14-02.
The inspector found that the
licensee had completed the necessary repairs to the 150 ton overhead
reactor building crane.
The repairs included using the services of a
private engineering firm for evaluation and consultation.
The licensee
did not write a licensee evaluation report on this problem because the
crane was not used in the Restricted Mode condition identified in
Technical Specifications.
Operational Safety Verification
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during
the period of December 31 through January 29, 1982.
The inspector
verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed
tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected
components.
Tours of Unit 2 reactor buildings and turbine buildings
were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including
2
potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to
verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in
need of maintenance.
The inspector by observation and direct inter-
view verified that the physical security plan was being implemented
in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions and
verified implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the
period of December 31, 1981 through January 29, 1982, the inspector
walked down the accessible portions of the Unit 2 Core Spray, Standby
Liquid Control, 2A LPCI, 2/3 Diesel Generator, and Unit 2 Diesel
Generator systems to verify operability.
The inspector also witnessed
portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with
radwaste shipments and barreling.
,.
While conducting routine plant tours during this inspection period,
the inspectors noted several locations with significant quantities
of combustible materials accumulated. in safety related equipment
areas.
Examples are:
(1) On January 26, 1982, in the Unit 2 Emergency
Diesel Gene.rator room, loose papers, wood, and oil scattered around
the room and engine foundation, plus a GI can without a lid, con-
tained used oil filters, oil rags, papers, and plastic, (2) On January 27,
1982, in the Unit 2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator room, about 12 open
oi.l drums with as much as several gallons of 'oil remaining in each
barrel, an open refuse barrel overflowing with oily rags, papers, wipes,
etc., plus considerable rags, wipes and oil were on the floor and work
bench.
In addition, there was evidence that individuals had been smoking
in the area by the presence of numerous cigarette butts, burned matches
and an empty match book on the floor.
It was found that the combus-
tibles in the Unit 2/3 Diesel Generator room were apparently left
from maintenance work that had been conducted during the previous
week.'
This is contrary to ANSI 18.7-1976, Section 5.2.10 which the
licensee is committed to under their Quality Assurance Program.
This
is an item of noncompliance (50-237/81-38-01 and 50-249/81-31-01).
A
similar noncompliance (10/80-19-01; 237 /80-21-01; and 249 /80-25-01)
brought about licensee corrective action in the form of a new adminis-
trative procedure DAP 3-11 which identified responsibilities for plant
cleanliness.
This is a significant breakdown in that corrective action.
Along with the combustibles left from maintenance and/or surveillance
work, the inspectors noted access covers missing or out of place as
follows on the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator: *.access cover over
the engine fly wheel unlatched and hanging open; a cover over a micro-
switch on the engine governor open and hanging by one screw; and
the cover missing from an electrical junction box for engine exhaust
RTDs.
Each of these items by themselves may appear insignificant;
however, they show evidence of carelessness in completion of work
assignments and could lead to eventual personnel injury or degradation
of exposed equipment.
This concern of the inspectors was relayed to
station management.
The inspectors will follow licensee corrective
actions.
The station superintendent pointed out that this had been
3
previously identified independently by non NRC personnel.
This is
open inspection item (50-237/81-38-02) and (50-249/81-37-02).
One item of noncompliance was identified.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility
operations were in conformance with the requirements established under
technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
4.
Monthly Maintenance Observation
. 5.
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and com-
ponents listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that tµey
were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory
guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with
- technical.specifications.
The following items were considered during this review:
the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components _or systems were
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were
performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality
control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by
qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified;
radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls
were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding' jobs
and.to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment
maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:
ii
Unit 2
2/3 Emergency Diesel Generator
Following completion of maintenance on the 2/3 Emergency Diesel
Generator, the inspector verified that this system had been returned
to service properly.
No items of noncompliance were identified .
Monthly Surveillance Observation
The inspectors observed technical specifications required surveillance
testing on portions of the Unit 2 RBCCW Service Water Radiation Monitor
and the High Steam Flow Isolation Surveillance and verified that testing
was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instru-
mentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were
met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were
4
accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications
and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than
the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified
during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate
management personnel.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Unusual Event
The licensee declared an unusual event on January 19, 1982, upon
detection of a release of airborne radioactive material on the
refuel floor in the Reactor Building.
