ML17157A780
| ML17157A780 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1991 |
| From: | Robert Stransky Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Marsh L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9108080043 | |
| Download: ML17157A780 (12) | |
Text
~e July 31, 1991 Docket No.
50-387 and 50-388 MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
DATE & TIME:
LOCATION:
PURPOSE:
L.
B. Marsh, Project Director Project Directorate III-1 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Robert Stransky, Project Manager Project Directorate III-1 Division of'eactor Projects - III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH PENNSYLVANIA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY August 8, 1991 10:00 - 2:00 One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD Room 12/B/9 To discuss the upcoming submittal of an amendment request to increase the rated thermal power of Susquhanna Units 1 and 2.
The uprate submittal will be based upon ongoing work between GE Nuclear Energy, the staff, and a number of interested BWR utilities.
"PARTICIPANTS:
NRC J.
Raleigh R. Stransky T. Marsh R.
Jones S.
Newberry et al.
PP&L J.
Kenney R.,Sgarro GE G. Sozzi et al.
cc:
See next page Robert Stransky, Project Manager Project Directorate III-1 Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation p
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0 "Meetings between NRC technical staff and applicants or licensees are usually open for interested members of the public, petitioners, intervenors, or other parties to attend as observers pursuant to "Open Meeting Statement of NRC Staff Policy," 43 Federal Receister
- 28058, 6/28/78.
However, this meeting and associated discussion relates to a process which is proprietary.
Therefore, certain portions of the meeting may not be open to the public.
A non-proprietary summary of the meeting will be prepared and will be available upon request.
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Walter R. Butler 2.
Qualify the MSIVs to the Recirculation System jet impingement loads and temperatures (includes the MSIVs and associated components).
A.
Finalize jet impingement analyses for the most limiting Nl and N2 nozzle break locations.
These analyses will provide jet pressure and temperature envelopes as a function of distance from the break locations and will form a basis for MSIV load definition.
B.
Determine by 'analysis an enveloping jet impingement load to which the MSIVs can be qualified.
Qualify the MSIVs by comparison of qualification load Co calculated load.
3.
Analyze the effect of jet impingment on other equipment.
A.
Using the jet impingment pressure and temperature envelopes for the worst case Recirculation System nozzle breaks, evaluate the effects of jet impingement on other equipment within the jet zone of influence.
B.
Analyze equipment targets for jet loads from other nozzle breaks where configurations of piping and bioshield doors are similar to the Recirculation System.
C.
Where safety-related equipment analyzed for jet loads cannot be qualified,'esign and install hardware to mitigate the effects of the jet loadings.
The staff has reviewed the above action plan and the associated completion schedule and found them, to be acceptable.
The licensee should submit the final documented results of their efforts for staff review following the implementation of the action plan.
The staff has also reviewed the 'licensee's justification for interim operation of the station until complete implementation of the above action plan.
Such justification is found acceptable based on the following:
l.
At the suggestion of the NRC staff in the November 5, 1987, meeting, PPLL has pursued defining a more realistic jet model with GE.
The preliminary results indicated that the jet pressures which could impact the MSIVs (the closest safety-related component to the postulated break location) are less Chan half of that originally estimated.
This information provides reasonable assurance that the HSIVs can be qualified, i.e., they are structurally capable of withstanding the postulated loads.
2.
Weld inspections have been and continue Co be performed by the licensee Co verify weld integrity.
Radiograph and dye penetrant inspections of welds were performed during the construction phase of Susquehanna.
Ultrasonic inspection of welds was performed for the Preservice Inspection Program.
Ultrasonic inspection of welds continues to be performed under Che Inservice Inspection Program.
One hundred percent of the Recirculation System nozzle welds are inspected every two refueling and inspection outages.
This is consistent with the staff position as stated in Generic Letter 88-01.
Walter R. Butler.
w 3 3.
Induction Heat Stress Improvement (IHSI) has been performed by the licensee on both units on welds where breaks are assumed to occur.
This treatment lessens the susceptibility of the material to intergr anular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) and significantly reduces the probability of failure.
PP5L's water chemistry control program also reduces the probability of failure.
