ML17157B060
| ML17157B060 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 02/19/1992 |
| From: | Noggle J, Pasciak W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17157B059 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-92-03, 50-387-92-3, 50-388-92-03, 50-388-92-3, NUDOCS 9202280061 | |
| Download: ML17157B060 (17) | |
See also: IR 05000387/1992003
Text
'
y
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Inspection No.
Docket Nos.
License Nos.
50-387 92-03
50-388 92-03
50-387
50-388
NPF-14 NPF-22
Licensee:
Penns
Ivania Power and Li ht Com
an
2 North Ninth Street
Allentown Penns
Ivania
18101
Facility Name:
Sus
uehanna
Steam Electric Station Units 1 & 2
Inspection At:
Berwick Penns
Ivania
Inspection Conducted:
Janua
21-24
1992
Inspector:
J. N
gle,
iation Specialist
Facilities Radiation Protection Section
date
Approved by:
W. Pasciak, Chief, Facilities
Radiation Protection Section
34Hz
date
A~i.*d:A
- dl dll p*l
l ldd':p
l
ly
identified items, response to an injured contaminated worker, organization changes,
outage preparation, ALARAstatus, and external dosimetry implementation.
Results:
The licensee has reorganized
and separated
the radwaste functions and staff
from the Health Physics Section for the purpose of providing better organization
effectiveness.
Outage preparations
and the review, of annual ALARAresults appeared
good.
The external dosimetry program appears to be strong.
The radiological hazard to
the victim of a hydrogen flash was low. The licensee responded very quickly and
effectively to this event.
9202280061
92021'V
ADOCK 05000387
8
'
DETAILS
1.0
Personnel Contacted
1.1
Licensee Personnel
"D. Crispell, Industrial Safety Engineer
D. Gallagher, HP Level II Technician
K. Harder, HP Level IITechnician
E.'Horstman, Sr. Health Physicist
J. Jessick, HP Specialist
L. Kalnoskas, Pipefitter
C. Kalter, Radiological Services Supervisor
R. Kessler, Health Physicist, Dosimetry
- D. McGann, Sr. Project Engineer - Compliance
P. McGlynn, Health Physicist, Respiratory Protection
E. McIlvaine, HP Foreman, ALARA
W. Morrissey, Radiation Operations Supervisor
D. Pfendler, HP Foreman
- H. Riley, Health Physics Supervisor
M. Rochester,
Sr. Health Physicist, Dosimetry
D. Shane, HP Asst Foreman
- G. Stanley, Superintendent of Plant
Burn victim, Pipefitter
1.2
NRC Personnel
- G. Barber, Senior Resident Inspector
- D. Mannai, Resident Inspector
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on January 24, 1992.
2.0
~Pur ore
This inspection was an unannounced
safety inspection of the Susquehanna
Steam
Electric Station radiation control programs.
The areas reviewed were:
response
to an injured contaminated worker incident, organization changes,
outage
.preparations, ALARAstatus, and implementation of the dosimetry program.
0
3.0 'eview of Previousl
Identified Items
During a previous inspection'he inspector identified the lack of proper controls
for locked high radiation areas containing HP instrument calibration sources.
The
licensee has developed
a new procedure, HP-TP-312, Rev. 0, entitled "Control of
High Radiation Sources" which requires HP supervision approval for qualified HP
technicians to be issued master keys to areas containing instrument calibration
sources.
Allother technicians
must sign out a specific high radiation key from a
controlled key cabinet.
The inspector was satisfied that appropriate safety
controls have been established for the HP instrument lab.
Also from the above mentioned inspection in June of 1991, the station practice of
detaching and reattaching TLD badges with security badges was identified as a
weakness when two individuals were found with incorrect TLD badges.
The
inspector's review determined that there was no dose discrepancy in that instance.
Since that inspection, the station reviewed the issue and recommended
several
human factor improvement suggestions,
only some of which have been
implemented to date.
The security control system for personnel
access to the
station was not originally designed'to accommodate
the TLD badge issuance and
has required manual matching of security and TLD badges prior to each
personnel entry to the station.
This root cause has yet to be addressed
by the
licensee but will be reviewed in the future.
4.0
Res
onse to In'ured Worker Incident
On January
18, 1992, at 8:47 a.m., a worker was injured when hydrogen gas in a
pipe ignited during a grinding activity on the plant's common offgas hydrogen
recombiner system.