The release occurred as a
result of polishing the Unit 3 reactor vessel feed nozzles for
- feed sparger replacement.
Initial indications showed release levels
about three times the Technical Specification limit of 0.12 µC/sec.
The licensee evacuated the Reactor Building, secured Reactor Building
Ventilation, and started the Standby Gas Treatment system.
The licensee
also made the required notifications to the NRC and State of Illinois.
Upon being informed by Region III management personnel, the SRI reported
to the site and remained until the event was cleared.
Later licensee
actions were to verify that the Reactor Building air activity had re-
turned to normal, and then to return the ventilation systems to normal.
Licensee personnel then commenced decontamination of affected areas.
Samples of snow, dirt, and air outside the site fence showed no
indication of an offsite release.
Later reevaluation by the licensee
and consultation with Region III health physics personnel showed that
the air activity did not exceed the allowable limits.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
7.
Review of Plant Operations
During the period of December 31, 1981 through January 29, 1982, the
inspector reviewed the following activities:
Training
The inspector attended one of the licensee's operator requalification
lecture series and verified that lesson plan objectives were met and
that training was in accordance with the approved operator requalifi-
cation program schedule and objectives.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Plant Trips
Following the plant trips of Unit 2 on January 26, 1982 the inspector
ascertained the status of the reactor and safety systems by observa-
tion of control room indicators and discussions with licensee personnel
concerning plant parameters, emergency system status and reactor coolant
5
chemistry.
The inspector verified the establishmerit of proper communi-
cations and reviewed the corrective actions taken by the licensee.
All
systems responded as expected, and the plant was returned to operation
on January 27, 1982.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Refueling Activities
The inspector verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the
core, all surveillance testing required by the technical specifica-
tions and licensee's procedures had been completed; verified that
during the outage the periodic testing of refueling related equipment
was performed as required by technical specifications; observed six
shifts of the fuel handling operations and verified the activities
were performed in accordance with the technical specifications and
approved procedures; verified that containment integrity was main-
tained as required by technical specifications; verified that good
housekeeping was maintained on the refueling area; and, verified that
staffing during refueling was .in accordance with technical specifi-
cations and approved procedures.
The inspectors also walked down accessable portions of the following
ECCS systems to verify operability.
Unit 3
Standby Liquid Control Syst~m
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Surveillance - Refueling
The inspector observed the calibration of ARM surveillance testing on
Unit 3 to verify that the tests were covered by properly approved pro-
cedures; that the procedures used were consistant with regulatory
requirements, licensee commitments, and administrative controls; that
minimum crew requirements were met, test prerequisites were completed,
special test equipment was calibrated and in service, and required data
was recorded for final review and analysis; that the qualifications of
personnel conducting the test were adequate; and that the*test results
were adequate.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
11.
Maintenance - Refueling
The inspector verified maintenance procedures include administrative
approvals; provisions for special authorization and fire watch respon-
sibilities for activities involving welding, open flame, *and other
6
ignition sources; reviews of material certifications; provisions for
assuring LCO requirements were met during repair; and responsibilities
for reporting defects to management.
The inspector observed the maintenance activities listed below and
verified work was accomplished in accordance with approved procedures
and by qualified personnel.
Unit 3
Core spray spargers inspection
Fuel sipping
Fuel channeling
Calibration of water level indicators in the Control Room for feedwater
sparger removal.
Steam separator removal
No items of noncompliance were identified.
12.
Inspection During Long Term Shutdown
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the
period of December 31, 1981 through January 29, 1982.
The inspector
verified surveillance tests required during the shutdown were accom-
plished, reviewed tagout records, and verified applicability of
containment integrety.
Tours of Units 1 and 3 accessible areas,
including exterior areas were made to make independent assessments
of equipment conditions, plant conditions, radiological controls,
safety, and adherence to regulatory requirements and to verify that
maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of
maintenance.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness
conditions, including potential fire hazards, and verified
implementation of radiation protection controls.
The inspector by
observation and direct interview verified that the physical security
plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security
plan.
No items *of noncompliance were identified.
13.
