ML17158A212
| ML17158A212 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 03/25/1994 |
| From: | Conte R, Williams J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17158A211 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1021 50-387-94-01OL, 50-387-94-1OL, 50-388-94-01OL, 50-388-94-1OL, NUDOCS 9404130020 | |
| Download: ML17158A212 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000387/1994001
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATOR COMMISSION
REGION 1
REPORT NOS:
FACILITYDOCKET NOS:
FACILITYLICENSE NOS:
LICENSEE:
FACILITY:
EXAMINATIONDATES:
EXAMINERS:
50-387/388-94-01
50-387 & 50-388
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company
2 North Ninth Street
Allentown, Pennsylvania
18101
-Susquehanna
Steam Electric Station, Units
1 & 2
January 31 to February 4, 1994
Julian H. Williams, Sr. Operations Engineer
Carl E. Sisco, Operations Engineer
CHIEF EXAMINER:
ulian H. Williams, Sr. Operations Engineer
BWR Section, Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Date
APPROVED BY'ichard J. Conte, Chic
BWR Section, Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Date
9404130020
940401
ADOCK 05000387
U
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 & 2
EXAMINATIONREPORT NOS. 50-387/388-94-01
Requalification examinations were administered to 6 reactor operators
(ROs) and 6 senior
reactor operators
(SROs).
The 12 licensed operators were divided into 3 crews.
Eleven of
the licensed operators
passed all portions of the examination, and all three crews performed
satisfactorily in the simulator.
One SRO failed the simulator portion'of the examination.
The results of the requalification examinations and program evaluation were satisfactory in
accordance with Examiner Standard
601 criteria.
Overall, operator performance on all parts of the examination was strong.
Strengths were
noted in the interface between the training and operations departments.
The facility prepared
examination met NRC standards
as defined in NUREG-1021, Revision 7, and required few
changes
(section 3).
An unresolved item (387/93-06-02 and 388/93-06-02) was reviewed dealing with radiation
levels in secondary containment and left open pending completion of licensee action and
NRC staff review (section 4).
DETAILS
1.0
INTRODUCTION
During the week of January 31 to February 4, 1994, the NRC staff administered
requalification examinations to 12 licensed operators (6 ROs and 6 SROs).
The examiners
used the process and criteria described in NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examiner
Standards,"
Revision 7.
An entrance meeting was held on January
10, 1994.
The examination materials were
reviewed and validated during the week of January
10, 1994.
An exit meeting was
conducted on February 4, 1994.
Attachment
1 lists those in attendance
at the exit meeting.
2.0
SUMMARYOF EXAMINATIONRESULTS AND PROGRAM
.FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS
2.1
Requalification Individual Examination Results
NRC GRADING OF REQUALIFICATIONEXAMINATION
Pass/Fail
Pass/Fail
TOTAL
Pass/Fail
Written
6/0
6/0
12/0
Simulator
6/0
5/1
Walk-through
6/0
6/0
12/0
Overall
6/0
5/1
FACILITYGRADING OF REQUALIFICATIONEXAMINATION
Pass/Fail
Pass/Fail
TOTAL
Pass/Fail
Written
6/0
6/0-
12/0
'imulator
6/0
5/1
Walk-through
6/0
6/0
12/0
Overall
6/0
5/1
Based on both the NRC and facility grading, all three crews passed the, simulator portion of
the requalification examination.
The facility failed one individual for the demonstrated
inability to implement the Emergency Plan.
In accordance with ES 601D.2.b.6, the NRC
also failed the individual.
2.2
Facility Generic Strengths and Weaknesses
Based on Requalification Examination
Performance
tren ths
Operations and Training Department personnel worked well together.
Operator performance on all portions of the examination was strong overall.
Weaknesses
None observed.
3.0
REQUALIFICATIONPROGRAM EVALUATIONRESULTS, FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS
3.1
Examiner Standards Evaluation Criteria and Results
Using the criteria of ES-601, "Administration of NRC Requalification Program Evaluations,"
the program evaluation is as follows:
D.2.a(1)
At least 75% of the licenses must pass all parts of the examination in which
they participate.
