ML17122A085

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2017-03 Final Operating Test
ML17122A085
Person / Time
Site: Cooper Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 03/16/2017
From: Vincent Gaddy
Operations Branch IV
To:
Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
References
Download: ML17122A085 (399)


Text

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 3/06/2017 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 1 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

A1, Perform Jet Pump Operability Check (RO)

Conduct of Operations R, D 2.1.25 (3.9/4.2)

A2, Perform SLC Operability Checks Conduct of Operations R, N 2.1.20 (4.6/4.6)

A3, Determine Isolation Boundaries (RHR)

Equipment Control R, D 2.2.13 (4.1/4.3)

A4, Determine Workers Projected Total Dose Radiation Control R, N 2.3.14 (3.4/3.8)

Emergency Plan NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, then all 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (2)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1) (2)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected) (0)

ES-301, Page 22 of 27 Rev. 0

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 3/06/2017 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 1 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

A5, Determine if Mode Change is Allowed Conduct of Operations R, D 2.1.20 (4.6/4.6), 2.2.35 (3.6/4.5), 2.2.40 (3.4/4.7)

A6, Reportable Occurrences to the NRC (#8)

Conduct of Operations R, N 2.1.18 (3.6/3.8), 2.1.20 (4.6/4.6), 2.4.30 (2.7/4.1)

A7, Review Jet Pump Operability and Recirc Pump Flow Checks Equipment Control R, M 2.2.12 (3.7/4.1), 2.2.42 (3.9/4.6)

A8, Authorize Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking Radiation Control R, D 2.3.14 (3.4/3.8)

A9, Emergency Classification Emergency Plan R, D 2.4.41 (2.9/4.6)

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, then all 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (3)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1) (2)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected) (0)

ES-301, Page 22 of 27 Rev. 0

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A1 Rev 2 Page 1 of 14 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure JPM A1

CNS NRC Examin3/2017 JPM A1 Rev 2 Page 2 of 14 (JPM A1)

Perform Jet Pump Operability Check (RO)

Revision Statement: Editorial enhancements per Chief Examiner comments (Rev 2).

JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: Classroom
2. Appropriate Applicant level: RO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path: [ ] YES [X] NO
5. Time Critical: [ ] YES [X] NO
6. Performance Time: 15 minutes
7. NRC K/A: 2.1.25 (3.9/4.2)
8. Task No.: 202012O0201
9. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 6.LOG.601, Daily Surveillance Log - Modes 1, 2, and 3 (Rev 124)
2. Jet Pump Operability Curves and Recirc Pump Flow curves (Cycle 10 28 30 data)
3. Procedure 2.1.10, Station Power Changes, Attachment 1, Power-To-Flow Map (Rev 113)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Calculator Attachments
1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key
2. Attachment 2 - N/A
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet Handouts:
1. Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet
2. Attachments 12 and 13 of Procedure 6.LOG.601, Daily Surveillance Log - Modes 1, 2, and 3 (Rev 124)
3. Attachment 1, Power-To-Flow Map of Procedure 2.1.10, Station Power Changes (Rev 113)
4. Jet Pump Operability and Recirc Pump Flow curves (Cycle 10 28 30 data)

CNS NRC Examin3/2017 JPM A1 Rev 2 Page 3 of 14 Task Standard:

The applicant correctly recorded core flow, RR Pump flow, RRMG Set speed, JP Flow parameters, and averaged Jet Pump Ps IAW answer key. Applicant determined Jet Pump

  1. 13 fell outside the Operability Curve limit, marked Check 3 UNSAT for Loop A, and determined Reactor Engineering must be immediately notified IAW Procedure 6.LOG.601.

(see Answer Key)

CNS NRC Examin3/2017 JPM A1 Rev 2 Page 4 of 14 (JPM A1)

Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to perform the daily Jet Pump Operability and Recirc Pump Flow check of the Daily Tech Specs Surveillance Log.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. If Unsatisfactory, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1, 2, 3, and 4.
5. Brief the applicant, and tell the applicant to begin.

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Examin3/2017 JPM A1 Rev 2 Page 5 of 14 Read the following to the JPM performer.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Plant is in Mode 1 at 100% power
  • Recirc Pump and Jet Pump indications are as follows:

Indicated core flow (106 lb/hr) Recorder NBI-DPR/FR-95 (Green Pen) = 62 mlbm/hr Recirc Pump flow (103 gpm) RR-FR-163 for Pumps A & B: A = 38.5 kgpm, B = 38.5 kgpm RRMG Set speed RRFC-SI-1A for RRMG A = 79%

RRFC-SI-1B for RRMG B = 80%

Jet Pump Flow NBI-FI-92A for LOOP A = 31 mlbm/hr NBI-FI-92B for LOOP B = 31 mlbm/hr Jet Pump Differential Pressure NBI-FI-78A through NBI-FI-78Z (% psid) 1 = 31 11 = 32 2 = 32 12 = 30 3 = 31 13 = 20 4 = 31 14 = 32 5 = 36 15 = 34 6 = 34 16 = 35 7 = 33 17 = 32 8 = 32 18 = 31 9 = 33 19 = 33 10 = 33 20 = 32 INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to perform the Jet Pump Operability (6.LOG.601 Attachment 12) and Recirc Pump Flow (6.LOG.601 Attachment 13).

CNS NRC Examin3/2017 JPM A1 Rev 2 Page 6 of 14 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 12 A. Record indicated core flow.

Standard Recorded Core flow from Recorder NBI-DPR/FR-95 (Green Pen) IAW Answer Key.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 12 B. Record RR pump flow for both loops.

Standard Recorded RR pump flow, from RR-FR-163 for Pumps A & B IAW Answer Key.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 12 C. Record RRMG Set Speed for both loops IAW Answer Key.

Standard Recorded RRMG Set speed from the following:

a. RRFC-SI-1A for RRMG A
b. RRFC-SI-1B for RRMG B Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Examin3/2017 JPM A1 Rev 2 Page 7 of 14

4. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 12 D. Record JP Flow for both loops IAW Answer Key.

Standard Recorded Jet Pump Flow from the following:

a. NBI-FI-92A for LOOP A
b. NBI-FI-92B for LOOP B Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT
5. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 12 Record Jet Pump P (%) for all 20 Jet Pumps.

Standard Record differential pressures from individual jet pump instruments NBI-FI-78A through NBI-FI-78Z IAW Answer Key.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 12 Average Loop B and Loop A flows.

Standard Added JP #1 through 10 and divided by 10 for LOOP B (result 32-33).

Added JP #11 through 20 and divided by 10 for LOOP A (result 31-32).

Cue Notes +/- 1 tolerance based on acceptable rounding error for calculated average Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 12 Check 1 VERIFY B and C values within curve limits for both loops.

Standard Determined the values recorded in Items B and C are within the operability limits of the curve and checked SAT for both Loop A and B.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Examin3/2017 JPM A1 Rev 2 Page 8 of 14

8. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 12 Check 2 VERIFY C and D values within curve limits.

Standard Determined the values recorded in Items C and D are within the operability limits of the curve and checked SAT for both Loop A and B.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

9. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 12 Check 3 VERIFY Jet Pump P differ by 20% from curves.

Standard Determined Jet Pump P differs by 20% from operability curve limits and checked UNSAT for Loop A and SAT for Loop B.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Next step may be performed out of listed sequence. Applicant may wait until surveillance has been completed to make notification.

10. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 12 Footnote (c)

IF any Jet Pump P vs. established pattern is not within curve limits, THEN immediately NOTIFY Reactor Engineering.

Standard Applicant notified Reactor Engineering JP 13 P was not within curve limit, or notified CRS that Reactor Engineering must be notified.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

11. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 12 VERIFY Checks 1 and 2 SAT or Check 3 SAT Standard Verified Check 1 and Check 2 SAT and marked SAT on form.

Cue Notes Check 3 is UNSAT, but since Check 1 and Check 2 are SAT, this step is SAT.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Examin3/2017 JPM A1 Rev 2 Page 9 of 14

12. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 13 VERIFY Core Flow, NBI-DPR/FR-95, value is not in Stability Exclusion Region of Power to Flow Map.

Standard Determined operation is outside Stability Exclusion Region of 2.1.10 Attachment 1, Power to Flow Map, using core flow value recorded in Item A of 6.LOG.601 Attachment 12 and power level listed in the initial conditions and marked SAT on form.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

13. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 13 VERIFY JP Flow, NBI-FI-92A/B, values for Loop A and Loop B flow mismatch is 7.35x106 lbs/hr at < 51.45x106 lbs/hr Rated Core Flow Standard Applicant determined step was N/A since actual core flow is > 51. 45x106 lbs/hr Rated Core Flow Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT
14. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 13 VERIFY JP Flow, NBI-FI-92A/B, values for Loop A and Loop B flow mismatch is 3.67x106 lbs/hr at 51.45x106 lbs/hr Rated Core Flow Standard Determined Item D values (previous page of 6.LOG.601 Attachment 12) for Loop A and Loop B flow mismatch is 0 ( 3.67x106 lbs/hr) and entered SAT into block.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

15. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Att. 13 VERIFY RR pump operating or RHR pump operating in SDC Standard Applicant determined step was N/A since plant not in Mode 3 Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Examin3/2017 JPM A1 Rev 2 Page 10 of 14

16. Procedure Step: N/A Standard Applicant provided completed forms to examiner Cue None Notes JPM Complete Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: __________

JPM ATTACHMENT 1 (DO NOT GIVE TO APPLICANTS) CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A1 Rev 2 Page 11 of 14 6.LOG.601 ATTACHMENT 12 JET PUMP OPERABILITY

1. IF in single loop operation, THEN MARK idle loop N/A.

JET PUMP P (%)

PARAMETERS LOOP A LOOP B JP # LOOP B JP # LOOP A A Core Flow (106 lb/hr) NBI-FRDPR-95 62 1 31 11 32 B RR Pump Flow (103 gpm) RR-FR-163 38.5 38.5 2 32 12 30 C RRMG Set Speed (%) RRFC-SI-1A/B 79 80 3 31 13 20 D JP Flow (106 lb/hr) NBI-FI-92A/B 31 31 4 31 14 32 5 36 15 34 KEY 6 34 16 35 7 33 17 32 8 32 18 31 9 33 19 33 10 33 20 32 LOOP B 32.6 LOOP 31.1 Avg (32-33) A Avg (31-32)

OPERABILITY APPLICABLE ATT. 22 CHECKS SAT UNSAT LIMIT MODE NOTE VERIFY B and C values Loop A:

1 within curve limits (a) Loop B:

VERIFY C and D values Loop A:

2 within curve limits (a) Loop B: SAT Loop A: 1 (b), 2 (b) 50 VERIFY Jet Pump P differ 3

by 20% from curves (a,c) Loop B:

VERIFY Checks 1 and 2 SAT or Loop A:

SAT Check 3 SAT Loop B:

(a) REFER to Jet Pump Operability Curves maintained in Control Room.

(b) APPLY within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after greater than 25% RTP and within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after associated recirculation loop is in service.

(c) IF any Jet Pump P vs. established pattern is not within curve limits, THEN immediately NOTIFY Reactor Engineering.

JPM ATTACHMENT 1 (DO NOT GIVE TO APPLICANTS) CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A1 Rev 2 Page 12 of 14 6.LOG.601 ATTACHMENT 13 RECIRC PUMP FLOW 0700-1000 1900-2200 OPERABILITY APPLICABLE ATT. 22 CHECKS SAT/UNSAT SAT/UNSAT LIMIT MODES NOTES VERIFY Core Flow, MCO NBI-DPR/FR-95, value is not in Stability SAT SAT 1, 2 49 Exclusion Region of Power to Flow Map (a)

VERIFY JP Flow, MCO NBI-FI-92A/B, values for Loop A and Loop B flow mismatch is N/A SAT 1 (c)

,2 (c) 48 7.35x106 lbs/hr at

< 51.45x106 lbs/hr Rated Core Flow (b,d)

VERIFY JP Flow, MCO NBI-FI-92A/B, values for Loop A and Loop B flow mismatch is SAT SAT 1 (c)

,2 (c) 48 3.67x106 lbs/hr at 51.45x106 lbs/hr Rated Core Flow (b,d)

(a)

REFERENCE power to flow map in Procedure 2.1.10.

(b)

NOTE - Per Technical Specification, a recirculation loop is considered not in operation when total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than mismatch limits.

1. IF greater than mismatch limit, THEN ENSURE loop with lower flow considered not in operation.

(c)

APPLY within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after both recirculation loops in service.

(d)

IF flow mismatch results in one loop considered not in operation, THEN CONTACT FRED to manually insert single loop operation limits into GARDEL.

KEY

JPM ATTACHMENT 1 (DO NOT GIVE TO APPLICANTS) CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A1 Rev 2 Page 13 of 14 6.LOG.601 ATTACHMENT 13 RECIRC PUMP FLOW 0700-1000 1900-2200 READING READING OPERABILITY APPLICABLE ATT. 22 CHECK SAT/UNSAT SAT/UNSAT LIMIT MODES NOTES 3 (when reactor VERIFY RR pump pressure less operating or RHR N/A SAT than SDC 66 pump operating in pressure SDC permissive)

(e)

(e)

APPLY within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after reactor steam dome pressure less than shutdown cooling permissive pressure.

KEY

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A1 Rev 2 Page 14 of 14 (JPM A1) (Rev 2)

ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Plant is in Mode 1 at 100% power
  • Recirc Pump and Jet Pump indications are as follows:

Indicated core flow (106 lb/hr) Recorder NBI-DPR/FR-95 (Green Pen) = 62 mlbm/hr Recirc Pump flow (103 gpm) RR-FR-163 for Pumps A & B: A = 38.5 kgpm, B = 38.5 kgpm RRMG Set speed RRFC-SI-1A for RRMG A = 79%

RRFC-SI-1B for RRMG B = 80%

Jet Pump Flow NBI-FI-92A for LOOP A = 31 mlbm/hr NBI-FI-92B for LOOP B = 31 mlbm/hr Jet Pump Differential Pressure NBI-FI-78A through NBI-FI-78Z (% psid) 1 = 31 11 = 32 2 = 32 12 = 30 3 = 31 13 = 20 4 = 31 14 = 32 5 = 36 15 = 34 6 = 34 16 = 35 7 = 33 17 = 32 8 = 32 18 = 31 9 = 33 19 = 33 10 = 33 20 = 32 INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to perform the Jet Pump Operability (6.LOG.601 Attachment 12) and Recirc Pump Flow (6.LOG.601 Attachment 13).

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A2 Rev 2 Page 1 of 14 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure NRC A2

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A2 Rev 2 Page 2 of 14 (JPM A2)

Perform SLC Operability Checks Revision Statement: In initial conditions, removed statement that SLC concentration is provided, since that will be provided later, upon request, as Handout #5. Other editorial enhancements per Chief Examiner comments. (Rev 2)

JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: Classroom
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: RO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path: [ ] YES [X] NO
5. Time Critical: [ ] YES [X] NO
6. Performance Time: 15 minutes
7. NRC K/A: 2.1.20 (4.6/4.6)
8. Task No.: 211004O0101
9. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 6.LOG.601, Daily Surveillance Log - Modes 1, 2 and 3 (Rev 124)
2. Procedure 6.SLC.601, SLC Tank Sampling (Rev 11)
3. TS 3.1.7, SLC System Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:
1. Calculator
2. Ruler or straightedge Attachments
1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key
2. Attachment 2 - N/A
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet
4. Attachment 4 - SLC Panel 9-5 indications
5. Attachment 5 - Procedure 6.SLC.601, SLC Tank Sampling, Section 2 data Handouts:
1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet
2. Attachment 9 (SLC) of Procedure 6.LOG.601, Daily Surveillance Log - Modes 1, 2, and 3 (Rev 124)
3. JPM Attachment 4 - SLC Panel 9-5 indications
4. Section 3 of Attachment 21 (Contingency Actions) of Procedure 6.LOG.601, Daily Surveillance Log - Modes 1, 2, And 3 (Rev 124)
5. JPM Attachment 5 - Procedure 6.SLC.601, SLC Tank Sampling, Section 2 data
6. TS Figure 3.1.7-1, Sodium Pentaborate Solution Volume versus Concentration Requirements

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A2 Rev 2 Page 3 of 14 Task Standard:

The applicant determined both SLC Squib continuities were SAT, determined SLC tank level of 3200-3300 gal, determined SLC tank level Operability Limit of 70.1-72.3%, and completed appropriate sections of Procedure 6.LOG.601, Attachments 9 and 21 IAW the answer key.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A2 Rev 2 Page 4 of 14 (JPM A2)

Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to perform SLC operability checks including determining the tank volume from boron concentration.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. If Unsatisfactory, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1, 2, and 3, and tell them to begin.
5. The following handouts will be provided during performance of the JPM:
  • Handout 4, 6.LOG.601 Att. 21 Section 3 (JPM step 8)
  • Handout 5, Procedure 6.SLC.601 Section 2 data (JPM step 9)
  • Handout 6, TS Figure 3.1.7-1 (JPM step 11)

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A2 Rev 2 Page 5 of 14 Read the following to the JPM performer.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Plant is in Mode 1
  • Local and remote SLC tanks level indications read the same

You are directed to perform day shift SLC Operability checks, including MCO readings, per 6.LOG.601 Attachment 9. Turn in your paperwork to the examiner after the checks are complete.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A2 Rev 2 Page 6 of 14 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Attachment 9 Verify Continuity of SLC-SQUIB-1106A Explosive Charge Standard Applicant determined that there was continuity since the Squib Valve Ready indicating lamp for 1106A was ON as indicated in the photograph on Attachment 4 and circled ON in Table.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Attachment 9 Verify Continuity of SLC-SQUIB-1106B Explosive Charge Standard Applicant determined that there was continuity since the Squib Valve Ready indicating lamp for 1106B was ON as indicated in the photograph on Attachment 4 and circled ON in Table.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Attachment 9 Footnote (a) IF white SQUIB VALVE READY DS-3A light off, THEN ENSURE SLC-MREL-67A (back of Panel 9-5) indicates 3 to 5 milliamps.

Standard Applicant determined milliamp reading not necessary since Squib A light was ON.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A2 Rev 2 Page 7 of 14

4. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Attachment 9 Footnote (b) IF white SQUIB VALVE READY DS-3B light off, THEN ENSURE SLC-MREL-67B (back of Panel 9-5) indicates 3 to 5 milliamps.

Standard Applicant determined milliamp reading not necessary since Squib B light was ON.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Attachment 9 SLC Boron Solution Tank Volume Standard Determined SLC tank level from Att. 4 photograph of SLC-LI-66, TANK LEVEL, and recorded >72% to <74% volume.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Attachment 9 Footnote (c)1. Mark one of following check boxes: Data Obtained from SLC-LI-66 (PNL 9-5 preferred).

Standard [] Data obtained from SLC-LI-66 (PNL 9-5, preferred).

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Attachment 9 Footnote (c)2 IF data from Reactor Building Log, THEN SM/CRS ENSURE data transferred correctly.

Standard Applicant determined step was N/A since data was obtained from Panel 9-5.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A2 Rev 2 Page 8 of 14 Examiner Note: When asked for 6.LOG.601, Attachment 21, provide Handout 4 to applicant.

8. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Attachment 9 Footnote (d)1 If OPERABILITY LIMIT exceeded, THEN DETERMINE calculated Lr per Attachment 21, Section 3.

Standard Determined 6.LOG.601 Attachment 21 was required, and transitioned to Attachment 21, Section 3.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: When asked for 6.SLC.601, provide Handout 5 to applicant.

9. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Attachment 21 3.1 Perform one of the following:

3.1.1 CONTACT Surveillance Coordinator to obtain SLC tank concentration from latest performed Procedure 6.SLC.601.

Standard Requested SLC tank concentration from latest completed 6.SLC.601 from Surveillance Coordinator, then determined Step 3.1.2 was not required Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Attachment 21 3.2 Record SLC tank concentration.

Standard Using Handout 5 Recorded 15.5%

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: When asked for TS Figure 3.1.7-1, provide Handout 6 to applicant.

11. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Attachment 21 3.3 Using recorded SLC tank concentration and TS Figure 3.1.7-1 OBTAIN Minimum Net Tank Volume (gallons).

Standard Plotted 15.5% on vertical axis to curve of TS Figure 3.1.7-1 to obtain 3200-3300 gallons Net Volume of Solution in Tank on horizontal axis Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A2 Rev 2 Page 9 of 14

12. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Attachment 21 3.4 RECORD obtained gallons. _________Minimum Net Tank Volume.

Standard Recorded 3200-3300 gallons.

Cue Notes Acceptable range is 3200 to 3300 gallons.

Results SAT UNSAT

13. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Attachment 21 3.5 CALCULATE SLC tank level OPERABILITY LIMIT (Lr):

Standard Calculated (3200 to 3300)/45.65=70.1 to 72.3 Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

14. Procedure Step: 6.LOG.601 Attachment 21 3.6 RECORD Lr in Attachment 9, OPERABILITY LIMIT cell of SLC Boron Solution Tank Volume table.

Standard Recorded 70.1 to 72.3 (%) in OPERABILITY LIMIT in 6.LOG.601 Attachment 9.

Cue Notes JPM Complete Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: __________

JPM ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A2 Rev 2 Page 10 of 14 6.LOG.601 ATTACHMENT 9 SLC 0700-1000 1900-2200 OPERABILITY APPLICABLE ATT. 22 LOC CHECK READING READING LIMIT MODES NOTES VERIFY MCO PNL Continuity of ON/OFF ON/OFF Light ON (a) 1, 2, 3 109 9-5 SLC-SQUIB-1106A Explosive Charge VERIFY MCO PNL Continuity of ON/OFF ON/OFF Light ON (b) 1, 2, 3 109 9-5 SLC-SQUIB-1106B Explosive Charge (a)

IF white SQUIB VALVE READY DS-3A light off, THEN ENSURE SLC-MREL-67A (back of Panel 9-5) indicates 3 to 5 milliamps.

(b)

IF white SQUIB VALVE READY DS-3B light off, THEN ENSURE SLC-MREL-67B (back of Panel 9-5) indicates 3 to 5 milliamps OPERABILITY APPLICABLE ATT. 22 PARAMETER VALUE LIMIT MODES NOTES 74% (d) or calculated SLC Boron Solution

>72 to <74 Lr 1, 2, 3 3 Tank Volume (c)

[ 71.2 %]

(70.1 to 72.3)

(c)

1. MARK one of following check boxes:

[ ] Data obtained from SLC-LI-66 (PNL 9-5, preferred).

[] Data obtained from SLC-LI-46 (R-976-E, Rack 25-19), Reactor Building Log.

IF data from Reactor Building Log, THEN SM/CRS ENSURE data transferred correctly.

SM/CRS Initials:

(d)

NOTE - SLC OPERABILITY LIMIT in table based on SLC Tank level administrative limits.

1. IF OPERABILITY LIMIT exceeded, THEN DETERMINE calculated Lr per Attachment 21, Section 3

JPM ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A2 Rev 2 Page 11 of 14 6.LOG.601 ATTACHMENT 21 CONTINGENCY ACTIONS

3. CALCULATING SLC TANK LEVEL OPERABILITY LIMIT 3.1 PERFORM one of following:

3.1.1 CONTACT Surveillance Coordinator to obtain SLC tank concentration from latest performed Procedure 6.SLC.601.

3.1.2 ACCESS latest performed Procedure 6.SLC.601 as follows:

3.1.2.1 At Control Room key depository, OBTAIN Key

  1. 27.

3.1.2.2 ACCESS Surveillance Coordinator office.

3.1.2.3 Using Key #27, OBTAIN SLC tank concentration from latest performed Procedure 6.SLC.601.

3.2 RECORD SLC tank concentration.

15.5%  % Sodium Pentaborate Solution by Weight 3.3 Using recorded SLC tank concentration and TS Figure 3.1.7-1, OBTAIN Minimum Net Tank Volume (gallons).

3.4 RECORD obtained gallons. 3200-3300 Minimum Net Tank volume 3.5 CALCULATE SLC tank level OPERABILITY LIMIT (Lr):

NOTE - SLC tank conversion from gallons to % equals 45.65 gallons/%.

Lr = 3200-3300/45.65 = 71.2 (70.1-72.3)  %

Minimum Net Tank Volume 3.6 RECORD Lr in Attachment 9, OPERABILITY LIMIT cell, of SLC Boron Solution Tank Volume table.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A2 Rev 2 Page 12 of 14 (JPM A2) (Rev 2)

ATTACHMENT 2 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Plant is in Mode 1
  • Local and remote SLC tanks level indications read the same

You are directed to perform day shift SLC Operability checks, including MCO readings, per 6.LOG.601 Attachment 9. Turn in your paperwork to the examiner after the checks are complete.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A2 Rev 2 Page 13 of 14 ATTACHMENT 4 From Panel 9-5

CNS NRC Examin3/2017 JPM A2 Rev 2 Page 14 of 14 ATTACHMENT 5 From Procedure 6.SLC.601, SLC Tank Sampling

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A3 Rev 2 Page 1 of 10 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure NRC A3

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A3 Rev 2 Page 2 of 10 (JPM A3)

Determine Isolation Boundaries Revision Statement: Editorial enhancements per Chief Examiner comments (Rev 2).

JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Location: Classroom
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: RO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path: [ ] YES [X] NO
5. Time Critical: [ ] YES [X] NO
4. Performance Time: 15 minutes
5. NRC K/A: 2.2.13 (4.1/4.3)
8. Task No.: 299012O0301
9. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 0.9, Tagout (Rev 89)
2. B & R drawing 2040, Residual Heat Removal System, Sheet 1 (Rev N82)
3. B & R drawing 2031, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System, Sheet 2 (Rev N65)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. highlighter Attachments
1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key
2. Attachment 2 - N/A
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet Handouts:
1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet
2. B & R drawing 2040, Residual Heat Removal System, Sheet 1 (Rev N82)
3. B & R drawing 2031, Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System, Sheet 2 (Rev N65)
4. Procedure 0.9, Tagout (Rev 89). (Not required if electronic file is used.)

Task Standard:

The applicant identified the MINIMUM mechanical/piping isolation boundaries required to isolate RHR Pump A for removal per Procedure 0.9, Tagout, IAW the Answer Key. The vent and drain paths should be identified but are not critical steps.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A3 Rev 2 Page 3 of 10 (JPM A3)

Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicants ability to determine appropriate mechanical isolation boundaries.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. If Unsatisfactory, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1, 2, and 3.
5. Give the applicant Handout 4 if electronic file is NOT used.
6. Tell the applicant to begin.

Notes: ______________________________________________________________________

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A3 Rev 2 Page 4 of 10 Read the following to the JPM performer.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Plant is shut down in a refueling outage

You are directed to determine the minimum mechanical/piping boundaries to isolate RHR Pump A for removal. The motor for RHR Pump A has already been tagged and removed.

  • Highlight all valves required to be included in the clearance order to support this task.
  • Indicate the valve position (open/closed) and whether the valve shall contain a clearance order tag (Tag/No Tag).

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A3 Rev 2 Page 5 of 10 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step: RHR-MO-15A, PUMP A SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION VALVE Standard Reviewed B&R 2040 Sheet 1 for RHR Pump A and determined RHR-MO-15A, PUMP A SHUTDOWN COOLING SUCTION VALVE, was required to be tagged closed, then highlighted and marked tagged and closed on B&R 2040 Sheet 1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: RHR-MO-13A, PUMP A TORUS SUCT VALVE Standard Reviewed B&R 2040 Sheet 1 for RHR Pump A and determined RHR-MO-13A, PUMP A TORUS SUCT VALVE, was required to be tagged closed, then highlighted and marked tagged and closed on B&R 2040 Sheet 1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step: RHR-98, CONDENSATE SUPPLY PUMP A SUCTION Standard Reviewed B&R 2040 Sheet 1 for RHR Pump A and determined RHR-98, CONDENSATE SUPPLY PUMP A SUCTION, was required to be tagged closed, then highlighted and marked tagged and closed on B&R 2040 Sheet 1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A3 Rev 2 Page 6 of 10

4. Procedure Step: Highlights RHR-58, PUMP A MINIMUM FLOW SHUTOFF Standard Reviewed B&R 2040 Sheet 1 for RHR Pump A and determined RHR-58, PUMP A MINIMUM FLOW SHUTOFF, was required to be tagged closed, then highlighted and marked tagged and closed on B&R 2040 Sheet 1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: RHR-11, PUMP A DISCHARGE Standard Reviewed B&R 2040 Sheet 1 for RHR Pump A and determined RHR-11, PUMP A DISCHARGE, was required to be tagged closed, then highlighted and marked tagged and closed on B&R 2040 Sheet 1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step: RHR-35, PUMP A DRAIN RHR-36, PUMP A DRAIN RHR-34, PUMP A SUCTION DRAIN Standard Reviewed B&R 2040 Sheet 1 for RHR Pump A and determined RHR-35, PUMP A DRAIN, and RHR-36, PUMP A DRAIN, and RHR-34, PUMP A SUCTION DRAIN, were required to be open to provide a drain path, then highlighted and marked No Tag and open on B&R 2040 Sheet 1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step: B&R 2031 Sheet 2 Standard Reviewed B&R 2031 Sheet 2 for REC tie in with RHR Pump A.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A3 Rev 2 Page 7 of 10

8. Procedure Step: REC-75, RHR PUMP A HX INLET Standard Reviewed B&R 2031 Sheet 2 for REC tie in with RHR Pump A and determined REC-75, RHR PUMP A HX INLET, was required to be tagged closed, then highlighted and marked tagged and closed on B&R 2031 Sheet 2.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

9. Procedure Step: REC-76, RHR PUMP A HX OUTLET Standard Reviewed B&R 2031 Sheet 2 for REC tie in with RHR Pump A and determined REC-76, RHR PUMP A HX OUTLET, was required to be tagged closed, then highlighted and marked tagged and closed on B&R 2031 Sheet 2.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step: REC-87, PX-476A ROOT REC-397, PX-476A SHUTOFF REC-83, RHR PUMP A HX DRAIN Standard Reviewed B&R 2031 Sheet 2 for REC tie in with RHR Pump A and determined REC-87, PX-476A ROOT, and REC-397, PX-476A SHUTOFF, and REC-83, RHR PUMP A HX DRAIN, were required to be open to provide a drain path, then highlighted and marked No Tag and open on B&R 2040 Sheet 1.

Cue Notes JPM Complete Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: __________

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A3 Rev 2 Page 8 of 10 DO NOT GIVE TO APPLICANTS Tagged and Closed No Tag and Open Tagged and Closed ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY B&R 2040 Sheet 1

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A3 Rev 2 Page 9 of 10 DO NOT GIVE TO APPLICANTS Tagged and Closed No Tag and Open ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY B&R 2031 Sheet 2

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A3 Rev 2 Page 10 of 10 (JPM A3) (Rev 2)

ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Plant is shut down in a refueling outage

You are directed to determine the minimum mechanical/piping boundaries to isolate RHR Pump A for removal. The motor for RHR Pump A has already been tagged and removed.

  • Highlight all valves required to be included in the clearance order to support this task.
  • Indicate the valve position (open/closed) and whether the valve shall contain a clearance order tag (Tag/No Tag).

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A4 Rev 2 Page 1 of 10 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure NRC A4

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A4 Rev 2 Page 2 of 10 (JPM A4)

Radiation Protection Table Top Revision Statement: Editorial enhancements per Chief Examiner comments (Rev 2).

Additional Program Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: Classroom
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: RO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path: [ ] YES [X] NO
5. Time Critical: [ ] YES [X] NO
6. Performance Time: 10 minutes
7. NRC K/A: 2.3.14 (3.4/3.8)
8. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 9.ALARA.1, Personnel Dosimetry and Occupational Radiation Exposure Program (Rev 46)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Calculator
2. RCA Survey Map Attachments
1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key
2. Attachment 2 - N/A
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet
4. Attachment 4 - Radiological Survey Map for Rx 903 Angle Valve Room Handouts:
1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet
2. Attachment 4 - Radiological Survey Map for Rx 903 Angle Valve Room
3. Procedure 9.ALARA.1, Personnel Dosimetry and Occupational Radiation Exposure Program (Rev
46) (NOT required if electronic files are used)

Task Standard:

The applicant determined the projected dose each worker would receive and that CNS Administrative dose limitations would be exceeded requiring management authorization for Worker #1, in accordance with Procedure 9.ALARA.1, Personnel Dosimetry and Occupational Radiation Exposure Program, and Answer Key.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A4 Rev 2 Page 3 of 10 (JPM A4)

Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to determine of work can be performed within the confines of CNS radiation protection procedures.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. If Unsatisfactory, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1 and 2.
5. If electronic files are NOT being used, give the applicant a copy of Procedure 9.ALARA.1, Personnel Dosimetry and Occupational Radiation Exposure Program (Rev 46)

Notes: ______________________________________________________________________

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A4 Rev 2 Page 4 of 10 Read the following to the JPM performer.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Plant is operating at power
  • RHR-MO-25B has developed a leak
  • Two workers are required to perform the leak repair
  • Worker #1 has accumulated 600 mrem this year (all CNS dose)
  • Worker #2 has accumulated 1415 mrem this year (all CNS dose - previously authorized to receive greater than 1000 mrem)
  • The following times for each worker have been estimated for task performance:
  • Staging time in area directly outside the CA, at the Step-off Pad, of Rx 903 Angle Valve room: 45 min
  • Staging time in area directly inside CA, just inside the Step-off Pad, of Rx 903 Angle Valve room: 15 min
  • Work time directly on RHR-MO-25B: 90 min
  • Transition dose is 5 mrem
  • Following completion of the job, an additional 15 mrem per worker will be received during de-staging activities INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to evaluate the leak repair job for possible performance under current plant conditions to include:

1. Determine the total projected dose each worker would receive to pre-stage, perform the leak repair and de-stage (assume the same task times for both workers).
2. Based upon the projected total accumulated dose for this job, determine if any CNS administrative dose limitations will be exceeded requiring Department Supervisor and RP Technical Supervisor authorization prior to performing job.
3. Complete the attached form to document your answers.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A4 Rev 2 Page 5 of 10 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: Determine dose for area directly outside the Rx 903 Angle Valve room.

Standard Determined dose for Staging - staging time in access area directly outside the Rx 903 Angle Valve room (45 min) 0.75 Hr X 5 mr/hr = 3.75 mrem (Accept 3.7 to 3.8 mrem)

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: Determine dose for area directly inside the Rx 903 Angle Valve room Standard Determined dose for Staging - staging time in area directly inside the Rx 903 Angle Valve room step off pad.

(15 min) 0.25 Hr X 16 mr/hr = 4 mrem Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step: Determine dose for work in RHR-MO-25B area.

Standard Determined dose for work - work time at RHR-MO-25B 1.5 Hr X 325 mr/hr = 487.5 mrem (Accept 487 to 488 mrem)

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: Determine transition dose.

Standard Determined dose for transition - an additional 5 mrem will be accumulated for transitions per initial conditions Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A4 Rev 2 Page 6 of 10

5. Procedure Step: Determine de-staging dose.

Standard Determined dose for de-staging - an additional 15 mrem will be accumulated for de-staging activities per initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: Determine total projected dose for each worker Standard Determined total dose for job-Total = 3.75 + 4 + 487.5 + 5 + 15 = 515.25 mrem (Accept 514.7 to 515.8 mrem)

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step: Determines Worker admin limit authorizations.

Standard Determined Worker #1 would require authorization to exceed 1000 mrem dose since accumulated dose 600 mrem + estimated dose 515.25 = 1115.25 per Procedure 9.ALARA.1 Step 6.2.1.1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step: Determines Worker admin limit authorizations.

