ML17157C536
| ML17157C536 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 10/18/1993 |
| From: | Conte R, Sisco C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17157C535 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-93-18, 50-388-93-18, NUDOCS 9311010113 | |
| Download: ML17157C536 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000387/1993018
Text
REPORT NOS:
LICENSE NOS:
LICENSEE:
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
50-387; 388/93-18
Pennsylvania Power &Light Company
2 North Ninth Street
Allentown, Pennsylvania
81801
FACILITY:
Susquehanna
Steam Electric Station
INSPECTION DATES:
September 27-October
1, 1993
INSPECTORS:
LEAD INSPECTOR:
C. Sisco, Operations Engineer
D. Mannai, Resident Inspector
C. Sisco, Operations Engineer
REVIEWED BY:
C. S', Operations Engineer
BWR Section, Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
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Date
APPROVED BY:
Richard J. Conte,
ief
BWR Section, Operations Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
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Date
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93iiOiOii3 931022
ADOCK OS000387
6
PDR,
In
ection Summa:
Inspection conducted from September 27-October
1, 1993 (Report
Nos. 50-387/93-18; 50-388/93-18)
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personnel,
and observations by the inspectors
was conducted.
Results:
The inspectors concluded control room operations are conducted in accordance with
station procedures.
In addition, operations management
was present in the control room
providing adequate
management
oversight.
Likewise, maintenance activities were performed
in accordance with station procedures
and with appropriate supervisory oversight.
I
The continuation of status control events with low safety consequences
indicated that the
licensee's corrective actions have been ineffective.
In addition, the repetitive nature of
mispositioned valves indicated that the licensee's root cause analysis of mispositioned
valve(s) may not have been sufficiently independent or thorough enough to include all
human performance aspects.
0
0
I
DETAILS
1.0
INTRODUCTIONAND SCOPE
The purpose of this inspection was to review licensee actions to control equipment status.
This initiative inspection was performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's root
cause evaluations and corrective action implementation for events status was not maintained.
These events, in some cases,
led to adverse consequences
such as primary containment
leakpaths; minor, uncontrolled releases;
and system trips or degradations.
Many of these
events were caused by valve.mispositionings.
The inspection consisted of a review of selective records, interviews with personnel,
and
observations of plant activities by the inspectors.
The inspectors used inspection procedures
71715 and 92720 during the course of this inspection.
2.0
FINDINGS
2.1
Observations of Plant Activities
The purpose of this review was to assure that safety-related activities were conducted in
accordance with approved station procedures
and that management
was involved in routine
activities including event reviews.
The inspectors observed licensee activities in,the control room during 100% power
operations of Unit 2, and shutdown activities of Unit 1.
The inspectors noted that activities
were conducted in a professional manner in accordance with station procedures,
and
management
oversight of control room activities were conducted on a routine basis.
The inspectors conducted observations of maintenance activities in the reactor building of
Unit 1.
The inspectors observed
the repacking of valves at the hydraulic control units and
work preparations
to remove the drywell equipment hatch.
The work activities were
conducted in accordance
with station procedures,
and these procedures
were located at the
work sites.
Maintenance supervision was observed in the work areas providing management
oversight.
2.2
Control of Valve Positions
The licensee has long identified the issue of maintaining the correct valve positions as a
problem in their facility. The inspectors reviewed several of the licensee's Nuclear Safety
Assessment
Group (NSAG) annual summary assessments
that identified valve position control
as a weakness.,
In 1992, the licensee formed a Status Control Review Team that issued a
report detailing the team's findings and corrective action recommendations.
The Status
Control Review Team Report was reviewed by the inspectors,
In addition, the inspectors
reviewed facility generated Significant Operating Occurrence Reports (SOORs).
Based on a
'v
review of these documents,
and past NRC Inspection Reports, the licensee's control of valve
positions continues to be less than effective.
Examples of this continuing problem are listed
below.
In July 1992 and during power operations at Unit 1, the licensee identified that five
containment atmosphere
sampling lines were disconnected
at the "B" containment
radiation monitoring (CRM) panel by the removal of five solenoid operated valves.
The valves were inadvertently removed during a maintenance activity (past unresolved
item No; 387,388/92-20-01).
The primary containment penetration isolation valve
was operable while these sample valves were removed from the system.
In April 1993, an NRC inspector identified that a High Pressure
Coolant Injectio'n
(HPCI) turbine exhaust vacuum breaker test valve was closed, capped and
containment tagged, but was not chain locked closed as required by facility procedure
on Unit 1. This event resulted in a Notice of Violation and is detailed in NRC
Inspection Report 50-387/93-07.