The worker received first degree burns to his chest, throat,
and face with a second degree burn area on his chest.
The worker was slightly
contaminated
and was transported offsite to the Berwick Hospital for
decontamination
and burn treatment.
As a result of the hydrogen ignition and
hospitalization of a contaminated worker, an Unusual Event was declared at 9:00
a.m. with NRC notification made at 9:51 a.m.
This inspection reviewed the
licensee's
response
to the incident from a radiological perspective.
'nspection No. 50-387/91-08; 50-388/91-08, Section 6
The inspector witnessed the scene of the incident, reviewed all available
radiological survey information available, and interviewed the victim and several
workers directly involved with the incident to determine the radiological hazards
involved, the actions taken by the licensee with respect to the radiological hazards
and the timeliness of those actions, and a review of the follow up actions taken by
the licensee at the time of this inspection.
- The hydrogen combiner and condenser work was, being accomplished on
Radiation Work Permit (RWP) No.92-032 for Turbine 656 Common Recombiner
Room, System 73, Recombiner Vessel and Condenser Replacement.
This RWP
called for weekly radiological surveys and required one full set of protective
clothing for 'work in this area with respiratory protection required for working on
highly contaminated (> 75,000 dpm/ 100 cm~) surfaces or for welding or cutting
on contaminated
surfaces (>1,000 dpm/ 100 cm~).
The pipe being worked on prior to the hydrogen flash had been surveyed
as <
1,000 dpm/ 100 cm"- with no respiratory protection required, however due to the
expected grinding debris, a plastic face shield was worn. The inspector reviewed
all of the survey data available for the comm'on recombiner room area prior to
and after the event.
The room posed generally low radiological hazards, with
contamination levels in the room at about the clean area limit value of 1,000 dpm/
100 cm"- and radiation levels were ( 2 mR/hr which is below the level of a
radiation area.
Although the RWP only required weekly surveys, the inspector's
review discovered at least one radiological survey documented for each day and
up to 3 surveys per day while work was being performed.
Smear samples taken
from inside some of the recombiner piping revealed 2,000 - 3,000 dpm/ 100 cm~
which would require respiratory protection when cutting or welding on these
internal pipe surfaces.,
On the morning of January 18th, the injured pipefitter was beginning to grind a
weld preparation on the outside surface of a previously severed
10" pipe wearing a
full set of protective clothing and a face shield. A review of the air sampling data
showed that particulate air samples were taken during the recombiner
modification work. The particulate air sample results never reached the 25%
Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) value which would require airborne
radioactivity area posting and therefore never reached the level which would
,require respiratory protection, although filter respirators were worn for the pipe
cutting work evolutions.
No radiogas air samplirig was performed as would be
expected if this had been an on-line off-gas system.
The HP Section assumed that the common recombiner system had been isolated
from the sources of off-gases and prior to the modification work, the piping had
been purged of residual radioactive gases with air. Realizing after the incident
that off-gas had been leaking into the room, the inspector questioned the presence
of non-particulate airborne radioisotopes.
The licensee had attempted to evaluate
the likely presence of the unmonitored radiogases
in the room late the sa'me day
of the incident.
The licensee successfully isolated the piping from the off-gas
intrusion and provided another purge of the piping with air while the HP Section
drew a gas sample from the pipe exhaust for analysis.
This worst case pipe
sample contained
a total airborne radioactivity concentration of 21% MPC
composed mainly of Xenon and Krypton. This post-incident sample indicated that
leaking off-gas levels were low during the modification work in the common
recombiner room.
Later whole body counts of the injured worker confirmed the
absence of any intake of radioactivity.
The inspector determined that the RWP specified appropriate controls
commensurate
with the radiological hazards of the work and that surveys had
been performed as required.
Surveys confirmed that low radiological hazards
were present in. the work area.
The common recombiner room was not posted
as a hydrogen recombiner room.
Nor was there any warning of a possible combustion hazard associated with the
off-gas system.
At Susquehanna
Station, the sampling of hazardous
non-
radioactive gases
has been the responsibility of the Safety Section.
The HP
Section did not have the sampling instrumentation nor the administrative controls
to address the hydrogen gas hazard associated with the modification work. As this
industrial safety issue is beyond the purview of this HP inspection, this issue will
be addressed
in the Resident Inspector's inspection report-.