Standard Determined Worker #2 would NOT require authorization due to already having greater than 1000 mrem and not reaching next admin limit of 2000 mrem since accumulated dose 1415 mrem + estimated dose 515.25 = 1930.25 per Procedure 9.ALARA.1 Step 6.2.1.2.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: __________

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A4 Rev 2 Page 7 of 10 DO NOT GIVE TO APPLICANTS ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY WORKER #1 WORKER #2 INITIAL DOSE 600 mrem 1415 mrem PROJECTED DOSE 514.7 to 515.8 mrem 514.7 to 515.8 mrem PROJECTED TOTAL DOSE 1114.7 to 1115.8 mrem 1929.7 to 1930.8 mrem CNS ADMIN DOSE LIMIT AUTHORIZATION YES NO YES NO REQUIRED (Circle Yes or No)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A4 Rev 2 Page 8 of 10 (JPM A4) (Rev 2)

ATTACHMENT 3 (Page 1 of 2)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Plant is operating at power
  • RHR-MO-25B has developed a leak
  • Two workers are required to perform the leak repair
  • Worker #1 has accumulated 600 mrem this year (all CNS dose)
  • Worker #2 has accumulated 1415 mrem this year (all CNS dose - previously authorized to receive greater than 1000 mrem)
  • The following times for each worker have been estimated for task performance:
  • Staging time in area directly outside the CA, at the Step-off Pad, of Rx 903 Angle Valve room: 45 min
  • Staging time in area directly inside CA, just inside the Step-off Pad, of Rx 903 Angle Valve room: 15 min
  • Work time directly on RHR-MO-25B: 90 min
  • Transition dose is 5 mrem
  • Following completion of the job, an additional 15 mrem per worker will be received during de-staging activities INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to evaluate the leak repair job for possible performance under current plant conditions to include:

1. Determine the total projected dose each worker would receive to pre-stage, perform the leak repair and de-stage (assume the same task times for both workers).
2. Based upon the projected total accumulated dose for this job, determine if any CNS administrative dose limitations will be exceeded requiring Department Supervisor and RP Technical Supervisor authorization prior to performing job.
3. Complete the attached form to document your answers.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A4 Rev 2 Page 9 of 10 ATTACHMENT 3 (Page 2 of 2)

WORKER #1 WORKER #2 INITIAL DOSE PROJECTED DOSE PROJECTED TOTAL DOSE CNS ADMIN DOSE LIMIT AUTHORIZATION YES NO YES NO REQUIRED (Circle Yes or No)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A4 Rev 2 Page 10 of 10 (JPM A4) (Rev 1)

ATTACHMENT 4

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A5 Rev 2 Page 1 of 7 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure JPM A5

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A5 Rev 2 Page 2 of 7 (JPM A5)

Determine if Mode Change is Allowed Revision Statement: Editorial enhancements per Chief Examiner comments (Rev 2).

Additional Program Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: Classroom
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path: [ ] YES [X] NO
5. Time Critical: [ ] YES [X] NO
6. Performance Time: 10 minutes
7. NRC K/A: 2.1.20 (4.6/4.6), 2.2.35 (3.6/4.5), 2.2.40 (3.4/4.7)
8. Task No.: 341033W0303
9. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Technical Specifications LCO 3.5.3, LCO 3.0.4, and Bases Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:
1. none Attachments
1. Attachment 1 - N/A
2. Attachment 2 - N/A
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet Handouts:
1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet
2. Technical Specifications and Bases (not required if electronic files are used)

Task Standard:

The applicant determined a Reactor Mode change to Mode 2 was not permitted with RCIC inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications LCO 3.5.3, LCO 3.0.4, and Bases.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A5 Rev 2 Page 3 of 7 (JPM A5)

Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to determine if a Reactor Mode change is allowed in accordance with Technical Specifications.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. If Unsatisfactory, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Attachment 3.
5. If electronic files are NOT being used, give the applicant a copy of Technical Specifications and Bases.
6. Tell the applicant to begin.

Notes: ______________________________________________________________________

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A5 Rev 2 Page 4 of 7 Read the following to the JPM performer.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The Plant is in MODE 3 with Reactor pressure 600 psig

You are directed to determine if a Reactor Mode change to Mode 2 is allowed in accordance with Technical Specifications. Record and justify your findings below.

Circle the appropriate choice (IS / IS NOT) below.

Change to Mode 2: IS or IS NOT allowed.

Justification:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A5 Rev 2 Page 5 of 7 Start Time: ____________

NOTE to Examiner: Operations Department expectation is that both Technical Specifications and applicable Bases are referenced when making Technical Specification calls. This will not result in failure but should be noted if both are not referenced during the performance of this JPM.

1. Procedure Step: Technical Specifications LCO 3.5.3 RCIC System Standard Reviewed to TS LCO 3.5.3 RCIC and Bases and determined RCIC must be restored operable or a shutdown statement will be entered and no special allowance for changing modes with RCIC inoperable is stated.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: NOTE above the Actions section of LCO 3.5.3.

Standard Reviewed the NOTE and determined LCO 3.0.4b is not applicable to RCIC, and therefore does not allow changing modes based on a risk evaluation.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step: Technical Specifications LCO 3.0.4 Standard Reviewed LCO 3.0.4 and Bases and determined LCO 3.0.4a does not allow mode change since LCO 3.5.3 does not permit continued operation with RCIC inoperable indefinitely and LCO 3.0.4c does not allow changing modes since no special allowance for changing modes with RCIC inoperable is stated in LCO 3.5.3.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step:

Standard Determined a Mode Change to MODE 2 is not allowed and recorded determination on applicant cue sheet.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A5 Rev 2 Page 6 of 7 Stop Time: __________

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A5 Rev 2 Page 7 of 7 (JPM A5) (Rev 2)

ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • The Plant is in MODE 3 with Reactor pressure 600 psig

You are directed to determine if a Reactor Mode change to Mode 2 is allowed in accordance with Technical Specifications. Record and justify your findings below.

Circle the appropriate choice (IS / IS NOT) below.

Change to Mode 2: IS or IS NOT allowed.

Justification:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A6 Rev 3 Page 1 of 11 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure JPM A6

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A6 Rev 3 Page 2 of 11 (JPM A6)

Reportable Occurrences to the NRC (#8)

Revision Statement:

Rev. 2 - Editorial enhancements per Chief Examiner comments Rev. 3 - Revised Answer Key following exam administration per Operations determination that 8-hour report for Non-Emergency, Specified System Actuation should also be checked.

Additional Program Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: Classroom
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path: [ ] YES [X] NO
5. Time Critical: [ ] YES [X] NO
6. Performance Time: 15 minutes
7. NRC K/A: 2.1.18 (3.6/3.8), 2.1.20 (4.6/4.6), 2.4.30 (2.7/4.1)
8. Task No.: 341014O0303
9. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 2.0.5, Reports to NRC Operations Center (Rev 47)
2. NUREG 1022 (Rev 3)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. none Attachments
1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key
2. Attachment 2 - N/A
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet
4. Attachment 4 - NRC Form 361, Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet Handouts:
1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet
2. JPM Attachment 4 - NRC Form 361, Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet
2. Procedure 2.0.5, Reports to NRC Operations Center (Rev 47) (not required if electronic files are used)
3. NUREG 1022 (Rev 3) (not required if electronic files are used)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A6 Rev 3 Page 3 of 11 Task Standard:

The applicant determined a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> report to the NRC was required and NRC Form 361 contained the correct technical information (10 CFR50.72 non-emergency classifications; 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A)

ECCS Discharge to RCS and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) Specified System Actuation) per Procedure 2.0.5, Reports to NRC Operations Center. (See Answer Key)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A6 Rev 3 Page 4 of 11 (JPM A6)

Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to determine an NRC Reportable Occurrence has occurred and correctly complete NRC Form 361.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. If Unsatisfactory, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1 and 2 (JPM Attachments 3 and 4).
5. If electronic files are NOT being used, give the applicant Procedure 2.0.5, Reports to NRC Operations Center (Rev 47) and a copy of NUREG 1022 (Rev 3).

Notes: ______________________________________________________________________

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A6 Rev 3 Page 5 of 11 Read the following to the JPM performer.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Plant is in Mode 3, shutting down for a refueling outage
  • RPV pressure 500 psig
  • RPV level + 35 inches
  • A drywell steam leak causes drywell pressure to rise to 2 psig
  • RPS actuates and ECCS initiation occurs as designed
  • HPCI injected into the RPV and operators took manual control and stopped HPCI from injecting
  • EAL FA1.1 was declared by Emergency Director and appropriate notifications made for that event
  • Shift Manager's phone number is 402-825-5253 INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to determine what non-EAL notification requirements exist and complete the required sections of NRC Form 361. Return the completed form to the evaluator when you have finished.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A6 Rev 3 Page 6 of 11 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: Procedure 2.0.5 Standard Referred to body of Procedure 2.0.5, Section 4 and Attachments 1, 2 and 8.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 4.1 DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITY FOR 10CFR20, 26, 37, 50.72, 70.52, 72.75, and 73.77 EVENTS 4.1.1 If immediate notification is required due to declaration of an emergency classification, perform the emergency notifications per Procedure 5.7.6.

Standard Applicant determines immediate notification already satisfied per initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step: 4.1 DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITY FOR 10CFR20, 26, 37, 50.72, 70.52, 72.75, and 73.77 EVENTS 4.1.7 The SM shall determine the appropriate reporting category (i.e.,

immediate, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, or 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />). Guidance is provided in Attachments 1 through 4 for determining the category for immediate notifications.

4.1.7.1 NUREG 1022 shall be referenced for all 10CFR50.72 reporting decisions.

Standard Applicant reviewed Attachments 1 and 2 and NUREG 1022 as necessary and determined 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> report is required under 10CFR50.72 non-emergency classification; 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) ECCS Discharge to RCS.

Cue Notes IAW procedure 2.0.5 Att. 1 flowchart, Att. 2 line 3, and NUREG 1022 page 33.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A6 Rev 3 Page 7 of 11

4. Procedure Step: 4.4 PREPARE NRC FORM 361 (ATTACHMENT 8) AND CONTACT THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER 4.4.3 The Preparer should ensure the worksheet is accurate and properly filled out.

Standard Applicant completed information on the NRC Form 361 IAW answer key.

Cue Notes Only items that are bolded and yellow highlighted on answer key are critical Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: Submits NRC Form 361 Standard Provided NRC Form 361 to the Examiner.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A6 Rev 3 Page 8 of 11 DO NOT GIVE TO APPLICANTS ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OPERATIONS CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN #

NRC OPERATION TELEPHONE NUMBER: PRIMARY - 301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469*, BACKUPS - [1st] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*

[2nd] 301-415-0550 and [3rd]301-415-0553 *Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NOTIFICATION TIME NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #

Cooper Nuclear Station 1 Applicants Name 402-825-5253 Event time and zone Event date Power/mode before Power/mode after Current Time Todays Date Subcritical / Mode 3 Subcritical / Mode 3 Event classification 1-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1) (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC TS Deviation ADEV (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) (v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC ALERT ALE/AAEC (i) TS Required S/D ASHU (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND UNSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC X (iv)(A) ECCS Discharge to RCS ACCS (xii) Offsite Medical AMED X 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (See Next Column) (iv) (B) RPS Actuation (Scram) ARPS (xiii) Loss Comm/Asmt/Resp ACCM PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DDDD (xi) Offsite Notification APRE 60-Day Optional 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1)

MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV FITNESS FOR DUTY HRT (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)

OTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (See Last Column) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA NONR INFORMATION ONLY NNF X (iv)(A) Specified System Actuation AESF NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)

The HPCI system started on a valid initiation signal and injected into the RPV.

NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR NOT YES (Explain above) NO NRC RESIDENT X UNDERSTOOD?

STATE(s) X DID ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTION YES NO (Explain above)

LOCAL X AS REQUIRED?

OTHER GOV AGENCIES X MODE OF OPERATION ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK RESTART DATE: Date + 4 or YES NO MEDIA/PRESS RELEASE X UNTIL CORRECTED: 4 unknown at this time Examiner Note: Only items that are bolded and yellow highlighted are critical.

The RPS Actuation is an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> notification because the reactor was subcritical. ECCS initiation without injection is an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> report, but since HPCI injected, which is a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> report, the notification is due within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A6 Rev 3 Page 9 of 11 (JPM A6) (Rev 2)

ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Plant is in Mode 3, shutting down for a refueling outage
  • RPV pressure 500 psig
  • RPV level + 35 inches
  • A drywell steam leak causes drywell pressure to rise to 2 psig
  • RPS actuates and ECCS initiation occurs as designed
  • HPCI injected into the RPV and operators took manual control and stopped HPCI from injecting
  • EAL FA1.1 was declared by Emergency Director and appropriate notifications made for that event
  • Shift Manager's phone number is 402-825-5253 INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to determine what non-EAL notification requirements exist and complete the required sections of NRC Form 361. Return the completed form to the evaluator when you have finished.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A6 Rev 3 Page 10 of 11 ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 1 of 2)

NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OPERATIONS CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN #

NRC OPERATION TELEPHONE NUMBER: PRIMARY - 301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469*, BACKUPS - [1st] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*

[2nd] 301-415-0550 and [3rd]301-415-0553 *Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #

Event time and zone Event date Power/mode before Power/mode after Event classification 1-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1) (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC TS Deviation ADEV (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) (v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC ALERT ALE/AAEC (i) TS Required S/D ASHU (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND UNSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC (iv)(A) ECCS Discharge to RCS ACCS (xii) Offsite Medical AMED 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (See Next Columns) (iv) (B) RPS Actuation (Scram) ARPS (xiii) Loss Comm/Asmt/Resp ACCM PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DDDD (xi) Offsite Notification APRE 60-Day Optional 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1)

MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV FITNESS FOR DUTY HRT (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)

OTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (See Last Column) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA NONR INFORMATION ONLY NNF (iv)(A) Specified System Actuation AESF NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)

NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR NOT NRC RESIDENT UNDERSTOOD? YES (Explain above)

NO STATE(s) DID ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTION YES NO (Explain above)

LOCAL AS REQUIRED?

OTHER GOV AGENCIES MODE OF OPERATION ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK UNTIL CORRECTED: RESTART DATE: YES NO MEDIA/PRESS RELEASE

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A6 Rev 3 Page 11 of 11 ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 2 of 2)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A7 Rev 2 Page 1 of 11 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure JPM A7

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A7 Rev 2 Page 2 of 11 (JPM A7)

Review of Completed Jet Pump Operability Check (SRO Version 2)

Revision Statement: Editorial enhancements per Chief Examiner comments (Rev 2).

Additional Program Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: Classroom
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path: [ ] YES [X] NO
5. Time Critical: [ ] YES [X] NO
6. Performance Time: 18 minutes
7. NRC K/A: 2.2.12 (3.7/4.1), 2.2.42 (3.9/4.6)
8. Task No.: 342026W0303
9. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 6.LOG.601, Daily Surveillance Log - Modes 1, 2, and 3 (Rev 124)
2. Jet Pump Operability Curves and Recirc Pump Flow curves (Cycle 10 28 30 data)
3. Procedure 2.1.10, Station Power Changes, Attachment 1, Power-To-Flow Map (Rev 113)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Calculator Attachments:
1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key
2. Attachment 2 - N/A
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet
4. Attachment 4 - completed Attachments 12 and 13 of Procedure 6.LOG.601, Daily Surveillance Log - Modes 1, 2, and 3 (Rev 124)

Handouts:

1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet
2. JPM Attachment 4 - completed Attachments 12 and 13 of Procedure 6.LOG.601, Daily Surveillance Log - Modes 1, 2, and 3 (Rev 124)
3. Attachment 1, Power-To-Flow Map of Procedure 2.1.10, Station Power Changes (Rev 113)
4. Jet Pump Operability Curves and Recirc Pump Flow curves (Cycle 10 28 30 data)

Task Standard:

The applicant determined Recirc Pump Flow loop mismatch for >51.45 mlbm/hr was inappropriately N/Ad and was UNSAT IAW Procedure 6.LOG.601, Daily Surveillance Log - Modes 1, 2, and 3. (See Answer Key.)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A7 Rev 2 Page 3 of 11 (JPM A7)

Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to perform the daily Jet Pump and Recirc Pump Flow Check of the Daily Tech Specs Surveillance Log.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. If Unsatisfactory, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A7 Rev 2 Page 4 of 11 Read the following to the JPM performer.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Plant is operating at rated power with DEH in Mode 4
  • Completed surveillance for Jet Pump Operability (6.LOG.601 Attachment 12) and Recirc Pump Flow Checks (6.LOG.601 Attachment 13) are provided.

INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to perform a review of the daily Jet Pump Operability (6.LOG.601 Attachment 12) and Recirc Pump Flow Checks (6.LOG.601 Attachment 13) 0700-1000 readings as part of the routine shift activities.

Record your conclusions on Page 4 of Attachment 4.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A7 Rev 2 Page 5 of 11 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: N/A Standard Reviewed Attachment 12 Jet Pump Operability Parameters A, B, C, D and Checks 1, 2, 3 and verified Operability Limit on Checks 1 and 2, or 3 are SAT for Loop A and B.

Cue Notes There are no errors on Att. 12 Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: N/A Standard Reviewed Attachment 13 checks and determined Recirc Jet Pump Flow loop mismatch for <51.45 mlbm/hr was inappropriately marked SAT and should have been marked N/A, since total core flow was 66 mlbm/hr.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step: N/A Standard Reviewed Attachment 13 checks and determined Recirc Jet Pump Flow loop mismatch for 51.45 mlbm/hr was inappropriately N/Ad and was UNSAT IAW Procedure 6.LOG.601.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: N/A Standard Recorded comments on Attachment 4, Page 4 and provided forms to Examiner.

Cue Inform applicant JPM complete.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A7 Rev 2 Page 6 of 11 DO NOT GIVE TO APPLICANTS ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY Identified loop flow mismatch for >51.45 mlbm/hr was inappropriately N/Ad and check for <51.45 mlbm/hr was inappropriately filled in and should have been N/Ad.

Noted loop flow mismatch for >51.45 mlbm/hr is not met should be checked UNSAT.

ATTACHMENT 13 RECIRC PUMP FLOW RECIRC PUMP FLOW 0700-1000 1900-2200 OPERABILITY APPLICABLE ATT. 22 CHECKS SAT/UNSAT SAT/UNSAT LIMIT MODES NOTES VERIFY Core Flow, MCO NBI-DPR/FR-95, value is not in Stability SAT SAT 1, 2 49 Exclusion Region of Power to Flow Map (a)

VERIFY JP Flow, MCO NBI-FI-92A/B, values for Loop A and Loop B SAT flow mismatch is SAT 1 (c)

,2 (c) 48 Should be 7.35x106 lbs/hr at N/A

< 51.45x106 lbs/hr Rated Core Flow (b,d)

VERIFY JP Flow, MCO NBI-FI-92A/B, values for Loop A and Loop B N/A flow mismatch is SAT 1 (c)

,2 (c) 48 Should be 3.67x106 lbs/hr at UNSAT 51.45x106 lbs/hr Rated Core Flow (b,d)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A7 Rev 2 Page 7 of 11 (JPM A7) (Rev 2)

ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Plant is operating at rated power with DEH in Mode 4
  • Completed surveillance for Jet Pump Operability (6.LOG.601 Attachment 12) and Recirc Pump Flow Checks (6.LOG.601 Attachment 13) are provided.

INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to perform a review of the daily Jet Pump Operability (6.LOG.601 Attachment 12) and Recirc Pump Flow Checks (6.LOG.601 Attachment 13) 0700-1000 readings as part of the routine shift activities.

Record your conclusions on Page 4 of Attachment 4.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A7 Rev 2 Page 8 of 11 JPM ATTACHMENT 4 (PAGE 1 OF 4) 6.LOG.601 ATTACHMENT 12 JET PUMP OPERABILITY

1. IF in single loop operation, THEN MARK idle loop N/A.

JET PUMP P (%)

PARAMETERS LOOP A LOOP B JP # LOOP B JP # LOOP A A Core Flow (106 lb/hr) NBI-FRDPR-95 66 1 39 11 29 B RR Pump Flow (103 gpm) RR-FR-163 39.9 41.7 2 39 12 28 C RRMG Set Speed (%) RRFC-SI-1A/B 81.0 84.8 3 39 13 29 D JP Flow (106 lb/hr) NBI-FI-92A/B 31 35 4 43 14 31 5 45 15 34 6 42 16 32 7 40 17 31 8 39 18 30 9 40 19 33 10 40 20 32 LOOP B LOOP 40.6 30.9 Avg A Avg OPERABILITY APPLICABLE ATT. 22 CHECKS SAT UNSAT LIMIT MODE NOTE VERIFY B and C values Loop A:

1 within curve limits (a) Loop B:

VERIFY C and D values Loop A:

2 SAT within curve limits (a) Loop B:

Loop A: 1 (b), 2 (b) 50 VERIFY Jet Pump P differ 3

by 20% from curves (a,c) Loop B:

VERIFY Checks 1 and 2 SAT or Loop A:

SAT Check 3 SAT Loop B:

(a) REFER to Jet Pump Operability Curves maintained in Control Room.

(b) APPLY within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after greater than 25% RTP and within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after associated recirculation loop is in service.

(c) IF any Jet Pump P vs. established pattern is not within curve limits, THEN immediately NOTIFY Reactor Engineering.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A7 Rev 2 Page 9 of 11 JPM ATTACHMENT 4 (PAGE 2 OF 4) 6.LOG.601 ATTACHMENT 13 RECIRC PUMP FLOW 0700-1000 1900-2200 OPERABILITY APPLICABLE ATT. 22 CHECKS SAT/UNSAT SAT/UNSAT LIMIT MODES NOTES VERIFY Core Flow, MCO NBI-DPR/FR-95, value is not in Stability SAT SAT 1, 2 49 Exclusion Region of Power to Flow Map (a)

VERIFY JP Flow, MCO NBI-FI-92A/B, values for Loop A and Loop B flow mismatch is SAT SAT 1 (c)

,2 (c) 48 7.35x106 lbs/hr at

< 51.45x106 lbs/hr Rated Core Flow (b,d)

VERIFY JP Flow, MCO NBI-FI-92A/B, values for Loop A and Loop B flow mismatch is N/A SAT 1 (c)

,2 (c) 48 3.67x106 lbs/hr at 51.45x106 lbs/hr Rated Core Flow (b,d)

(a)

REFERENCE power to flow map in Procedure 2.1.10.

(b)

NOTE - Per Technical Specification, a recirculation loop is considered not in operation when total jet pump flows of the two loops is greater than mismatch limits.

IF greater than mismatch limit, THEN ENSURE loop with lower flow considered not in operation.

(c)

APPLY within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after both recirculation loops in service.

(d)

IF flow mismatch results in one loop considered not in operation, THEN CONTACT FRED to manually insert single loop operation limits into GARDEL.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A7 Rev 2 Page 10 of 11 JPM ATTACHMENT 4 (PAGE 3 OF 4) 6.LOG.601 ATTACHMENT 13 RECIRC PUMP FLOW 0700-1000 1900-2200 READING READING OPERABILITY APPLICABLE ATT. 22 CHECK SAT/UNSAT SAT/UNSAT LIMIT MODES NOTES 3 (when reactor VERIFY RR pump pressure less operating or RHR N/A SAT than SDC 66 pump operating in pressure SDC permissive)

(e)

(e)

APPLY within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after reactor steam dome pressure less than shutdown cooling permissive pressure.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A7 Rev 2 Page 11 of 11 ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 4 of 4)

==

Conclusion:==

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A8 Rev 2 Page 1 of 11 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure JPM A8

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A8 Rev 2 Page 2 of 11 (JPM A8)

Authorize Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking Revision Statement: Editorial enhancements per Chief Examiner comments (Rev 2).

JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: Classroom
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path: [ ] YES [X] NO
5. Time Critical: [ ] YES [X] NO
6. Performance Time: 8 minutes
7. NRC K/A: 2.3.14 (3.4/3.8)
8. Task No.: 344033O0303
9. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 5.7.14, Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking (KI) (Rev 21)
2. Procedure 5.7.2, Emergency Director EPIP (Rev 34)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. None Attachments
1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key
2. Attachment 2 - N/A
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet Handouts:
1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet
2. Marked up Procedure 5.7.2 (Rev 34), Attachment 1 (EPIP 5.7.2 ALERT) (Rev 05)
3. Procedure 5.7.14, Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking (KI) (Rev 21) (Paper copy required)

Task Standard:

The applicant determined Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking is authorized for EMTs per Procedure 5.7.14, Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking (KI). (See Answer Key.)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A8 Rev 2 Page 3 of 11 (JPM A8)

Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to determine the need to authorize stable iodine thyroid blocking.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. If Unsatisfactory, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1 and 2, and tell them to begin.
5. Do NOT give applicant Handout 3, Procedure 5.7.14, until requested.

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A8 Rev 2 Page 4 of 11 Read the following to the JPM performer.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Reactor is shutdown in a refueling outage
  • A refuel floor crane accident has resulted in personnel injuries to two refuel floor workers and severe damage to several spent fuel bundles
  • The two injured refuel floor workers have no immediate life threatening injuries but they are unable to leave the area on their own. No other personnel are currently present on the refueling floor
  • You, as Emergency Director, have declared an ALERT, EAL AA2.1, Damage to Irradiated Fuel.
  • RMA-RA-1, FUEL POOL AREA, indicates 60 Rem/hr and RMA-RA-2 FUEL POOL AREA is upscale
  • No survey data or air samples are available from refuel floor
  • A team of EMTs, one of which is an RP who will be performing the RP functions, are standing by to evacuate the injured workers
  • RPs estimate 15 rem per person for lifesaving efforts
  • Release rate data is available
  • Dose assessment is in progress IAW EPIP 5.7.17, CNS-DOSE ASSESSMENT INITIATING CUE:

You are the Emergency Director and Shift Manager; Procedure 5.7.2 Emergency Director EPIP, ALERT has been initiated (See Handout).

You are directed to address RAD RELEASE AND KI step A/R-1 and determine the requirements for the EMTs to complete the evacuation of the injured workers. Hand any completed forms or attachments to the examiner.

Any announcements are to be omitted.

Record any log entries below:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A8 Rev 2 Page 5 of 11 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: Procedure 5.7.2 Attachment 1 - ALERT RAD RELEASE AND KI leg, Step A/R-1 first line:

IF Release rate data is not available, then enter EPIP 5.7.16 Standard Determined step is N/A since release rate data is available (initial condition).

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: Procedure 5.7.2 Attachment 1 - ALERT RAD RELEASE AND KI leg, Step A/R-1 second line:

IF Release in progress, then enter EPIP 5.7.17 Standard Determined step was satisfied since dose assessment IAW EPIP 5.7.17 was already in progress (initial condition).

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A8 Rev 2 Page 6 of 11

3. Procedure Step: Procedure 5.7.2 Attachment 1 - ALERT RAD RELEASE AND KI leg, Step A/R-1 third line:

IF Any Table 1 conditions exists, then enter EPIP 5.7.14 Table 1, EPIP 5.7.14 ENTRY CONDITIONS:

IODINE THYROID BLOCKING IS REQUIRED IF ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS EXIST:

1. Fuel cladding determined to be lost per EPIP 5.7.1, Attachment 3, FISSION PRODUCT BARRRIERS - INDICATIONS OF LOSS OR POTENTIAL LOSS TECHNICAL BASES, or
2. a CALCULATED DOSE OF 5rem(0.05 Sv) to the thyroid (CDE) is likely to be received, or
3. Emergency workers being dispatched to areas where high levels of radio-iodine are suspected AND no current air sample data is available, or
4. A General Emergency has been declared and the Emergency Director expects progression of the event with likely damage to fuel and a radiological release.

Standard Determined that item 3 applied and Iodine Thyroid Blocking was required for the emergency workers involved in the rescue and Procedure 5.7.14 was required to be entered, and determined items 1, 2, and 4 were not applicable.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: Procedure 5.7.2 Attachment 1 - ALERT RAD RELEASE AND KI leg, Step A/R-1 third line:

Caution 3 - Operations personnel are required to be authorized KI in the event that fuel cladding is determined to be lost.

Standard Reviewed caution and determined it was N/A since fuel cladding barrier was not lost.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A8 Rev 2 Page 7 of 11 Examiner Note: When requested, provide Procedure 5.7.14 to Applicant.

5. Procedure Step: 5.7.2 Attachment 1 ALERT A/R-1 Enter Procedure 5.7.14 Standard Obtained current revision of Procedure 5.7.14, Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: This JPM is not intended to evaluate the Applicant distributing KI, ONLY to authorize the distribution of KI, Section 4 and Attachment 1 of procedure 5.7.14.

The applicant may or may not authorize distribution of KI to the injured personnel on the refuel floor.

6. Procedure Step: 5.7.14 Section 3. REQUIREMENTS 3.1 Emergency Director (non-delegable) shall authorize KI for emergency workers when any of the following conditions are present:

3.1.1 Fuel cladding has been determined to be lost per EPIP 5.7.1, Attachment 3.

3.1.2 A calculated dose of 5 rem (0.05 Sv) to the thyroid (CDE) is likely to be received.

3.1.3 Emergency workers being dispatched to areas where high levels of radio-iodine are suspected and no current air sample data is available.

3.1.4 A General Emergency has been declared and the Emergency Director expects progression of the event with likely damage to fuel and a radiological release.

Standard Determined step 3.1.3 applied and authorization of KI was required for emergency workers being dispatched (EMTs), and determined steps 3.1.1, 3.1.2, and 3.1.4 were not applicable..

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A8 Rev 2 Page 8 of 11

7. Procedure Step: Procedure 5.7.14 4.1 WHEN KI has been authorized, THEN the Emergency Director shall perform the following actions:

4.1.1 Log decision to authorize KI.

Standard Applicant logged decision to authorize KI on JPM Att. 3 cue sheet.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step: 4.1 WHEN KI has been authorized, THEN the Emergency Director shall perform the following actions:

4.1.2 Determine affected personnel and complete Attachment 1, KI Distribution/Notification Checklist.

Standard Determined the affected personnel and completed Attachment 1, KI Distribution/Notification Checklist, by denoting Emergency Medical Technicians in the table beneath step 1 on Attachment 1 of EPIP 5.7.14. The applicant may have included the RP on the EMT Team or have identified them as Other on the KI Distribution/Notification Checklist. Determined notification of non-NPPD emergency response organizations was not required, since fuel cladding barrier had not been lost, and N/Ad step 2 on Attachment 1. (See Answer Key.)

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Plant announcements are to be omitted as stated in Initiating Cue.

9. Procedure Step: 4.1 WHEN KI has been authorized, THEN the Emergency Director shall perform the following actions:

4.1.3 Announce authorization of KI to the facility.

Standard Determined step was N/A from initiating cue that announcements are to be omitted.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A8 Rev 2 Page 9 of 11 Examiner Note: Plant announcements are to be omitted as stated in Initiating Cue.

10. Procedure Step: 4.1 WHEN KI has been authorized, THEN the Emergency Director shall perform the following actions:

4.1.4 Direct the following plant announcement be made:

4.1.4.1 "Attention all plant personnel, the Emergency Director has authorized the use of KI for designated Emergency Workers".

(Repeat)

Standard Determined step was N/A from initiating cue that announcements are to be omitted.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

11. Procedure Step: 4.1 WHEN KI has been authorized, THEN the Emergency Director shall perform the following actions:

4.1.5 Designate individual (e.g., Shift Chem/RP Technician or Rad Control Manager) to manage the distribution of Kl using Attachment 2.

Standard Provided the completed Attachment 1 to the Examiner when applicant transitioned to Attachment 2 of Procedure 5.7.14.

Cue When applicant requests Attachment 2, inform them that JPM is complete.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A8 Rev 2 Page 10 of 11 ATTACHMENT 1 DO NOT GIVE TO APPLICANTS KEY 0.ATTACHMENT 1 KI DISTRIBUTION/NOTIFICATION CHECKLIST

1. Determine groups selected to be authorized KI and check the selected groups.

[ ] Control Room Personnel [ ] OSC (ALL including OSC Mission Teams)

[ ] Station Operators [ ] TSC (ALL)

[ ] Downwind Field Monitoring Teams [ ] EOF (ALL)

[ ] Security Officers [X] Emergency Medical Technicians (NPPD)

[ ] Fire Brigade Personnel [ ] West Warehouse Addition (ERO Personnel)

[ ] Other: (may include RP as other, here)

NOTE - KI may also be provided to non-NPPD emergency response organizations for distribution to their emergency workers. Administration of KI to non-NPPD personnel shall be the responsibility of the organizations to which these personnel belong.

N/A2. Determine non-NPPD emergency response organizations to be contacted to inform them of the decision by NPPD to authorize KI.

[ ] Federal Agencies [ ] MO State Personnel

[ ] Fire Brigade/Mutual Aid [ ] NE State Personnel

[ ] State Police [ ] Off-Site Ambulance Crews

[ ] Local Law Enforcement [ ] Other:

3. Provide completed worksheet to individual designated to manage the distribution of KI per Attachment 2.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A8 Rev 2 Page 11 of 11 (JPM A8) (Rev 2)

ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Reactor is shutdown in a refueling outage
  • A refuel floor crane accident has resulted in personnel injuries to two refuel floor workers and severe damage to several spent fuel bundles
  • The two injured refuel floor workers have no immediate life threatening injuries but they are unable to leave the area on their own. No other personnel are currently present on the refueling floor
  • You, as Emergency Director, have declared an ALERT, EAL AA2.1, Damage to Irradiated Fuel.
  • RMA-RA-1, FUEL POOL AREA, indicates 60 Rem/hr and RMA-RA-2 FUEL POOL AREA is upscale
  • No survey data or air samples are available from refuel floor
  • A team of EMTs, one of which is an RP who will be performing the RP functions, are standing by to evacuate the injured workers
  • RPs estimate 15 rem per person for lifesaving efforts
  • Release rate data is available
  • Dose assessment is in progress IAW EPIP 5.7.17, CNS-DOSE ASSESSMENT INITIATING CUE:

You are the Emergency Director and Shift Manager; Procedure 5.7.2 Emergency Director EPIP, ALERT has been initiated (See Handout).

You are directed to address RAD RELEASE AND KI step A/R-1 and determine the requirements for the EMTs to complete the evacuation of the injured workers. Hand any completed forms or attachments to the examiner.

Any announcements are to be omitted.

Record any log entries below:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A9 Rev 2 Page 1 of 8 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure JPM A9

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A9 Rev 2 Page 2 of 8 (JPM A9)

EAL Table Top 9 Revision Statement: Editorial enhancements per Chief Examiner comments (Rev 2).

JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: Classroom
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path: [ ] YES [X] NO
5. Time Critical: [X] YES [ ] NO
6. Performance Time: 15 minutes
7. NRC K/A: 2.4.41 (2.9/4.6)
8. Task No.: 344018O0303
9. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 5.7.1, Emergency Classification (Rev 56)
2. Procedure 5.7.6, Notification (Rev 68)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. None Attachments
1. Attachment 1 - N/A
2. Attachment 2 - N/A
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet Handouts:
1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet
2. Procedure 5.7.1, Emergency Classification (Rev 56) (Not required if electronic files are used)
3. Procedure 5.7.1, Attachment 4, EAL Classification Matrix charts EPIPEALHOT and EPIPEALCOLD (Rev. 14) (Paper copy required)

Task Standard:

The applicant determined the most severe emergency classification was an ALERT (EAL SA2.1) IAW Procedure 5.7.1, Emergency Classification. The emergency was declared within 15 minutes after the applicant stated that they were ready to begin.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A9 Rev 2 Page 3 of 8 (JPM A9)

Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to make an EAL classification given a set of plant conditions.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. If Unsatisfactory, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handout 1.
5. Inform the applicant this is a Time Critical JPM, and the stop time will be recorded when they turn in their results.
6. When the applicant has read initial conditions and states they are ready to begin, give the applicant Handouts 2 and 3, tell them to begin, and record start time. (Handout 2 paper copy not required if electronic files are being used.)