In June 1993 and during power operation at Unit 2, the licensee identified that a 3/8"
drain valve on the suppression
chamber narrow range pressure instrument line was
found open and the end uncapped.
This uncapped
and open drain valve allowed a
leak path between the primary and secondary containments.
The leakage amount was
within regulatory limits and was of minor safety significance.
In July 1993, the licensee identified that a drain valve at the Condensate
Storage Tank
berm of Unit 2 was mispositioned by being open.
This event resulted in a small
unmonitored and uncontrolled release (low level) of radioactivity from the berm area.
In August 1993, the licensee identified that a valve in the Containment Instrument Gas
(CIG) system was mispositioned.
This event caused
the CIG system to transfer
automatically to the gas bottle backup system.
The gas bottles provide an emergency
backup supply of nitrogen pressure for the Automatic Depressurization
System.
In September
1993, the licensee identified that the vent valves on the Main Generator
exciter heat exchanger were mispositioned by being closed on Unit 2.
In September
1993, the licensee identified that a valve in the Fuel Pool Cooling
(FPC) system was mispositioned by being open.
This event resulted in a low level in
the skimmer surge tank of the FPC system and the resultant trip of the FPC system
pumps.
The licensee took immediate corrective action(s) to restore the mispositioned valve(s) and
plant systems to the correct configuration once identified for each of these cases.
With
'
respect to long-term corrective actions, the licensee's NSAG group has long identified and
tracked equipment status control events.
The licensee's
1992 report identified status control
events as needing additional management
attention.
The licensee has implemented several additional corrective actions since mid-1993.
However, the inspectors noted that these corrective actions could have been implemented in a
more timely fashion since the licensee's
Status Control Review Team Report was issued in
September
1992.
Based on recent examples,
these actions have not prevented recurrence.
The individual examples of mispositioned valves by themselves
has low safety consequences.
However, the continuing nature of valve mispositioning events that have occurred indicated
that licensee's corrective actions have been ineffective in maintaining complete control of
valve positions.
In addition, the repetitive nature of mispositioned valves indicated that the
licensee's root cause analysis of mispositioned valve{s) may not have been sufficiently
independent or thorough enough to include all human performance aspects.
3.0
SUMMARY
The inspectors concluded control room operations are conducted in accordance with station
procedures.
In addition, operations management
was present in the control room providing
adequate
management
oversight.
Likewise maintenance activities were performed in
accordance with station procedures
and with appropriate supervisory oversight.
The continuation of status control events with low safety consequences
indicated that the
licensee's corrective actions have been ineffective. In addition, the repetitive nature of
mispositioned valves indicated that the licensee's root cause analysis of mispositioned
valve{s) may not have been sufficiently independent or thorough enough to include all human
performance aspects.
4.0
EXIT
MEETING'n
exit meeting was conducted October 1, 1993, at the Susquehanna
Steam Electric Station.
The inspector's findings and conclusions were discussed
at this meeting.
Those in attendance
are listed below.
At the meeting, the NRC staff focused on its concern with the ineffectiveness of the
licensee's corrective actions with respect to status configuration control on valve positions.
In response
to the staff's request,
the licensee representatives
agreed to a written response
detailing additional actions and controls to minimize further valve mispositioning events.
The area addressed
in this report is unresolved pending NRC staff review of the licensee's
response
as noted above (387,388/93-18-01).
(An unresolved item is an area in which more
information is needed to determine ifthe item is acceptable,
a violation, or a deviation.)
PENN YLVANIAPOWER Ec LIGHT
MPANY
G. Stanley
G. Kuczynski
B. Saccone
H. Palmer
T. Dalpiaz
K. Chambliss
R. Breslin
S. Laskos
D. McGann
A. Dominquez
F. Guscavage
M. Golden
J. Meter
T. Clymer
Vice-President Nuclear Operations
Manager-Plant Services
'anager-NSE
Manager-Operations
Manager-Maintenance
Supervisor-Maintenance
Chemistry Supervisor
Scheduling Supervisor
Supervisor-Compliance
Supervisor-NSAG
Supervisor-Operations
Engineering
Supervisor-NSE - PAT
Compliance
NQA-Audits
LEAR RE
LAT RY
MMI I N
L. Bettenhausen
C. Sisco
D. Mannai
Chief, Operations Branch, Division of Reactor Safety
Operations Engineer
Resident Inspector