ML17157A404
| ML17157A404 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1990 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17157A403 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9011080060 | |
| Download: ML17157A404 (3) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 101 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-14 PENNSYLVANIA POWER It LIGHT COMPANY ALLEGHENY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INC.
DOCKET NO. 50-387 SUS UEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated April 17, 1990, Pennsylvania Power 8 Light Company (the licensee) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-14 for the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1.
The proposed amendment would add new containment isolation valves to Automatic Isolation Valves Section of Technical Specifications Table 3.6.3-1 "Primary Containment Isolation Valves.
The new valves are being added in support of the forthcoming modifications which will separate the Containment Radiation Monitors (CRMs) from Hydrogen/Oxygen (H2/02) Analyzers and Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) which currently share a
common containment penetration.
Specifically, the licensee is installing two new CRM panels and a wetwell sample rack.
The new panels and the new rack will have their own dedicated sample lines with redundant containment isolation valves designed to close on process signals.
The proposed modification will use four existing unused containment penetrations.
2.0 EVALUATION The licensee stated that since the H2/02 analyzers and the PASS are required to be available post accident, the CRM panels have been subjected to meeting containment leakage criteria in a post accident environment.
Ensuring leak tightness of the sample pumps has resulted in persistent operational and maintenance problems.
The proposed modification which separates CRM panels from the PASS and the H2/02 analyzers will solve the operational and maintenance problems with the CRM system because the CRM will have its own dedicated sample lines.
/
E.
The licensee has proposed to install two 1-inch supply and return sample lines from drywell to new CRM panels A and B and one 1-inch supply and return line from wetwell to the new sample racks using four existing unused containment penetrations.
The licensee indicated that each sample and return line will have two 1-inch class lE process solenoid operated containment isolation valves installed outboard of the containment penetrations as close to the containment as possible.
The proposed arrangement is similar to the existing sample lines as described in Susquehanna FSAR Section 6.2.4.3.3.6.
The staff previously approved the existing arrangement for the containment isolation valves in the 90ii080060 90i03i PDR ADOCK 05000387 P
PDC Susquehanna Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0776, Section 6.2.4) indicating that the location of one isolation valve inside containment would subject it to severe environmental conditions (including suppression pool dynamic loads) and would not be easily accessible for inspection.
All new sample lines will have manual 1-inch full port valves to permit local leak rate testing per 10 CFR 50 Appendix J and to provide isolation capability.
The supply and return sample lines will be left capped until the installation of new CRN panels and the sample racks.
The design of the solenoid valve is such that inadvertant opening is not possible without the application of the electrical power.
The piping is designed to Seismic Category I requirements up to the first anchor point past a "g" boundary at the outboard end of the second containment isolation valve.
Appendix J Type B tests will be performed on each containment penetration affected by the proposed modification and the results will be added to the results of the last Type A test and compared with the allowable limits. Initial and periodic Type C tests of the new containment isolation valves will be performed in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
The staff finds the above procedures meet the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
The proposed Technical Specification changes identify the addition of non-powered automatic isolation valves to Table 3.6.3 with a footnote in the Isolation Signal(s) column for each valve stating that solenoid valves are not capable of being opened due to the absence of permanently installed electric power.
The licensee indicated that the isolation signals and maximum isolation times will be provided later in support of the installation and activation of the new CRH panels and the sample racks when power to the solenoid valves is provided.
The modification associated with the proposed Technical Specification changes meets all applicable design standards for containment integrity requirements and approved deviations in accordance with SRP Section 6.2.4.
The modification includes installation of small 1-inch piping into penetrations similar or identical to the design already in place in the plant.
There is no specific condition of this modification or its location in containment, that would affect any accident analysis evaluated in the FSAR.
The Technical Specification change simply lists the new isolation valves.
- Further, no change in operational requirements are proposed for the new valves.
The surveillance requirements for the Technical Specification Sections 3.6.1.1, 3.6.1.2 and 3.6.3 which deal with primary containment integrity, leakage, and isolation will be equally applicable for the above isolation valves.
Based on the above considerations, the staff finds the licensee's proposed changes to Susquehanna, Unit 1 to be acceptable.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements.
The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation
exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.
Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal
~Re ister (55 FR 26478) on Ju'ly 11, 1990 and consulted with the Commonweeal~e of Pennsylvania.
Yo public comments were received, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did not have any comments.
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed
- manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the health and safety of the public. "
Principal Contributor:
R. Goel Dated:
October 31, 1990