Notes: ______________________________________________________________________

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A9 Rev 2 Page 4 of 8 Read the following to the JPM performer.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is operating at 100% power when the following occur:

  • Both Reactor Feed Pumps trip
  • As Reactor water level passes through 0 inches NR all RPS Group white lights stay illuminated
  • Reactor Operator depresses Manual Scram Push Buttons and RPS Group white lights extinguish
  • All APRMs indicate downscale
  • 4160V bus 1F de-energized on the scram and remains de-energized INITIATING CUE:

This is a Time Critical JPM.

You are directed to classify the event at its highest EAL IAW Procedure 5.7.1, Emergency Classification.

Record the emergency classification and EAL number below.

Highest Classification: __________________

EAL Number____________________

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A9 Rev 2 Page 5 of 8 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: Procedure 5.7.1 2.1 AFTER recognition of off-normal event, THEN SM shall:

2.1.1 COMPARE event to EALs on EAL Classification Matrix.

Standard Referred to EAL Classification Matrix, Attachment 4, chart EPIPEALHOT, since plant was at 100 % power, Mode 1, when event occurred.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: Procedure 5.7.1 2.1 AFTER recognition of off-normal event, THEN SM shall:

2.1.2 IF more than one EAL of different classification levels is reached (i.e., EAL for ALERT and EAL for SITE AREA EMERGENCY), THEN SELECT EAL for most severe emergency classification.

Standard Determined automatic scram failed to shut down the reactor occurred and was associated with EAL SS2.1 and SA2.1. Determined EAL SS2.1 did NOT apply since manual scram from Panel 9-5 caused sufficient rod insertion to lower power to downscale on APRMs. Determined EAL SA2.1 applied since manual scram from Panel 9-5 caused sufficient rod insertion to lower power to downscale on APRMs. Then, selected ALERT per EAL SA2.1 as the most severe emergency classification.

Cue .

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A9 Rev 2 Page 6 of 8

3. Procedure Step: Procedure 5.7.1 2.1 AFTER recognition of off-normal event, THEN SM shall:

2.1.3 IF event appears to meet an EAL and time permits, THEN REFER to Attachment 2 or 3 for further explanation and guidance.

Standard Referred to Procedure 5.7.1 Attachment 2 or 3 if time permitted.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: Procedure 5.7.1 2.1 AFTER recognition of off-normal event, THEN SM shall:

2.1.4 IF determined EAL is met, THEN PERFORM following within 15 minutes:

2.1.4.1 ASSUME Emergency Director Responsibilities.

Standard Applicant assumed Emergency Director Responsibilities.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: Procedure 5.7.1 2.1 AFTER recognition of off-normal event, THEN SM shall:

2.1.4 IF determined EAL is met, THEN PERFORM following within 15 minutes:

2.1.4.2 DECLARE emergency.

Standard Declared an ALERT based on EAL SA2.1 IAW Procedure 5.7.1 and documented on JPM Attachment 3. Declaration was made within 15 minutes.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A9 Rev 2 Page 7 of 8

6. Procedure Step: N/A Standard Returned the completed Attachment 3 to the Examiner.

Cue Notes Record STOP TIME when applicant turns in Attachment 3 to the Examiner.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM A9 Rev 2 Page 8 of 8 (JPM A9) (Rev 2)

ATTACHMENT 3 INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant is operating at 100% power when the following occur:

  • Both Reactor Feed Pumps trip
  • As Reactor water level passes through 0 inches NR all RPS Group white lights stay illuminated
  • Reactor Operator depresses Manual Scram Push Buttons and RPS Group white lights extinguish
  • All APRMs indicate downscale
  • 4160V bus 1F de-energized on the scram and remains de-energized INITIATING CUE:

This is a Time Critical JPM.

You are directed to classify the event at its highest EAL IAW Procedure 5.7.1, Emergency Classification.

Record the emergency classification and EAL number below.

Highest Classification: __________________

EAL Number____________________

ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 03/06/2017 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: 1 Control Room Systems; * (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); 2 or 3 for SRO-U Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function JPM S1 - Secure SDG from Control Room L, N, S 6 264000 A4.04 (3.7/3.7)

JPM S2 - Start Torus Cooling from ASD Room L, D, S 5 219000 A1.02 (3.5/3.5)

JPM S3 - Conduct Alt Pressure Control Using Reactor Feed Pumps L, D, S 3 259001 A4.02 (3.9/3.7)

JPM S4 - Level Recovery During Shutdown Conditions Using LPCI A, EN, L, N, S 2 203000 A4.05 (4.3/4.1)

JPM S5 - Perform 6.TG.303 Testing OPC Overspeed L, N, S 4 241000 A3.12 (2.9/2.9), 241000 A4.19 (3.5/3.4)

JPM S6 - Align REC System IAW 5.3EMPWR L, N, S 8 400000 A4.01 (3.1/3.0)

JPM S7 - Withdrawal of Control Rod From Position 00 A, L, N, S 1 201003 A2.01 (3.4/3.6)

JPM S8 - Verify Group 2 Isolation (TIP Shear)

A, D, S 7 223002 A4.01 (3.6/3.5), 223002 A4.06 (3.6/3.7)

In-Plant Systems * (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

JPM P1 - Securing Fire Pump C Locally A, N 8 286000 A4.05 (3.3/3.3), 286000 A1.05 (3.2/3.2)

JPM P2 - Locally Align RHRSW Crosstie for RPV Injection D, E, L 4 2.1.29 (4.1/4.0); 295031 EA1.08 (3.8/3.9)

JPM P3 - ASD - Locally Operate SW-MO-89B for Torus Cooling D, E, L, R 5 219000 A1.08 (3.7 / 3.6), 295016 AK2.02 (4.0/4.1)

All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (4)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9/<8/<4 (5)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1/>1/>1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature > 1 / > 1 / > 1 (control room system) (1)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1/>1/>1 (9)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2/>2/>1 (6)

(P)revious 2 exams < 3 / < 3 / < 2 (randomly selected) (0)

(R)CA >1/>1/>1 (1)

(S)imulator Rev 1

Rev 1 ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 03/06/2017 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: 1 Control Room Systems; * (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); 2 or 3 for SRO-U Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function S1 - Secure SDG from Control Room L, N, S 6 264000 A4.04 (3.7/3.7)

S2 - Start Torus Cooling from ASD Room L, D, S 5 219000 A1.02 (3.5/3.5)

S4 - Level Recovery During Shutdown Conditions Using LPCI A, EN, L, N, S 2 203000 A4.05 (4.3/4.1)

S5 - Perform 6.TG.303 Testing OPC Overspeed L, N, S 4 241000 A3.12 (2.9/2.9), 241000 A4.19 (3.5/3.4)

S6 - Align REC System IAW 5.3EMPWR L, N, S 8 400000 A4.01 (3.1/3.0)

S7 - Withdrawal of Control Rod From Position 00 A, L, N, S 1 201003 A2.01 (3.4/3.6)

S8 - Verify Group 2 Isolation (TIP Shear)

A, D, S 7 223002 A4.01 (3.6/3.5), 223002 A4.06 (3.6/3.7)

In-Plant Systems * (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P1 - Securing Fire Pump C Locally A, N 8 286000 A4.05 (3.3/3.3), 286000 A1.05 (3.2/3.2)

P2 - Locally Align RHRSW Crosstie for RPV Injection D, E, L 4 2.1.29 (4.1/4.0); 295031 EA1.08 (3.8/3.9)

P3 - (ASD) Locally Operate SW-MO-89B for Torus Cooling D, E, L, R 5 219000 A1.08 (3.7 / 3.6), 295016 AK2.02 (4.0/4.1)

All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path A 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (4)

(C)ontrol room C -----

(D)irect from bank D <9 / <8 / <4 (4)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant E >1 / >1 / >1 (2)

(EN)gineered safety feature EN >1 / >1 / > 1 (control room sys) (1)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown L >1 / >1 / >1 (8)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) N-M >2 / >2 / >1 (6)

(P)revious 2 exams P <3 / <3 / < 2 (randomly selected) (0)

(R)CA R >1 / >1 / >1 (1)

(S)imulator S -----

Rev 1

ES-301 Control Room/In Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 03/06/2017 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: 1 Control Room Systems; * (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); 2 or 3 for SRO-U Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function JPM S1 - Secure SDG from Control Room L, N, S 6 264000 A4.04 (3.7/3.7)

JPM S4 - Level Recovery During Shutdown Conditions Using A, EN, L, N, S 2 LPCI 203000 A4.05 (4.3/4.1)

JPM S7 - Withdrawal of Control Rod From Position 00 A, L, N, S 1 201003 A2.01 (3.4/3.6)

In-Plant Systems * (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

JPM P1 - Securing Fire Pump C Locally A, N 8 286000 A4.05 (3.3/3.3), 286000 A1.05 (3.2/3.2)

JPM P3 - ASD - Locally Operate SW-MO-89B for Torus Cooling D, E, L, R 5 219000 A1.08 (3.7 / 3.6), 295016 AK2.02 (4.0/4.1)

All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

Page 1 of 2 Rev 3

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (3)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9/<8/<4 (1)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1/>1/>1 (1)

(EN)gineered safety feature > 1 / > 1 / > 1 (control room system) (1)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1/>1/>1 (4)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2/>2/>1 (4)

(P)revious 2 exams < 3 / < 3 / < 2 (randomly selected) (0)

(R)CA >1/>1/>1 (1)

(S)imulator Page 2 of 2 Rev 3

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S1 Rev 2 Page 1 of 12 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure NRC - S1

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S1 Rev 2 Page 2 of 12 Secure SDG from Control Room Revision Statements:

Rev 1 - Editorial changes per Chief Examiner comments.

Rev 2 - Editorial and format changes per Chief Examiner comments.

JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: SIM
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: RO / SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path: [ ] YES [X] NO ( Alternate Path denoted by )
5. Time Critical: [ ] YES [X] NO
6. Performance Time: 8 minutes
7. NRC K/A 264000 A4.04 (3.7/3.7)
8. Safety Function: 6, Electrical
9. Task No.: 264026P0101
10. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System - Emergency AC Power
11. Critical Steps denoted by Standard in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 2.2.99, Supplemental Diesel Generator System (Rev 7)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Set-Up IAW Attachment 2 Attachments:
1. Attachment 1 - N/A
2. Attachment 2 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet Handouts:
1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet
2. Section 14 of Procedure 2.2.99, Supplemental Diesel Generator System (Rev 7)

Task Standard:

Applicant transferred Bus 480S to the 12.5 kV system, opened SDG output breaker and stopped the SDG in accordance with Procedure 2.2.99, Supplemental Diesel Generator System.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S1 Rev 2 Page 3 of 12 Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicants ability to shut down the Supplemental Diesel Generator (SDG) from the control room and transfer bus 480S to the 12.5kV system.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1 and 2.
5. Brief the applicant, place the simulator in run, and tell the applicant to begin.

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S1 Rev 2 Page 4 of 12 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

Read the following to the JPM performer.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is shutdown following loss of electrical power SDG is powering Bus 4160S Emergency Transformer (ESST) has been restored to service and is supplying critical buses 1F and 1G 12.5kV system is available INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to secure the SDG from the Control Room per Procedure 2.2.99, Supplemental Diesel Generator System, Section 14.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S1 Rev 2 Page 5 of 12 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.2.99, Supplemental Diesel Generator System)
14. SECURING SDG FROM CONTROL ROOM 14.1 Ensure BUS 1S TIE BKR 1SS is in NORMAL AFTER TRIP (green flagged).

Standard Checked BUS 1S TIE BKR 1SS is in NORMAL AFTER TRIP (green flagged) position on switch and green light on.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 14. SECURING SDG FROM CONTROL ROOM 14.2 IF Bus 480S is powered from SDG, THEN transfer Bus 480S to 12.5 kV System using Switchgear Display screen:

14.2.1 Open Breaker 480S-(4160S) by pressing TRIP button twice.

Standard On SDG HMI, opened Breaker 480S-(4160S) by pressing Breaker 480S-(4160S) TRIP button twice.

Cue None Notes Flashing Green-Yellow Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S1 Rev 2 Page 6 of 12

3. Procedure Step 14. SECURING SDG FROM CONTROL ROOM 14.2 IF Bus 480S is powered from SDG, THEN transfer Bus 480S to 12.5 kV System using Switchgear Display screen:

14.2.2 Close Breaker 480S-(12.5) by pressing CLOSE button twice.

Standard On SDG HMI, closed Breaker 480S-(12.5) by pressing Breaker 480S-(12.5) CLOSE button twice.

Cue None Notes Flashing Red-Yellow Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 14. SECURING SDG FROM CONTROL ROOM 14.3 Open SDG OUTPUT BKR SG1 and check following:

14.3.1 Switch spring returns to NORMAL AFTER TRIP (green flagged).

Standard Rotated SDG OUTPUT BKR SG1 switch counter-clockwise to Trip position and released allowing it to spring return to NORMAL AFTER TRIP and checked switch indicator was green flagged.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S1 Rev 2 Page 7 of 12

5. Procedure Step 14. SECURING SDG FROM CONTROL ROOM 14.3 Open SDG OUTPUT BKR SG1 and check following:

14.3.2 4160V BUS 1S BUS ENERGIZED light goes out.

Standard Checked 4160V BUS 1S BUS ENERGIZED light goes out Cue None Notes On HMI, 4160S bus color turns green Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Time compression is allowed in JPM step 6.

6. Procedure Step 14. SECURING SDG FROM CONTROL ROOM 14.4 Ensure SDG has been unloaded 15 minutes.

Standard Proceeded to next step after informed that 15 minutes had elapsed.

Cue After applicant reads procedure step, inform 15 minutes has elapsed.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: SDG has a programmed auto cooldown of ~2 minutes. SDG stops after the cooldown is complete.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S1 Rev 2 Page 8 of 12

7. Procedure Step 14. SECURING SDG FROM CONTROL ROOM 14.5 Place SUPPLEMENTAL DIESEL GENERATOR switch to STOP.

Standard Rotated SUPPLEMENTAL DIESEL GENERATOR switch counter-clockwise to STOP position and released.

Cue None Notes Generator Energized light goes out. SDG red light stays lit until cooldown period is complete.

Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step 14. SECURING SDG FROM CONTROL ROOM 14.6 At SDG-LCP-GEN1, SDG GEN LOCAL CONTROL PANEL (SDG Engine Room), press ALARM SILENCE, if required.

Standard Directed operator in SDG Engine room to press Alarm Silence on local panel.

Cue NLO in SDG Engine Room reports Alarm on local panel has been acknowledged.

Notes JPM complete.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S1 Rev 2 Page 9 of 12 Examiner Follow-up Questions (JPM S1):

Q1: Is the SDG still running? [yes]

A1:

Q2: If answered yes, ask why? [programmed auto cooldown]

A2:

Q3: When will the SDG stop? [answer - approx.. 2 min]

A3:

Q4:

A4:

Q5:

A5:

Q6:

A6:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S1 Rev 2 Page 10 of 12 ATTACHMENT 1 Not Applicable

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S1 Rev 2 Page 11 of 12 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC 158 C. Run Batch File None D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Triggers None
2. Malfunctions
3. Remotes None N/A N/A
4. Overrides None N/A N/A
a. Insert Malfunction ED05 (Loss of SSST)
b. Insert Malfunctions DG06A and DG06B. (DGs fail to start)
c. Scram reactor.
d. Place Mode Switch in Shutdown.
5. Panel Setup
e. Ensure 4160V Bus 1F and 1G transfer to ESST.
f. Trip both DGs.
g. Start SDG and energize Bus 4160S per 2.2.99 (Section 5 and Section 8 through Step 8.6.4).

Note: If this JPM is to be performed more than once, take a SNAPSHOT after the panel setup is complete.

ATTACHMENT 3 DIRECTIONS TO APPLICANT:

Read the following and inform the Examiner when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is shutdown following a loss of electrical power SDG is powering Bus 4160S Emergency Transformer (ESST) has been restored to service and is supplying critical buses 1F and 1G 12.5kV system is available INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to secure the SDG from the Control Room per Procedure 2.2.99, Supplemental Diesel Generator System, Section 14.

JPM S1 (Rev 2)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 1 of 17 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure NRC - S2

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 2 of 17 Start Torus Cooling from ASD Room Revision Statements:

Rev 1 - Replaced original JPM Rev 2 - Removed requirement to maximize Torus cooling and made editorial changes per Chief Examiner comments (Rev 2).

Rev 3 - Format changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 4 - Updated step standards and cues, editorial and format changes per Chief Examiner comments JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: SIM
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: RO/SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path YES NO ( Alternate Path denoted by )
5. Time Critical: YES NO
6. Inside RCA: YES NO
7. Performance Time: 15 minutes
8. NRC K/A: 219000 A1.02 (3.5/3.5)
9. Safety Function: 5, Containment Integrity
10. Task No.: 344055P0503
11. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System - RHR/SPC
12. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown (Rev. 17)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator set up IAW Attachment 2 Attachments:
1. Attachment 1 - N/A
2. Attachment 2 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 3 of 17 Handouts:

1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet
2. Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown (Rev. 17)

Task Standard:

Applicant placed RHR Loop B in Torus Cooling at 4000-7000 gpm flow and closed RHR-MO-66B HX BYPASS VLV from the ASD panel IAW Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown, Section 9.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 4 of 17 Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to operate controls on the ASD panel to place RHR Loop B in Torus Cooling mode.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1 and 2.
5. Brief the applicant, place the simulator in run, and tell the applicant to begin.

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 5 of 17 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

Read the following to the Applicant.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Control Room has been evacuated due to toxic gas Control Room actions of 5.1ASD were completed prior to evacuation HPCI was operated from the ASD Panel INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to start torus cooling IAW Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown, , ASD Operator, Step 9.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 6 of 17 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: (Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown, Attachment 1, ASD Operator)
9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.1 Place all RHR ISOLATION switches in ISOL.

Standard At ASD Panel, placed RHR ISOLATION switches to ISOLATE for each of the following:

MO-34B MO-27B FLOW INDICATOR MO-66B MO-12B MO-13D MO-39B MO-15D MO-16B MO-65B Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 7 of 17

2. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.2 Ensure following valves closed:

9.2.1 RHR-MO-15D, PUMP D SDC SUCT VLV Standard Verified PUMP D SDC SUCT VLV MO 15D closed by observing green light on and red light off Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.2 Ensure following valves closed:

9.2.2 RHR-MO-16B, LOOP B MIN FLOW BYP VLV Standard Closed LOOP B MIN FLOW BYP VLV MO 16B by placing control switch to CLOSE, then releasing, and observed green light on, red light off Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 8 of 17

4. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.2 Ensure following valves closed:

9.2.3 RHR-MO-27B, OUTBD INJECTION VLV Standard Closed OUTBD INJECTION VLV MO 27B by placing control switch to CLOSE and holding until green light on and red light off, then released switch Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.2 Ensure following valves closed:

9.2.4 RHR-MO-34B, SUPPR POOL COOLING INBD THROTTLE VLV Standard Verified SUPPR POOL COOLING INBD THROTTLE VLV MO 34B closed by observing green light on and red light off Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 9 of 17

6. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.3 Ensure following valves open:

9.3.1 RHR-MO-13D, PUMP D TORUS SUCT VLV Standard Opened PUMP D TORUS SUCT VLV MO13D by placing control switch to OPEN, then releasing, and observed red light on, green light off Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.3 Ensure following valves open:

9.3.2 RHR-MO-12B, HX OUTLET VLV Standard Verified HX OUTLET VLV MO 12B open by observing red light on and green light off Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 10 of 17

8. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.3 Ensure following valves open:

9.3.3 RHR-MO-39B, SUPPR POOL COOLING/TORUS SPRAY OUTBD VLV Standard Opened SUPPR POOL COOLING / TORUS SPRAY OUTBD VLV MO 39B by placing control switch to OPEN and holding until red light on and green light off, then released switch Cue None Notes RHR-MO-39B stroke time is approx. 2 min.

Results SAT UNSAT

9. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.3 Ensure following valves open:

9.3.4 RHR-MO-65B, HX INLET VLV Standard Verified HX INLET VLV MO 65B open by observing red light on and green light off Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 11 of 17

10. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.3 Ensure following valves open:

9.3.5 RHR-MO-66B, HX BYPASS VLV Standard Verified HX BYPASS VLV MO 66B open by observing red light on and green light off Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

11. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.4 Direct Reactor Building Operator to open SW-MO-89B per Attachment 5, Step 3.

Standard Directed Reactor Building Operator to open SW-MO-89B per Attachment 5, Step 3 via radio, phone, or paging system Cue As RB Operator, report SW-MO-89B is positioned for SW Booster pump start IAW 5.1ASD Attachment 5, Step 3.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 12 of 17

12. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.5 WHEN SW-MO-89B is opened off its seat, THEN direct Control Building Operator to start SWB Pump B or D per Attachment 2, Step 5.

Standard Directed Control Building Operator to start SWB Pump B or D per 5.1ASD Attachment 2, Step 5 via radio, phone, or paging system Cue As CB Operator, report RHRSWB Pump B has been started per 5.1ASD Attachment 2, Step 5.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

13. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

CAUTION prior to Step 9.6 CAUTION - Step 9.7 must be performed within 10 seconds after Step 9.6 to prevent RHR pump overheating.

Standard Applicant reviewed caution Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Direct Booth Operator to insert trigger 2 to start RHR Pump D when requested by the applicant in JPM step 14.

Applicant must begin JPM step 16 within 10 seconds of acknowledging cue provided in JPM step 14.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 13 of 17

14. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.6 Direct Control Building Operator to start RHR Pump D per Attachment 2, Step 5.

Standard Directed Control Building Operator to start RHR Pump D per Attachment 2, Step 5 via radio, phone, or paging system.

Cue As CB Operator report RHR Pump D has been started per 5.1ASD Attachment 2, step 5.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

15. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

NOTE prior to Step 9.7 NOTE - RHR pump operation at minimum flow should be limited to < 15 minutes or pump damage may result.

Standard Applicant reviewed note.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 14 of 17

16. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.7 Throttle open RHR-MO-34B to raise flow > 2500 gpm on RHR-FI-1133B Standard Within 10 seconds of acknowledging cue in JPM step 14, throttled opened RHR-MO-34B, SUPPR POOL COOLING INBD THROTTLE VLV, by placing control switch to OPEN and holding until flow indicated on RHR-FI-1133B, RHR B FLOW, was 2500-3500 gpm, then released switch.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

17. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.8 Direct Control Building Operator to monitor RHR Pump D motor amps as RHR-MO-34B is throttled open to maintain < 157 amps.

Standard Directed Control Building Operator to monitor RHR Pump D motor amps as RHR-MO-34B is throttled open to maintain

< 157 amps via radio, phone, or paging system.

Cue Control Bldg Operator acknowledges direction to monitor RHR Pump D motor amps Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 15 of 17

18. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.9 Raise RHR flow to between 4000 and 7000 gpm on RHR-FI-1133B Standard Throttled opened RHR-MO-34B, SUPPR POOL COOLING INBD THROTTLE VLV, by placing control switch to OPEN and holding until flow indicated on RHR-FI-1133B, RHR B FLOW, was 4000-7000 gpm, then released switch.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: There is no minimum requirement for closing RHR-MO-66B in JPM step 19. Valve must only be closed enough to cause green light to come on, or it may be closed to any position, including fully closed.

19. Procedure Step: 9. Start torus cooling by performing following:

9.10 Throttle RHR-MO-66B to adjust cooldown rate of suppression pool.

Standard Closed RHR-MO-66B, HX BYPASS VLV, by placing control switch to CLOSE and holding until green light on, then released switch.

Cue None Notes JPM Complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S2 Rev 4 Page 16 of 17 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC IC-161 C. Run Batch File None D. Change the simulator conditions Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial as follows:

1. Triggers None
2. Malfunctions N/A N/A
3. Remotes RHR Pump 1D Rh36 4160V breaker 2 CLOSE manual control
4. Overrides N/A N/A
a. Open an SRV until Torus temperature is above 95 F
b. Close the SRV.
5. Panel Setup
c. A manual scram may be inserted if required by another JPM that is to be run in parallel.

Note: If this JPM is to be performed more than once, take a SNAPSHOT after the panel setup is complete.

ATTACHMENT 3 DIRECTIONS TO APPLICANT:

Read the following and inform the Examiner when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Control Room has been evacuated due to toxic gas Control Room actions of 5.1ASD were completed prior to evacuation HPCI was operated from the ASD Panel INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to start torus cooling IAW Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown, , ASD Operator, Step 9.

JPM S2 (Rev 4)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 1 of 18 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure NRC - S3

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 2 of 18 Conduct Alternate Pressure Control Using Reactor Feed Pumps Revision Statements:

Rev 1 - Editorial changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 2 - Format changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 3 - Revised step Standards, Examiner Cues and Notes; format changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 4 Added Examiner cue to JPM step 22 JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: SIM
2. Appropriate applicant level: RO / SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path YES NO ( Alternate Path denoted by )
5. Time Critical: YES NO
6. Inside RCA: YES NO
7. Performance Time: 15 minutes
8. NRC K/A: 259001 A4.02 (3.9/3.7)
9. Safety Function: 3, Reactor Pressure Control
10. Task No.: 200177A0501
11. PSA Applicability: N/A
12. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 5.8.1, RPV Pressure Control Systems (Table 1) (Rev 28)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator set up IAW Attachment 2 Attachments:
1. Attachment 1 - N/A
2. Attachment 2 - Simulator Set-up Instructions
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 3 of 18 Handouts:

1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet
2. Procedure 5.8.1, RPV Pressure Control Systems (Table 1) (Rev 28), Sections 1-3 and 8 Task Standard:

The applicant reset RFPT A trip, performed a QUICK RESTART, and raised RFPT A speed to lower RPV pressure 10-20 psig in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedure 5.8.1, RPV Pressure Control Systems (Table 1).

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 4 of 18 Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to conduct alternate pressure control using a Reactor Feed Pump.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1 and 2.
5. Brief the applicant, place the simulator in run, and tell the applicant to begin.

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 5 of 18 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

Read the following to the Applicant.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant had been operating at 100% on day 90 of a 2 year cycle Main Turbine tripped followed by a Reactor scram RFP A was tripped IAW Procedure 2.1.5 actions RFP B was tripped later due to a steam leak EOPs have been entered There are NO known issues with RFPT 1A turning gear RFPT 1A has NOT been stationary INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to conduct Alternate Pressure Control using Reactor Feed Pump A IAW Procedure 5.8.1, RPV Pressure Control Systems (Table 1), Section 8. Maintain RPV pressure 500-700 psig.

Another operator will manage RPV water level.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 6 of 18 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: (Procedure 5.8.1 RPV Pressure Control Systems (Table 1)
8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A NOTE prior to Step 8.1 NOTE - FAST button may be used with UP/DOWN arrows to change OUTPUT faster Standard Applicant reviewed note.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.1 Ensure RF-MO-29, RFP A DISCHARGE VLV, is closed (PANEL A).

Standard Verified RF-MO-29 green indicating light ON and red indicating light OFF.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 7 of 18

3. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.2 Ensure RF-MO-30, RFP B DISCHARGE VLV, is closed (PANEL A).

Standard Verified RF-MO-30 green indicating light ON and red indicating light OFF.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.3 At RFPT/RVLC HMI on MAIN CONTROL screen, ensure RFPT-1A controller is in MDVP with OUTPUT at 0.0%

Standard At RFPT/RVLC HMI, selected MAIN CONTROL screen, verified RFPT-1A controller in MDVP with OUTPUT at 0.0%.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 8 of 18

5. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.4 At a RFPT/RVLC HMI, select STARTUP VALVE screen.

Standard At a RFPT/RVLC HMI, selected STARTUP VALVE screen.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.5 On STARTUP VALVE screen, press EMER CLOSE button on either FCV-11AA or FCV-11BB and confirm 'YES' to pop-up box.

Standard Selected STARTUP VALVE screen; pressed EMER CLOSE button on either FCV-11AA or FCV-11BB and selected YES to pop-up box.

Cue None Notes EMER CLOSE boxes for both FCV-11AA and FCV-11BB turn yellow.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 9 of 18

7. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.6 Ensure Feedwater Startup Flow Controllers FCV-11AA and FCV-11BB OUTPUTs are at 0.0%.

Standard Verified FCV-11AA and FCV-11BB OUTPUT indicating 0.0%

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.7 On STARTUP VALVE screen, press EMER CLOSE button on either FCV-11AA or FCV-11BB and confirm

'YES' to pop-up box.

Standard Selected STARTUP VALVE screen; pressed EMER CLOSE button on either FCV-11AA or FCV-11BB and selected YES to pop-up box.

Cue None Notes EMER CLOSE boxes for both FCV-11AA and FCV-11BB turn green. Emergency close signal is removed with this step in case RPV injection is desired.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 10 of 18

9. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A CAUTION prior to step 8.8 CAUTION - Turbine damage may result if RFPT is stationary > 15 minutes.

Standard Applicant reviewed caution.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.8 IF known that RFPT 'A' turning gear might not automatically disengage, THEN perform following:

Standard Applicant determined steps 8.8.1 - 8.8.4 not applicable (due to NO known deficiency with turning gear as stated in Initial Conditions).

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 11 of 18

11. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A WARNING prior to step 8.9 WARNING - If RFPT speed increases following trip reset and turning gear is not disengaged, severe damage and personnel injury could result.

Standard Applicant reviewed warning.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

12. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.9 WHILE performing Steps 8.10 through 8.12.3, IF RFPT A speed starts to rise and turning gear does not disengage, THEN perform following:

Standard Applicant determined steps 8.9.1 - 8.9.3 were not required when RFPT A speed was raised.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 12 of 18

13. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.10 Depress RFPT A trip RESET button until RFPT A HP and LP STOP valves are open (PANEL A).

Standard On bench board A, depressed RFPT A RESET pushbutton. Verified RFPT A HP and LP STOP valve indicating lights are: red light illuminated and green light extinguished, then released pushbutton.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

14. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A CAUTION prior to step 8.10.1 CAUTION - Using overspeed TRIP BLOCK and overspeed TRIP RESET buttons to reset RFPT A trip bypasses normal reset circuit.

Standard Applicant reviewed caution.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 13 of 18

15. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.10.1 IF RFPT A did not reset, THEN press and hold following buttons until HP and LP STOP valves are open:

Standard Applicant determined steps 8.10.1.1 and 8.10.1.2 were not applicable since RFPT A was reset in step 8.10.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

16. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.11 Verify that minimum flow valve RF-FCV-11A is open.

Standard On bench board A, verified RF-FCV-11A red light illuminated and green light extinguished.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 14 of 18

17. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.12 On FEEDPUMP 1A screen, select QUICK RESTART.

Standard Selected FEEDPUMP 1A screen and selected QUICK RESTART. Verified QUICK RESTART box turned yellow.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

18. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.12.1 IF LP steam is available, THEN select LP START; otherwise, select HP START.

Standard Pressed HP START box and verified box turned yellow.

Cue None Notes LP steam is not available Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 15 of 18

19. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.12.2 Press green START button in TURBINE LATCH box.

Standard Pressed green START button in turbine latch box.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

20. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.12.3 Confirm starting turbine by pressing START button in pop-up box.

Standard Pressed green START button in pop-up box.

Cue None Notes Display cycles through ACCELERATE TO IDLE and ends at MINIMUM GOVERNOR. At ~ 2000 rpm, CONTINUE box turns green.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 16 of 18

21. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.12.4 WHEN RFPT-1A reaches MINIMUM GOVERNOR TARGET SPEED, THEN press green CONTINUE button.

Standard Pressed green CONTINUE button.

Cue Notes None Results SAT UNSAT

22. Procedure Step: 8. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE A 8.13 Control RFPT-1A speed using UP/DOWN arrows or using SPEED TARGET SETPOINT to control reactor pressure.

Standard Used UP/DOWN to raise speed to reduce RPV pressure 10-20 psig.

Cue If necessary, as CRS, direct applicant to lower RPV pressure by 30 psig.

Notes JPM Complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S3 Rev 4 Page 17 of 18 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC 157 C. Run Batch File None D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Triggers None
2. Malfunctions N/A N/A
3. Remotes None N/A N/A
4. Overrides None N/A N/A
a. Place Simulator in RUN.
b. Trip main turbine.
c. Scram Rx.
d. Place Mode switch to SHUTDOWN
5. Panel Setup
e. Trip both feed pumps.
f. Ensure 1 Condensate Booster and 1 Condensate pump running.
g. Ensure RPV level between 15 and 35 inches.

Note: If this JPM is to be performed more than once, take a SNAPSHOT after the panel setup is complete.

ATTACHMENT 3 DIRECTIONS TO APPLICANT:

Read the following and inform the Examiner when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant had been operating at 100% on day 90 of a 2 year cycle Main Turbine tripped followed by a reactor scram RFP A was tripped IAW Procedure 2.1.5 actions RFP B was tripped later due to a steam leak EOPs have been entered There are NO known issues with RFPT 1A turning gear RFPT 1A has NOT been stationary INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to conduct Alternate Pressure Control using Reactor Feed Pump A IAW Procedure 5.8.1, RPV Pressure Control Systems (Table 1), Section 8. Maintain RPV pressure 500-700 psig.

Another operator will manage RPV water level.

JPM S3 (Rev 4)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S4 Rev 3 Page 1 of 13 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure NRC - S4

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S4 Rev 3 Page 2 of 13 Level Recovery During Shutdown Conditions Using LPCI ALTERNATE PATH Revision Statement:

Rev 1 - Editorial changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 2 - Format changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 3 - Revised step Standards, Examiner Cues and Notes; format changes per Chief Examiner comments JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: SIM
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: RO / SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path: [X] YES [ ] NO ( Alternate Path denoted by )
5. Time Critical: [ ] YES [X] NO
6. Performance Time: 10 minutes
7. NRC K/A 203000 A4.05 (4.3/4.1)
8. Safety Function: 2, Reactor Water Inventory Control
9. Task No.: 203025P0101
10. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System RHR
11. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 2.2.69.1, RHR LPCI Mode, Attachment 1, RHR Systems Operation Hard Card (Rev 30)
2. EOP-1A, RPV Control (Rev 20)
3. Procedure xxxxx, Conduct of Operations (Rev xx)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator set up IAW Attachment 2 Attachments:
1. Attachment 1 - N/A
2. Attachment 2 - Simulator Setup Instructions
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S4 Rev 3 Page 3 of 13 Handouts:

1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet
2. Procedure 2.2.69.1, RHR LPCI Mode, Attachment 1, RHR Systems Operation Hard Card (Rev 30)

Task Standard:

The applicant reset the RHR injection valve isolation for RHR-MO-25A and RHR-MO-25B and attempted to open RHR-MO-25A, and then opened RHR-MO-25B, started RHR Pump B or D, and raised RPV water level to +10 to +30 inches narrow range in accordance with Procedure 2.2.69.1, RHR LPCI Mode, Attachment 1, RHR Systems Operation Hard Card.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S4 Rev 3 Page 4 of 13 Directions to Examiner:

THIS IS AN ALTERNATE PATH JPM. RHR injection valve MO-25A will fail to open, requiring the applicant to transition to RHR Loop B.

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to recover RPV level using the LPCI Mode of RHR after a Shutdown Cooling isolation.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1 and 2.
5. Brief the applicant, place the simulator in run, and tell the applicant to begin.