The inspector filed-
an Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) notification of this
accident via the NRC Regional OSHA Liaison Officer to the regional OSHA
office in accordance with a memorandum of understanding between the NRC and
OSHA agencies.
The inspector reviewed the adequacy and timeliness of the licensees
actions in
response
to the event. At 8:47 a.m. on January-18,
1992, a pipefitter started a
hand held disc grinder and as he touched it to the end of a severed recombiner
system pipe, a rapid hydrogen flash occurred which blew him off of a step ladder.
- Inspection No. 50-387/92-02; 50-388/92-02
The flash scorched
his coveralls and blew out the zipper on his chest area.
The
victim picked himself up off of the floor and removed his protective clothing as he
exited the room. An HP technician on normal rounds encountered
the dazed
worker and called the control room for assistance.
The victim had received first
degree. burns under his chin, neck, and chest area with an approximately 4" X 4"
area on his chest of blistered second degree burns. At 8:55 a.m. he was surveyed
by an HP technician resulting in 3,000 dpm detected on the second degree burn
area.
No other contamination was found. At 9:00 a.m. the control room declared
an Unusual Event and the local Berwick Hospital was notified of a contaminated
burn victim and an ambulance was requested.
Susquehanna
Emergency Medical
Technicians (EMT) arrived at about the same time and proceeded to measure
vital signs and place the victim onto a stretcher. A protective covering of cotton
gauze was placed over the chest wound and the victim was transported out of the
Radiological Controlled Area (RCA) at 9:11 a.m.
The ambulance arrived at 9:15
a.m. and by 9:20 a.m. the burn victim and an HP technician were on their way to
the hospital.
The hospital staff had been trained for response
to contaminated
workers and had already setup a plastic laydown area for contamination control
and distributed Susquehanna
supplied dosimeters to the receiving hospital
personnel.
The ambulance arrived at approximately 9:30 a.m. and the victim was
transported into the contamination controlled receiving area in the hospital.
The
victim was transferred from the stretcher to a wash table where the doctor
proceeded
to flush and dry dab the victim for decontamination
purposes
afterwhich the attending HP technician resurveyed the wound.
This practice was
repeated three times until the HP technician indicated less than 20 counts per
minute above background.
By 10:00 a.m. he was decontaminated,
the doctor had
dressed
the wound with burn ointment, bandaged
the area and the victim was
released.
The wash solution used for- decontamination
was collected from the
'wash table drain and the hospital personnel, areas and ambulance were surveyed
for contamination and released
by 10:20 a.m. At about 10:40 a.m. the licensee
terminated the Unusual Event.
In summary, the accident victim had left the station by way of ambulance thirty
minutes after the incident and was decontaminated,
treated for his injuries and
released forty minutes later. Twenty minutes later the hospital was surveyed and
released
back to normal operations and twenty minutes later the Unusual Event
was terminated.
It was commendable that the hospital staff were well trained and
equipped by the licensee to handle this event.
Interviews with the victim and
attending HP personnel confirmed that appropriate contamination controls were
taken and that safety considerations were appropriate.
In general, the licensee
reacted very quickly to this-event demonstrating management
preparations for this
type of accident.
An Event Review Team which included an HP foreman was
created immediately after the incident to establish causation and corrective
actions.
The final system isolation, purging and gas sampling was a result of the
team's actions.
The station's preparation and management's
response to this
event appeared
to be superior.
5.0
Or anization
As the result of the latest "Organization Effectiveness Review" conducted by the
lic'ensee, the Health Physics Section has been reduced in scope and size. Allof
the radwaste handling and radioactive material shipment functions have been
transferred to a newly created Effluents Management Section.
The HP staff
previously tasked with radwaste/shipping
duties have been reassigned
to the new
Effluents Management Section.
Under the previous HP Section organization, the
HP Supervisor (Radiation Protection Manager) had two supervisor direct reports.
The Radiological Operations Supervisor continues as before to provide the
operational HP support for the station.
The Radiation Protection Supervisor
(RPS) was promoted and tasked with leading the new Effluents Management
Section and the vacated RPS position has been deleted.
The HP Supervisor has
reorganized
the section adding a Senior Health Physicist - Technical Support
position with the responsibility for internal and external dosimetry and respiratory
protection functions.