'The pass rate was 92% (11 out of 12) for all parts of the examination.
D.2.a(2)
At least two thirds of the crews pass the simulator'examination.
All three crews passed
the simulator examination.
The following factors were also considered in the program evaluation:
D.2.b(1)
There was agreement between the facility and NRC on all crew
evaluations.
D.2.b(2)
Allfacility evaluators performed satisfactorily.
D.2.b(3)
Operators were trained and evaluated in positions permitted by their license.
D.2.b(4)
D.2.b(5)
Administrative controls are in place to preclude an inactive
licensee from performing licensed duties.
The licensee has sufficient quality control of its examination bank.
There were
no post-examination
changes
to questions,
D.2.b(6)
There were no differences between NRC and licensee failures.
The results of the licensed operator requalification program review were satisfactory in
accordance with Examiner Standard
601 criteria.
3.2
Requalification Examination Development and Administration
The Sample Plan that was provided with the examinations materials was detailed and
complete.
The Test Outline for,the examinations adhered to the Sample Plan.
No revisions were made to the proposed written examinations.
The proposed Job Performance Measures
(JPMs) required only minor revision.
The dynamic simulator scenarios contained events that challenged the SRO's ability to
prioritize actions and effectively direct crew operations.
The crew critical tasks required
minor revision to meet the Examiners Standards criteria for critical tasks for safety
significance and measurable performance standards.
The scenarios that were used for the
examinations met the guidelines for qualitative attributes defined in the Examiners Standards.
The administration of the examinations went smoothly, and the examination was conducted
as
planned.
During the dynamic simulator examination, the examiner raised a question over the adequacy
of the procedure for electrical bus restoration (Energizing Dead 4 kv ESS bus, ON-004-002).
The procedure did not include the final steps for restoring the bus to service.
For the steps
omitted, licensee representatives
considered
the restoration
steps to be within the skills of the
trade.
However, this caused
some confusion, with'respect to bus restoration, on the
operators'art.
The licensee took prompt action to change the procedure
so as to eliminate
the confusion.
These changes were reviewed by the inspector and found to be satisfactory.
Also during the dynamic simulator examination, one crew allowed the reactor vessel water
level to drop lower than (top of active fuel) desired while a crew briefing was being
conducted.
Discussions with the licensee determined that conducting a briefing before taking
a significant action was normal training practice.
The briefing should have been done before
reactor water level reached
the top of the active fuel rather than after it reached this level.
This practice was considered
a potential weakness in training.
The licensee indicated that the
training department would assess
the generic nature of the problem and make any necessary
changes to their training program.
3.3
Conclusions
Operator performance on all portions of the examination was strong overall.
The Licensed
Operator Requalification Program performance was determined to be satisfactory.
The
examination materials that were proposed for the examination met the examiner standards
and required only minor revisions.
Administration of the examinations went smoothly and it
was conducted
as planned.
4.0
LICENSEE ACTION ON PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS
(Open) Unresolved Item 387/93-06-02 and 388/93-06-02
With respect to EO-100-104, "Secondary Containment Control (SC-EOP)," this open issue
. involved the adequacy of licensee's value and use of a single value for "maximum normal
radiation levels" (MNRL) in areas of secondary containment.
The EOP Generic Technical
Guideline defines MNRL as the highest value of the identified parameter expected to occur
during normal plant operating conditions with all directly associated
support and control
systems functioning properly.
When the MNRL is exceeded,
the EOP action is to isolate the
unnecessary
systems and locate the leak, ifpossible.
These levels were entry conditions for
the SC-EOP and indicators of worsening conditions that may lead to plant scram and
emergency depressurization
based on "maximum safe radiation levels."
In Inspection Report Nos. 50-337,338/93-06,
the inspector questioned the use (under
emergency conditions) of the single radiation value (100 mR/hr) established for MNRLs for
all areas of the secondary containment in light of significantly varying normal (general area)
radiation level's depending on the area and equipment within the area.
This issue was also
discussed in telephone conversations
between NRC staff and the licensee representatives
on
March 24 and March 25, 1994.
The MNRLs were also used in the licensee's
emergency action level (EAL) definitions.