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S4 Rev 3 Page 5 of 13 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

Read the following to the JPM performer.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is in cold shutdown Level dropped to approximately -50 inches on Fuel Zone indicators NBI-LI-91A and NBI-LI-91B before a valve lineup error was corrected RHR Loops A and B are in LPCI standby lineup with suction from the Torus INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to raise RPV water level to +10 to +30 inches Narrow Range using RHR Loop A per Procedure 2.2.69.1, RHR LPCI Mode, Attachment 1, RHR Systems Operation Hard Card.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S4 Rev 3 Page 6 of 13 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.2.69.1, RHR LPCI Mode, Attachment 1, RHR Systems Operations Hard Card)
1. RHR INJECTION WITH RHR PUMPS 1.1 Ensure RR-MO-53A is closed.

Standard Verified green light ON and red light OFF for RR-MO-53A, PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE on Panel 9-4 Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 1. RHR INJECTION WITH RHR PUMPS 1.2 Ensure PCIS Group 2 SDC RHR-MO-25A(B) isolation reset by pressing:

1.2.1 SDC ISOL RESET VLV 25A Standard Depressed SDC ISOL RESET VLV 25A push-button on Panel 9-3.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: JPM step 3 allows operation of RHR-MO-25B. It may be performed prior to JPM step 4, or it may not be performed until just before JPM step 7.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S4 Rev 3 Page 7 of 13

3. Procedure Step 1. RHR INJECTION WITH RHR PUMPS 1.2 Ensure PCIS Group 2 SDC RHR-MO-25A(B) isolation reset by pressing:

1.2.2 SDC ISOL RESET VLV 25B Standard Depressed SDC ISOL RESET VLV 25B push-button on Panel 9-3.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 1. RHR INJECTION WITH RHR PUMPS 1.3 Ensure RHR-MO-25A is open.

Standard Momentarily placed control switch for RHR-MO-25A, INBD INJECTION VLV to OPEN. Determined valve will not open. Green light ON, red light OFF on Panel 9-3.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step N/A.

Standard Reported RHR-MO-25A will not open to CRS.

Cue CRS acknowledges report.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S4 Rev 3 Page 8 of 13

6. Procedure Step 1. RHR INJECTION WITH RHR PUMPS 1.1 Ensure RR-MO-53B is closed.

Standard Verified green light ON and red light OFF for RR-MO-53B, PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE on Panel 9-4 Cue None Notes This is where Alternate Path begins. Applicant returns to step 1.1 of Hard Card for RHR Loop B.

Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step 1. RHR INJECTION WITH RHR PUMPS 1.3 Ensure RHR-MO-25B is open.

Standard Momentarily placed control switch for RHR-MO-25B, INBD INJECTION VLV to OPEN. Verified red light ON, green light OFF on Panel 9-3.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S4 Rev 3 Page 9 of 13

8. Procedure Step 1. RHR INJECTION WITH RHR PUMPS 1.4 Start RHR pump(s).

Standard Placed control switch for RHR Pump B or D to START.

Verified pump started, red light ON, green light OFF on Panel 9-3.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

9. Procedure Step 1. RHR INJECTION WITH RHR PUMPS NOTE prior to step 1.5 NOTE - RHR pump operation at minimum flow should be limited to < 15 minutes or pump damage may result.

Standard Applicant reviewed note.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S4 Rev 3 Page 10 of 13

10. Procedure Step 1. RHR INJECTION WITH RHR PUMPS 1.5 Throttle RHR-MO-27B, as required.

Standard Rotated control switch for RHR-MO-27B, B OUTBD INJECTION VLV, counter-clockwise to CLOSE, clockwise to OPEN to establish system flow at desired value on RHR-FI-133A(B) on Panel 9-3.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

11. Procedure Step 1. RHR INJECTION WITH RHR PUMPS 1.6 IF RHR HX COOLING required, THEN perform following:

Standard Applicant determined RHR used for injection only, therefore cooling was not required and step was N/A Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S4 Rev 3 Page 11 of 13

12. Procedure Step 1. RHR INJECTION WITH RHR PUMPS 1.7 If PCIS Group 6 lights lit on Panel 9-5, THEN ensure one of the following open:

1.7.1 REC-MO-711; or 1.7.2 REC-MO-714 Standard Applicant determined Group 6 PCIS lights were NOT lit on Panel 9-5, therefore steps 1.7.1 - 1.7.2 were N/A.

Cue None Notes Group 6 PCIS lights NOT lit indicates Group 6 signal present.

REC-MO-711 or REC-MO-714 automatically open, depending on which REC HX is in service, upon a Group 6 signal; therefore, operator action is not needed and steps are N/A.

Results SAT UNSAT

13. Procedure Step N/A Standard Informed the CRS RPV level was restored +10 to +30 inches narrow range using RHR Loop B.

Cue None Notes When level +10-30 inches narrow range, and under applicant control, JPM complete.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S4 Rev 3 Page 12 of 13 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC 158 C. Run Batch File None D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Triggers zdirhrsws8a[2]==1 3

dmf rh04b zdirhrsws8b[2]==1 4

dmf rh04a

2. Malfunctions N/A
3. Remotes None N/A N/A
4. Overrides None RHR-MO-25B an:p1255 OFF Valve overload RHR-MO-25A an:p1134 OFF Valve overload
a. At VBD-M, ensure REC-MO-711 or REC-MO-714, associated with the in-service REC HX is open.
5. Panel Setup b. Place Simulator in RUN and insert RR20A and RR20B at 100%.
c. Allow RPV water level to lower to ~ -50 inches on NBI-LI-91A (takes approximately 10 minutes), then remove the malfunctions.

Note: If this JPM is to be performed more than once, take a SNAPSHOT after the panel setup is complete.

ATTACHMENT 3 DIRECTIONS TO APPLICANT:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant is in cold shutdown Level dropped to approximately -50 inches on Fuel Zone indicators NBI-LI-91A and NBI-LI-91B before a valve lineup error was corrected RHR Loops A and B are in LPCI standby lineup with suction from the Torus INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to raise RPV water level to +10 to +30 inches Narrow Range using RHR Loop A per Procedure 2.2.69.1, RHR LPCI Mode, Attachment 1, RHR Systems Operation Hard Card.

JPM S4 (Rev 3)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 1 of 16 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure NRC - S5

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 2 of 16 Perform 6.TG.303 Testing OPC Overspeed Revision Statement:

Rev 1 - Editorial changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 2 - Format changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 3 - Updated step standards and cues, editorial and format changes per Chief Examiner comments JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: SIM
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: RO / SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path YES NO ( Alternate Path denoted by )
5. Time Critical: YES NO
6. Inside RCA: YES NO
7. Performance Time: 10 minutes
8. NRC K/A: 245000 A3.05 (3.0/3.1); 241000 A4.19 (3.5/3.4)
9. Safety Function: 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core
10. Task No.: 248016O0101
11. PSA Applicability: N/A
12. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 6.TG.303, Main Turbine Overspeed Trip Test (Rev 8)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator set up IAW Attachment 2 Attachments:
1. Attachment 1 - N/A
2. Attachment 2 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet Handouts:
1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet
2. Section 5 of Procedure 6.TG.303, Main Turbine Overspeed Trip Test (Rev 8)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 3 of 16 Task Standard:

The applicant enabled OPC 20-1 and OPC 20-2 test on DEH HMI and selected OPC 20-1 and 20-2 test in accordance with Surveillance Procedure 6.TG.303, Main Turbine Overspeed Trip Test.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 4 of 16 Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to perform OPC 20-1 and OPC 20-2 overspeed test surveillance.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1 and 2.
5. Brief the applicant, place the simulator in run, and tell the applicant to begin.

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 5 of 16 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

Read the following to the Applicant.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant startup is in progress Main turbine is operating at 1800 rpm Main generator is not in service INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to perform turbine overspeed testing per Surveillance Procedure 6.TG.303, Main Turbine Overspeed Trip Test, Section 5. Another operator will perform the Restoration and Acceptance Criteria Sections.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 6 of 16 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 6.TG.303, Main Turbine Overspeed Trip Test)
5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED NOTE prior to step NOTE 1 - Annunciators 9-5-2/C-2, TURBINE STOP VALVE CLOSURE TRIP, and 9-5-2/C-3, TURBINE CONTROL VALVE FAST CLOSURE TRIP, will alarm and clear during trip testing.

Standard Applicant reviewed note.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED NOTE prior to step NOTE 2 - A governor valve is considered closed even if it indicated < 2% after being driven closed; this is due to variances in the LVDT outputs.

Standard Applicant reviewed note.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 7 of 16

3. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED NOTE prior to step NOTE 3 - Valve actuations occur in rapid sequence and require close observation.

Standard Applicant reviewed note.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.1 Test OPC 20-1 by performing following:

5.1.1 On OPC/OS TEST screen, OPC control, push TEST ENABLE button.

Standard Ensured Group 2 selected. Selected OPC/OS TEST Screen and pushed TEST ENABLE button.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 8 of 16

5. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.1 Test OPC 20-1 by performing following:

5.1.2 Push YES to enable OPC TEST.

Standard Pushed YES on Enable OPC TEST pop up Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.1 Test OPC 20-1 by performing following:

5.1.3 Select OPC 20-1 TEST.

Standard Selected OPS 20-1 TEST Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.1 Test OPC 20-1 by performing following:

5.1.4 Push YES to enact OPC 20-1 TEST.

Standard Pushed YES on TEST OPC 20-1 popup Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 9 of 16

8. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.1 Test OPC 20-1 by performing following:

5.1.5 Monitor turbine speed lowering, and governor valves and intercept valves closing.

Standard Selected Group 1 and Main Display and monitored turbine speed and governor valves and intercept valves changing.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

9. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.1 Test OPC 20-1 by performing following:

5.1.6 AC Check governor (< 2%) and interceptor valves close.

Standard Checked governor valves <2% open and interceptor valves closed.

Cue None Notes AC denotes acceptance criteria Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 10 of 16

10. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.1 Test OPC 20-1 by performing following:

5.1.7 Monitor turbine speed returning to 1800 rpm and OPC 20-1 TEST button returning to shadow condition.

Standard Selected Group 2 and OPC/OS TEST Screen and monitored turbine speed returning to 1800 rpm and OPT 20-1 TEST button returning to shadow condition.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

11. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.1 Test OPC 20-1 by performing following:

5.1.8 Verify TEST ENABLE no longer backlit yellow.

Standard Observed TEST ENABLE yellow backlight extinguishes Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 11 of 16

12. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.2 Test OPC 20-2 by performing following:

5.2.1 On OPC/OS TEST screen, OPC control, push TEST ENABLE button.

Standard Ensured Group 2 selected. Selected OPC/OS TEST Screen and pushed TEST ENABLE button.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

13. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.2 Test OPC 20-2 by performing following:

5.2.2 Push YES to enable OPC TEST.

Standard Pushed YES on Enable OPC TEST pop up Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 12 of 16

14. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.2 Test OPC 20-2 by performing following:

5.2.3 Select OPC 20-2 TEST.

Standard Selected OPS 20-2 TEST Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

15. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.2 Test OPC 20-2 by performing following:

5.2.4 Push YES to enact OPC 20-2 TEST.

Standard Pushed YES on TEST OPC 20-2 popup Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 13 of 16

16. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.2 Test OPC 20-2 by performing following:

5.2.5 Monitor turbine speed lowering, and governor valves and intercept valves closing.

Standard Selected Group 1 and Main Display and monitored turbine speed and governor valves and intercept valves changing.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

17. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.2 Test OPC 20-2 by performing following:

5.2.6 AC Check governor (< 2%) and interceptor valves close.

Standard Checked governor valves <2% open and interceptor valves closed.

Cue None Notes AC denotes acceptance criteria Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 14 of 16

18. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.2 Test OPC 20-2 by performing following:

5.2.7 Monitor turbine speed returning to 1800 rpm and OPC 20-2 TEST button returning to shadow condition.

Standard Selected Group 2 and OPC/OS TEST Screen and monitored turbine speed returning to 1800 rpm and OPC 20-2 TEST button returning to shadow condition.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

19. Procedure Step 5. TESTING OPC OVERSPEED 5.2 Test OPC 20-2 by performing following:

5.2.8 Verify TEST ENABLE no longer backlit yellow.

Standard Observed TEST ENABLE yellow backlight extinguishes.

Cue None Notes JPM complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S5 Rev 3 Page 15 of 16 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC 160 C. Run Batch File None D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Triggers None
2. Malfunctions N/A
3. Remotes None N/A N/A
4. Overrides None N/A N/A
a. Mark up 6.TG.303 with signatures giving permission to
5. Panel Setup perform surveillance.

Note: If this JPM is to be performed more than once, take a SNAPSHOT after the panel setup is complete.

ATTACHMENT 3 DIRECTIONS TO APPLICANT:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant startup is in progress Main turbine is operating at 1800 rpm Main generator is not in service INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to perform turbine overspeed testing per Surveillance Procedure 6.TG.303, Main Turbine Overspeed Trip Test, Section 5. Another operator will perform the Restoration and Acceptance Criteria Sections.

JPM S5 (Rev 3)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S6 Rev 4 Page 1 of 15 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure NRC - S6

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S6 Rev 4 Page 2 of 15 Align REC System IAW 5.3EMPWR Revision Statements:

Rev 1 - Replaced JPM per Chief Examiner comments.

Rev 2 - Editorial changes per Chief Examiner comments.

Rev 3 - Editorial and format changes per Chief Examiner comments.

JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: SIM
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: RO/SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path: [ ] YES [X] NO ( Alternate Path denoted by )
5. Time Critical: [ ] YES [X] NO
6. Performance Time: 15 minutes
7. NRC K/A 400000 A4.01 (3.1/3.0)
8. Safety Function: 8, Plant Service Systems
9. Task No.: 208018C0101
10. PSA Applicability: N/A
11. Critical Steps denoted by Standard in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 5.3EMPWR, Emergency Power During Modes 1, 2, or 3 (Rev 65)
2. Procedure 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations (Rev 92)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Set-Up IAW Attachment 2 Attachments:
1. Attachment 1 - N/A
2. Attachment 2 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet Handouts:
1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet
2. Section 4 of Procedure 5.3EMPWR, Emergency Power During Modes 1, 2, or 3 (Rev. 65)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S6 Rev 4 Page 3 of 15 Task Standard:

Applicant isolated REC to RRMG Sets and RWCU Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger and aligned REC to supply the REC Non-Critical Header with REC-MO-713 HX B OULET VLV fully open and REC HEADER PRESSURE established in the green band of REC-PI-452 with DRYWELL REC ISOL VALVE CONTROL in AUTO IAW Procedure 5.3EMPWR Section 4, Subsequent Operator Actions.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S6 Rev 4 Page 4 of 15 Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to align REC following loss of NSST and SSST IAW 5.3EMPWR.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1 and 2.
5. Brief the applicant, place the simulator in run, and tell the applicant to begin.

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S6 Rev 4 Page 5 of 15 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

Read the following to the JPM performer.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

5.3EMPWR has been entered 5.3EMPWR subsequent actions up to Step 4.3 are complete REC Heat Exchanger B was in service prior to 5.3EMPWR entry INITIATING CUE:

CRS directs you to align REC IAW 5.3EMPWR, Section 4, Subsequent Operator Actions.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S6 Rev 4 Page 6 of 15 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (5.3EMPWR, Emergency Power During Modes 1, 2, OR 3)
4. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.1 Record current time and date.

4.2 IF Emergency DG(s) running without SW flow, THEN perform one of the following:

Standard Applicant determined steps were completed by observing steps already circled and slashed on handout.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S6 Rev 4 Page 7 of 15

2. Procedure Step 4. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.3 IF REC System has isolated, THEN perform following:

4.3.1 Ensure two REC pumps are running.

Standard Determined the REC system had isolated by observing the following valves closed, green light on and red light off on VBD-M:

REC-MO-700, NON-CRITICAL HEADER SUPPLY REC-MO-702, DRYWELL SUPPLY ISOLATION REC-MO-1329, AUGMENTED RADWSTE SUPPLY REC-MO-712, HX A OUTLET VLV REC-MO-713, HX B OUTLET VLV Determined the actions of this step were applicable.

Determined that two REC pumps were running by observing red light on, green light off for REC Pumps A and D.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S6 Rev 4 Page 8 of 15

3. Procedure Step 4. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.3 IF REC System has isolated, THEN perform following:

4.3.1 Ensure two REC pumps are running.

CAUTION prior to Step 4.3.2 CAUTION - Restoring REC flow to Drywell FCUs with Drywell temperature > 260F could result in a breach of FCU tubing.

Standard Applicant reviewed CAUTION and checked drywell temperatures on various indicators on VBD-H below 260F.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 4. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.3 IF REC System has isolated, THEN perform following:

4.3.2 Place DRYWELL REC ISOL VALVE CONTROL switch to OPEN (perform regardless of power loss)

Standard Placed DRYWELL REC ISOL VALVE CONTROL switch clockwise to OPEN, then released. Checked REC-MO-702 opened by red light on, green light off.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: REC pressure is adjusted to green band (65-85 psig) in JPM Steps 5, 7, and 10. Need >60 psig on REC-PI-452 to prevent REC isolation when JPM Step 12 is performed.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S6 Rev 4 Page 9 of 15

5. Procedure Step 4. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.3 IF REC System has isolated, THEN perform following:

4.3.3 Throttle open REC HX outlet valve for a HX that was in service to maintain REC-PI-452, REC HEADER PRESSURE, in green band.

(N/A) 4.3.3.1 REC-MO-712, HX A OUTLET VLV; or 4.3.3.2 REC-MO-713, HX B OUTLET VLV.

Standard Determined from Initial Conditions that REC HX B was in service previously, then throttled open REC-MO-713, HX B OUTLET VLV, by turning control switch clockwise to OPEN until pressure indicated on REC-PI-452 was in the green band (65-85 psig), then released switch. Checked red light on for REC-MO-713.

Cue None Notes REC HX B identified as in service prior to 5.3EMPWR entry in the Initial Conditions Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: For next JPM step, applicant may elect to start a third REC pump (B or C) now for added margin in REC header pressure, or they may elect to start a third pump later. Final required conditions (REC pressure in green band with non-critical loop being supplied) may be achieved with either 2 or 3 pumps in operation.

It is expected the applicant will start REC Pump C since power is available and HX B is in service.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S6 Rev 4 Page 10 of 15

6. Procedure Step 4. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.3 IF REC System has isolated, THEN perform following:

4.3.4 Start third REC pump, if necessary.

Standard If Applicant determined starting a third pump is necessary, then started REC Pump B or C by placing the respective control switch clockwise to START and observed respective red light on and green light off.

Cue None Notes Since final required conditions (as detailed in Task Standard) can be achieved with only 2 REC pumps running, this step is not critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step 4. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.3 IF REC System has isolated, THEN perform following:

4.3.5 Throttle open REC HX outlet valve to maintain REC HEADER PRESSURE in top of green band.

(N/A) 4.3.5.1 REC-MO-712, HX A OUTLET VLV; or 4.3.5.2 REC-MO-713, HX B OUTLET VLV.

Standard Throttled open REC-MO-713, HX B OUTLET VLV, by placing control switch clockwise to OPEN until pressure indicated on REC-PI-452 was 75-85 psig, then released switch.

Cue None Notes This adjustment of REC HEADER PRESSURE is to put it high in the green band, whereas Step 4.3.3 (JPM Step 5) was just in the green band. Green band is defined as 65-85 psig, and high in green band is 75-85 psig.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S6 Rev 4 Page 11 of 15

8. Procedure Step 4. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.3 IF REC System has isolated, THEN perform following:

4.3.6 Ensure following valves are closed:

4.3.6.1 REC-AO-701, RRMG SET OIL HX INLET.

Standard Closed REC-AO-701, RRMG SET OIL HX INLET, by placing control switch to CLOSE, then releasing, and observed green light on, red light off.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

9. Procedure Step 4. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.3 IF REC System has isolated, THEN perform following:

4.3.6 Ensure following valves are closed:

4.3.6.2 REC-AO-710, RWCU NON-REGEN HX INLET.

Standard Closed REC-AO-710, RWCU NON-REGEN HX INLET, by placing control switch to close, then releasing, and observed green light on, red light off.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: For next JPM step, two-handed operation is authorized by procedure 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations, Step 7.5.6.1.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S6 Rev 4 Page 12 of 15

10. Procedure Step 4. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.3 IF REC System has isolated, THEN perform following:

4.3.7 Perform following concurrently:

4.3.7.1 Open REC-MO-700, NON-CRITICAL HEADER SUPPLY 4.3.7.2 Continue throttling open REC HX outlet valve to maintain REC HEADER PRESSURE in green band (N/A) a. REC-MO-712, HX A OUTLET VLV; or

b. REC-MO-713, HX B OUTLET VLV.

Standard Opened REC-MO-700, NON-CRITICAL HEADER SUPPLY, by placing control switch clockwise to OPEN, then releasing, and observed red light illuminated.

Throttled open REC-MO-713, HX B OUTLET VLV, by intermittently or continuously placing control switch clockwise to OPEN, as necessary, to maintain REC HEADER PRESSURE indicated on REC-PI-452 in green band, until REC-MO-700 was OPEN, then released REC-MO-713 control switch.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S6 Rev 4 Page 13 of 15

11. Procedure Step 4. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.3 IF REC System has isolated, THEN perform following:

4.3.8 Ensure REC HX outlet valve full open.

(N/A) 4.3.3.1 REC-MO-712, HX A OUTLET VLV; or 4.3.3.2 REC-MO-713, HX B OUTLET VLV.

Standard Opened REC-MO-713, HX B OUTLET VLV, by placing control switch clockwise to OPEN, then released control switch. Observed red light on, green light off.

Cue None Notes REC-MO-713 was throttled open in previous JPM step; this step is to ensure it is full open.

Results SAT UNSAT

12. Procedure Step 4. SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 4.3 IF REC System has isolated, THEN perform following:

4.3.9 Place DRYWELL REC ISOL VALVE CONTROL switch to AUTO Standard Placed DRYWELL REC ISOL VALVE CONTROL switch counter-clockwise to AUTO.

Cue Notes JPM complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S6 Rev 4 Page 14 of 15 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC IC-161 C. Run Batch File None D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Triggers None
2. Malfunctions Ed05 Loss of SSST 6 Ed07 Loss of NSST 6
3. Remotes N/A N/A
4. Overrides N/A N/A
a. Ensure REC HX B is in service.
b. Initiate trigger 6.
c. Allow simulator to run for 1 minute.
5. Panel Setup d. Ensure RPV level is controlled -30 to +30 inches using RCIC, HPCI, and or CRD.
e. Reset the scram if necessary for level control.
f. Mark up copy of 5.3EMPWR complete through step 4.2.2.2 to provide to applicant.

Note: If this JPM is to be performed more than once, take a SNAPSHOT after the panel setup is complete.

ATTACHMENT 3 DIRECTIONS TO APPLICANT:

Read the following and inform the Examiner when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

5.3EMPWR has been entered 5.3EMPWR subsequent actions up to Step 4.3 are complete REC Heat Exchanger B was in service prior to 5.3EMPWR entry INITIATING CUE:

CRS directs you to align REC IAW 5.3EMPWR, Section 4, Subsequent Operator Actions.

JPM S6 (Rev 4)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 1 of 22 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure NRC - S7

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 2 of 22 Withdraw Control Rod from Position 00 ALTERNATE PATH Revision Statements:

Rev 1 - Editorial changes per Chief Examiner comments.

Rev 2 - Editorial and format changes per Chief Examiner comments.

Rev 3 Added Ensure Rod Worth Minimizer is reset to panel setup in Att. 2.

JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: SIM
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: RO / SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path: [X] YES [ ] NO ( Alternate Path denoted by )
5. Time Critical: [ ] YES [X] NO
6. Performance Time: 15 minutes
7. NRC K/A 201003 A2.01 (3.4/3.6)
8. Safety Function: 1, Reactivity Control
9. Task No.: 201043P0101
10. PSA Applicability: N/A
11. Critical Steps denoted by Standard in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 2.2.8, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (Rev 95)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Set Up IAW Attachment 2 Attachments:
1. Attachment 1 - N/A
2. Attachment 2 - Simulator Setup Instructions
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet Handouts:
1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet
2. Section 32 of Procedure 2.2.8, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (Rev 95)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 3 of 22 Task Standard:

Using the RMCS, the applicant attempted to withdraw control rod 10-11 using methods detailed in Sections 32.2 and 32.3 of Procedure 2.2.8, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System, then successfully withdrew control rod 10-11 to position 02 by raising CRD drive water P to 290 to 310 psid as detailed in Section 32.4 of the procedure.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 4 of 22 Directions to Examiner:

THIS IS AN ALTERNATE PATH JPM. Control rod 10-11 cannot be withdrawn from position 00 using alternate (Section 32.2) and double-clutching (Section 32.3) methods. When CRD drive water P is raised above 290 psid IAW Section 32.4, the control rod can be withdrawn to position 02.

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to withdraw a control rod that is temporarily stuck at position 00.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1 and 2.
5. Brief the applicant, place the simulator in run, and tell the applicant to begin.

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 5 of 22 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

Read the following to the JPM performer.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Plant startup is in progress
  • Rod Sequence is: Rod Group 9/1, Step 1

You are directed to withdraw control rod 10-11 to position 02 per Procedure 2.2.8, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System, Section 32.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 6 of 22 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.2.8, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System)
32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 NOTE prior to Step 32.1 NOTE - Following is a guideline to follow if a control rod is unusually difficult to withdraw from 00 or 02.

Standard Applicant reviewed note.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.1 Reactor Engineering should be consulted for additional guidance if the control rod should move past its intended target position when performing this section.

Standard Applicant noted that Reactor Engineering will need to be consulted if a control rod should happen to move past its intended position (02) during performance of this section.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 7 of 22

3. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.2 Attempt to withdraw rod as follows:

(first method) 32.2.1 Place ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch to OUT NOTCH and HOLD.

Standard Rotated ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch clockwise to the OUT NOTCH position and held switch.

Cue None Notes Control rod does not withdraw.

Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.2 Attempt to withdraw rod as follows:

32.2.2 Place EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE switch to EMER ROD IN and release.

Standard Rotated EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE switch clockwise to the EMER ROD IN position and released.

Cue None Notes Control rod does not withdraw.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 8 of 22

5. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.2 Attempt to withdraw rod as follows:

32.2.3 IF first attempt is unsuccessful, THEN repeat Step 32.2.2 several times or until outward rod movement occurs.

Standard Applicant recognized that the control rod did not withdraw and repeated Step 32.2.2 twice before being cued by Examiner that the several times requirement had been met.

Applicant also recognized that the ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch should have been held in the OUT NOTCH position until all attempts were completed.

Cue After the applicant has repeated Step 32.2.2 (JPM Step 4) twice, inform them The several attempts requirement using this method has been met.

Notes

  • Applicant should NOT release the ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch (from the OUT NOTCH position) in between attempts. The procedure directs this switch to be released after all attempts have been completed as Step 32.2.4.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 9 of 22

6. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.2 Attempt to withdraw rod as follows:

32.2.4 Release ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch.

Standard Released ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch allowing it to spring return to the OFF position.

Cue None Notes Control rod does not withdraw.

Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.3 IF Step 32.2 is unsuccessful, THEN attempt to withdraw rod using double-clutching method as follows:

32.3.1 Place EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE switch to EMER ROD IN and hold for several seconds.

Standard Rotated EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE switch to the EMER ROD IN position and held for several seconds.

Cue None Notes Control rod does not withdraw.

Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.3 IF Step 32.2 is unsuccessful, THEN attempt to withdraw rod using double-clutching method as follows:

32.3.2 Simultaneously release EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE switch and place ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch to OUT NOTCH.

Standard Simultaneously released EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE switch and placed ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch to OUT NOTCH.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 10 of 22 Cue None Notes Control rod does not withdraw.

Results SAT UNSAT

9. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.3 IF Step 32.2 is unsuccessful, THEN attempt to withdraw rod using double-clutching method as follows:

32.3.3 IF first attempt is unsuccessful, THEN repeat Steps 32.3.1 and 32.3.2 several times.

Standard Applicant recognized that the control rod did not withdraw and repeated Steps 32.3.1 and 32.3.2 twice before being cued by Examiner that the several times requirement had been met.

Cue After the applicant has repeated Steps 32.3.1 and 32.3.2 (JPM Steps 7 and 8) twice, inform them The several attempts requirement using this method has been met.

Notes

  • Procedure doesnt direct operator to release ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch (from OUT NOTCH, spring return to OFF), but the applicant is expected to determine this is required in order to repeat the steps.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 11 of 22

10. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.3 IF Step 32.2 is unsuccessful, THEN attempt to withdraw rod using double-clutching method as follows:

32.3.4 IF double-notching of a control rod cannot be tolerated, THEN proceed to Step 32.6.

Standard Applicant determined that double-notching can be tolerated and proceeded to Step 32.3.5.

Cue If applicant requests guidance from CRS/SM/RE, inform applicant As the CRS, double-notching can be tolerated for this evolution.

If applicant determines on their own that double-notching cannot be tolerated, then intervene as the CRS with above cue. Then follow-up after the JPM with questions as to how the determination was made that double-notching could not be tolerated.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 12 of 22

11. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.3 IF Step 32.2 is unsuccessful, THEN attempt to withdraw rod using double-clutching method as follows:

CAUTION prior to Step 32.3.5 CAUTION - Use of the following double clutch method employs the notch override feature. If EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE and ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switches are not released in a timely manner following initial outward rod movement, rod mis-positioning could occur.

Standard Applicant reviewed caution.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

12. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.3 IF Step 32.2 is unsuccessful, THEN attempt to withdraw rod using double-clutching method as follows:

32.3.5 IF Step 32.3.3 is unsuccessful, THEN perform following:

Standard Applicant reviewed procedure step.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 13 of 22

13. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.3 IF Step 32.2 is unsuccessful, THEN attempt to withdraw rod using double-clutching method as follows:

32.3.5 IF Step 32.3.3 is unsuccessful, THEN perform following:

Note prior to Step 32.3.5.1 NOTE - Continuous withdrawal allowed for withdraw /

bypass operations.

Standard Applicant reviewed note.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 14 of 22

14. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.3 IF Step 32.2 is unsuccessful, THEN attempt to withdraw rod using double-clutching method as follows:

32.3.5 IF Step 32.3.3 is unsuccessful, THEN perform following:

32.3.5.1 IF continuous withdrawal of control rod desired, THEN perform following:

a. Determine if continuous withdrawal allowed.
b. Obtain permission from SM/CRS.

Standard Applicant determined continuous withdrawal was desired and obtained SM/CRS permission.

Cue If applicant requests permission from CRS/SM, inform applicant As the CRS, continuous withdrawal is approved for this evolution.

If applicant determines on their own that continuous withdrawal of control rod is not desired, then intervene as the CRS with above cue. Then follow-up after the JPM with questions as to how the determination was made that continuous withdrawal was not desired. (Initiating Cue was to withdraw control rod to position 02)

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 15 of 22

15. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.3 IF Step 32.2 is unsuccessful, THEN attempt to withdraw rod using double-clutching method as follows:

32.3.5 IF Step 32.3.3 is unsuccessful, THEN perform following:

32.3.5.2 Place EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE switch to EMER ROD IN and hold for several seconds.

Standard Rotated EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE switch to the EMER ROD IN position and held for several seconds.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

16. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.3 IF Step 32.2 is unsuccessful, THEN attempt to withdraw rod using double-clutching method as follows:

32.3.5 IF Step 32.3.3 is unsuccessful, THEN perform following:

32.3.5.3 Simultaneously place EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE switch to OVERRIDE and place ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch to OUT NOTCH.

Standard Simultaneously placed EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE switch to OVERRIDE and placed ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch to OUT NOTCH.

Cue Notes Control rod does not withdraw.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 16 of 22

17. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.3 IF Step 32.2 is unsuccessful, THEN attempt to withdraw rod using double-clutching method as follows:

32.3.5 IF Step 32.3.3 is unsuccessful, THEN perform following:

32.3.5.4 Perform one of following:

a. IF continuous withdrawal authorized, THEN release EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE and ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switches when control rod at desired position.

Standard Applicant determined no control rod movement so was not at desired position. Applicant did not release switches as part of this step.

Cue None Notes Continuous withdrawal was authorized earlier at Step 32.3.5.1 (JPM Step 14) but since rod doesnt move, can never be at desired position even though it was authorized. Thus, this step is N/A (and a PEO).

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 17 of 22

18. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.3 IF Step 32.2 is unsuccessful, THEN attempt to withdraw rod using double-clutching method as follows:

32.3.5 IF Step 32.3.3 is unsuccessful, THEN perform following:

32.3.5.4 Perform one of following:

b. IF outward rod movement occurs, THEN immediately release EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE and ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switches.

Standard Applicant determined no outward control rod movement, and did not immediately release switches.

Cue None Notes This step is a PEO since an operator would only be at this step in the procedure if they received authorization (step should be deleted).

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 18 of 22

19. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.3 IF Step 32.2 is unsuccessful, THEN attempt to withdraw rod using double-clutching method as follows:

32.3.5 IF Step 32.3.3 is unsuccessful, THEN perform following:

32.3.5.5 If first attempt is unsuccessful, THEN repeat Steps 32.3.5.2, 32.3.5.3, and 32.3.5.4 several times.

Standard Applicant recognized that control rod did not withdraw and repeated Steps 32.3.5.2 - 32.3.5.4 twice before being cued by Examiner that the several times requirement had been met.

The applicant determined the switches had to be released after each attempt.

Cue After the applicant has repeated Steps 32.3.5.2 - 32.3.5.4 (JPM Steps 15 - 18) twice, inform them The several attempts requirement using this method has been met.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

20. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.4 IF Step 32.3 is unsuccessful, THEN perform following:

Note prior to Step 32.4.1 NOTE - Recommended drive water P 300 psid.

Standard Applicant reviewed note.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 19 of 22 Examiner Note: For the next JPM step, either method of obtaining drive water P =

290 - 310 psig is allowed. Reference is same procedure being used (2.2.8, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System) Section 33, Normal System Operations, Steps 33.2.3 and 33.2.4.

21. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.4 IF Step 32.3 is unsuccessful, THEN perform following:

32.4.1 Raise drive water P to 290 to 310 psid.

If CRD-FC-301 was in BAL, then applicant adjusted SETPOINT thumbwheel to obtain 290 - 310 psid on CRD WTR DP, CRD, DPI-303. (from Step 33.2.3)

OR Standard Applicant manipulated DRIVE PRESS CONT VALVE MO 20 (CLOSE to raise or OPEN to lower) as necessary to obtain 290 - 310 psid on CR WTR DP, CRD-DPI-303. (from Step 33.2.4)

Cue None Notes A NOTE prior to Step 33.2.4 says Balancing drive water and cooling water requires VERY small adjustments to CRD-MO-20 so applicant should exercise care when using MO-20 to avoid large pressure changes. This could be source of a comment or follow-up question if done poorly.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 20 of 22

22. Procedure Step 32. WITHDRAWAL OF CONTROL RODS FROM POS 00 32.4 IF Step 32.3 is unsuccessful, THEN perform following:

32.4.2 Attempt rod withdrawal using normal notch out method.

Standard Rotated ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL switch to OUT NOTCH position and released. Checked control rod 10-11 withdrew to position 02.

Cue None Notes JPM complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 21 of 22 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC 160 C. Run Batch File None D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

Event Action: ZAOCRDDPI303 .GT.290

1. Triggers Command: dmf rd121011
2. Malfunctions Control Rod 10-11 RD121011 N/A A 0 N/A N/A N/A stuck
3. Remotes None N/A N/A
4. Overrides None Stuck rod individual scram N/A N/A switch.
a. Insert trigger information into Event Trigger popup.
b. Ensure correct Control Rod Sequence book at 9-5.
c. Ensure Control Rod Sequence book marked indicating current control rod movement attempt. (Rod Group 9/1, Step 1)
5. Panel Setup
d. With draw control rods per sequence package until control rod 10-11 is the next rod to be withdrawn.
e. Select control rod 10-11.
f. Ensure Rod Worth Minimizer is reset.