The person promoted to this position was formerly the HP
Specialist - ALARAand is now expected to help the station make the transition
into compliance with the new 10 CFR 20 requirements.
The technical leads for
dosimetry and the respiratory protection program continue to run their respective
programs.
The previous HP Specialist for instruments and sources has been
elevated to a direct RPM report position, now designated
as the Radiation
Instrument Supervisor.
The effectiveness of this organization will be revised
during future inspections.
6.0
Outa
e Pre aration
The Unit 1'sixth refueling outage was sch'eduled to begin on March 7, 1992
approximately six weeks from the date of this inspection.
Aside from the normal
refueling and maintenance
activities, the station plans for a limited number of high
exposure modifications during the next outage.
One-high exposure job will be
replacement of two reactor water clean up (RWCU) pumps with low maintenance
seal-less pumps.
The inspector reviewed the radiological controls preparations for this outage.
vo
7.1
Approximately four months prior to the outage, the licensee awarded a health
physics contract for supplying additional HP technicians for the outage.
The
licensee has contracted for approximately 110 HP technicians to complement the
30 utilityHP technicians/foremen for this outage.
Two months prior to the outage
the individual resumes of technicians were screened
and names finalized.
Approximately six weeks prior to the outage several utilityLevel II HP technicians
(ANSI 18.1 qualified sr. HP technicians) will be upgraded to HP assistant foreman
positions to act as HP control point supervisors for the contract HP technicians.
In three waves, the additional HP technicians arrive for the outage approximately
four weeks before the outage and willbe given three days of generic personnel in-
processing activities followed by three days of contractor HP training consisting of
plant specific HP procedure familiarization. Following this training, plant layout
familiarity and specific outage assignments will be made allowing for specific duty
and performance expectations to be communicated by the acting HP assistant
foremen.
Aside from an apparently short HP technician formal training program,
it appears
adequate
preparations have'been
made and appropriate responsibilities
and controls will be in place.
ALARAStatus
Annual Collective Ex osures
The licensee uses'primarily historical data to derive an ALARAestimate.
This
includes benefits from ALARAmeasures
utilized in the past.
An ALARAgoal
includes the benefits from any additional new ALARAmitigating measures
and a
certain percentage
exposure reduction as a challenge factor.
The station's
1991 annual estimate was 563 person-rem with a station goal set at
500 person-rem.
The'final result for 1991 was 529 person-rem, with the maximum
exposure to an individual was 2.104 rem for the year.
The year of 1991 included
one refueling outage which accounted for 329 person-rem.
Although the ALARA
goal was not reached, the licensee considers it a successful ALARAyear since
they came in under their estimate,
The areas that exceeded their ALARAgoal
included the spent fuel pool clean out project representing
15 person-rem greater
than allocated.
Reasons
given were slightly higher dose rates around the cask
storage pit area,and
an unplanned decon and maintenance work evolution
performed on the reactor hardware shearing machine.
Routine maintenance
ran
9.3 person-rem above the goal from two identified causes.
More frequent
condensate
demineralizer resin change outs resulted in a 4.5 person-rem overrun
and higher th'an expected exposures were accrued from general cleaning and
derate walkdowns.
The refueling outage also proved slightly over its goal (9
person-rem over the goal of 320 person-rem).
Allof these overrun areas
appeared
to be legitimate dose expenditures.
The 1992 station collective exposure estimate which includes two refueling outages
was determined to be 835 person-rem with an ALARAgoal of 751 person-rem.
The ALARAgoals for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 refueling outages were 317 person-
rem and 254 person-rem respectively. Ifthe ALARAgoals are met, Susquehanna
will continue to rank above the average BWR for low annual exposures.
This
year',s collective exposure estimating has been subdivided along maintenance
functional groups as well as along station departmental groups.
This provides a
matrix accounting method to more clearly differentiate dose expenditures at the
station and provide appropriate ALARAgoals to the, responsible supervisors.
Susquehanna
utilizes a historical ALARAdatabase,
detailed ALARAestimating
and tracking, and detailed advance maintenance work planning resulting in a
strong ALARAtracking program.
ALARAInitiatives
The licensee indicated that Susquehanna
station's radioactive source term has
apparently reached
a plateau after many years of continued buildup of radioactive
corrosion products within the reactor piping systems causing increasing dose rates
for the first few years since plant start up.