Regional Requests
The resident inspector prepared and forwarded a Significant Occurence
Report to Region III on the simultaneous inoperability of the High
Pressure Coolant Injection system and one of the Electromatic Automatic
Depressurization System valves.
This event occurred on December 23,
1981, and was documented in a previous inspection report (50-237/81-37
and 50-249/81-29).
The resident inspector followed up on a Region III request to conduct a
special inspection on the licensee's Prompt Public Notification/Warning
System.
The inspectors personally sited over 20% of the installed sirens.
The inspectors also contacted CECo corporate personnel regarding the
7
--
capability and availability of this system.
The results of the inspec-
tion were forwarded. to Region III and will be issued in a special report
by the Division of Emergency Preparedness or Operational Support.
During the inspection period, the Senior Resident Inspector and a
Region III inspector conducted the Dresden portion of a lengthy
investigation following up on allegations.
The allegations pertained
to operator training on Vice Presidents Instruction 1-0-17, offsite
review of DVRs, scrams of unknown cause or numerous scrams from
similar causes and approvals for restart; and LER corrective actions,
steps to prevent recurrence and trending.
Since the allegations were
related to all CECo plants, a similar review was conducted at Quad Cities
and Zion Stations.
A final summary report will be forthcoming with
the findings.
Region III requested followup by the resident inspectors to review
fire doors installed at Dresden.
This came about as a result of a
recent situation where certification was unavailable for fire doors
at the Kewaunee Nuclear Station.
CECo personnel stated that fire
protection doors at Dresden were manufactured by the James Walker
Company, a subsidiary of Allied Fire Equipment Company of Chicago,
which is not the manufacturer of the doors at Kewaunee, and that
certification is available upon request.
14.
Licensee Identified Items
The licensee reported finding a discrepancy in the timeliness of the
installation of the Unit 2 Drywell continuous pressure recorder to
meet TM! Task Action plan T.A.P. II-F-1.4.
The pressure recorder was
scheduled to be installed by January 1, 1982.
However, it was combined
in a modification package with the torus wide range level recorder
whpse delayed installation was reported to NRR by CECo letter dated
December 15, 1981, to be completed by February 1, 1982.
Immediately
upon discovery of the discrepancy, the licensee took steps to complete
the installation and report the item to the NRC.
The licensee reported identifying that the submission of the updated
curvers (Technical Specification Figure 3.6.1) had not been submitted
to the NRC prior to six effective full power years as required by
Technical Specification 3.6.B.1.
(The licensee did conduct a study
with a consultant in 1979, and concluded that the curvers should remain
the same for the next 10 to 16 years.)
The apparent cause was delay in
offsite review.
Upon discovery, the licensee immediately submitted the
updated information (TS Figure 3.c.1) to NRR.
The inspector was also
informed by* CECo offsite review personnel that they were taking steps
to prioritize and track items submitted for offsite review to prevent
future occurence.
This matter is similar to one of the allegations
reviewed and addressed in P~ragraph 13 of this report.
Final resolution
will be reviewed by the Region III team conducting the investigation of
the allegations.
8
These are licensee identified items of noncompliance.
In accordance
with the Interim Enforcement Policy, 45 FR 66754 (October 7, 1980),
Section IV.A, a Notice of Violation will not be issued for these
licensee identified items of noncompliance which are of Severity
Level V or VI.
Corporate corrective action followup is being conducted
by Region III personnel and conclusions will be presented in a separate
report.
No other items of noncompliance were identified.
15.
Bulletin Review
Based on the licensee's 180 day response dated November 30, 1981, to
IE Bulletin No. 80-11, the inspector reviewed many of the walls not
meeting the licensee's acceptance criteria.
The licensee failed to
determine if the failure of the walls not meeting the acceptance
criteria joepardized the operability of any safety related system.
The licensee is conducting a review to determine if the failure during
a seismic event of these walls not meeting the acceptance criteria
would affect the operability of systems or components.
Based on a
telecon between Region III DRPR personnel and CECo licensing per-
sonnel, the results of that review will be submitted to Region III
within one month.
This bulletin remains open.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
16.
Exit Interview
The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)
throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on January 22
and 29, 1982, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection
activities.
The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspection.
9