Note: If this JPM is to be performed more than once, take a SNAPSHOT after the panel setup is complete.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S7 Rev 3 Page 22 of 22 ATTACHMENT 3 DIRECTIONS TO APPLICANT:

Read the following and inform the Examiner when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

  • Plant startup is in progress
  • Rod Sequence is: Rod Group 9/1, Step 1

You are directed to withdraw control rod 10-11 to position 02 per Procedure 2.2.8, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System, Section 32.

JPM S7 (Rev 3)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 1 of 18 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure NRC - S8

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 2 of 18 Verify Group 2 Isolation (TIP Shear)

ALTERNATE PATH Revision Statements:

Rev 1 - Editorial changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 2 - Editorial and format changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 3 - Format changes per Chief Examiner Rev 4 Corrected page numbering on Attachment 1, 2, and 3, and in step 1 changed from TIP BALL VALVES to TIP VALVES JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: SIM
2. Appropriate Applicant Level: RO / SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Perform
4. Alternate Path YES NO ( Alternate Path denoted by )
5. Time Critical: YES NO
6. Inside RCA: YES NO
7. Performance Time: 14 minutes
8. NRC K/A: 223002 A4.01 (3.6/3.5), 223002 A4.06 (3.6/3.7)
9. Safety Function: 7, Instrumentation
10. Task No.: 213002P0101
11. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System - Primary Containment (Isolation)
12. Critical Steps denoted by Standard in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 2.1.22, Recovering From A Group Isolation (Rev 60)
2. Procedure 4.1.4, Traversing In-Core Probe System (Rev 33)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Set Up IAW Attachment 2 Attachments:
1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key
2. Attachment 2 - Simulator Setup
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 3 of 18 Handouts:

1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet
2. Attachment 1 [Group Isolation Hard Card] of Procedure 2.1.22, Recovering From A Group Isolation (Rev 60)
3. Procedure 4.1.4, Traversing In-Core Probe System (Rev 33)

Task Standard:

The applicant verified a PCIS Group 2 Isolation IAW Procedure 2.1.22, Recovering From A Group Isolation, recognized TIP A Ball Valve failed to close, attempted to retract the TIP A detector, and then isolated the penetration by firing the TIP A Shear Valve, in accordance with Procedure 4.1.4, Traversing In-Core Probe System.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 4 of 18 Directions to Examiner:

THIS IS AN ALTERNATE PATH JPM. The TIP Ball valve will have failed to close, requiring the applicant to identify the failure and actuate the TIP tubing shear valve to isolate the penetration.

Note: DO NOT give Procedure 4.1.4 to applicant until requested at JPM step 4.

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to verify a PCIS Group 2 Isolation and determine the TIP Ball valve failed to close and effect isolation of the penetration.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1 and 2. (DO NOT give Handout 3, Procedure 4.1.4, to applicant until identified by the applicant at JPM step 4.)
5. Brief the applicant, place the simulator in run, and tell the applicant to begin.

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 5 of 18 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

Read the following to the Applicant.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant scrammed on low reactor water level Low water level resulted in PCIS Groups 2 and 6 isolations There are indications of a reactor coolant leak in the drywell INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to perform the actions associated with verifying Group 2 and 6 isolations using Procedure 2.1.22, Recovering From a Group Isolation, Attachment 1, Group Isolation Hard Card. Verify Group 2 first and then Group 6.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 6 of 18 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step N/A Standard Obtained Procedure 2.1.22, Attachment 1, GROUP ISOLATION HARD CARD Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT
2. Procedure Step Attachment 1, Hard Card Standard Ensured following Group 2 valves closed (Green light ON Red light OFF):

RHR-MO-920 ____ RHR-MO-921 ____ RW-AO-82 ____ RW-AO-83 ____

RHR-MO-274A __ RHR-MO-274B _ _ RW-AO-94 ____ RW-AO-95 ____

RHR-MO-25A ____ RHR-MO-25B ____ PC-MO-1306 ____ PC-MO-1305 ____

RHR-MO-18 ____ RHR-MO-17 _ _ PC-MO-1304 ____ PC-MO-1303 ____

RHR-SSV-60 ____ RHR-SSV-61 ____ PC-MO-1311 ____ PC-MO-1310 ____

RHR-SSV-95 ____ RHR-SSV-96 ____ PC-MO-1302 ____ PC-MO-1312 ____

RHR-MO-57 ____ RHR-MO-67 ____ PC-MO-1308 ____ PC-MO-1301 ____

RMV-AO-10 ____ RMV-AO-11 ____

RMV-AO-12 ____ RMV-AO-13 ____ TIP VALVES ____

Valves are de-energized (closed)

Cue None Notes Refer to JPM Attachment 1 (Answer Key) showing Group 2 valves highlighted yellow on Hard Card.

Valves are listed to enable Examiner to check off as Applicant marks off valves on the Hard Card.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 7 of 18

3. Procedure Step N/A Standard Reports to CRS that TIP valve(s) not closed.

Cue CRS acknowledges the report. Respond to the failed automatic action using appropriate procedure, and then complete verifying the Group isolations.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step N/A Standard Applicant determined Procedure 4.1.4, Traversing In-Core Probe System, was required to correct TIP valve(s) out of position and obtained Procedure 4.1.4.

Cue When the applicant identifies procedure 4.1.4 is needed, provide applicant Handout 3, Procedure 4.1.4.

Notes This is where the Alternate Path begins. AP steps are marked by a in the Procedure Step block.

Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The remaining steps are from Procedure 4.1.4, Traversing In-Core Probe System, Section 6.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 8 of 18

5. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION NOTES prior to Step 6.1 NOTE 1 - Section performed by a Licensed Operator.

Standard Applicant determined Section 6 was appropriate section, and reviewed Note 1.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION NOTES prior to Step 6.1 NOTE 2 - Red TIP VALVES light ON at Panel 9-3 containment ISOLATION VALVE POSITIONS display indicates one or more of TIP ball valves are in open position.

Standard Applicant reviewed note.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 9 of 18

7. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION 6.1 lF containment ISOLATION VALVE POSITIONS (Panel 9-3) display red TIP VALVES light remains on, THEN at Panel 9-13, CHECK ball valve positions to determine which valve remain in open position.

Standard Checked TIP Machine A ball valve indicating open - red light ON.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION 6.2 For affected TIP drives:

6.2.1 Manually retract TIP drives as follows:

6.2.1.1 PLACE MODE switch to MAN. A[ ]

Standard At TIP Drive Control Panel A, rotated MODE switch to MAN position.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 10 of 18

9. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION 6.2 For affected TIP drives:

6.2.1 Manually retract TIP drives as follows:

6.2.1.2 PLACE MAN. VALVE CONTROL switch to OPEN. A[ ]

Standard At TIP Drive Control Panel A, verified MAN. VALVE CONTROL switch in OPEN and verified ball valve was open.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION 6.2 For affected TIP drives:

6.2.1 Manually retract TIP drives as follows:

6.2.1.3 VERIFY red BALL VALVE OPEN light on VALVE CONTROL MONITOR on. A[ ]

Standard Observed red BALL VALVE OPEN light on.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 11 of 18

11. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION 6.2 For affected TIP drives:

6.2.1 Manually retract TIP drives as follows:

6.2.1.4 PLACE MANUAL switch to REV. A[ ]

Standard Rotated MANUAL switch to the REV. position and observed no movement of TIP A detector.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

12. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION 6.2 For affected TIP drives:

6.2.1 Manually retract TIP drives as follows:

6.2.1.5 Check lN-SHIELD light status. A[ ]

Standard Observed IN-SHIELD light Off.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 12 of 18

13. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION 6.2 For affected TIP drives:

6.2.1 Manually retract TIP drives as follows:

6.2.1.5 Check lN-SHIELD light status.

a. IF IN-SHIELD light remains OFF and there are indications of reactor coolant leak in the drywell, THEN PROCEED to Step 6.3.

Standard With observed IN-SHIELD light OFF and indications of reactor coolant leak in drywell, applicant proceeded to Step 6.3.

Cue None Notes Indications of a reactor coolant leak in the DW was given in Initial Conditions.

Results SAT UNSAT

14. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION NOTE prior to Step 6.3 NOTE - Control Room Key Numbers 78, 79, 80, and 81 are required to operate keylock switches that fire shear valves.

Critical Step Standard Applicant read NOTE and observed that Step 6.3 was marked as a Critical Step by a red diamond ().

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 13 of 18

15. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION 6.3 IF attempt to close affected ball valves failed and there are indications of a reactor coolant leak in the drywell, THEN PERFORM following for affected TIP Drives:

6.3.1 PLACE TIP SQUIB VALVE to fire. A[ ]

Standard Applicant obtained appropriate key and inserted it in TIP SQUIB VALVE A keylock and rotated switch to the FIRE position.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

16. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION 6.3 IF attempt to close affected ball valves failed and there are indications of a reactor coolant leak in the drywell, THEN PERFORM following for affected TIP Drives:

6.3.2 VERIFY amber SQUIB MONITOR light on. A [ ]

Standard Verified amber SQUIB MONITOR light illuminated for A.

Cue None Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 14 of 18

17. Procedure Step 6. RESPONSE TO GROUP 2 ISOLATION 6.3 IF attempt to close affected ball valves failed and there are indications of a reactor coolant leak in the drywell, THEN PERFORM following for affected TIP Drives:

6.3.3 VERIFY amber SHEAR VLV MONITOR light on.

A[ ]

Standard Verified amber SHEAR VLV MONITOR light illuminated for A.

Cue None Notes JPM Complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 15 of 18 ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY (Procedure 2.1.22, Attach 1, Front Panel Group Isolation Hard Card)

Page 15 of 2

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 16 of 18 ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY (Procedure 2.1.22, Attach 1, Back Panel Group Isolation/SGT Hard Card)

Page 16 of 2

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM S8 Rev 4 Page 17 of 18 ATTACHMENT 2 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC 157 C. Run Batch File None D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Triggers None
2. Malfunctions RR20a A RR Loop leak N/A N/A 20 N/A N/A NM10a TIP stuck in core N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
3. Remotes None N/A N/A
4. Overrides
a. Place simulator in Run.
b. Place TIP Machine A ON
c. MODE switch in Auto.
d. Place toggle switch for the in-shield limit switches above the TIP machines to ON.
e. Place MAN. VALVE CONTROL switch to OPEN.
5. Panel Setup f. Drive TIP into the core area and insert malfunction NM10a and verify the detector stops within the core region.
g. Put in malfunction RR20a and ensure Groups 2 and 6 are in.
h. Place Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.
i. Place HPCI AOP in PTL.
j. Ensure PCIS Display for TIP Ball Valves indicates OPEN and that TIP Ball Valve A indicates OPEN.

ATTACHMENT 3 DIRECTIONS TO APPLICANT:

Read the following and inform the Examiner when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Plant scrammed on low reactor water level Low water level resulted in PCIS Groups 2 and 6 isolations There are indications of a reactor coolant leak in the drywell INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to perform the actions associated with verifying the Groups 2 and 6 Isolation using Procedure 2.1.22 Attachment 1, Group Isolation Hard Card. Verify Group 2 first and then Group 6.

JPM S8 (Rev 4)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P1 Rev 4 Page 1 of 9 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure NRC - P1

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P1 Rev 4 Page 2 of 9 Securing Fire Pump C Locally ALTERNATE PATH Revision Statement:

Rev 1 - Editorial changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 2 - Format changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 3 - Revised step Standards, Examiner Cues and Notes; format changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 4 - Moved cue for Fire Pump C noise rapidly lowering from step 6 to step 3, and added reference 2.

JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: PLANT
2. Appropriate applicant level: RO / SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Simulate
4. Alternate Path: [X] YES [ ] NO ( Alternate Path denoted by )
5. Time Critical: [ ] YES [X] NO
6. Performance Time: 10 minutes
7. NRC K/A 286000 A4.05 (3.3/3.3), A1.05 (3.2/3.2)
8. Safety Function: 8, Plant Service Systems
9. Task No.: 286029I0201
10. PSA Applicability: N/A
11. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 2.2.30, Fire Protection System (Rev 66)
2. GTE Sylvania Drawing A10-308468 sheet 2, Fire Pump Controller 1C (Rev N06)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. None Attachments:
1. Attachment 1 - N/A
2. Attachment 2 - N/A
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet Handouts:
1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet
2. Section 9 of Procedure 2.2.30, Fire Protection System (Rev 66)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P1 Rev 4 Page 3 of 9 Task Standard:

The applicant attempted to secure Fire Pump C locally by pressing the STOP button, and then secured and electrically isolated the pump by opening the circuit breaker and ISOLATING MEANS DISCONNECT SWITCH, in accordance with Procedure 2.2.30, Fire Protection System.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P1 Rev 4 Page 4 of 9 Directions to Examiner:

NOTE: THIS IS AN ALTERNATE PATH JPM. Fire Pump C will fail to stop using the normal local control push button. The applicant will then have to open the associated circuit breaker and disconnect switch.

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability secure Fire Pump C locally using an alternate method.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1 and 2.
5. Brief the applicant, and tell the applicant to begin.

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P1 Rev 4 Page 5 of 9 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

Read the following to the Applicant.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Fire Pump C is running Attempts to secure Fire Pump C from the Control Room have failed INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to secure Fire Pump C locally per Procedure 2.2.30, Fire Protection System, Section 9.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P1 Rev 4 Page 6 of 9 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.2.30, Fire Protection System)
9. FP-P-C, FIRE PUMP C, SHUTDOWN NOTE prior to step 9.1 NOTE - Placing ELECTRIC FIRE PUMP C switch to PULL-TO-LOCK or placing its ISOLATING switch to OFF requires a Fire Protection Impairment Permit to be filled out per Procedure 0.39.1.

Standard Applicant reviewed note.

Cue none Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 9. FP-P-C, FIRE PUMP C, SHUTDOWN 9.1 Stop FP-P-C using one of following methods:

9.1.2 At FP-PNL-C (SW Pump Room), press STOP button.

Standard Pressed the STOP button.

Cue There is no reduction of noise and pump shaft is still turning.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P1 Rev 4 Page 7 of 9

3. Procedure Step 9. FP-P-C, FIRE PUMP C, SHUTDOWN 9.2 IF pump has not stopped using above methods, THEN perform following at FP-PNL-C:

9.2.1 Place CIRCUIT BREAKER (DISCONNECTING MEANS) to OFF.

Standard Rotated CIRCUIT BREAKER counter-clockwise to OFF.

Cue 1. If asked, inform applicant the Fire Protection Impairment has been completed.

2. With writing instrument, point to OFF on mimic breaker.
3. Fire Pump C noise is rapidly lowering.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 9. FP-P-C, FIRE PUMP C, SHUTDOWN 9.2 IF pump has not stopped using above methods, THEN perform following at FP-PNL-C:

9.2.2 Press RELEASE button and hold.

Standard Depressed ISOLATING MEANS RELEASE button and held.

Cue Button depresses and remains depressed.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P1 Rev 4 Page 8 of 9

5. Procedure Step 9. FP-P-C, FIRE PUMP C, SHUTDOWN 9.2 IF pump has not stopped using above methods, THEN perform following at FP-PNL-C:

9.2.3 Place ISOLATING MEANS DISCONNECT to OFF.

Standard Rotated ISOLATING MEANS DISCONNECT counter-clockwise to OFF.

Cue With writing instrument, point to OFF on mimic disconnect.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step 9. FP-P-C, FIRE PUMP C, SHUTDOWN 9.2 IF pump has not stopped using above methods, THEN perform following at FP-PNL-C:

9.2.4 Release the RELEASE button.

Standard Released RELEASE button.

Cue Button moved outward.

Notes JPM complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

ATTACHMENT 3 DIRECTIONS TO APPLICANT:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Fire Pump C is running Attempts to secure Fire Pump C from the Control Room have failed INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to secure Fire Pump C locally per Procedure 2.2.30, Fire Protection System, Section 9.

JPM P1 (Rev 3)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P2 Rev 3 Page 1 of 9 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure NRC - P2

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P2 Rev 3 Page 2 of 9 Locally Align RHRSW Crosstie for RPV Injection Revision Statement:

Rev 1 - Editorial changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 2 - Format changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 3 - Revised Examiner Cues and Notes; format changes per Chief Examiner comments JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: PLANT
2. Appropriate Applicant Levels: RO/SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Simulate
4. Alternate Path [ ] YES [X] NO ( Alternate Path denoted by )
5. Time Critical: [ ] YES [X] NO
6. Performance Time: 18 minutes
7. NRC K/A: 2.1.29 (4.1/4.0); 295031 EA1.08 (3.8/3.9)
8. Safety Function: 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core
9. Task No.: 200201A0501
10. PSA Applicability: N/A
11. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 5.8.4, Alternate Injection Subsystems (Table 4) (Rev. 22)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. None Attachments:
1. Attachment 1 - N/A
2. Attachment 1 - N/A
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet Handouts:
1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant Cue Sheet
2. Section 5 of Procedure 5.8.4, Alternate Injection Subsystems (Table 4) (Rev. 22)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P2 Rev 3 Page 3 of 9 Task Standard:

The applicant closed valve SW-121 and opened valves SW-118, SW-119, and SW-120 IAW Procedure 5.8.4, Alternate Injection Subsystems (Table 4), Section 5.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P2 Rev 3 Page 4 of 9 Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to line up the RHRSW crosstie for injection of RHRSW into the Reactor Vessel.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the Notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1 and 2.
5. Brief the applicant, and tell the applicant to begin.

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P2 Rev 3 Page 5 of 9 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

Read the following to the Applicant.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

CRS has determined RHRSW crosstie is required for RPV injection IAW EOP-1A There are NO adverse radiological conditions for dispatching personnel for EOP actions INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to locally align manual valves for alternate RPV injection using RHRSW crosstie IAW Procedure 5.8.4, Alternate Injection Subsystems (Table 4),

Section 5, beginning at step 5.5.11.

Inform the CRS when step 5.6.4 is ready to be performed.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P2 Rev 3 Page 6 of 9 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.8.4, Alternate Injection Subsystems (Table 4))
5. ALTERNATE RPV INJECTION WITH RHRSW CROSSTIE 5.5 Ensure following valves are closed:

5.5.11 SW-121, SW/EMERG. CORE FLOODING TELL-TALE DRN. (C-882-S, west of Instrument Air Dryer B inside radiation enclosure).

Standard Closed valve by turning handwheel clockwise several rotations until resistance was felt.

Cue 1. If asked as RP, fishbowl enclosure has been surveyed and is free of surface contamination.

2. Resistance is felt, handwheel will not turn further.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: Rotation direction indicators on the handwheels for opening SW-118, SW-119, and SW-120 (JPM steps 2, 3 and 4) are difficult to see, and their rising stems are enclosed. Lock wire seals are installed on valve chains and can be broken by force applied to chain. If the applicant tries to open the valve by turning the handwheel clockwise, indicate in your cue that the handwheel will not move.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P2 Rev 3 Page 7 of 9

2. Procedure Step 5. ALTERNATE RPV INJECTION WITH RHRSW CROSSTIE 5.6 Open following valves:

5.6.1 SW-118, EMERG. CORE FLOODING SUPP.

ROOT (C-882-S, between Instrument Air Dryers A and B in overhead).

Standard Opened valve by pulling chain to turn handwheel counter-clockwise several rotations until resistance was felt.

Cue Resistance is felt, handwheel will not turn further.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step 5. ALTERNATE RPV INJECTION WITH RHRSW CROSSTIE 5.6 Open following valves:

5.6.2 SW-119, EMERG. CORE FLOODING SUPP.

ROOT (west of Instrument Air Dryer B in overhead).

Standard Opened valve by pulling chain to turn handwheel counter-clockwise several rotations until resistance was felt.

Cue Resistance is felt, handwheel will not turn further.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P2 Rev 3 Page 8 of 9

4. Procedure Step 5. ALTERNATE RPV INJECTION WITH RHRSW CROSSTIE 5.6 Open following valves:

5.6.3 SW-120, EMERG. CORE FLOODING SUPP.

SHUTOFF (C-882-S, west of Instrument Air Dryer B)

Standard Opened valve by pulling chain to turn handwheel counter-clockwise several rotations until resistance was felt.

Cue Resistance is felt, handwheel will not turn further.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step N/A Standard Informed CRS local RHRSW valves have been aligned, and step 5.6.4 is ready to be performed.

Cue None Notes JPM Complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

ATTACHMENT 3 DIRECTIONS TO APPLICANT:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

CRS has determined RHRSW crosstie is required for RPV injection IAW EOP-1A There are NO adverse radiological conditions for dispatching personnel for EOP actions INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to locally align manual valves for alternate RPV injection using RHRSW crosstie IAW Procedure 5.8.4, Alternate Injection Subsystems (Table 4),

Section 5, beginning at step 5.5.11.

Inform the CRS when step 5.6.4 is ready to be performed.

JPM P2 (Rev 3)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P3 Rev 3 Page 1 of 11 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure NRC - P3

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P3 Rev 3 Page 2 of 11 Alternate Shutdown-Locally Operate SW-MO-89B for Starting Torus Cooling Revision Statement:

Rev 1 - Editorial changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 2 - Format changes per Chief Examiner comments Rev 3 - Added #6 to JPM Information; revised some step Standards, Examiner Cues and Notes; format changes per Chief Examiner comments JPM Information:

1. Appropriate Performance Locations: PLANT
2. Appropriate applicant level: RO / SRO
3. Evaluation Method: Simulate
4. Alternate Path YES NO ( Alternate Path denoted by )
5. Time Critical: YES NO
6. Inside RCA: YES NO
7. Performance Time: 11 minutes
8. NRC K/A: 219000 A1.08 (3.7/3.6), 295016 AK2.02 (4.0/4.1)
9. Safety Function: 5, Containment Integrity
10. Task No.: 344056P0503
11. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System - RHR/SPC
12. Critical steps denoted in bold and shaded box

References:

1. Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown (Rev 17)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Reactor Building Operator backpack containing Key for SW-SW-LASP IS-MO89B at MCC-Y Local Aux. Shutdown Panel and stopwatch (simulated)

Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - N/A
2. Attachment 2 - N/A
3. Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet Handouts:
1. JPM Attachment 3 - Applicant cue sheet
2. Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown (Rev 17)

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P3 Rev 3 Page 3 of 11 Task Standard:

Using MCC-Y Local Auxiliary Shutdown Panel keylock switches, the applicant positioned SW-MO-89B for SWBP start and then opened SW-MO-89B to achieve SWBP current of 100-136 amps IAW 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown, Attachment 5, Section 3.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P3 Rev 3 Page 4 of 11 Directions to Examiner:

1. This JPM evaluates the applicant's ability to locally operate components for placing Torus cooling in operation IAW 5.1ASD Attachment 5.
2. Observe the applicant during performance of the JPM for proper use of self-checking methods.
3. Check off either satisfactory or unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat state why in the notes section below.
4. Give the applicant Handouts 1 and 2.
5. Brief the applicant, and tell the applicant to begin.

Notes:

Total Time: ___________

Applicant: Examiner:

Pass Fail Examiner Signature: Date:

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P3 Rev 3 Page 5 of 11 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

Read the following to the Applicant.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Control Room was evacuated due to toxic fumes Torus cooling is required ASD panel is manned Control Building Operator is standing by breaker for SW Booster Pump B You are the designated Reactor Building Operator and have the appropriate backpack with keys and stopwatch INITIATING CUE:

ASD Operator directs you to locally operate SW-MO-89B, HX-B SW DISCH VLV 89B, IAW 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown, Attachment 5, Section 3, to place Torus cooling in operation.

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P3 Rev 3 Page 6 of 11 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step N/A Standard Obtained Key for SW-SW-LASP IS-MO89B.

Cue When the applicant describes where a key would be obtained, indicate the key is in the applicants possession.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: All step references are from 5.1ASD Attachment 5, Section 3.

2. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown, Attachment 5, REACTOR BUILDING OPERATOR)
3. When directed, operate torus cooling by performing following:

3.1 At MCC-Y Local Aux. Shutdown Panel, insert key and place SW-SW-LASP IS-MO89B for SW-MO-89B to ISOL.

Standard Inserted key into control switch SW-SW-LASP IS-MO89B for SW-MO-89B, HX-B SW DISCH VLV 89B, and rotated control switch clockwise to ISOL position.

Cue Indicate switch is aligned with ISOL position, and the red and green lights are ON.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P3 Rev 3 Page 7 of 11

3. Procedure Step 3. When directed, operate torus cooling by performing following:

3.2 Remove key from SW-SW-LASP IS-MO89B.

Standard Pulled key from SW-SW-LASP IS-MO89B and retained key.

Cue Indicate the applicant has the key.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 3. When directed, operate torus cooling by performing following:

3.3 At MCC-Y Local Aux. Shutdown Panel, ensure SW-MO-89B is closed.

Standard Observed position indicating lights at SW-MO-89B control switch and determined valve is NOT closed.

Cue Indicate the red and green lights are ON.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P3 Rev 3 Page 8 of 11 Examiner Note: SW-MO-89B stroke time is approximately 2 min, 40 sec.

5. Procedure Step 3. When directed, operate torus cooling by performing following:

3.3 At MCC-Y Local Aux. Shutdown Panel, ensure SW-MO-89B is closed.

3.3.1 IF SW-MO89B is not fully closed, THEN place and hold SW-SW-LASP CS-MO89B to CLOSE until SW-MO-89B is closed.

Standard Closed SW-MO-89B, HX-B SW DISCH VLV 89B, by rotating control switch SW-SW-LASP CS-MO89B counter-clockwise to CLOSE and holding until red light extinguished, then released.

Cue When the applicant describes rotating the control switch to CLOSE, indicate the green light is ON, indicate approximately 3 minutes have elapsed, and now, the red light is OFF. Indicate the switch spring-returned to NORM when released.

Notes Consider asking applicant how long they would expect to hold the key in CLOSE before valve fully closed prior to giving the cue.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P3 Rev 3 Page 9 of 11

6. Procedure Step 3. When directed, operate torus cooling by performing following:

3.4 At MCC-Y Local Aux. Shutdown Panel, throttle open SW-MO-89B by holding SW-SW-LASP CS-MO89B to OPEN for 15 seconds.

Standard Throttled open SW-MO-89B, HX-B SW DISCH VLV 89B, by rotating control switch SW-SW-LASP CS-MO89B clockwise to OPEN and holding for approximately 15 seconds, then released.

Cue When the applicant describes rotating the control switch to OPEN, after approximately 5 seconds indicate red and green lights are ON. When the applicant states the switch has been released, indicate the switch spring-returned to NORM.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step 3. When directed, operate torus cooling by performing following:

3.5 Inform ASD Operator SW-MO-89B is positioned for SW Booster pump start.

Standard Contacted ASD Operator via radio, phone, or pager and informed SW-MO-89B, HX-B SW DISCH VLV 89B has been throttled open for SW Booster pump start.

Cue As ASD Operator, acknowledge the report. Then, as the Control Building Operator, inform the applicant that SW Booster Pump B is started and ready to monitor SWBP B motor amps.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 3/2017 JPM P3 Rev 3 Page 10 of 11 Examiner Note: The applicant may intermittently place the control switch to OPEN in the following step, or may hold it in OPEN.

8. Procedure Step 3. When directed, operate torus cooling by performing following:

3.6 WHEN SW Booster pump is running, THEN coordinate with Control Building Operator to open SW-MO-89B, limiting pump amps to < 136 amps.

Standard Throttled open SW-MO-89B, HX-B SW DISCH VLV 89B, by rotating control switch SW-SW-LASP CS-MO89B clockwise to OPEN and released when pump amps were 100 - 136 amps.

Cue When applicant places the control switch to open, as the Control Building Operator report SWBP B pump amps rising and indicate ascending values followed by brief pauses (e.g.

90 amps 100 amps 110 amps 120 amps 130 amps).

Notes If you report SWBP B greater than 136 amps, and applicant takes no corrective action to lower amps, the applicant fails this Critical Step.

Results SAT UNSAT

9. Procedure Step N/A Standard Informed CRS that SW-MO-89B has been aligned to support Torus cooling Cue As CRS, acknowledge the report.

Notes JPM complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

ATTACHMENT 3 DIRECTIONS TO APPLICANT:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

Control Room was evacuated due to toxic fumes Torus cooling is required ASD panel is manned Control Building Operator is standing by breaker for SW Booster Pump B You are the designated Reactor Building Operator and have the appropriate backpack with keys and stopwatch INITIATING CUE:

ASD Operator directs you to locally operate SW-MO-89B, HX-B SW DISCH VLV 89B, IAW 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown, Attachment 5, Section 3, to place Torus cooling in operation.

JPM P3 (Rev 3)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 1 of 44 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Shift CRD Stabilizing valves.
2. Lower reactor power using RR pumps.
3. Respond to Reactor Bldg to Torus Vacuum Breaker PC-AO-243 failing open.
4. Respond to RPV flange leakage.
5. Respond to trip of RPS A EPAs with failure of RMV-AO-10 to close.
6. Respond to loss of multiple REC pumps.
7. ATWS Level Power control
8. Respond to RHR SPC valve failing to open.

Initial Conditions: Plant operating at 100% power.

Inoperable Equipment: HPCI inoperable. Auxiliary Oil pump motor replacement.

TS LCO 3.5.1, Condition C Turnover:

The plant is at 100% power.

Planned activities for this shift are:

Shift CRD Stabilizing valves per Procedure 2.2.8 (Rev. 95)

Lower power to 95% with RR Pumps per Procedure 2.1.10 (Rev. 113)

Electrical Maintenance working on replacing HPCI AOP motor Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario.

Validation Time: 75 minutes Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 2 of 44 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description 1 N/A N (ATC,CRS) Shift CRD stabilizing valves 2 N/A R (ATC, CRS) Lower Reactor power by lowering RR pump speed.

(or) Reactor Building to Torus vacuum breaker fails open.

3 TS (CRS) zdipcswcs243av[2] CRS declares vacuum breaker inoperable.

C (BOP,CRS) Respond to reactor vessel flange seal leak alarm, 4 rr21 enter Procedure 4.6.3, and cycle the flange leak-off A (CREW) drain valves.

I rp03a (BOP,ATC,CRS) RPS EPA Breaker 1A1/1A2 trip, (half scram and half 5 PCIS group isolations) RMV-AO-10 fails to isolate.

(rf) rh32a A (CREW) CRS declares valve inoperable.

TS (CRS) sw 11a C (BOP, ATC) REC Pump A trip. Start another REC pump. REC 6

sw11b A(CREW) Pump B trip. Manual scram due to loss of REC.

Hydraulic block ATWS > 3% power (EOP-1A, 3A, 6A, 6B, 7A)

(CT-1) When control rods fail to scram, crew injects SLC and/or inserts control rods before exiting EOP-6A. (All control rods do not have to be fully inserted to satisfy this critical task; this only requires that the crew is making progress to achieving all rods in by fully inserting at least 5 control rods using RMCS.)

(CT-2) Inhibit ADS prior to automatic ADS valve opening during a failure to Scram.

7 rd02a,b (CT-3) During failure to scram conditions with M (CREW) power >3%, stop and prevent injection from all sources (except boron, CRD, RCIC) as necessary to lower RPV water level to below -

60 CFZ (or LL, as applicable) and control between -60 (or LL, as applicable) to -183 CFZ prior to exiting EOP-7A.

(CT-4) When control rods fail to scram and energy is discharging to the primary containment, crew injects SLC before exceeding the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature (BIIT) curve.

(rf) rh29(A) First RHR loop to be put into suppression pool 8 C (BOP,CRS)

(rf) rh30(A) cooling has RHR-MO-39A(B) fail to open.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

  • Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

CREW notation for Abnormal (A) and Major (M) events denotes ATC, BOP, and CRS are credited.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 3 of 44 Quantitative Attributes Table ES-304-1 Attribute Actual Description Target Malfunctions after EOP entry 1-2 1 RHR-MO-39A(B) fails to open.

RPV flange seal leak Abnormal Events 2-4 3 RPS EPA trip Loss of multiple REC Pumps Major Transients 1-2 1 ATWS EOP-3A EOP entries requiring substantive action 1-2 2 EOP-6A EOP contingencies requiring substantive 0-2 1 EOP- 7A action (CT-1) When control rods fail to scram, crew injects SLC and/or inserts control rods before exiting EOP-6A. (All control rods do not have to be fully inserted to satisfy this critical task; this only requires that the crew is making progress to achieving all rods in by fully inserting at least 5 control rods using RMCS.)

(CT-2) Inhibit ADS prior to automatic ADS valve opening during a failure to Scram.

(CT-3) During failure to scram conditions with EOP based Critical power >3%, stop and prevent injection from all 2-3 4 Tasks sources (except boron, CRD, RCIC) as necessary to lower RPV water level to below -

60 CFZ (or LL, as applicable) and control between -60 (or LL, as applicable) to -183 CFZ prior to exiting EOP-7A.

(CT-4) When control rods fail to scram and energy is discharging to the primary containment crew injects SLC before exceeding the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature (BIIT) curve.

Normal Events N/A 1 Shift CRD Stabilizing valves.

Reactivity Manipulations N/A 1 Lower power using Reactor Recirculation pumps RPV Flange leak Reactor Bldg to Torus vacuum breaker fails open Instrument/ RPS A EPA Breaker trip N/A 6 Component Failures Loss of REC pump A Loss of REC pump B RHR-MO39A(B) valve fails to open RPV Flange leak Reactor Bldg to Torus vacuum breaker fails open RPS a EPA Breaker trip Total Malfunctions N/A 6 Loss of REC pump A Loss of REC pump B RHR-MO39A(B) valve fails to open Top 10 systems and operator actions important to risk that are tested:

Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 4 of 44 Reactor Protection System (Event 5)

Residual Heat Removal System in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode (Event 8)

SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 100% power. HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump motor replacement is taking place.

Event 1 After the crew takes the watch, the ATC shifts the CRD Stabilizing valves per Procedure 2.2.8. (Event 1)

Event 2 After shifting stabilizing valves, the ATC lowers power ~5% per Load Dispatcher schedule.

NOTE: Events 3 and 4 are triggered simultaneously due to Event 4 taking ~ 10 minutes to manifest itself.

Event 3 (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

After lowering power the Reactor to Torus vacuum breaker PC-AO-243 fails open. The CRS enters LCO 3.6.1.7, Condition A and declares the vacuum breaker inoperable.

Event 4 (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

The RPV inner seal develops a small leak requiring the BOP cycle the leak-off isolation valves from the control room to clear the alarm.

Event 5 (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

After actions for RPV flange leakage are complete, RPS EPAs on Division I trip causing a half reactor scram and half Group 1, 2, 7, and full Group 3, 6 isolations.

RMV-AO-10 fails to isolate on the loss of RPS. The CRS enters LCO 3.6.1.3, Condition A for RMV-AO-10 failing to isolate and determines a potential LCO for TS 3.3.8.2 Condition A is required for the EPA breaker. LCO 3.3.8.2 entry is not required, since the EPA is no longer supplying RPS.

Event 6 (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

After RPS A power has been restored from the alternate supply and RRMG cooling restored, and the half scram is reset, REC Pump A trips requiring the BOP to start the standby pump per alarm procedures. Shortly after the standby pump is started, REC Pump B trips requiring entry into Emergency Procedure 5.2REC. The ATC will insert a reactor scram. The CRS will not have time to enter Technical Specifications for the REC pumps.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 5 of 44 Event 7 (No Trigger required)

When the reactor is scrammed, a low power ATWS occurs due to hydraulic block of both scram discharge volumes, and EOP-6A and 7A are entered via EOP-1A.

Reactor power is above 3%. The crew injects SLC and/or installs the necessary PTMs to bypass interlocks and insert control rods individually via RMCS (CT-1, CT-4).