Each year, the licensee has carried out
in-field gamma spectroscopy
measurements
to track this growth. During the
current SALP cycle, the station has been working to improve the chemical purity
of the feedwater to reduce the introduction of feedwater metals into the reactor
systems.
Two modifications have been made on the condensate
demineralizer
vessels to improve the amount of spent resins removed during resin bed
replacement.
Also, efforts have been made at achieving the best ion exchange
resin mixture to avoid pass-through of impurities.
These efforts serve to block
some of the more controllable sources of addition to the radioactive source term.
By the end of 1992, the licensee will have developed
a plan for reducing the
existing radioactive source term for the future.
Other station modifications affecting lower station exposures include RWCU
pump replacement, elimination of unnecessary
pipe support snubbers,
and
replacement of control rod blades.
After several years of accruing significant
exposures performing frequent maintenance
on RWCU pump seals, these pumps
will be replaced with seal-less
pumps during the 1992 refueling outages.
The
snubber elimination program will continue over the next four outages with project
0
10
completion expected by the spring of 1994.
Additionally,-approximately 36 control
rod blades containing activated cobalt stellite rollers willbe replaced in both
reactors this year.
By including the 98 control rod blades removed from both
reactor units during previous outages, approximately 37% of all control rod blades
will have been replaced by years end.
As a pilot project for this year, one valve
will be selected to be refaced with a low-cobalt containing hard face material to
measure
its performance
as a substitute for the high-cobalt containing traditional
stellite valve facing material.
In summary, the licensee has shown continued
attention to the lowering of the station's radiation exposure sources.
8.0
External Dosimet
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for external dosimetry and external
exposure control.
Areas reviewed included:
dosimetry laboratory operations,
dosimetry exchange
and issue, field handling of dosimetry, and exposure control.
8.1
Dosimet
Laborato
0 erations
The Thermolum>nescent
Dos>metry (TLD) processing laboratory is located in the
licensee's office located in Allentown, Pennsylvania.
An inspection of this
laboratory was conducted on July 29 - August 2, 1991'.
The. current Susquehanna
based inspection focused on the review of the operations at the Allentown facility
that interfaced with the Susquehanna
site dosimetry operations.
The licensee utilizes the Panasonic Model UD-802-AS1 dosimeter which contains
two lithium borate TLDs and two calcium sulfate TLDs for determining personnel
record exposures.
This Panasonic
system has been in place since May 1987.
The
TLD laboratory is currently National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
(NVLAP) qualified in all ionizing radiation categories including neutron radiation
for the specified dosimeter.
The fairly recent qualification in neutron dose
measurement
had not been incorporated into station use at the time of this
inspection.
Vendor services continued to supply results for licensee records of
neutron exposures.
The licensee plans to perform in-field neutron spectrum
measurements
over the next two refueling outages and incorporate appropriate
correction factors in the TLD dose calculation algorithm. Additional software
, 'nspection No. 50-387/91-12; 50-388/91-12
changes are required prior to integrating the neutron monitoring category into the
licensee's
dose tracking system.
~ The TLD laboratory processes
approximately 3000 station TLDs on a monthly
basis with an inventory of some 13,000 TLDs. Element Correction Factor (ECF)
determinations are performed every 18 months for each TLD. Prior to reading
the personnel TLDs, the badges are surveyed for contamination, and,
accountability of all badges
is verified. After a 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> delay to account for fade,
the TLDs are read and a'omputational algorithm is used to compute the
resultant dose.
Doses are computed for shallow dose (0.007 cm depth), eye dose
(0.3 cm depth), and deep dose,(1 cm depth).
Prior to reissuing a personnel TLD,
the badges are annealed,and
checked to verify that complete anneals are attained
with each TLD reset to its ground state with no residual exposure energy retained
in the TLD (<10 mR). The lab technician cross checks final personnel TLD
results with the results obtained from the direct reading dosimeter (DRD) data for
the same time period.
Any anomalies require resolution by an appropriately
qualified HP Specialist.
The inspector reviewed the laboratory-to-site operation interfaces to determine
possible causes for mishandling or misprocessing of personnel dosimeters or
dosimetry data.
Appropriate cross checks have been incorporated to ensure,
accurate TLD issuance and processing results.
8.2
Dosimet
Issue & Exchan
e
Dosimetry is normally issued to personnel from the North or South Guard Houses
located at the entrance to the Restricted Area. Initial issue requires that
appropriate training, exposure history, baseline bioassay, and security background
investigation have been completed.