In addition, safe ends at the N2 nozzles'ave been replaced with corrosion-resistant material and the piping has been clad with corrosion resistant material.
4.
The probability of occurrence of Recirculation System nozzle breaks is small.
'or recirculation line breaks which impact the inboard MSIVs, the outboard MSIVs would still be expected to close and provide containment isolation.
The probability of a double-ended guillotine break at the N1A nozzle, in addition to the failure of impacted inboard A and D MSIVs and a corresponding outboard MSIV random failure is exceedingly small.
Other potential jet impingement effects on the Reactor Water Cleanup and Reactor Building Chilled Water systems would be contained within the Secondary Containment where the leakage would be processed by the Standby Gas Treatment System.
5.
Susquehanna has a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation of 5 gpm unidentified leakage.
Existing leak detection systems of Susquehanna Station are capable of identifying the leakage.
The staff will review the licensee's documented results on the above jet impingement issue when the action plan is compIete'ly implemented, and report, its review findings in a supplemental safety evaluation.
Priginal $ifnpd Py James A. Norberg, Chief Mechanical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering Technology cc:
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Richardson B. D. Liaw J. Raleigh DISTRIBUTION:
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3.
Induction Heat Stress Improvement (IHSI) has been performed by the licensee on both units on welds where breaks are assumed to occur.
This treatment lessens the susceptibility of the material to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) and significantly reduces the probability of failure.
PPSL's water chemistry control program also reduces the probability of failure.
In addition, safe ends at the N2 nozzles have been replaced with corrosion-resistant material and the piping has been clad with corrosion resistant material.
4.
The probability of occurrence of Recirculation System nozzle breaks is small.
For recirculation line breaks which impact the inboard MSIVs, the outboard MSIVs would still be expected to close and provide containment isolation.
The probability of a double-ended guillotine break at the NIA nozzle, in addition to the failure of impacted inboard A and D MSIVs and a corresponding outboard MSIV random failure is exceedingly small.
Other potential jet impingement effects on the Reactor Water Cleanup and Reactor Building Chilled Water systems would be contained within the Secondary Containment where the leakage would be processed by the Standby Gas Treatment System.
5.
Susquehanna has a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation of 5 gpm unidentified leakage.
Existing leak detection systems of Susquehanna Station are capable of identifying the leakage.
The staff will review the licensee's documented results on the above jet impingement issue when the action plan is completely implemented, and report its review findings in a supplemental safety evaluation.
PAgNal Sjgngd gy James A. Norberg, Chief Mechanical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering Technology cc:
J. Richardson B.
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Induction Heat Stress Improvement (IHSI) has been performed by the licensee on both units on wel ds where breaks are assumed to occur.
This treatment lessens the susceptibility of the material to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) and significantly reduces the probability of failure.
PP8L's water chemistry control program also reduces the probability of failure.
In addition, safe ends at the N2 nozzles~have been replaced with corrosion-resistant material and the piping has4been cladded with corrosion resistant material.
The probability of occurrence of Recirculation System nozzle breaks is small.
For recircul'ation line breaks which impact the inboard MSIVs, the outboard MSIVs would still be expected to close and provide containment isolation.
The probability>of a double-ended guillotine break at the NIA nozzle, in addition to the failure of impacted inboard A and D MSIVs and, a corresponding outboard MSIV random, failure is exceedingly small.
Other potential jet impingement effects~on the Reactor Water Cleanup and Reactor,:Building Chilled Water systems would be'ontained within the Secondary Containment where the leakage would be processed by the Standby Gas.Treatment System.
Susquehanna has a Technical, Specification Limiting Condition for Operation of 5 gpm unident'ified leakage.
Existin'g,leak detection systems of Susquehanna Station are capable of identifying the leakage.
The staff will review the licensee's documente'd results on the above jet impingement issue when the action"plan is completely implemented, and report its review findings in a supplemental safety evaluation.
James A'., Norberg, Chief Mechanical Engineering Branch Division of, Engineering Technology cc:
J.
Richardson B.
D. Liaw J. Raleigh DISTRIBUTION:
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