ML17139B984
| ML17139B984 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 11/08/1983 |
| From: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Curtis N PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8311210068 | |
| Download: ML17139B984 (7) | |
Text
UNITED STATES'UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 November 8, 1983 Docket No.:
50-387 Nr. Norman W. Curtis Vice President Engineering and Construction - Nuclear Pennsylvania Power
& Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Dear t1r.
Curtis:
Subject:
Request for Additional Information Regarding Submittals for License Conditions 2.C.(25)(a) and 2.C.(25)(b)
License Condition 2.C.(25)(a) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-14
'required Pennsylvania Power
& Light (PP&L) to perform an analysis to determine what, if any, design or procedural changes would be necessary to ensure that the effects of failures of any power sources,
- sensors, or sensor impulse lines which are shared by two or more control systems would not result in consequences outside the bounds of the FSAR Chapter 15 analysis or beyond the capability of operators or safety systems.
License Condition 2.C.(25)(b) required PP&L to perform analysis to determine what, if any, design changes or operator actions would be necessary.to ensure that the effects of high energy line breaks.would not cause control system malfunctions which could complicate events beyond the FSAR analysis.
By letter dated July 7, 1983, from N.
W. Curtis to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PP&L stated that the analysis for 2.C.(25)(a) had been completed and that no failures were found that resulted in consequences outside the bounds of the Chapter 15 analysis or beyond the capability of operators or safety systems.
By letter dated September 22, 1983, from N.
W. Curtis to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PP&L provided the conclusion of the analysis for 2.C.(25)(b) that simultaneous malfunctions of control systems due to a single high energy line break are bounded by the FSAR Chapter 15 analysis and are within the capabilities of operators and safety systems to mitigate these events.
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On request of the NRC staff, PP8L providedithe analysis reports that supported their conclusions on License Condition 2.C.(25)(a) and 2.C.(25)(b),
by letters dated October 14, 1983 (PLA-1894 and PLA-1893, respectively).
However, specific information regarding these analyses was not provided.
To enable the staff to complete its review 'for these two license conditions, additional information is required and is identified in enclosures (1) and (2). If you have any. questions regarding this matter, please contact R. Perch, Project Manager.
Sincerely, cc:
See next page 5'+~si68X sig+ga by g A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No.
2 Division of Licensing DISTRIBUTION:
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Susquehanna Mr. Norman W. Curtis Vice President Engineering and Construction Pennsylvania Power
& Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 ccs'ay Silberg, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts
& Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.
W.
Washington, D. C. 20036 Edward M. Nagel, Esquire General Counsel and Secretary Pennsylvania Power
& Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Mr. William E. Barberich Nuclear Licensing Group Supervisor Pennsylvania Power
& Light.Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101
'r.
G. Rhodes Resident Inspector P. 0.
Box 52 Shickshinny, Pennsylvania 18655 Gerald R. Schultz, Esquire Susquehanna Environmental Advocates P. 0. Box 1560 Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18703 Mr. E. B. Poser Project Engineer Bechtel Power Corporation P. 0.
Box 3965 San Francisco, California 94119 Ms. Colleen Marsh P. 0. Box 538A, RD 0'4 Mountain Top, Pennsylvania 18707 Mr. Thomas J. Halligan Correspondent The Citizens Against Nuclear Dangers P. 0.
Box 5
- Scranton, Pennsylvania 18501 Mr. N. D. Weiss Project Manager Mail Code 391 General Electric Company 175. Curtner Avenue San Jose, California 95125 Robert W. Adler, Esquire Office of Attorney General 505 'Executive House P. 0.
Box 2357 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Dr. Judith H. Johnsrud Co-Director Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power 433 Orlando Avenue State College, Pennsylvania 16801 Mr. Thomas M. Gerusky, Director Bureau of Radiation Protection Resources Commonwealth of Pennsylvania P. 0.
Box 2063 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120
Enclosure 1,
SUS UEHANNA UNIT 1 REQUEST.
FOR ADD N L.N R
I C
ERNING LICEN C
ND N..2 a
L PL N
ROL SYSTEM F IL R S
(1)
Ident'ify all significant non-safety related multiple control system events caused by failures of shared sensor impulse lines.
(2)
Verify that for each failed shared power supply, sensor and sensor impulse line and the subsequent control system failures event, re-dundant safety-related systems are available (i.e., unaffected by the event) to mitigate the effects of the event.
The intent here is to assume th'at the consequences of the event can be mitigated given a single failure within the systems used to mitigate the event.
(3)
Verify that no credit was taken in the analysis for non-safety related equipment (e.g.,
feedwater trip on level 8) to mitigate the effects of the multiple control system failures.
(4)
Verify that the consequences of the worst case event combinations considered in item (2) are bounded by a small fraction
(
10K) of 10 CFR 100 guideline doses.
Enclosure 2
SUS UEHANNA UNIT I REQUEST FOR ADDI I N
L R
TI N
C NC NG LICNS ND IN..
5 F
OF HIG G
L N
N N
LSS S
(I)
Verify that for each HELB event and its consequential control system
- failures, redundant safety-related systems are available (i.e.,
unaffected by the event) to mitigate the effects of the event.
The intent here is to assure that the consequences of the event can be mitigated given a single failure within the systems used to mitigate the event.
(2)
Verify that no credit was taken in the analysis for non-safety related equipment (e.g., feedwater trip on level 8) to mitigate the effects of the HELB and consequential control system failures.
(3)
Verify that the consequences of the worst case event combinations considered are bounded by a small fraction
(
10%) of 10 CFR 100 guideline doses.