ADS is manually inhibited to prevent automatic operation (CT-2). Stop and Prevent is required because reactor power is above 3%. RPV level is intentionally lowered below -60 inches wide range in order to lower core inlet subcooling and lower reactor power (CT-3). Only 1 Main Turbine Bypass valve is available to control RPV pressure. SRVs have to be used to supplement pressure control. Feedwater injection is available for RPV level control.

Event 8 (Automatically Triggered when opening the first MO39A(B) is attempted)

After the crew has stabilized conditions following the scram, the selected RHR suppression pool cooling loop cannot be placed into service because RHR-MO39A (B) fails to open. The BOP transfers to the other division of RHR and places it into suppression pool cooling.

After the scram has been reset twice, the control rods are allowed to be fully inserted with the next scram. The CRD transitions from ATWS to non-ATWS flowcharts, SLC injection is halted and RPV level restoration is directed.

The exercise ends when control rods are inserted, and RPV water level is being maintained between -183 inches and +54 inches.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 6 of 44 Critical Tasks (CT-1) When control rods fail to scram, (CT-2) Inhibit ADS prior to automatic ADS crew injects SLC and/or inserts control valve opening during a failure to Scram.

rods before exiting EOP-6A. (All control rods do not have to be fully inserted to satisfy this critical task; this only requires that the crew is making progress to achieving all rods in by fully inserting at least 5 control rods using RMCS.)

EVENT 7 7 Safety Failure to effect shutdown of the reactor With a Reactor Scram required, reactor not significance when a RPS setting has been exceeded shut down, and conditions for ADS blowdown would unnecessarily extend the level of are met, INHIBIT ADS to prevent an degradation of the safety of the plant. This uncontrolled RPV depressurization and cold could further degrade into damage to the water injection from low pressure sources to principle fission product barriers if left prevent causing a significant power excursion.

unmitigated. The crew is authorized and required by Conduct of Operations to take mitigating actions when automatic safety systems fail to perform their intended function. Action to shut down the reactor is required when RPS and control rod drive systems fail.

Cueing Manual scram is initiated and numerous ADS Timer initiated alarm on panel 9-3-1/A-1 control rods indicate beyond position 00 and reactor power not downscale on panel 9-5 indications.

Performance Operator manipulates keylocked switches for Manipulation of ADS A and ADS B Inhibit indicator SLC B pump to START on panel 9-5. switches on panel 9-3 vertical section.

Operator selects individual control rods by depressing the respective pushbutton on the panel 9-5 matrix and inserts the rod by manipulating the emergency in switch on panel 9-5.

Performance SLC B pump red light illuminated, SLC Inhibit switches click into the vertical, inhibit feedback discharge pressure rising, and SLC tank level position on panel 9-3.

lowering on panel 9-5.

Receipt of ADS inhibited alarm panel 9-3-1/D-Operator selecting and inserting control rods 1.

indicated by rod position decreasing to 00 for selected rod on panel 9-5.

Justification There is no time limit for effecting complete The 105 second ADS timer allows sufficient for the chosen reactor shutdown via boron injection or time for the crew to recognize and override performance control rod insertion. For the timeframe of automatic operation of the system. As long as limit this scenario, containment limits are not ADS is inhibited before ADS valves open, closely challenged and power oscillations are reactor pressure will not be reduced to the not experienced. However, if the failure to shutoff heads of high volume, cold water scram EOP were to be exited, other systems.

procedures would not provide the guidance necessary to achieve reactor shutdown.

Before exiting EOP-6A ensures guidance to effect reactor shutdown is not removed.

BWR Owners App. B, step RC/Q-6,RC/Q-7 App. B, step RC/Q-6 Group Appendix Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 7 of 44 Critical Tasks (CT-3) During failure to scram conditions (CT-4) When control rods fail to scram and with power >3%, stop and prevent energy is discharging to the primary injection from all sources (except boron, containment, crew injects SLC before CRD, RCIC) as necessary to lower RPV exceeding the Boron Injection Initiation water level to below -60 CFZ (or LL, as Temperature (BIIT) curve.

applicable) and control between -60 (or LL, as applicable) to -183 CFZ prior to exiting EOP-7A.

EVENT 7 7 Safety Regarding lowering level below -60 CFZ, to Failure to effect shutdown of the reactor when significance prevent or mitigate the consequences of any a RPS setting has been exceeded would large irregular neutron flux oscillations unnecessarily extend the level of degradation induced by neutronic/thermal-hydraulic of the safety of the plant. This could further instabilities, RPV water level is lowered degrade into damage to the principle fission sufficiently below the elevation of the product barriers if left unmitigated. Action to feedwater sparger nozzles. This places the shut down the reactor is required when RPS feedwater spargers in the steam space and control rod drive systems fail.

providing effective heating of the relatively cold feedwater and eliminating the potential The Boron Injection Initiation Temperature for high core inlet subcooling. For conditions (BIIT) is the greater of:

that are susceptible to oscillations, the initiation and growth of oscillations is

  • The highest suppression pool temperature at principally dependent upon the subcooling at which initiation of boron injection will permit the core inlet; the greater the subcooling, the injection of the Hot Shutdown Boron Weight of more likely oscillations will commence and boron before suppression pool temperature increase in magnitude. exceeds the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit.

24" below the lowest nozzle in the feedwater

  • The suppression pool temperature at which a sparger has been selected as the upper reactor scram is required by plant Technical bound of the RPV water level control band. Specifications.

This water level is sufficiently low that steam heating of the injected water will be at least The BIIT is a function of reactor power. If 65% to 75% effective (i.e., the temperature of boron injection is initiated before suppression the injected water will be increased to 65% to pool temperature reaches the BIIT, emergency 75% of its equilibrium value in the steam RPV depressurization may be precluded at environment). This water level is sufficiently lower reactor power levels. At higher reactor high that the capability to bypass the low power levels, however, the suppression pool RPV water level MSIV isolation should be heatup rate may become so high that the Hot able to control RPV water level with Shutdown Boron Weight of boron cannot be feedwater pumps to preclude the isolation. injected before suppression pool temperature reaches the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit Regarding lowering level below LL, the even if boron injection is initiated early in the combination of high reactor power (above the event. Since failure-to-scram conditions may APRM downscale trip), high suppression pool present severe plant safety consequences, the temperature (above the Boron Injection requirement to initiate boron injection is Initiation Temperature), and an open SRV or independent of any anticipated success of high drywell pressure (above the scram control rod insertion. When attempts to insert setpoint) are symptomatic of heat being control rods satisfactorily achieve reactor rejected to the suppression pool at a rate in shutdown, the requirement for boron injection excess of that which can be removed by the no longer exists. (Control rod insertion is Suppression Pool Cooling System. Unless directed under Step RC/Q-7 concurrently with mitigated, these conditions ultimately result in Step RC/Q-6.)

loss of NPSH for ECCS pumps taking suction on the suppression pool, containment over-pressurization, and (ultimately) loss of primary containment integrity, which in turn could lead to a loss of adequate core cooling and uncontrolled release of radioactivity to the environment. The conditions listed, combined with the inability to shut down the Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 8 of 44 reactor through control rod insertion, dictate a requirement to promptly reduce reactor power since, as long as these conditions exist, suppression pool heatup will continue.

If torus water temperature was allowed to exceed the HCTL prior to commencing the lowering of level, a RPV depressurization would be required. Failure to completely stop RPV injection flow (with the exception of CRD and SLC) prolongs the elevated reactor power condition; thus, depositing more energy than necessary into the suppression pool.

Cueing Manual scram is initiated and numerous Manual scram is initiated and numerous control rods indicate beyond position 00 and control rods indicate beyond position 00 and reactor power >3% on panel 9-5 indications reactor power not downscale on panel 9-5 and SPDS and RPV level is >-60CFZ on indications.

SPDS.

Suppression Pool temperature rising on panel 9-3 indication.

Performance Operator manipulates Feedwater HMIs on Operator manipulates keylocked switches for indicator panel 9-5 or panel A as necessary to stop SLC A(B) pump to START on panel 9-5.

FW injection until RPV level goes below -

60CFZ.

Operator manipulates HPCI controls on panel 9-3 to stop HPCI injection until RPV level is below -60CFZ.

Performance Feedwater flow indication on panel 9-5 SLC A(B) pump red light illuminated, SLC feedback indicate zero. discharge pressure rising, SLC tank level lowering on panel 9-5.

HPCI flow indication on panel 9-3 indicates zero and/or HPCI injection MOV indicates closed.

Justification Applicability for this CT is during EOP-7A If boron injection is initiated before suppression pool for the chosen conditions where it is necessary to lower level to temperature reaches the BIIT, emergency RPV performance control power with Table 17 condition NOT met depressurization may be precluded at lower reactor (i.e. no high energy input into primary power levels. At higher reactor power levels, limit containment). There is no time limit for this however, the suppression pool heatup rate may lowering level, but it establishes margin to become so high that the Hot Shutdown Boron conditions where fuel damaging power oscillations Weight of boron cannot be injected before may theoretically occur. Before exiting EOP-7A suppression pool temperature reaches the Heat was chosen because Capacity Temperature Limit even if boron injection is other procedures would not provide the guidance initiated early in the event. Since failure-to-scram necessary to establish margin for power oscillation conditions may present severe plant safety mitigation. Before exiting EOP-7A ensures consequences, the requirement to initiate boron guidance to effect this control is not removed. injection is independent of any anticipated success of control rod insertion.

NOTE This critical task must be evaluated carefully based on the level changes. If power is reduced significantly below 3%, reactor water level may continue to rise above -60" with only CRD and SLC while driving rods this would not result in an UNSAT on this critical task.

BWR Owners App. B, Contingency #5 App. B, step RC/Q-6 Group Appendix Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 9 of 44 SIMULATOR SET-UP A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the simulator in IC 20, 100% power (EOL) (IC-152)

Batch File Name - None C. Change the simulator conditions as follows:

1. Auto Triggers Number File Name/Variable Description 6 zdirhrsws14b(2)==1 Place RHR-MO-39B switch to open and modify remote mrf rh29a ENER function for RHR-MO-39A to function.

7 zdirhrsws14a(2)==1 Place RHR-MO-39A switch to open and modify remote mrf rh30a ENER function for RHR-MO-39B to function.

8 zloslcsws1a[2]==1 When SLC Pump A starts, the main turbine trips after a 5 imf tc01 1:00 second time delay

2. Malfunctions Number Title Trigger TD Severity Ramp Initial rr21 Vessel Head Inner Seal Leakage 3 N/A 100 N/A N/A rp03a EPA 1A1\1A2 trip 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A sw11a REC Pump A trip 5 N/A N/A N/A N/A sw11b REC Pump B trip 5 2.5 min N/A N/A N/A rd02a ATWS south rods A N/A 45 N/A N/A rd02b ATWS north rods A N/A 35 N/A N/A tc01 Main Turbine trip 8 1 min N/A N/A N/A Main Turbine bypass valve A tc07a A N/A 0 N/A N/A fails closed.

Main Turbine bypass valve B tc07b A N/A 0 N/A N/A fails closed.

Main Turbine bypass valve C N/A tc07c A N/A 0 N/A fails closed.

yp:lpmisor PMIS Point N977 (RMV-AO-10) 4 N/A OPEN N/A N/A (768) position Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 10 of 44

3. Remotes Number Title Trigger Value TD Ramp rr18 Un-isolate air to NBI-736/737AV 2 OPEN N/A N/A rh29a RHR-MO-39A 7 DE-ENER 3 sec N/A rh30A RHR-MO-39B 6 DE-ENER 3 sec N/A
4. Overrides Instrument Tag Trigger TD Value Ramp HPCI AOP C/S zdihpcisws20[1] N/A 0 PTL N/A HPCI AOP Green light zlophcisws20[1] N/A N/A OFF N/A HPCI Inop on SSSP zdieeswhp[1] N/A N/A PUSH-IN N/A PC-AO-243 RB to Torus zdipcswcs243av[2] 3 N/A OPEN N/A vacuum breaker RMV-AO-10 red light zlormvao10[2] 4 N/A ON N/A D. Panel Setup
1. Ensure PMIS IDTs are blank
2. Ensure RR Controllers are selected to P.
3. Place HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump control switch to P-T-L.
4. Place caution tag on HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump control switch.
5. Ensure copy of Procedure 2.2.8 available for turnover.
6. Ensure copy of Procedure 2.1.10 available for turnover.
7. At Panel 9-4-3, set SSST Y Voltage Adjust to Tap 2.
8. At Panel C, set SSST X Voltage Adjust to Tap 5.
9. On STARTUP TRANSFORMER BACKUP VOLTAGE BUS, placard:

TAP POSITION: 5 MAX 4473 MIN 4372 Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 11 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Shift CRD Stabilizing Valves Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRS Directs ATC to shift CRD Stabilizing valve per Procedure 2.2.8, Section 17.

Role Play: The isolation valves (CRD-32 and CRD-33) are normally open Booth valves. When sent to ensure the valves are open, wait 2 minutes and Operator report they are open.

17.2 IF placing STABILIZER VALVE B in service, THEN perform following; N/A if placing STABILIZER VALVE A in service:

17.2.1 Ensure CRD-32, STABILIZING VALVE ASSEMBLY 25B INLET ISOLATION (R-903-SE), is open.

17.2.2 Ensure CRD-33, STABILIZING VALVE ASSEMBLY 25B ATC OUTLET ISOLATION (R-903-SE), is open.

17.2.3 At Panel 9-5, place STABILIZER VALVES A & B switch to B.

17.2.4 Check stabilizing flow at ~ 6 gpm on CRD-FI-216, CRD SYSTEM STABILIZER FLOW (R-903-SE near CRD-MO-20).

Booth Role Play: When asked for reading on CRD-FI-216, CRD SYSTEM Operator STABILIZER FLOW, report it is indicating ~6 gpm.

BOP Provides peer check of ATC actions.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event after valve shift is complete.

Operator Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 12 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Lower power to 95% using Reactor Recirculation flow control Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRS Directs ATC to lower power using Recirculation flow to 95% IAW 2.1.10.

Role Play: As Rx Building NLO, when requested to monitor RRMG lube Booth oil temps and maintain 110-130°F, respond you will monitor RRMG lube Operator oil temps and maintain them in band.

Lowers power using Recirculation flow IAW 2.1.10:

Selects S on RR flow controllers on panel 9-4 7.4 Lowers RR pump flow (by turning speed demand counter-clockwise on one speed controller at a time and allowing conditions to stabilize before ATC adjusting other controller).

Closely monitors scoop tube position/RR pump flow response.

Closely monitors reactor power on APRMs and Main Turbine output on DEH HMI.

Repeats until desired thermal power (target 95%) achieved.

BOP Provides peer check of ATC actions.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when power reduction is complete.

Operator Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 13 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker fails open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiners: Initiating Event 3 also initiates Event 4. (Event 4 takes approximately 10 minutes to become apparent to the applicants)

When directed by Lead Examiner, insert Trigger 3, causing Reactor Booth Building to Torus Vacuum Breaker fails open AND RPV flange leak Operation for Event 4.

Respond to alarm H-1/A-5 SUPPR CHAMBER VACUUM RELIEF 243AV OPEN and report to CRS.

1.1 Check valve position.

1.2 Check suppression chamber and secondary containment pressures.

NOTE - When torus pressure greater than Reactor Building pressure, BOP PC-DPIS-516A indication will be positive.

1.3 Dispatch Operator to monitor PC-DPIS-516A, ATMOSPHERE TO TORUS DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH (R-903-B RHR HX ROOM east wall).

1.4 Check pneumatic and electrical supplies to PC-SOV-SPV243, PILOT VALVE FOR PC-AO-243.

Report to CRS the valve will not close with its control switch.

BOP Report Torus and Drywell pressures.

Role Play: If directed to verify air valves PC-569 and PC-570 closed, Booth wait 2 minutes and report valves are closed.

Operator If sent to PC-DPIS-516A, report it is indicating 0.3 psig.

Enters LCO 3.6.1.7, Condition A and declares PC-AO-243 inoperable for CRS closing.

TS Required Action is to close the open vacuum breaker with a Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

END OF EVENT Proceed to the next event which is already active.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 14 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Respond to RPV Flange Leakage Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiners: RPV flange inner seal leak is already active.

Respond to Annunciator 9-4-1/F-5, VESSEL FLANGE SEAL LEAK BOP 1.1 Enter Procedure 4.6.3.

CRS Direct entry into Procedure 4.6.3.

Booth Role Play: As Rx Bldg NLO perform steps 5.1 through 5.4 of Procedure 4.6.3. Wait 2 minutes and Insert Trigger 2 to open the listed valves.

Operator Report the valves are open.

Direct NLO perform following Procedure 4.6.3 steps:

5.1 Remove seal and open PC-559, NBI-AO-737AV ISOLATION (R-903-SE).

5.2 Remove seal and open PC-560, NBI-AO-737AV SUPPLY (R-903-SE).

BOP 5.3 Remove seal and open PC-565, NBI-AO-736AV ISOLATION (R-881-NW Torus Area).

5.4 Remove seal and open PC-566, NBI-AO-736AV SUPPLY (R-881-NW Torus Area).

5.5 Place REACTOR FLANGE LEAKOFF switch (Panel 9-4) to OPEN and verify following:

5.5.1 INLET NBI-736AV (NORMALLY OPEN) closes.

5.5.2 DRAIN NBI-737AV (NORMALLY CLOSED) opens.

5.5.3 Annunciator 9-4-1/F-5 clears.

BOP 5.5.4 NBI-PI-101 (R-931-NW LR 25-5) indicates 0 pressure.

5.6 (Independent Verification) Place REACTOR FLANGE LEAKOFF switch (Panel 9-4) to CLOSE.

5.6.1 Verify following:

5.6.1.1 INLET NBI-736AV (NORMALLY OPEN) opens.

5.6.1.2 DRAIN NBI-737AV (NORMALLY CLOSED) closes.

Booth Action: When directed to close the PC valves, Delete Remote Function rr18 and Delete Malfunction rr21.

Operator Role Play: When directed to NBI-PI-101, as Rx Bldg NLO, wait 1 minute Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 15 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Respond to RPV Flange Leakage Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior and report pressure is 0 psig.

Direct NLO perform following Procedure 4.6.3 steps:

5.7 (Independent Verification) Close and seal PC-559.

BOP 5.8 (Independent Verification) Close and seal PC-560.

5.9 (Independent Verification) Close and seal PC-565.

5.10 (Independent Verification) Close and seal PC-566.

Booth Role Play: As Rx Bldg NLO, wait 2 minutes and report steps 5.7 through 5.10 are complete and you will come up to the control room and Operator complete step 5.11.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 16 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RPS EPA 1A1/1A2 trip, RMV-AO-10 fails to fully close.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner, insert Trigger 4 causing a trip of Operator RPS EPA 1A1/1A2 and failure of RMV-AO-10 to close.

Responds per alarm C-1/F-1, RPS PWR PANEL 1A VOLTAGE FAILURE:

2.1 IF a RPS power supply is available, THEN transfer RPS A to available source.

2.2 Reset RPS Channel "A" half scram per Procedure 2.1.5.

BOP 2.3 Reset Group Isolations per Procedure 2.1.22.

2.4 Dispatch Operator to RPS A Room to check EPAs and RPS MG Set A to determine cause of failure.

2.5 WHEN cause of failure has been determined and corrected, THEN place RPS A on desired source per Procedure 2.2.22.

Reports status of reactor and status of PCIS Group isolations:

Half Group 1 Half Group 2 ATC Full Group 3 Full Group 6 Half Group 7 Directs NLO to RPS MG Set A to investigate loss of power.

Booth Role Play: as building operator at RPS MG Set A, wait 3 minutes, then Operator report EPAs 1A1/1A2 are open.

Directs BOP to transfer RPS A bus to alternate power per alarm card CRS guidance.

At Panel 9-16, verifies ALT SOURCE AVAIL white light illuminated and transfers RPS A to alternate power by placing RPS BUS A POWER BOP TRANSFER switch to ALT FEED on panel 9-16.

Verifies Red ALT SOURCE ON light illuminated.

Reset half scram per Procedure 2.1.5: (Section 4) 4.1 Place REACTOR SCRAM RESET switch to Group 1 and 4, Group 2 ATC and 3, then back to NORM.

4.2 Ensure eight SCRAM GROUP lights (Panels 9-15 and 9-17) or SCRAM INDICATIONS GROUP A and GROUP B lights are on.

CRS Direct BOP to verify Group Isolations per Procedure 2.1.22.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 17 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RPS EPA 1A1/1A2 trip, RMV-AO-10 fails to fully close.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiners: Group Isolation verification Hard Card is attached for reference.

CRS Enters TS LCO 3.3.8.2, Condition A. Required Action to remove associated in service power supply from service within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

TS CREW May report small rise in drywell pressure and temperature.

May enter Abnormal Procedure 2.4PC due to drywell pressure and CRS temperature rising.

CRS Enter Abnormal Procedure 2.4HVAC Per 2.4HVAC, Attachment 1

1. IF RRMG Set Ventilation System has failed, THEN perform following:

NOTE - RRMG Set motor and generator winding temperatures are monitored on RRMG-TR-26, RX RECIRC DRIVE MTR GEN WINDING TEMPERATURE RECORDER (PNL-21).

BOP 1.1 Reduce reactor power per Procedure 2.1.10 to maintain affected RRMG Set motor and generator winding temperatures below 250°F.

1.1.1 IF winding temperature cannot be maintained below 250°F, THEN trip affected RRMG and concurrently enter Procedure 2.4RR.

1.1.2 IF both RRMGs are tripped, THEN SCRAM and concurrently enter Procedure 2.1.5.

Verifies isolations IAW 2.1.22 (May use the Hard Card), including:

Crack open RWCU-MO-74, DEMIN SUCTION BYPASS VLV, on panel 9-4 BOP Checks SGT for proper operation Determines RMV-AO-10 is indicating dual position.

Reports RMV-AO-10 status to CRS.

Direct NLO to investigate valve.

Booth Role Play: as building operator sent to investigate RMV-AO-10, wait 3 Operator minutes, then report you see nothing wrong with the valve.

Directs BOP to reset isolations and restore Reactor Recirc MG ventilation CRS IAW 2.1.22.

BOP Checks RR MG temperatures on recorders RRMG-TR-25 and 26 on Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 18 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RPS EPA 1A1/1A2 trip, RMV-AO-10 fails to fully close.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Panel 9-21. Reports RRMG temperatures rising.

Resets Group 6 isolation and restores RB ventilation IAW 2.1.22:

9.8.1 Place following Reactor Building HVAC switches to OFF:

9.8.1.1 SF-R-1A-A, SUPPLY FAN.

9.8.1.2 SF-R-1A-B, SUPPLY FAN.

9.8.1.3 EF-R-1A, EXHAUST FAN.

9.8.1.4 EF-R-1B, EXHAUST FAN.

9.8.1.5 BF-R-1A, EXH BSTR FAN.

9.8.1.6 BF-R-1B, EXH BSTR FAN.

9.8.2 Place following Reactor Building HVAC isolation valve switches to CLOSE:

9.8.2.1 HV-MO-272, HV-R-1A DISCH VLV.

9.8.2.2 HV-AO-257, HV-R-1A DISCH VLV.

9.8.2.3 HV-AO-259, EXH FANS DISCH VLV.

9.8.2.4 HV-AO-261, EXH FANS DISCH VLV.

9.8.2.5 HV-MO-258, EXH FANS DISCH VLV.

9.8.2.6 HV-MO-260, EXH FANS DISCH VLV 9.8.3 IF isolation caused by high radiation in Reactor Building, THEN have Chemistry and Radiation Protection sample and evaluate situation.

9.8.4 IF Reactor Building Vent Monitors tripped and Reactor Building radiation levels normal, THEN perform following:

9.8.5 IF required, turn Group ISOL RESET CHANNEL A and CHANNEL B switches (Panel 9-5) to right RESET position, and THEN release to NOR.

9.8.6 At VBD-R, ensure SGT-DPIC-546, RX BLDG/SGT DP, in MANUAL.

9.8.7 Adjust SGT-DPIC-546, RX BLDG/SGT DP, Parameter V to 0%.

9.8.8 Ensure switch for operating SGT fan, EF-R-1F, SGT B EXHAUST FAN, in RUN (VBD-K).

9.8.9 Simultaneously press PCIS GROUP 6 DIV 1 and DIV 2 ISOLATION RESET buttons (VBD-K).

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 19 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RPS EPA 1A1/1A2 trip, RMV-AO-10 fails to fully close.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 9.8.10 Perform one of following:

9.8.10.1 Check PCIS GROUP 6 DIV 1 ISOLATION and PCIS GROUP 6 DIV 2 ISOLATION lights turn on (VBD-K).

9.8.10.2 Check Group 6, CHANNEL A and Group 6, CHANNEL B Isolation indicating lights on (Panel 9-5).

9.9 Check following RRMG ventilation isolation valves open:

9.9.1 HV-AO-263, MG SET-1A INLET VLV.

9.9.2 HV-MO-262, MG SET-1A INLET VLV.

9.9.3 HV-AO-267, MG SET-1A OUTLET VLV.

9.9.4 HV-MO-266, MG SET-1A OUTLET VLV.

9.9.5 HV-AO-265, MG SET-1B INLET VLV.

9.9.6 HV-MO-264, MG SET-1B INLET VLV.

9.9.7 HV-AO-269, MG SET-1B OUTLET VLV.

9.9.8 HV-MO-268, MG SET-1B OUTLET VLV.

9.10 Check following RRMG exhaust fan starts:

9.10.1 EF-R-1C, EXH FAN (BOTTOM).

9.10.2 EF-R-1D, EXH FAN (TOP).

Checks RR MG temperatures lowering on RRMG-TR-25 and 26, panel 9-21.

NOTE to Examiners: It is not expected that the crew restore all systems within the time frame of the scenario for this event before proceeding to the next event, only that the half scram is reset, the RMV-AO-10 valve failure is recognized, and possibly, RRMG ventilation is restored. (Normal recovery time for all of Group 6 isolation is 15 minutes).

Resets Group 1 isolation IAW 2.1.22:

4.6.2 Reset Group 1 Isolation by turning Group ISOL RESET, CHANNEL A and CHANNEL B, switches (Panel 9-5) to left RESET position and then releasing to NOR.

BOP 4.6.3 Check Group 1, CHANNEL A Isolation lights turn on (Panel 9-5).

4.6.4 Check Group 1, CHANNEL B Isolation lights turn on (Panel 9-5).

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 20 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

RPS EPA 1A1/1A2 trip, RMV-AO-10 fails to fully close.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 4.6.5 Ensure MS-MO-74 open.

NOTE - If all main steam lines in service and main steam line flow through each steam line is > 1.2x106 lbm/hr, Step 4.6.6 may be N/A'd.

4.6.6 Ensure MS-MO-77 open.

Enters TS LCO 3.6.1.3, Condition A and declares RMV-AO-10 INOPERABLE.

Required Action is to isolate the penetration with a Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Enters TS LCO 3.4.5, Condition B due to isolation of the drywell atmosphere CRS Inboard Sample Return Valve RMV-AO-12 on panel 9-4. Required Actions TS are to analyze grab samples of DW atmosphere with a Completion time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> AND restore required DW atmospheric monitoring system to Operable status with a Completion Time of 30 days.

May enter TS LCO 3.6.4.1, Condition A due to Reactor Building dP momentarily exceeding -0.25 wg. Required Action is to restore secondary containment to Operable status with a Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

END OF EVENT Notes Proceed to the next event at direction of the Lead Examiner.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 21 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

REC Pump A and B trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner insert Trigger 5, REC Pump A trips Operation followed by REC Pump B trip after 2.5 minutes.

Respond to alarm M-1/B-1, REC PUMP A FAILURE.

1. OPERATOR OBSERVATION AND ACTION BOP 1.1 Start another REC pump.

1.2 Monitor REC pump discharge pressures and ensure valve line-up is correct.

1.3 For multiple loss of REC pumps, enter Procedure 5.2REC.

Note to Examiners: If operator starts another REC pump before the system low pressure isolation times out (~40 seconds), the following BOP actions are N/A. He may perform the actions to start another pump from memory as immediate operator actions of Abnormal Procedure 5.2REC or he may perform the steps from the Annunciator card.

If alarm M-1/A-1, REC SYSTEM LOW PRESSURE, remains in for > 40 seconds (REC system will isolate), operator will respond per alarm card:

2. OPERATOR OBSERVATION AND ACTION 2.1 If available, start additional REC pumps.

2.2 Ensure REC-MO-711, NORTH CRITICAL LOOP SUPPLY, BOP or REC-MO-714, SOUTH CRITICAL LOOP SUPPLY (associated with an in service HX), is open to obtain critical subsystem pressure indication.

2.3 If REC System header pressure on REC-PI-452, REC HEADER PRESSURE, remains 62 psig, enter Procedure 5.2REC.

2.4 If REC HX or Drywell header isolated and restoration desired, take action per REC Restoration Hard Card (2.2.65.1).

If REC system isolated restore per REC Restoration Hard Card:

BOP 1.1 Ensure low pressure isolation not due to leakage or leak isolated.

1.2 Ensure two REC pumps are running.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 22 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

REC Pump A and B trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1.3 Ensure one of following valves are OPEN:

1.3.1 REC-MO-711, NORTH CRITICAL LOOP SUPPLY.

1.3.2 REC-MO-714, SOUTH CRITICAL LOOP SUPPLY.

CAUTION - Restoring REC flow to drywell FCUs with drywell temperature > 260F could result in a breach of FCU tubing.

1.4 If drywell temperature 260F on PC-TI-505A through PC-TI-505E, place DRYWELL REC ISOL VALVE CONTROL switch to OPEN.

NOTE - REC-MO-712 and REC-MO-713 are throttle open only.

If REC HX OUTLET PRESSURE alarm is received, REC-MO-712 or REC MO 713 must be fully closed prior to recommencing pressurization of REC non-critical header.

1.5 Throttle open REC HX outlet valve for a HX that was in service, as necessary, while maintaining REC CRIT LOOP SUPPLY PRESS in green band.

1.5.1 REC-MO-712, HX A OUTLET VLV.

1.5.2 REC-MO-713, HX B OUTLET VLV.

1.6 Start third REC pump. NOTE to Examiners: Step is N/A.

1.7 Throttle open REC HX outlet valve, as necessary, to obtain following conditions:

1.7.1 REC CRIT LOOP SUPPLY PRESS 62 psig.

1.7.2 REC HEADER PRESSURE in top of green band.

1.8 Perform following simultaneously:

1.8.1 Open REC-MO-700, NON-CRITICAL HEADER SUPPLY.

1.8.2 Continue throttling open REC HX outlet valve, as necessary, to maintain REC HEADER PRESSURE in green band.

1.9 Ensure REC HX outlet valve full open.

1.10 If REC-AO-710, RWCU NON-REGEN HX INLET, not closed for leak isolation, open REC-AO-710.

1.11 If REC-MO-1329, AUGMENTED RADWASTE SUPPLY, not closed for leak isolation and cooling desired, open REC-MO-1329.

1.12 Place DRYWELL REC ISOL VALVE CONTROL switch to AUTO Respond to alarm M-1/B-2, REC PUMP B FAILURE.

BOP 1.3 For multiple loss of REC pumps, enter Procedure 5.2REC Report trip of REC Pump B.

CRS Enter Procedure 5.2REC. Assign actions to BOP.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 23 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

REC Pump A and B trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Enter Procedure 5.2REC.

3. IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 3.1 IF REC HEADER PRESSURE 62 psig, THEN start available REC pumps.

3.2 IF REC HEADER PRESSURE not restored, THEN close following valves:

3.2.1 REC-AO-710, RWCU NON-REGEN HX INLET.

3.2.2 REC-MO-1329, AUGMENTED RADWASTE SUPPLY.

4.3 IF REC HEADER PRESSURE not restored after completing Immediate Operator Actions, THEN perform following:

BOP 4.3.1 SCRAM and enter Procedure 2.1.5.

4.3.2 Stop both Reactor Recirc pumps and enter Procedure 2.4RR.

4.3.3 Stop running CRD pump.

NOTE - Securing all AC lube oil pumps first will cause DC lube oil pumps to start unless DC oil pump control switches are first taken to STOP and allowed to spring return to their normal positions.

4.3.4 WHEN Recirc MG Sets have stopped, THEN perform following:

4.3.4.1 Momentarily place respective control switches for both DC lube oil pumps to STOP and allow them to spring return to their normal positions (R-958-NW at 125 VDC Reactor Bldg Starter Rack).

4.3.4.2 Shut down all AC lube oil pumps.

END OF EVENT Notes Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 24 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

REC Pump A and B trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Proceed to the next event for the scram and ATWS.

NOTE to Examiners:

CRS actions start on the next page of the Scenario Guide.

ATC actions start on Page 30 of the Scenario Guide.

BOP actions start on Page 36 of the Scenario Guide.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 25 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

40% Power ATWS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiners: Malfunctions RD02a and RD02b, set at 45% (ATWS) are already active.

CRS Direct the reactor scrammed per 5.2REC.

Enter EOP 1A and transition to EOP 6A (Power/Pressure control) and EOP CRS 7A (RPV Level control).

EOP 6A Power CRS (CT-1): When control rods fail to scram, crew injects SLC and/or inserts control rods before exiting EOP-6A. (All control rods do not have to be fully inserted to satisfy this Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 26 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

40% Power ATWS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior critical task; this only requires that the crew is making progress to achieving all rods in by fully inserting at least 5 control rods using RMCS.)

CRS Direct insertion of control rods per EOP5.8.3.

(CT-2): Inhibit ADS prior to automatic ADS valve opening during a failure to Scram.

Direct ADS inhibited.

EOP 7A RPV Level CRS Direct installing PTMs for any open MSIV.

EOP 7A RPV Level CRS (CT-3): During failure to scram conditions with power >3%, stop and prevent injection from all sources (except boron, CRD, RCIC) as necessary to lower RPV water level to below -60 CFZ (or LL, as applicable) and control between -60 (or LL, as applicable) to -

183 CFZ prior to exiting EOP-7A.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 27 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

40% Power ATWS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Direct RPV level lowered below -60 inches by using stop and prevent.

EOP 7A RPV Level CRS Role Play: When directed by BOP to install EOP PTMs97-100, wait 3 Booth minutes then put in the overrides for the PTMs. Report back to BOP Operator when PTMs installed.

(CT-4): When control rods fail to scram and energy is discharging to the primary containment (e.g. SRVs, LOCA), crew injects SLC before exceeding the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature (BIIT) curve.

Direct SLC injection prior to exceeding the BIIT Curve EOP 6A/7AA CRS Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 28 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

40% Power ATWS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Direct BOP stabilize RPV pressure below 1050 psig:

CRS EOP 6A RPV Pressure END OF EVENT Proceed to the next event Suppression Pool Cooling valve failure.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 29 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Suppression Pool Cooling valve failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Direct suppression pool cooling placed into service when torus temperature CRS rises above 95°F.

After the scram has been reset for the second time, or as directed by the Booth Lead Examiner, delete both RD02A and RD02B malfunctions while the Operator scram is reset to allow the control rods to fully insert on the next scram.

ATC Report all control rods fully inserted.

CRS Order SLC injection stopped.

ATC Place both SLC Pump control switches to OFF.

Exits EOP 6A and 7A and enters EOP 1A.

CRS RC/L-3 Direct restoring and maintaining RPV water level between +3 inches and +54 inches.

BOP Raise RPV injection and raise level between +3 inches and +54 inches.

END OF SCENARIO Notes Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, place the simulator in freeze and Operator tell the crew to stop operating.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 30 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

40% Power ATWS ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiners: Malfunctions RD02a and RD02b, set at 45% (ATWS) are already active.

Depress both Manual Scram pushbuttons on Panel 9-5.