In a
letter of June 9, 1993, the NRC staff questioned the change in facility EALs.
The licensee's
response of January 5, 1994, was under review by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
staff.
The licensees submittal indicated the maximum normal levels were 200 mR/hr); but,
by telephone conversation on March 24, 1994, Mr. Peale confirmed that this submittal was
in error because of an oversight.
Licensee representatives
also confirmed that this
correspondence
does not address
the adequacy for the established MNRL in the SC-EOP.
During this inspection, the inspector determined that EOPs still reflect the single value for all
areas of 100 mR/hr.
However, a licensee multi-disciplinary group reevaluated
this item, and
they found that, during normal operations/surveillance
testing, three areas exceed the MNRL
and this was not indicative of a primary system leak to secondary
containment.
These areas
were:
High Pressure
Coolant Injection Room, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Room, and
Residual Heat Removal Room.
Subsequently,
the licensee representatives
provided an
evaluation for a higher single point value for the EOP use (500mR/hr).
Several shortcomings with the licensee's evaluation were noted.
The evaluation doesn'
specifically address
the potential problem of masking real, primary-to-secondary
containment
leakage for areas with normally-low radiation levels ((100 mR/hr) and with the relatively
high MNRL action level.
There may be an excessive delay in isolating the leak ifthe
general area radiation level has to build up to 500 mR/hr in any area.
The licensee
representatives
reported that similar EOP-type actions are taken as a result of high alarms on
area radiation monitor in accordance with alarm response or abnormal procedures.
The
justification for the single value throughout the SC appears to be a reliance on non-EOP type
procedures
to complete the EOP strategy.
However, these facility procedures
may not be
under the same level of control as the EOPs.
Further, ifthe leak becomes unisolable, this
delay may be a factor in shutting down the reactor (2 or more areas exceeding maximum safe
level or for a worsening condition necessitating
emergency blowdown of the reactor in order
to isolate or remove the source of the leak).
Also, the single value also poses operational
problems in which an EOP entry would be needed
as a result normal testing of:equipment.
8
As a result of these concerns,
licensee representatives
committed to not implement the
change in the EOP's MNRL to a higher value until additional information on their evaluation
was received and reviewed by NRC staff.
This area remained open pending completion'of licensee and NRC staff action as noted
above.
5.0
EXITMEETING
An exit meeting was conducted on February 4, 1994.
Personnel attending are listed in
Attachment
1.
The NRC presented preliminary results of the examinations
and discussed
examination-related
findings.
An unresolved item is an area in which more information is needed to determine ifthe item
is acceptable,
a deviation or a violation. The status of an open unresolved item was
addressed
in section 4.
Attachments:
1.
Persons
Contacted
2.
Simulator Facility Report
N
ATTACHMENT1
PERSONS CONTACTED
Pennsylvania Power and Light
Gene Stanley, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
Howard Palmer, Manager, Nuclear Operations
Art Fitch, Manager, Operator Training
T. C. Dalpiaz, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance
Bruce Stitt, Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor
Rick Wehny, Compliance Engineer
Carl Fedako, Nuclear Operations Training Supervisor
T. R, Markowski, Dayshift Supervisor
Kevin Chambliss, Maintenance Outage/Production
Supervisor
Terry Logsdon, Operator Training Instructor
Dave Walsh, Operations
Ira Kaplan, Public Information
Bob Prego, Nuclear Quality Assurance
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Herb Williams, Sr. Operations Engineer
Carl Sisco, Operations Engineer
Allof the above personnel attended the exit meeting.
10'TTACH1VH<24T 2
SIMULATORFACILITYREPORT
Facility Licensee:
u
uehanna
team Electric Stati
n
Facility Docket No: ~~7388
Operating Tests Administered from January 31 to February 4, 1994
This form is to used only to report observations.
These observations do not constitute audit
of inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of
noncompliance with 10 CFR 55.45(b).
These observations
do not affect NRC certification or
approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information that may be used in
future evaluations.
No licensee action is required in response
to these observations.
While conducting the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following item's were
observed (ifnone, so state):
ITEM
D
RIPTI N
None