TLD numbers are assigned from the
Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) mainframe computer system at initial issue.
DRDs are allocated to the department supervisors for issuance
as needed.
Extremity TLDs and multiple whole body dosimetry are handled at the Unit 1 HP
Access Control Center.
Processing of the normal whole body TLD prior to issuing
multiple dosimetry monitoring packets is not generally required.
Normally, the
regularly worn whole body TLD is exchanged
at the Unit 1 HP Access Control
Center for the required multiple whole body badge packet.
Upon exiting the
RCA the multiple badge packet is again exchanged for the normal whole body
TLD badge.
The inspector noted that contrary to station radiation protection
policy, radiation workers are given their multiple whole body TLD packets in a
hand held bag without provision for whole body monitoring between the neck and
the waist of the individual. The licensee agreed to revise this current practice to
maintain wearing one of the whole body monitoring TLDs on the upper body area
at all times within the RCA.
Appropriate TLD control badges are placed in the North and South Guard
Houses and at the Unit 1 HP Access Control Center for background radiation
measurement.
During dosimeter exchanges,
the freshly annealed replacement
= TLDs are brought to the site and a manual verification of the badges to the active
dosimetry list is made.
TLDs are exchanged
on a one-for-one basis and all of the
collected TLDs are inventoried against the same active dosimetry list. Badges are
.taken to the Allentown dosimetry laboratory and surveyed for contamination (The
licensee stated that they have never had a contaminated badge).
The badges are
prepared for automatic TLD reader feed, daily QC routines are completed and
known exposed TLDs (reference standards)
are sandwiched in the reading
sequence
providing one reference standard TLD for every 50 badges.
After the
TLDs are read, the raw data is reviewed for correct computer file names and for
accountability of badges and then the final dose results are computed using the
appropriate dose algorithm. The background and reference standard TLD results
are'verified before the final results are downloaded into the RMS mainframe
computer system by TLD number and resultant dose.
TLD issue determines the
correspondence
between TLD number 'and personnel deinographics which allows
for correct dose history assignment.
As mentioned before, TLD processing
anomalies require the review and approval of appropriate HP specialists.
Any
final dose assignments
that required HP supervision resolution of conflicting data
. require the individual's concurrence prior to updating his or her exposure history
with the dose assignment.
The inspector was satisfied that the licensee has
provided appropriate quality control of the dosimetry processing and dose
assignment
activities.'.3
Dosimet
Field Handlin
After initial dosimetry issue, the worker is responsible for properly locating his
'osimetry
on the front upper body area.
HP technicians are responsible for
affixing the various multiple dosimeters to the appropriate body parts after
reading the DRDs and recording the initial readings.
After job execution, the HP
technician is again responsible for removing the dosimeters and recording the final
readings on the appropriate Radiation Work Permit (RWP) sign-in sheets.
Any
relocation of the normal singular whole body TLD and direct reading dosimeter to
another part of the whole body can only be performed by an HP technician as
dictated by the workers'adiation environment.
8.4
-
Ex nsure Control
TLD results serve as the basis for recording of personnel exposures.
Between the
routine monthly reading of these dosimeters, the direct reading dosimeters serve
to control individual exposures within station administrative and regulatory limits.
Monthly comparisons between TLD results and DRD results are routinely
performed to verify the adequacy of using the DRD for exposure control
purposes.
The licensee stated that on the average, DRD results have been 4%
'
higher than the record TLD results.
13
The station has various administrative dose control levels that require higher levels
of management
approval for each dose step increase.
Each worker is required to
know his or her allowable dose limit which is required for RWP sign-in. This
information is provided in an RMS computer report made up of the latest TLD
data supplemented
with DRD data called the RMS Exposure Tracking Report,
This report is issued daily throughout the year and twice:per day during outages.
The RWP sign-in sheets provide the HP technician with the information needed to
control exposures within the administrative and regulatory limits. The inspector
was satisfied that appropriate exposure control measures
were in place.
In
general, the licensee appeared
to have well controlled external dosimetry
processing and reporting programs in place.
9.0
K~M
The inspector met with licensee representatives
at the conclusion of the
inspection, on January 24, 1992.
The inspector reviewed the purpose and scope of
the inspection and discussed
the findings.
0