ATC Report ATWS conditions and reactor power level.

NOTE to Examiners: The RR Pumps might already be tripped from 5.2REC actions.

Place Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.

Initiate ARI.

ATC Report reactor power level to CRS.

Run RR pumps back to minimum when directed by CRS.

Trip RR pumps when directed by CRS.

NOTE to Examiners: The crew may elect to trip the running CRD pump per 5.2REC direction so no rod insertion takes place with RMCS.

ATC Place both CRD Pumps in service or trip running CRD pumps due to loss of REC cooling (5.2REC direction).

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 31 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

40% Power ATWS ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior ATC EOP 5.8.3 Ensure CRD-FC-301 is in Manual to maintain drive water d/p approximately ATC 265 psid.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 32 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

40% Power ATWS ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Selects the rods starting in the center and works out in a spiral pattern using the 5.8.3 Board depicted below.

ATC Inserts approximately 10-15 control rods manually prior to bypassing the ATC RPS trips.

(CT-1): When control rods fail to scram, crew injects SLC and/or inserts control rods before exiting EOP-6A. (All control rods do not have to be fully inserted to satisfy this critical task; this only requires that the crew is making progress to achieving all rods in by fully inserting at least 5 control rods using RMCS.)

Role Play: When directed by ATC to install EOP PTMs97-100, wait 3 Booth minutes then put in the overrides for the PTMs. Report back to BOP Operator when PTMs installed.

(CT-4): When control rods fail to scram and energy is discharging to the primary containment (e.g. SRVs, LOCA), crew injects SLC before exceeding the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature (BIIT) curve.

When directed by the CRS inject SLC.

1.1 Place both keys in SLC PUMP A and SLC PUMP B keylock switches on Panel 9-5 and place switches to START.

ATC 1.2 Check both SLC pumps start.

1.3 Check white SQUIB VALVE READY DS-3A (1106A) and SQUIB VALVE READY DS-3B (1106B) lights turn off (Panel 9-5).

1.4 Check pressure on SLC-PI-65, PUMP PRESSURE (Panel 9-5), is Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 33 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

40% Power ATWS ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior greater than reactor pressure.

1.5 Check Annunciator 9-5-2/G-7, LOSS OF CONT TO SQUIB VLVS, alarms.

1.6 Ensure RWCU-MO-15, INBD ISOL VLV (Panel 9-4), is closed.

1.7 Ensure RWCU-MO-18, OUTBD ISOL VLV (Panel 9-4), is closed.

1.8 Ensure both RWCU pumps are off (Panel 9-4).

1.9 Ensure RWCU-MO-74, DEMIN SUCTION BYPASS VLV (Panel 9-4), is throttled open.

ATC Provide CRS initial SLC tank level.

Booth When directed, install EOP PTMs 61-62 per Procedure 5.8.3.

Operator Direct NLO to install EOP PTMs 61-62.

ATC Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 34 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

40% Power ATWS ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior ATC EOP 5.8.3 ATC Resets the scram and repeats scrams as rod motion is verified.

After the scram has been reset for the second time, or as directed by Booth the Lead Examiner, delete both RD02A and RD02B malfunctions while Operator the scram is reset to allow the control rods to fully insert on the next scram.

ATC Report all control rods fully inserted.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 35 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

40% Power ATWS ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior END OF EVENT Notes Return to Page 29 for completion of ATC actions.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 36 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

40% Power ATWS BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiners: Malfunctions RD02a and RD02b, set at 45% (ATWS) are already active.

(CT-2): Inhibit ADS prior to automatic ADS valve opening during a failure to Scram.

Inhibit ADS when directed by CRS:

BOP At Panel 9-3 place ADS A and ADS B INHIBIT switches to INHIB.

Defeat MSIV low level interlocks, when directed by CRS, by installing EOP PTMs 57 through 60 per EOP 5.8.20 in Panels 9-15 and 9-17.

4.3.1 Install EOP PTM Number 57 jumper between Terminals DD-1 and DD-2 (BAY-1, PNL 9-15).

4.3.2 Install EOP PTM Number 58 jumper between Terminals BB-1 BOP and BB-2 (BAY-3, PNL 9-15).

4.3.3 Install EOP PTM Number 59 jumper between Terminals DD-1 and DD-2 (BAY-1, PNL 9-17).

4.3.4 Install EOP PTM Number 60 jumper between Terminals BB-1 and BB-2 (BAY-3, PNL 9-17).

(CT-3): During failure to scram conditions with power >3%, stop and prevent injection from all sources (except boron, CRD, RCIC) as necessary to lower RPV water level to below -60 CFZ (or LL, as applicable) and control between -60 (or LL, as applicable) to -

183 CFZ prior to exiting EOP-7A.

Perform Stop and Prevent per EOP 5.8 HARD CARD:

STOP INJECTION 1.1 Stop HPCI by performing one of following: NOTE to Examiners: HPCI is tagged out so these steps have been deleted.

1.2 Stop feedwater by performing following:

1.2.1 At a RVLC/RFPT HMI, select STARTUP VALVE screen, press BOP EMER CLOSE button, and confirm "YES" in pop-up box.

1.2.2 IF two RFPs are running, THEN ensure non-preferred RFP is tripped.

1.2.3 IF both RF-MO-29 and RF-MO-30 are not fully closed, THEN ensure operating pump is run back to ~ 2800 rpm by performing following:

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 37 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

40% Power ATWS BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1.2.3.1 On MAIN CONTROL screen, place MASTER LEVEL in MANUAL.

1.2.3.2 Depress FAST and use arrows to lower DEMAND to ~

0%.

1.2.3.3 Ensure RF-MO-29 and RF-MO-30 are closed.

1.2.4 IF RF-MO-29 or RF-MO-30 are open and cannot be closed from Control Room, THEN perform following:

1.2.4.1 Trip both RFP's.

1.2.4.2 Trip all operating condensate booster pumps.

CAUTION - If Core Spray and RHR pumps are placed in PULL-TO-LOCK before system flow is reduced to minimum, draining of system may occur.

1.3 Place both core spray pumps in PULL-TO-LOCK.

1.4 Stop RHR by ensuring one of following:

1.4.1Both RHR Systems secured with pumps in PULL-TO-LOCK.

1.4.2 RHR outboard injection valves automatic open signal bypassed BOP per Procedure 5.8.20 (PTMs 97 through 100) with injection valves closed.

1.4.3 IF RPV pressure is maintained 500 psig, THEN operate RHR aligned to suppression pool cooling and/or containment spray per Procedure 2.2.69.3.

PREVENT INJECTION 2.1 Prevent RHR by performing one of following:

2.1.1Both RHR Systems secured with pumps in PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.1.2 IF RPV pressure is maintained 500 psig, THEN operate RHR aligned to suppression pool cooling and/or containment spray per Procedure 2.2.69.3; and BOP 2.1.2.1 Bypass RHR outboard injection valves automatic open signal per Procedure 5.8.20 (PTMs 97 through 100) with injection valves closed.

2.1.3 RHR outboard injection valves automatic open signal bypassed per Procedure 5.8.20 (PTMs 97 through 100) with injection valves closed.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 38 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

40% Power ATWS BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 2.2 Prevent feedwater by performing following:

2.2.1 If required, at a RVLC/RFPT HMI, select STARTUP VALVE screen, press EMER CLOSE button, and confirm "YES" in pop-up box.

2.2.2 Ensure RF-MO-29 is closed.

2.2.3 Ensure RF-MO-30 is closed.

2.2.4 Trip condensate and condensate booster pump(s), as required.

2.3 Prevent CS by performing following:

BOP 2.3.1 Ensure CS-MO-12A is closed.

2.3.2 Ensure CS Pump A control switch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.3.3 Ensure CS-MO-12B is closed.

2.3.4 Ensure CS Pump B control switch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.4 Prevent HPCI by performing following: NOTE to Examiners-HPCI is tagged out for motor replacement.

Role Play: When directed by BOP to install EOP PTMs97-100, wait 3 Booth minutes then put in the overrides for the PTMs. Report back to BOP Operator when PTMs installed.

(CT-4): When control rods fail to scram and energy is discharging to the primary containment (e.g. SRVs, LOCA), crew injects SLC before exceeding the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature (BIIT) curve.

BOP Report RPV level trend as it lowers.

When RPV level lowers to less than -60 inches, maintain RPV level between BOP

- 60 inches and -183 inches using EOP 5.8.13 systems.

END OF EVENT Notes Proceed to the next event Suppression Pool Cooling valve failure. (Next Page)

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 39 of 44 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Suppression Pool Cooling valve failure BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Monitor and report torus level and temperature as SRVs are utilized for pressure control. Announce EOP 3A entry conditions as necessary.

BOP NOTE to Examiners: RHR-MO-39A(B) fails on the first loop placed into Suppression Pool Cooling. The other loop is available and the trainee re-performs procedure steps below.

Use RHR and place into suppression pool cooling (after EOP PTMs97-100 are installed) per the HARD CARD.

1.1 Place RHR SW System in service:

1.1.1 Start SWBP(s).

1.1.2 Adjust SW-MO-89A(B) to maintain flow between 2500 and 4000 gpm.

1.2 If required, with CRS permission, place CONTMT COOLING 2/3 CORE VALVE CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL OVERRD.

1.3 If required, place CONTMT COOLING VLV CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL.

BOP 1.4 Open RHR-MO-39A(B).

1.5 If reactor pressure 300 psig and injection not desired, close RHR-MO-27A(B), OUTBD INJECTION VLV.

NOTE - If directed by EOP 3A, maximize cooling.

1.6 Ensure RHR PUMP running.

NOTE - RHR pump operation at minimum flow should be limited to

< 15 minutes or pump damage may result.

1.7 Throttle RHR-MO-34A(B), as required to obtain desired cooling flow.

1.8 Throttle RHR-MO-66A(B), as required to obtain desired cooling rate.

1.9 If PCIS Group 6 lights lit on Panel 9-5, ensure one of following open:

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 1 Page 40 of 44 1.9.1 REC-MO-711; or 1.9.2 REC-MO-714.

If additional cooling required, initiate cooling in non-running RHR Loop and start additional pumps.

BOP Report failure of RHR-MO39A(B) and use other loop of RHR for SPC.

BOP Raise RPV injection and raise level between +3 inches and +54 inches.

Return to Page 29 for completion of BOP actions.

Rev. 2

ATTACHMENT 1 GROUP ISOLATION HARD CARD FRONT PANEL GROUP ISOLATION HARD CARD R e viis io n 0 R H R -9 21 R H R -9 2 0 4 H P C I -1 6 H P C I- 1 5 M S -8 0 A M S -8 6 A 1 M S -8 0 B M S -8 6 B 5 R C IC - 16 R C IC -1 5 M S- 80 C M S -86 C R H R -95/ 96 M S -8 0 D M S -8 6 D R R -74 0 7 MS-7 4 M S-7 7 R H R -60/ 61 R R -74 1 RW C U -1 5 RW C U -18 3 R H R - 57 R H R -6 7 R H R -1 7 R H R -1 8

  • 2 T IP VALV ES RW -83 RW -8 2 R M V -1 0 R M V -1 1 RW -95 RW -9 4 R M V -12 R M V -13 R H R -2 5 A
  • 1 R H R - 274 A R H R -25B
  • 2 *1 RH R - 2 7 4 B
  • 1 - U n le s s LP C I in itia tio n s ig n a l e xis ts
  • 2
  • 2 - Va lve n o rm a lly d e e n e rg iz e d c lo s e d Figure 1 ADDITIONAL ACTIONS GROUP 3

[ ] Crack open RWCU-MO-74, DEMIN SUCTION BYPASS VLV, allowing a path for mini purge flow to reactor to prevent over-pressurization.

GROUP 4

[ ] Ensure HPCI-MO-58 is CLOSED if HPCI-MO-17 is full open.

[ ] Ensure HPCI-AO-70 and HPCI-AO-71 are CLOSED.

[ ] Ensure HPCI turbine has tripped.

GROUP 5

[ ] Ensure RCIC turbine has tripped.

Rev. 2

BACK PANEL GROUP ISOLATION/SGT HARD CARD Figure 2 RESPONSE TO AUTOMATIC SGT INITIATION

[ ] IF pressure on HV-DPR-835, RX BLDG/ATMOS DP (VBD-R), is being maintained at

-0.25" wg, THEN perform following:

[ ] Place switch for preferred SGT fan, EF-R-1E, SGT A EXHAUST FAN, or EF-R-1F, SGT B EXHAUST FAN, to RUN.

[ ] Place switch for SGT fan to be selected for standby, EF-R-1E or EF-R-1F, to OFF, then to STANDBY, and check following:

[ ] EF-R-1E or EF-R-1F stops.

[ ] SGT-AO-249, SGT A INLET, or SGT-AO-250, SGT B INLET, closes.

[ ] SGT-AO-251, SGT A DISCHARGE, or SGT-AO-252, SGT B DISCHARGE, closes.

[ ] Close SGT-AO-270, SGT A DILUTION AIR.

[ ] Close SGT-AO-271, SGT B DILUTION AIR.

Rev. 2

INITIAL CONDITIONS A. Plant Status:

1. 100% power, near End of Cycle.
2. Rod Sequence Information: RO to provide B. Tech. Spec. Limitations in effect:
1. LCO 3.5.1 C.2 restore HPCI to Operable status in 14 days
2. Currently on day 2 of LCO 3.5.1.
3. RCIC is verified OPERABLE.

C. Significant problems/abnormalities:

1. HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor replacement.

D. PRA Risk:

Green E. Evolutions/maintenance for the on-coming shift:

1. After taking the shift, the ATC is to shift CRD Stabilizing valves per Procedure 2.2.8, Section 17.
2. Lower power to 95% per Load Dispatchers request, with RR Pumps per Procedure 2.1.10, Section 7.
3. Electrical Maintenance working on replacing the HPCI AOP motor.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 1 of 37 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Shift REC Pumps.
2. CRD FCV auto function fails requiring manual control.
3. One outboard MSIV fails closed.
4. Partial loss of main condenser vacuum requiring manual scram.
5. Electric ATWS
6. FW line break inside PC with loss of RCIC.
7. RWCU fails to auto isolate
8. Emergency Depressurize on low RPV level.
9. Low pressure injection valves fail to automatically open.

Initial Conditions: Plant operating at 100% power.

Inoperable Equipment: HPCI inoperable. Auxiliary Oil pump motor replacement.

TS LCO 3.5.1, Condition C Turnover:

The plant is at 100% power.

Planned activities for this shift are:

Maintain present power level.

Electrical Maintenance working on installing HPCI AOP motor.

Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario.

Validation Time: 75 minutes Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 2 of 37 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description N (BOP, CRS) 1 N/A Shift REC pumps TS (CRS)

OR: I (ATC,CRS) Auto function on CRD FCV fails causing manual control 2

zaicrdfc301 A (CREW) to be used C

ms09e (ATC,BOP,CRS) 3 OR: Outboard MSIV 86A closes but leaks by A (CREW) zdipcissws4a TS (CRS)

C (ATC,CRS) 4 mc01 Partial loss of condenser vacuum-scram A (CREW) rp01 (a-d)

OR: Electrical ATWS 5 zdirpssws1 M(CREW) (CT-1 When RPS fails to scram the reactor on a manual zdirpssws3a scram signal, within two minutes initiate the ARI System.

zdirpssws3b FW A line break inside primary containment.

RCIC spurious isolation fw18a (CT-2) When RPV level lowers to -158 CFZ (TAF) and cannot be maintained above -183 CFZ (MSCWL) and 6 rr20a M (CREW) insufficient high pressure injection systems are available to restore level, crew begins to Emergency Depressurize rc02 by opening the first of six SRVs before RPV level lowers below -183 CFZ.) (Momentary shrink below -183 due to automatic SRV closure does not constitute failure of this critical task).

7 rp12 C (BOP,CRS) RWCU fails to automatically isolate.

ECCS system valves fail to auto open.

cs02a C (CT-3 )When operating injection systems cannot maintain cs02b RPV level and ECCS systems fail to automatically align for 8 (ATC,BOP,CRS) rh04a injection, crew manually aligns ECCS systems for injection:

rh04b

  • For low pressure ECCS systems, prior to RPV pressure lowering below 200 psig.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

  • Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

CREW notation for Abnormal (A) and Major (M) events denotes ATC, BOP, and CRS are credited.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 3 of 37 Quantitative Attributes Table ES-304-1 Attribute Actual Description Target Malfunctions after Low Pressure ECCS injection valves fail to open.

1-2 2 EOP entry RWCU fails to auto isolate Outboard MSIV closure Abnormal Events 2-4 2 Partial loss of condenser vacuum ATWS Major Transients 1-2 2 FW line break EOP entries requiring EOP-1A 1-2 2 substantive action EOP-3A EOP contingencies requiring substantive 0-2 1 EOP-2A action (CT-1) When RPS fails to scram the reactor on a manual scram signal, within two minutes initiate the ARI System.

(CT-2) When operating injection systems cannot maintain RPV level and ECCS systems fail to automatically align for injection, crew manually aligns ECCS systems for injection: For low pressure ECCS systems, prior to RPV pressure EOP based Critical 2-3 lowering below 200 psig.

3 Tasks (CT-3) When RPV level lowers to -158 CFZ (TAF) and cannot be maintained above -183 CFZ (MSCWL) and insufficient high pressure injection systems are available to restore level, crew begins to Emergency Depressurize by opening the first of six SRVs before RPV level lowers below -183 CFZ.) (Momentary shrink below -183 due to automatic SRV closure does not constitute failure of this critical task).

Normal Events N/A 1 Shift REC Pumps Reactivity Manipulations N/A 1 1 CRD FCV controller failure Outboard MSIV closure Instrument/

Component Failures N/A 5 Condenser in-leakage loss of vacuum RWCU fails to isolate.

LP ECCS injection valves fail to open CRD FCV controller failure Outboard MSIV closure Total Malfunctions N/A 5 Condenser in-leakage rise RWCU fails to isolate.

LP ECCS injection valves fail to open Top 10 systems and operator actions important to risk that are tested:

Reactor Protection System (Event 5)

ADS/SRV (Event 6)

Residual Heat Removal System in LPCI Mode (Event 8)

Operator fails to depressurize with SRVs (Event 6)

Operator fails to initiate ADS and initiate ECCS early (Event 6)

Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 4 of 37 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 100% power at the end of the operating cycle. HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump motor is removed and a replacement is being installed.

Event 1 After the crew takes the watch, the BOP operator shifts REC pumps by starting B and securing A. The CRS is required to declare REC Div I subsystem inoperable per LCO 3.7.3, Condition B, Event 2 (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

After TS are addressed for the REC pump shift, the CRD FCV automatic setpoint fails downscale requiring the ATC to take manual control and return CRD cooling water flow and pressure to normal.

Event 3 (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

After the CRD system flows are returned to normal in manual, outboard MSIV 86A partially closes. The crew enters Abnormal Procedure 2.4MSIV and the RO rapidly lowers reactor power to <70%. The BOP places the effected MSIV control switch to CLOSE to prevent reopening. The CRS enters LCO 3.6.1.3, Condition A and declares the PCIV inoperable.

Event 4 (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

After TS are addressed for the partially closed MSIV, condenser in-leakage rises requiring reactor power to be lowered to maintain vacuum > 23 inches mercury.

Condenser vacuum continues to lower requiring the reactor scram.

Event 5 (No Trigger required)

On the manual reactor scram, the crew recognizes the ATWS is an electric block ATWS. Manual ARI initiation successfully inserts the control rods (CT-1).

Event 6 (Automatically triggered when RFP Discharge Valve automatically closes,

~2 minutes after ARI is initiated)

After the control rods are inserted, Feedwater A line break inside the PC commences and the CRS enters EOP 3A. The torus and drywell are sprayed to control containment pressure and temperature. RPV water level continues to drop. RCIC will be unavailable due to a spurious isolation signal.

Event 7 (No Trigger required)

RWCU fails to isolate on low RPV level. Manual isolation from the control room is required.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 5 of 37 Event 8 (No Trigger required)

RPV level lowers to TAF requiring the crew to emergency depressurize (CT-2). As RPV level and pressure lower, RHR injection valves fail to open and cannot be opened. The CS injection valves fail to open and can be opened from the control room (CT-3).

The exercise ends when emergency depressurization is complete and RPV level restoration is being controlled.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 6 of 37 Critical Tasks (CT-1) When RPS fails to scram the (CT-2) When RPV level lowers to -158 CFZ reactor on a manual scram signal, within (TAF) and cannot be maintained above -

two minutes initiate the ARI System. 183 CFZ (MSCWL) and insufficient high pressure injection systems are available to restore level, crew begins to Emergency Depressurize by opening the first of six SRVs before RPV level lowers below -183 CFZ. (Momentary shrink below -183 due to automatic SRV closure does not constitute failure of this critical task).

EVENT 5 6 Safety RPS initiates a reactor scram when one or The MSCWL is the lowest RPV water level at significance more monitored parameters exceed their which the covered portion of the reactor core specified limits to preserve the integrity of the will generate sufficient steam to preclude any fuel cladding and the reactor coolant clad temperature in the uncovered portion of pressure boundary (RCPB) and minimize the the core from exceeding 1500F. When water energy that must be absorbed following a level decreases below MSCWL with injection, loss of coolant accident (LOCA). Failure to clad temperatures may exceed 1500F.

effect shutdown of the reactor when a RPS setting has been exceeded, even at low power, would unnecessarily extend the level of degradation of the safety of the plant. This could further degrade into damage to the principle fission product barriers if left unmitigated. The crew is authorized and required by Conduct of Operations to take mitigating actions when automatic safety systems fail to perform their intended function. Action to shut down the reactor is required when RPS and control rod drive systems fail.

Cueing Annunciators 9-5-2/A-1 (A-2) RX SCRAM Corrected Fuel Zone indication (SPDS) falls to CHANNEL A (B) in alarm with RPS -158 and lowering trend continues, and, remaining energized. before -158 CFZ is reached, initial conditions, field reports, and control room indications convey that adequate high pressure injection cannot be restored before level falls below -

183 CFZ Performance Operator depresses both manual scram Manipulation of any six SRV controls on panel indicator pushbuttons, or places the Reactor Mode 9-3:

Switch to SHUTDOWN on panel 9-5. SRV-71A SRV-71B SRV-71E SRV-71G SRV-71H SRV-71C SRV-71D SRV-71F Performance RPS Group lights de-energized on panel 9-5. Crew will observe SRV light indication go from feedback Control Rod full -in indication on panel 9-5. green to red, amber pressure switch lights Reactor power trend on nuclear illuminate, reactor pressure lowering on SPDS instrumentation on panel 9-5. and panel 9-3 and 9-5 meters and recorders, and SRV tailpipe temperatures rise on recorder MS-TR-166.

Justification Procedure 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations The MSCWL (-183 CFZ) is the lowest RPV for the chosen requires upon recognition of a failure of water level at which the covered portion of the performance automatic action, the CRO shall manually reactor core will generate sufficient steam to limit perform those actions necessary to fulfill the preclude any clad temperature in the Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 7 of 37 safety function and report the completion of uncovered portion of the core from exceeding the manual action to the CRS as soon as 1500F. Emergency depressurization is possible. Failure of RPS to automatically allowed when level goes below TAF (-158 function would involve multiple sensor and CFZ) and should be performed, if in the sensor relay failures. The complexity of an judgment of the CRS, level cannot be automatic RPS failure would necessarily maintained above -183 CFZ. Since it is require a short amount of time to diagnose intended for the scenario supporting this CT to, and validate using control room indications. early in the event, clearly indicate no high Two minutes is a reasonable time for pressure injection systems can be made operators to recognize a scram signal, verify available to reverse the lowering level trend, the condition is valid, communicate the crew will have time to communicate and conditions to the crew, and insert a manual open 6 SRVs before -183 CFZ.

scram, without unnecessarily extending the level of degradation to plant safety.

BWR Owners App. B, step RC-1 App. B, Contingency#1 Group Appendix Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 8 of 37 Critical Tasks (CT-3) When operating injection systems cannot maintain RPV level and ECCS systems fail to automatically align for injection, crew manually aligns ECCS systems for injection:

  • For low pressure ECCS systems, prior to RPV pressure lowering below 200 psig.

EVENT 8 Safety Failure to recognize the auto valve alignment significance not occurring, and failure to take manual action per Conduct of Ops will result in unavailability of safety-related equipment necessary to provide adequate core cooling, otherwise resulting in core damage and a large offsite release.

Cueing Indication ECCS valves are not opening with initiation conditions present:

Green light on and Red lamp extinguished at respective injection handswitch on panel 9-3 or 9-4.

Indication of Drywell Pressure 1.83 psig Indication of RPV water level -113 RPV pressure below injection valve open permissive setpoint Performance Manipulation of controls as required to open indicator the affected ECCS injection valve(s) or pump turbine controls from panel 9-3 or 9-4:

Operator places affected ECCS injection valve(s) control switch(es) to OPEN on panel 9-3 or 9-4.

Performance Red light illuminates and Green light feedback extinguishes for the affected ECCS injection valve(s), as applicable, on panel 9-3 or 9-4.

RCIC or HPCI turbine speed and flow rate rises, as applicable, on panel 9-3 or 9-4.

Justification Attempting to align high pressure ECCS for the chosen systems must be performed to determine performance their availability by the time TAF is reached in limit order to properly implement EOP-1A decision steps regarding restoring and maintaining RPV level. Attempting to align low pressure ECCS systems can only be done one RPV pressure falls below the injection valve RPV pressure permissive and will only be effective once RPV pressure falls below the shutoff head of the respective ECCS pump. The reduction in RPV pressure will normally be via Emergency Depressurization, which is a separate critical task bounded by a minimum RPV level.

BWR Owners App. B, Contingency 1, step C1-1 Group Appendix SIMULATOR SET-UP Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 9 of 37 A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the simulator in IC 153, 100% power (EOL)

Batch File Name - None C. Change the simulator conditions as follows:

1. Auto Triggers Number File Name/Variable Description 5 zlorfsw29mv[2]==0 RFP A discharge valve red light off (valve closed) 3 zlopcissws1a[1]==1 Close MSIV 80A and green light illuminating deletes MSIV dmf fw13a leakage through 86A malfunction..
2. Malfunctions Number Title Trigger TD Severity Ramp Initial rp01a RPS Group 1 A N/A N/A N/A N/A rp01b RPS Group 2 A N/A N/A N/A N/A rp01c RPS Group 3 A N/A N/A N/A N/A rp01d RPS Group 4 A N/A N/A N/A N/A ms09e MSIV 86A slower closing time 2 N/A 0 N/A N/A fw13a Represents MSIV 86A not fully closed 2 10 97 N/A N/A mc01 Main Condenser air in-leakage 4 N/A 50 60 N/A fw18a FW line A break inside PC 5 N/A 20 N/A N/A RR loop break to replicate break rr20a downstream of the feedwater check 5 N/A 20 N/A N/A valve.

RHR-MO-25A mechanically bound rh04a A N/A N/A N/A N/A closed RHR-MO-25B mechanically bound rh04b A N/A N/A N/A N/A closed cs02a CS-MO-12A fails to auto open A N/A N/A N/A N/A cs02b CS-MO-12B fails to auto open A N/A N/A N/A N/A rp12 RWCU fails to isolate A N/A N/A N/A N/A Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 10 of 37 rc02 RCIC turbine trip 5 3:00 N/A N/A N/A

3. Remotes Number Title Trigger Value TD Ramp rd12 CRD Filter B in service 6 open N/A N/A rd13 Close CRD-13 & 14 (min flow) 7 0 N/A N/A
4. Overrides Instrument Tag Trigger TD Value Ramp zdirpssws1 Rx Mode Switch A N/A RUN N/A zdirpssws3a Man Scram A3 A N/A PUSH-OUT N/A zdirpssws3b Man Scram B3 A N/A PUSH-OUT N/A zaicrdfc301[2] CRD FC set point 1 N/A 0 N/A zdipcissws4a MSIV A Test PB 2 N/A ON N/A HPCI AOP C/S zdihpcisws20[1] N/A 0 PTL N/A HPCI AOP Green light zlophcisws20[1] N/A N/A OFF N/A HPCI Inop on SSSP zdieeswhp[1] N/A N/A PUSH-IN N/A MSIV 86A red light zlomslt86a[1] N/A ON N/A MSIV 86A red light Zlopcissws2a[2] N/A ON N/A D. Panel Setup
1. Ensure PMIS IDTs are blank
2. Ensure RR Controllers are selected to P.
3. Ensure REC Pump A is running and Selector Switch is in STANDBY.
4. Ensure copy of Procedure 2.2.65.1 ready for review during turnover.
5. Place HPCI Aux Oil Pump c/s to P-T-L.
6. Place Caution Tag on HPCI AOP c/s.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 11 of 37

7. Ensure HPCI INOP displayed on Safety System Status Panel.
8. At Panel 9-4-3, set SSST Y Voltage Adjust to Tap 2.
9. At Panel C, set SSST X Voltage Adjust to Tap 5.
10. On STARTUP TRANSFORMER BACKUP VOLTAGE BUS, placard:

TAP POSITION: 5 MAX 4473 MIN 4372 Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 12 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Shift REC Pumps A and B Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRS Directs BOP to Shift Rec Pumps A and B per Procedure 2.2.65.1, Section 8.

NOTE 1 - When starting REC pump, it is normal for associated pump low pressure alarm to come in and immediately clear.

NOTE 2 - For better temperature control, it is preferred to run two REC pumps aligned to in-service HX or HX with its TCV in Auto.

8.1 Start desired idle pump.

8.2 Secure selected running pump.

8.3 Check system pressure > 65 psig on REC-PI-452, REC HEADER PRESSURE.

8.4 Check drywell flow remains in green band on REC-FI-453, SUPPLY HEADER FLOW.

8.5 IF REC pump NORMAL/STANDBY selector switches must be manipulated in step 8.6, THEN perform one of following:

BOP 8.5.1 IF both NORMAL/STANDBY selector switches in one division will be in NORMAL during swap, THEN inform SM that associated REC Subsystem is inoperable.

8.5.2 IF both NORMAL/STANDBY selector switches in one division will be in STANDBY during swap, THEN inform SM that associated Diesel Generator is inoperable. (Not expected to be performed.)

8.6 (Independent Verification) For each REC division, ensure selector switch for one running REC pump in STANDBY and other selector switch in NORMAL.

8.7 Monitor REC temperature and adjust REC HX outlet temperature per Section 5 or 6, as required, to maintain REC temperature stable.

NOTE to Examiner: Depending upon how the REC Pump Selectors switches are manipulated determines whether the Diesel Generator or the REC subsystem is inoperable for a short duration. (See Procedure steps 8.5.1 and 8.5.2 above)

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 13 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Shift REC Pumps A and B Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Enter LCO for REC Subsystem Inoperable.

CRS TS Enter LCO 3.7.3 Condition B, Restore REC Subsystem to an operable status in 30 days.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 14 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CRD-FC-301, CRD Flow Controller automatic signal fails low Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner, insert Trigger 1, to fail CRD-FC-301 output to zero flow.

Operator Report CRD system flows and pressures abnormal. Respond to alarm ATC 9-5-2/E-6, CRD CHARGING HEADER HIGH PRESSURE.

NOTE to Examiner: Crew may respond per the alarm card and not enter Abnormal Procedure 2.4CRD.

Enter Abnormal Procedure 2.4CRD, direct ATC to perform subsequent CRS operator actions of 2.4CRD.

Take responsibility for 2.4CRD scram action:

ATC If more than one rod is drifting, SCRAM and concurrently enter Procedure 2.1.5.

Enter 2.4CRD Attachment 5 for abnormal cooling water flows:

ATC Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 15 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

CRD-FC-301, CRD Flow Controller automatic signal fails low Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior ATC Take manual control of FC-301 and adjust drive water flow to 45-50 gpm.

END OF EVENT Notes Proceed to the next event at direction of the Lead Examiner.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 16 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Outboard MSIV 86A fails partially closed Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert Trigger 2 to cause Main Operator Steam Line A outboard valve, MSIV 86A, to fail partially closed.

NOTE to Examiners: The APRM Upscale/Rod Block alarms may annunciate.

A small amount of steam Flow is indicated on RFC-FI-88B on Panel 9-5.

Recognizes and reports power rise on all channels of APRM recorders.

If applicable, refers to alarm cards for the following possible alarms:

ATC 9-5-1/A-4 Rod Withdrawal Block 9-5-1/B-8 APRM Upscale 9-5-2/F-4 RVLC SYSTEM LOGIC INITIATED 9-5-2/G-4 RVLC SYSTEM TROUBLE Checks panel indications and recognize pressure transient on recorders.

CREW Diagnose and recognize MSIV 86A indicates intermediate and some flow is still present on RFC-FI-88B on Panel 9-5.

Enters 2.4MSIV:

CRS Directs BOP to perform remaining action of 2.4MSIV.

May enter 5.1BREAK as directed by alarm 9-5-2/F-4.

Performs rapid power reduction IAW 2.1.10 hard card:

NOTE - Power reduction may be stopped at any point when determined to be no longer needed.

1.1 IF power change is going to be > 10% and OWC Injection System operating in Operator Flow Control Mode, THEN place OWC INJECTION SYS ENABLE switch to SHUTDOWN (Panel A).

CAUTION - When reducing core flow from high power, rod line could ATC exceed 118.0%.

NOTE 1 - If conditions exist where RR flow reduction cannot be reduced rapidly, rod insertion per Section 9 may be required.

NOTE 2 - Core flow reduction may result in entry into LCO 3.4.1 due to recirculation loop flow mis-match.

1.2 While monitoring rod line and feedwater flow, reduce core flow to 40x106 lbs/hr using Reactor Recirculation.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 17 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Outboard MSIV 86A fails partially closed Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1.2.1 IF RRMG is being controlled locally, THEN operate per Procedure 2.4RR.

1.2.2 Before rod line exceeds 118.0%, go to Section 9.

1.3 WHEN core flow is ~ 40x106 lbs/hr, THEN go to Section 9 and perform remaining applicable steps of rapid power reduction.

Booth If crew closes MSIV 80A, ensure Trigger 3 activates and DELETES Operator malfunction fw13a.

Performs 2.4MSIV actions as directed:

4.2 Performed by ATC.

4.3 Places control switch for affected MSIV(s) to CLOSE.

4.4 IF only one line is isolated or conditions did not result in a scram, THEN maintain MSIV(s) closed until Engineering Evaluation has been performed.

NOTE - MS-MO-78, OUTBD THROTTLE VLV, stroke time is ~ 24 seconds.

BOP 4.5 Ensure main steam line drain is in service as follows (PNL 9-4):

4.5.1 Ensure MS-MO-79, RO BYPASS VLV, is closed.

4.5.2 Throttle open MS-MO-78, OUTBD THROTTLE VLV, to intermediate position.

4.5.3 Fully open MS-MO-78, OUTBD THROTTLE VLV.

4.5.4 Open MS-MO-77, OUTBD ISOL VLV.

Booth Role Play: If sent as building operator to investigate MSIV SOLENOID Operator CURRENT METERS, wait 2 minutes, then report all meters in Green band.

Completes power reduction to 70% by inserting control rods IAW 2.1.10:

9.5.1 Insert Emergency Power Reduction Rods per Procedure 10.13:

8. EMERGENCY POWER REDUCTION 8.1 Obtain Attachment 6 from the Control Rod Sequence Package.

ATC 8.2 Insert rods in the order listed on Attachment 6 from the current position to 00 using continuous insert. Do not stop at intermediate positions.

8.3 Operator and Concurrent Verifier initials are not required on this attachment.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 18 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Outboard MSIV 86A fails partially closed Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Reviews Technical Specifications:

Enter TS LCO 3.6.1.3 Condition A for MSIV 86A inoperable.

Required Actions to isolate the penetration by at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve with a Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for MSIV AND CRS verify affected penetration flow path is isolated with a Completion Time of once per 31 days.

TS Determines the penetration is isolated within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

May enter TS LCO 3.6.1.3 Condition D for MSIV leakage.

Required Action is to restore leakage within limits with a Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to the next event at direction of the Lead Examiner.

Operator Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 19 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Air in-leakage causes loss of main condenser vacuum.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner, insert Trigger 4 to cause a loss of Main Condenser vacuum.

Operator BOP Report main condenser vacuum going away.

Enter Abnormal Procedure 2.4VAC and direct BOP to perform subsequent CRS operator actions.

Take ownership of 2.4VAC Scram actions:

3.1.2 IF vacuum cannot be maintained 23" Hg, THEN:

ATC 3.1.2.1 IF Annunciator 9-5-2/C-4 clear, THEN SCRAM and enter Procedure 2.1.5.

Take action per Abnormal Procedure 2.4VAC:

3. IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS ATC 3.1 For lowering condenser vacuum:

3.1.1 Reduce power per Procedure 2.1.10 to maintain vacuum 23" Hg.

Take action per Abnormal Procedure 2.4VAC:

3. IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 3.2 Hg, THEN:

3.2.1 IF Annunciator 9-5-2/C-4 clear, THEN SCRAM and enter BOP Procedure 2.1.5.

3.2.2 Trip Main Turbine.

3.2.3 IF reactor not scrammed, THEN enter Procedure 2.2.77.

Provide vacuum critical parameter at which the reactor is to be scrammed.

Procedure 2.1.5 Attachments 1, 2, and 3 and scram are ATCs responsibility.

CRS Procedure 2.1.5 Attachments 4 and 5 and trip Main Turbine and close MSIVs are BOPs responsibility.

Provide BOP the critical parameter for closing MSIVs.

ATC When directed by the CRS, manually scram the reactor per Procedure Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 20 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Air in-leakage causes loss of main condenser vacuum.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 2.1.5, Attachment 1, Mitigating Task Scram Actions:

1. MITIGATING TASK SCRAM ACTIONS 1.1 Press both RX SCRAM buttons.

1.2 Place REACTOR MODE switch to REFUEL.

1.3 IF reactor power > 3%, THEN perform following:

1.3.1 Place REACTOR MODE switch to SHUTDOWN.

1.3.2 Initiate ARI.

END OF EVENT Notes Note the next event (ATWS) is already active NOTE to Examiners :

CRS actions start on the next page of the Scenario Guide.

ATC actions start on Page 27 of the Scenario Guide.

BOP actions start on Page 33 of the Scenario Guide.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 21 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Electrical ATWS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiners: ATWS Malfunctions and RWCU isolation failures are already active.

Enter EOP 1A and transition to EOP 6A (Power/Pressure control) and EOP CRS 7A (RPV Level control).

CREW Recognize the ATWS is an electrical block.

EOP 6A Power CRS NOTE to Examiners: If the crew recognizes the ATWS is an electronic block, they may not enter EOP 7A and take those actions.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 22 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Electrical ATWS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior EOP 7A RPV Level CRS Booth Role Play: If directed to install PTM 103 to defeat RCIC trip, wait 2 Operator minutes and report you cannot get the door open to lift the wire.

(CT-1): When RPS fails to scram the reactor on a manual scram signal, within two minutes initiate the ARI System.

CRS Transition from EOPs 6A and 7A to EOP 1A after all control rods full in.

EOP-1A step RC/L-1:

Directs BOP/ATC to verify CRS PCIS isolations per 2.1.22 ECCS initiations DG initiations END OF EVENT Notes The next event goes active when Reactor Feed Pump A discharge valve (RF-MO-29) is closed.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 23 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7 & 8 Event

Description:

FW Line A break in DW (LOCA), ED on low RPV level RWCU fails to isolate on low RPV level, & Low pressure ECCS injection valves fail to open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Trigger 5 causes Feedwater Line A to rupture in the drywell. (A RR Booth break is also added to represent a leak downstream of the feedwater Operator check valve).

CREW Recognize and report high drywell pressure, LOCA.

CRS Enters EOP-1A and EOP-3A on drywell pressure high.

CRS Enters and directs ATC to perform 2.4MC-RF for Feedwater line break.

EOP 3A CRS Per EOP 3A, directs Torus Sprays and then Drywell Sprays into service..

Per EOP 3A, directs Drywell pressure maintained between +2 psig and +10 psig.

Role Play: When directed by BOP to install EOP PTMs97-100, wait 3 Booth minutes then put in the overrides for the PTMs. Report back to BOP Operator when PTMs installed.

CRS Assigns RPV water level as critical parameter.

CRS EOP 1A Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 24 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7 & 8 Event

Description:

FW Line A break in DW (LOCA), ED on low RPV level RWCU fails to isolate on low RPV level, & Low pressure ECCS injection valves fail to open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior EOP 1A CRS Per EOP 1A, directs ATC to maximize CRD flow Per EOP 1A, directs ATC to initiate SLC for level control Role Play: If directed to manually close CRD-63, wait 3 minutes and report it is closed. (Valve is not modeled)

Role Play: If directed to place CRD Filter B in service, wait 2 minutes Booth and report filter is in service. (Valves are not modeled)

Operator Role Play: If directed to place Flow Control Valve B in service, wait 2 minutes and Insert Trigger 6.

Role Play: If directed to close CRD-13 and CRD-14, wait 2 minutes and Insert Trigger 7.

EOP 1A CRS Per EOP 1A, when RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above -150 inches CFZ, directs ATC to line up Core Spray and LPCI for Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 25 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7 & 8 Event

Description:

FW Line A break in DW (LOCA), ED on low RPV level RWCU fails to isolate on low RPV level, & Low pressure ECCS injection valves fail to open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior injection.

EOP 1A CRS When RPV level goes below -158 inches CFZ and cannot be maintained above -183 inches CFZ, emergency depressurization is required.

Enters EOP-2A:

Verifies suppression pool water level is >6 feet PC-LRPR1A (Panel 9-3-1)

Directs BOP to open 6 SRVs (CT-2): When RPV level lowers to -158 CFZ (TAF) and cannot be maintained above -183 CFZ (MSCWL) and insufficient high pressure injection systems are available to restore level, crew begins to Emergency Depressurize by opening the first of six SRVs before RPV level lowers below

-183 CFZ. (Momentary shrink below -183 due to automatic SRV closure does not constitute failure of this critical task).

(CT-3): When operating injection systems cannot maintain RPV level and ECCS systems fail to automatically align for injection, crew manually aligns ECCS systems for injection:

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 26 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7 & 8 Event

Description:

FW Line A break in DW (LOCA), ED on low RPV level RWCU fails to isolate on low RPV level, & Low pressure ECCS injection valves fail to open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior For low pressure ECCS systems, prior to RPV pressure lowering below200 psig.

Role Play: If directed to manually open RHR injection valves, wait 5 Booth minutes and report you cannot get either valve to come off its closed Operator seat.

CRS Directs RPV level restored and controlled between+3 inches to +54 inches.

When level rises above -158 inches CFZ, controls injection from CS A(B),

ATC/BOP SLC, and CRD by throttling valves and/or cycling pumps to raise and maintain level +3 inches to +54 inches.

NOTE to Examiners: Scenario objectives have been met when the crew has emergency depressurized and level is being raised in a controlled manner to restore it to +3 inches to

+54 inches.

END OF SCENARIO Notes Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, place the simulator in freeze and Operator tell the crew to stop operating.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 27 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Electrical ATWS ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiners: ATWS Malfunctions and RWCU isolation failures are already active.

ATC Report ATWS conditions and reactor power level. RECORD TIME:_______

CREW Recognize the ATWS is an electrical block.

NOTE to Examiners: If the crew recognizes the ATWS is an electronic block, they may not enter EOP 7A and take those actions.

(CT-1): When RPS fails to scram the reactor on a manual scram signal, within two minutes initiate the ARI System.

Place Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.

Initiate ARI. RECORD TIME:_______

ATC Report reactor power level to CRS.

Report ARI was successful in inserting all control rods full in.

END OF EVENT Notes The next event goes active when Reactor Feed Pump A discharge valve (RF-MO-29) is closed.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 28 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7 & 8 Event

Description:

FW Line A break in DW (LOCA), ED on low RPV level RWCU fails to isolate on low RPV level, & Low pressure ECCS injection valves fail to open ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Trigger 5 causes Feedwater Line A to rupture in the drywell. (A RR Booth break is also added to represent a leak downstream of the feedwater Operator check valve).

CREW Recognize and report high drywell pressure, LOCA.

ATC Recognizes and reports Feedwater Line break inside containment.

Perform the actions of 2.4MC-RF to secure Feedwater and condensate:

4.2 IF system piping not intact, THEN perform following:

4.2.1 IF break is endangering personnel or equipment necessary for safe operation, THEN perform following:

4.2.1.1 Concurrently enter Procedure 2.1.5.

4.2.1.2 Ensure RFPs tripped.

4.2.1.3 Ensure RFP discharge valves closed.

4.2.1.4 At a RFPT/RVLC HMI, perform following:

ATC/BOP

a. Select RFPT-1A or RFPT-1B System.
b. Select STARTUP VALVE screen.
c. Press EMER CLOSE button.
d. Confirm pop-up screen.

4.2.1.5 Ensure condensate booster pumps tripped.

4.2.1.6 IF necessary to stop the leak, THEN trip condensate pumps.

Role Play: When directed by BOP to install EOP PTMs97-100, wait 3 Booth minutes then put in the overrides for the PTMs. Report back to BOP Operator when PTMs installed.

Booth Role Play: If directed to manually close CRD-63, wait 3 minutes and Operator report it is closed. (Valve is not modeled)

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 29 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7 & 8 Event

Description:

FW Line A break in DW (LOCA), ED on low RPV level RWCU fails to isolate on low RPV level, & Low pressure ECCS injection valves fail to open ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Role Play: If directed to place CRD Filter B in service, wait 2 minutes and report filter is in service. (Valves are not modeled)

Role Play: If directed to place Flow Control Valve B in service, wait 2 minutes and Insert Trigger 6.

Role Play: If directed to close CRD-13 and CRD-14, wait 2 minutes and Insert Trigger 7.

Maximizes CRD flow as directed IAW 5.8.4:

9.3 Start second CRD Pump A by placing its control switch to start on panel 9-5.

9.4 Close CRD-63, NBI CONTINUOUS BASKFILL SHUTOFF. (R-903-SE) 9.5 Place Standby CRD discharge filter in service (R-903-SE):

9.5.2 FILTER B 9.5.2.1 Ensure CRD-21, CRD FILTER 1B OUTLET, is closed.

9.5.2.2 Ensure CRD-20, CRD FILTER 1B INLET, is open.

9.5.2.3 Vent Filter B with CRD-22, CRD FILTER B VENT.

9.5.2.4 Throttle open CRD-21 until pressure equalized, then fully open.

9.6 Place Standby CRD System FCV in service to operate in parallel ATC with in service FCV as follows (R-903-SE):

9.6.2 FLOW CONTROL VALVE B 9.6.2.1 Ensure CRD-26, FLOW CONT. VLV. AO19B INLET, is open.

9.6.2.2 Place CRD-MA-245B, SYSTEM FLOW CONTROL MANUAL/AUTO STATION, to AUTO.

9.6.2.3 Throttle open CRD-27, FLOW CONT. VLV. AO19B OUTLET, until pressure equalized, then fully open.

9.7 Close CRD-13, CRD PUMP A MINIMUM FLOW (R-881-SE QUAD).

9.8 Close CRD-14, CRD PUMP B MINIMUM FLOW (R-881-SE QUAD).

9.9 Places CRD-FC-301 to MAN and throttle open in-service FCV.

Informs CRS CRD injection has been maximized.

Sends building operator to perform local steps of 5.8.4 section 9.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 30 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7 & 8 Event

Description:

FW Line A break in DW (LOCA), ED on low RPV level RWCU fails to isolate on low RPV level, & Low pressure ECCS injection valves fail to open ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Initiates SLC as directed IAW 5.8.4:

6.2 WHEN CRS directs, THEN commence Alternate RPV Injection as follows (PANEL 9-5):

6.2.1 Place following keylock switches to START:

6.2.1.1 SLC PUMP A.

6.2.1.2 SLC PUMP B.

6.2.2 Verify red indicating lights for each pump energize.

6.2.3 Verify SLC-14A, LOOP A SQUIB VALVE, has fired by observing that SQUIB VALVE READY Light 1106A has extinguished.

6.2.4 Verify SLC-14B, LOOP B SQUIB VALVE, has fired by observing that SQUIB VALVE READY Light 1106B has extinguished.

6.2.5 Observe SLC pump discharge pressure rises above RPV pressure as indicated on SLC-PI-65, PUMP PRESS.

6.2.6 Inform CRS that Alternate RPV Injection with SLC from boron tank has commenced.

ATC/BOP Verifies PCIS Group Isolations IAW Procedure 2.1.22 or Hard Card.

Recognize failure of RWCU to isolate on low RPV level or SLC Pump CREW actuation.

Place RWCU-MO-15 and 18 control switches to CLOSE.

ATC/BOP Report valves closed.

Verifies Core Spray is lined up for injection with pump running on panel 9-3.

Ensures at least one LPCI loop is aligned for injection with at least one pump ATC/BOP running on panel 9-3.

If RHR loop was in containment spray mode, on panel 9-3:

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 31 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7 & 8 Event

Description:

FW Line A break in DW (LOCA), ED on low RPV level RWCU fails to isolate on low RPV level, & Low pressure ECCS injection valves fail to open ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior o Ensures MO-26A(B) is closed o Ensures MO-39A(B) is closed o Ensures MO-27A(B) is open (CT-3): When operating injection systems cannot maintain RPV level and ECCS systems fail to automatically align for injection, crew manually aligns ECCS systems for injection:

For low pressure ECCS systems, prior to RPV pressure lowering below200 psig.

Verifies low pressure ECCS injection valves open on panel 9-3 when pressure goes below the injection valve auto open permissive (approximately 400 psig).

Core Spray - INBD INJ THROTTLE VLV MO 12A(B)

LPCI A(B) - INBD INJECTION VLV MO 25A(B)

ATC/BOP Reports Core Spray and LPCI injection valves not opening.

Reports RHR-MO-25A(B) cannot open with control switch.

Opens CS-MO-12A(B) with control switch.

Core Spray A(B) - PUMP FLOW CS-FI-50A(B)

Role Play: If directed to manually open RHR injection valves, wait 5 Booth minutes and report you cannot get either valve to come off its closed Operator seat.

ATC/BOP Reports CS injection flow and level rising.

When level rises above -158 inches CFZ, controls injection from CS A(B),

ATC/BOP SLC, and CRD by throttling valves and/or cycling pumps to raise and maintain level +3 inches to +54 inches.

Notes Return to Page 26 for completion of ATC actions.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 32 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Electrical ATWS BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiners: ATWS Malfunctions and RWCU isolation failures are already active.

CREW Recognize the ATWS is an electrical block.

NOTE to Examiners: If the crew recognizes the ATWS is an electronic block, they may not enter EOP 7A and take those actions.

Booth Role Play: If directed to install PTM 103 to defeat RCIC trip, wait 2 Operator minutes and report you cannot get the door open to lift the wire.

END OF EVENT Notes The next event goes active when Reactor Feed Pump A discharge valve (RF-MO-29) is closed.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 33 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7 & 8 Event

Description:

FW Line A break in DW (LOCA), ED on low RPV level RWCU fails to isolate on low RPV level, & Low pressure ECCS injection valves fail to open BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Trigger 5 causes Feedwater Line A to rupture in the drywell. (A RR Booth break is also added to represent a leak downstream of the feedwater Operator check valve).

CREW Recognize and report high drywell pressure, LOCA.

Perform the actions of 2.4MC-RF to secure Feedwater and condensate:

4.2 IF system piping not intact, THEN perform following:

4.2.1 IF break is endangering personnel or equipment necessary for safe operation, THEN perform following:

4.2.1.1 Concurrently enter Procedure 2.1.5.

4.2.1.2 Ensure RFPs tripped.

4.2.1.3 Ensure RFP discharge valves closed.

4.2.1.4 At a RFPT/RVLC HMI, perform following:

BOP/ATC

a. Select RFPT-1A or RFPT-1B System.
b. Select STARTUP VALVE screen.
c. Press EMER CLOSE button.
d. Confirm pop-up screen.

4.2.1.5 Ensure condensate booster pumps tripped.

4.2.1.6 IF necessary to stop the leak, THEN trip condensate pumps.

Checks low pressure ECCS systems have initiated Checks low pressure ECCS pumps have started on panel 9-3:

o RHR Pump A BOP o RHR Pump C o Core Spray Pump B o RHR Pump B Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 34 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7 & 8 Event

Description:

FW Line A break in DW (LOCA), ED on low RPV level RWCU fails to isolate on low RPV level, & Low pressure ECCS injection valves fail to open BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior o RHR Pump D Reports ECCS status to CRS.

BOP Checks DG1 and DG2 are operating, with Service Water.

Per EOP 1A, stabilize RPV pressure below 1050 psig - verifies Low-Low Set controlling pressure on panel 9-3.

BOP If ADS timer has initiated THEN inhibit ADS by placing ADS A and B inhibit switches to INHIBIT on panel 9-3.

Role Play: When directed by BOP to install EOP PTMs97-100, wait 3 Booth minutes then put in the overrides for the PTMs. Report back to BOP Operator when PTMs installed.

2. Containment Sprays (RHR Hard Card) 2.1 IF required, with CRS permission, THEN place CONTMT COOLING 2/3 CORE VALVE CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL OVERRD.

2.2 IF required, THEN place CONTMT COOLING VLV CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL.

2.3 Ensure RHR-MO-39 A(B) open.

2.4 IF reactor pressure 300 psig and injection not desired, THEN close RHR-MO-27B, OUTBD INJECTION VLV.

2.5 Ensure RHR PUMP(s) running.

BOP NOTE - RHR pump operation at minimum flow should be limited to

< 15 minutes or pump damage may result.

2.6 Throttle RHR-MO-38 A(B) to maintain desired containment pressure.

2.7 Throttle RHR-MO-66 A(B) to obtain desired cooling rate.

2.8 IF Drywell Spray required, THEN perform following:

2.8.1 Open RHR-MO-31 A(B).

2.8.2 Throttle RHR-MO-26 A(B) to maintain desired containment pressure.

2.9 IF PCIS Group 6 lights lit on Panel 9-5, THEN ensure one of following open:

2.9.1 REC-MO-711; or Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 35 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7 & 8 Event

Description:

FW Line A break in DW (LOCA), ED on low RPV level RWCU fails to isolate on low RPV level, & Low pressure ECCS injection valves fail to open BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 2.9.2 REC-MO-714.

2.10 Place RHR SW System in service:

2.10.1 Start SWBP(s).

2.10.2 Adjust SW-MO-89 A(B) to maintain flow between 2500 and 4000 gpm.

2.11 Throttle RHR-MO-66 A(B) to maintain desired cooling rate.

Maintain Drywell pressure between +2 psig and +10 psig.

BOP/ATC Verifies PCIS Group Isolations IAW Procedure 2.1.22 or Hard Card.

Recognize failure of RWCU to isolate on low RPV level or SLC Pump CREW actuation.

Place RWCU-MO-15 and 18 control switches to CLOSE.

BOP/ATC Report valves closed.

Verifies Core Spray is lined up for injection with pump running on panel 9-3.

Ensures at least one LPCI loop is aligned for injection with at least one pump running on panel 9-3.

BOP/ATC If RHR loop was in containment spray mode, on panel 9-3:

o Ensures MO-26A(B) is closed o Ensures MO-39A(B) is closed o Ensures MO-27A(B) is open (CT-2): When RPV level lowers to -158 CFZ (TAF) and cannot be maintained above -183 CFZ (MSCWL) and insufficient high pressure injection systems are available to restore level, crew begins to Emergency Depressurize by opening the first of six SRVs before RPV level lowers below

-183 CFZ. (Momentary shrink below -183 due to automatic SRV closure does not constitute failure of this critical task).

Opens 6 of the following SRVs by placing control switches to OPEN on panel 9-3.

SRV-71A BOP SRV-71B SRV-71E SRV-71G SRV-71H Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 2 Page 36 of 37 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7 & 8 Event

Description:

FW Line A break in DW (LOCA), ED on low RPV level RWCU fails to isolate on low RPV level, & Low pressure ECCS injection valves fail to open BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SRV-71C SRV-71D SRV-71F Verifies red solenoid light and amber SRV tailpipe pressure switch light illuminate and green solenoid light extinguishes Verifies RPV pressure falls (CT-3): When operating injection systems cannot maintain RPV level and ECCS systems fail to automatically align for injection, crew manually aligns ECCS systems for injection:

For low pressure ECCS systems, prior to RPV pressure lowering below200 psig.

Verifies low pressure ECCS injection valves open on panel 9-3 when pressure goes below the injection valve auto open permissive (approximately 400 psig).

Core Spray - INBD INJ THROTTLE VLV MO 12A(B)

LPCI A(B) - INBD INJECTION VLV MO 25A(B)

BOP/ATC Reports Core Spray and LPCI injection valves not opening.

Reports RHR-MO-25A(B) cannot open with control switch.

Opens CS-MO-12A(B) with control switch.

Core Spray A(B) - PUMP FLOW CS-FI-50A(B)

Role Play: If directed to manually open RHR injection valves, wait 5 Booth minutes and report you cannot get either valve to come off its closed Operator seat.

Notes Return to Page 26 for completion of BOP actions.

Rev. 2

INITIAL CONDITIONS A. Plant Status:

1. 100% power, near End of Cycle.
2. Rod Sequence Information: RO to provide B. Tech. Spec. Limitations in effect:
1. LCO 3.5.1 C.2 restore HPCI to Operable status in 14 days
2. Currently on day 2 of LCO 3.5.1.
3. RCIC is verified OPERABLE.

C. Significant problems/abnormalities:

1. HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump motor replacement.

D. PRA Risk:

Green E. Evolutions/maintenance for the on-coming shift:

1. Shift REC Pumps A and B so B is running and A is secured per Procedure 2.2.65.1, Section 8 so mechanical maintenance can take vibration readings.

AVOID entry into TS 3.8.1 for DG1 inoperable during the pump shift.

2. Electrical Maintenance working on replacing the HPCI AOP motor.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 1 of 47 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 4 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Shift RRMG oil pumps
2. Place RHR SP cooling in service
3. Respond to CRD pump trip
4. Respond to a RR Pump A #1 seal failure and subsequent pump trip
5. Respond to a RR Pump A #2 seal failure. Vent PC
6. Respond to a FW line break inside PC
7. Respond to failure of HPCI to automatically start
8. Respond to loss of RPV level indication, flood the RPV to the MSLs Initial Conditions: Plant is operating at 100% power Inoperable Equipment: None Turnover:

The plant is operating at 100% power.

Planned activities for this shift are:

Shift RRMG oil pumps Place RHR SPC in service Maintain present power level Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario.

Validation Time: 75 minutes Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 2 of 47 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description 1 N/A N (ATC,CRS) Shift RRMG lube oil pumps N (BOP,CRS) 2 rf rh14 Place RHR loop B in SPC, Min flow valve de-energizes open.

TS (CRS) 3 rd08b C (ATC,CRS) CRD Pump B trip.

C (BOP) 4 rr10a A (CREW) RR Pump A Seal #1 leak and RR Pump A trip.

TS (CRS)

C rr04b 5 (BOP,ATC,CRS) RR Pump A Seal #2 leak, vent PC.

rr11a A (CREW)

FW Line B break in PC-Scram M (CT-1) Initiate drywell sprays when torus pressure 6 fw18b exceeds 10 psig, prior to drywell temperature reaching (CREW) 280F and prior to torus pressure exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) curve.

7 hp01 C (BOP,CRS) HPCI fails to automatically start.

Loss of RPV level instruments, RPV flooding.

(CT-2) When RPV level cannot be determined and torus level is above 6', open six SRVs before drywell radiation reaches 150 R/hr or entering PC Flooding.

(CT-3) When RPV level cannot be determined and the reactor has been depressurized below the shutoff head M of the respective pump(s), inject into the RPV to flood 8 NBI various to the Main Steam Lines before drywell radiation (CREW) reaches 150 R/hr or entering PC Flooding.

(CT-4) When RPV level cannot be determined and at least 1 SRV is manually opened, isolate MSIVs, MSL drains, HPCI steam supply, and RCIC steam supply, prior to RPV water level rising to the bottom of the main steam lines.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

  • Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

CREW notation for Abnormal (A) and Major (M) events denotes ATC, BOP, and CRS are credited.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 3 of 47 Quantitative Attributes Table ES-304-1 Attribute Actual Description Target Malfunctions after 1-2 1 HPCI fails to automatically start.

EOP entry RR pump trip.

Abnormal Events 2-4 2 RR seal leakage FW line break inside PC Major Transients 1-2 2 Loss of all RPV level instruments EOP-1A EOP entries requiring substantive action 1-2 2 EOP-3A EOP contingencies requiring substantive 0-2 1 EOP- 2B action (CT-1) Initiate drywell sprays when torus pressure exceeds 10 psig, prior to drywell temperature reaching 280F and prior to torus pressure exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) curve.

(CT-2) When RPV level cannot be determined and torus level is above 6', open six SRVs before drywell radiation reaches 150 R/hr or entering PC Flooding.

EOP based Critical (CT-3) When RPV level cannot be determined and the 2-3 4 reactor has been depressurized below the shutoff head Tasks of the respective pump(s), inject into the RPV to flood to the Main Steam Lines before drywell radiation reaches 150 R/hr or entering PC Flooding.

(CT-4) When RPV level cannot be determined and at least 1 SRV is manually opened, isolate MSIVs, MSL drains, HPCI steam supply, and RCIC steam supply, prior to RPV water level rising to the bottom of the main steam lines.

Shift RRMG oil pumps Normal Events N/A 2 Place RHR Suppression Pool Cooling in service Reactivity Manipulations N/A 0 N/A CRD Pump trip.

Instrument/ RR Pump A Seal #1 failure with RR pump trip.

N/A 4 Component Failures RR Pump A Seal #2 failure.

HPCI fails to automatically start CRD Pump trip.

RR Pump A Seal #1 failure with RR pump trip.

Total Malfunctions N/A 4 RR Pump A Seal #2 failure.

HPCI fails to automatically start Top 10 systems and operator actions important to risk that are tested:

Nuclear Boiler Instrumentation (Event 8)

Residual Heat Removal in Containment Spray Mode (Event 6)

HPCI (Event 7)

ADS/SRV Operator fails to depressurize with SRVs Operator fails to initiate ADS and initiate ECCS early Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 4 of 47 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 100% power.

Event 1 After the crew takes the watch, the ATC shifts RRMG oil pumps B1 and B3 per procedure 2.2.68.1. The oil pump shift is in preparation for tagging out the oil pump later in the shift.

Event 2 The BOP then places RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling in preparation a HPCI run the next shift. As the system's minimum flow valve starts to close it de-energizes in an intermediate position. The CRS declares the LPCI subsystem inoperable per LCO 3.5.1, Condition A. The valve is declared inoperable per LCO 3.6.2.3, Condition A.

Event 3 (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

After Technical Specifications are addressed for LPCI inoperable, the operating CRD pump trips requiring the ATC to start the standby pump.

Event 4 (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

After the CRD pump trip is addressed, RR Pump A develops a #1 seal failure. The crews responds to rising seal temperatures and lowers RR pump speed.

Subsequently the RR pump trips, placing plant operation near the buffer region of the power to flow map. The CRS enters TS LCO 3.4.1.

Event 5 (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

After the RR pump trip is addressed, the pump's #2 seal develops a leak requiring the pump to be isolated and the PC to be vented with Standby Gas Treatment.

Event 6 (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

After the #2 seal failure is addressed, FW line B develops a leak inside PC. The reactor scrams on high drywell pressure. The crew initiates Torus and Drywell Sprays (CT-1).

Event 7 (No Trigger required)

HPCI fails to automatically start on high drywell pressure and must be started manually.

Event 8 (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

All RPV level instrumentation is lost and the crew emergency depressurizes (CT-2).

Steam lines are isolated (CT-3) and the crew uses injection systems to flood the RPV to the bottom of the Main Steam Lines (CT-4).

Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 5 of 47 The exercise ends when emergency depressurization is complete and RPV level is maintained at the bottom of the MSLs.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 6 of 47 Critical Tasks (CT-1) Initiate drywell sprays when torus (CT-2) When RPV level cannot be pressure exceeds 10 psig, prior to drywell determined and torus level is above 6',

temperature reaching 280F and prior to open six SRVs before drywell radiation torus pressure exceeding the Pressure reaches 150 R/hr or entering PC Flooding.

Suppression Pressure (PSP) curve.

EVENT 6 8 Safety Drywell sprays are initiated in two legs of Depressurization of the RPV is necessary to significance EOP-3A: Temperature and Pressure control. perform the RPV flooding actions for the following reasons:

The open SRVs establish a path from Regarding drywell temperature, if operation the RPV capable of rejecting energy of all available drywell cooling is unable to in excess of decay heat to ensure the terminate increasing drywell temperature RPV flooding actions are successful.

before the structural design temperature limit Reduced RPV pressure results in increased injection flow rates, initiated to affect the required drywell reducing the total time required to flood the RPV.

temperature reduction status of the DSIL and Reduced RPV pressure reduces the adequate core cooling permitting. Spray water inventory loss through operation effects a drywell pressure and non-isolable leaks and breaks.

temperature reduction through the combined Dynamic loading on the SRVs and effects of evaporative cooling and convective downstream piping is minimized as cooling. RPV water level reaches and is discharged through these valves.

Regarding drywell pressure, operation of RPV depressurization can be most easily and drywell sprays reduces primary containment rapidly accomplished by opening SRVs. The pressure by condensing any steam that may ADS valves are used first since they are the be present and by absorbing heat from the most reliable, considering component containment atmosphere through the qualifications, pneumatic supply systems, combined effects of evaporative and initiation circuitry, and control power. In convective cooling. Drywell sprays are addition, the relative locations of the ADS initiated when torus pressure exceeds the valve discharges provide uniform distribution of Torus Spray Initiation Pressure (10# torus the heat load around the suppression pool.

pressure) to preclude chugging the cyclic The direction to open all ADS valves requires condensation of steam at the downcomer manual action, even if the valves are already openings of the drywell vents. When a steam open on high pressure. Automatic valve bubble collapses at the exit of the operation in the relief or safety mode does not downcomers, the rush of water drawn into accomplish the objective of this step, even if the downcomers to fill the void induces low-low set logic has actuated. RPV flooding stresses at the junction of the downcomers conditions are defined based on steam flow and the vent header in Mark I containments through the SRVs. Direct manual control must and at the junction of the downcomers. be established to ensure that the valves Repeated application of such stresses could remain open as RPV pressure decreases.

cause fatigue failure of these joints; thereby, SRVs may be opened only if suppression pool creating a direct path between the drywell water level is above the elevation of the top of and torus. When drywell sprays are initiated, the discharge devices. If the SRVs were the resulting pressure reduction opens the opened with the discharge devices exposed, vacuum breakers, drawing non-condensable steam would pass directly into the suppression from the torus back into the drywell. This chamber airspace, bypassing the suppression condition defines the Torus Spray Initiation pool. The resulting pressure increase could Pressure. As the drywell atmosphere is exceed the maximum pressure capability of purged to the torus and replaced by steam, the primary containment.

torus pressure increases. The SCSIP is the Failing to depressurize could prevent recovery lowest torus pressure which can occur when of RPV level above MSCRWL, resulting in core 95% of the non-condensable in the drywell damage have been transferred to the torus. Since the failure mode is based on fatigue failure, a precise time limit or pressure cannot be provided. Therefore, prompt initiation of drywell sprays is required based on existing Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 7 of 47 EOP priorities.

Cueing Rising torus pressure indicated on SPDS and Erratic or inconsistent indication on all RPV panel 9-3 recorder PC-LRPR-1A. level indications, and CRS declares RPV level cannot be determined.

Cursor approaching unsafe boundary on PSP graph display on SPDS.

Performance Aligns torus spray on panel 9-3 using RHR Manipulation of any six SRV controls on panel indicator loop A and/or B: 9-3:

SRV-71A places CONTMT COOLING 2/3 CORE SRV-71B VALVE CONTROL PERMISSIVE SRV-71E switch to MANUAL OVERRD SRV-71G SRV-71H opens RHR-MO-39B, if closed SRV-71C SRV-71D closes close RHR-MO-27B, OUTBD SRV-71F INJECTION VLV, if necessary starts RHR PUMP(s), if not running For drywell spray, opens RHR-MO-31B Performance On panel 9-3, RHR pump/valve control Crew will observe SRV light indication go from feedback switch light indication consistent with green to red, amber pressure switch lights intended operation (Red - open/running, illuminate, reactor pressure lowering on SPDS Green - closed/stopped). and panel 9-3 and 9-5 meters and recorders, RHR flow rate rises on recorder RHR-FR-143 and SRV tailpipe temperatures rise on and indicator RHR-FI-133A(B.) recorder MS-TR-166.

Torus/drywell pressure stabilizes/lowers on SPDS and panel 9-3 recorder PC-LRPR-1A.

Justification When torus pressure cannot be maintained Before 150R/hr in the drywell was chosen for the chosen below PSP is the EOP-3A, step PC/P-4 because this is an indicator of loss of RPV performance criteria requiring transition to emergency level and the shielding effect of the water, limit depressurization. indicating core exposure, yet it is much lower than the 2500R/hr trigger point during RPV Flooding that indicates gross cladding failure is in progress. Before exiting to PC Flooding was chosen because the design of the scenario provides the crew with the means to restore and maintain adequate core cooling IAW EOP-2B or 7B, and exiting to SAGs is neither required nor authorized.

BWR Owners App. B, step PC/P-1. App. B, Contingency#4 Group Appendix Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 8 of 47 Critical Tasks (CT-3) When RPV level cannot be (CT-4) When RPV level cannot be determined and the reactor has been determined and at least 1 SRV is manually depressurized below the shutoff head of opened, isolate MSIVs, MSL drains, HPCI the respective pump(s), inject into the steam supply, and RCIC steam supply, RPV to flood to the Main Steam Lines prior to RPV water level rising to the bottom before drywell radiation reaches 150 R/hr of the main steam lines.

or entering PC Flooding.

EVENT 8 8 Safety Once the SRVs have been opened to Steam lines connected to the RPV are isolated significance depressurize the RPV, injection systems are prior to initiating action to flood the RPV to aligned to flood the RPV and establish core preclude damage which may occur from cold cooling by submergence. The list of flooding water coming in contact with the hot metal, methods includes all motor-driven systems excessive loading of lines or hangers not capable of injecting into the RPV. Any or all designed to accommodate the weight of water, of these systems may be used, as and flooding of steam driven equipment (RCIC necessary, to flood the RPV to the elevation turbine, main turbine, etc.). Isolation is of the main steam lines. Steam-driven performed, however, only if the status of SRVs systems are not listed since, with SRVs open assures the RPV will remain depressurized and the reactor shut down, the RPV will during the flooding evolution. For non-ATWS, depressurize to below the turbine stall only one SRV open is required to meet this pressures. Failing to raise RPV level to and condition.

observable point could prevent recovery of RPV level above MSCRWL, resulting in core damage.

Cueing Erratic or inconsistent indication on all RPV Erratic or inconsistent indication on all RPV level indications, and CRS declare RPV level level indications, and CRS declares RPV level undetermined. cannot be determined, and SRVs have been Six ADS valves have been manually manually opened IAW EOP-2B or EOP-7B for opened. RPV depressurization.

Performance Crew establishes injection flow by Crew places the following valve control indicator manipulating controls as required to start the switches to CLOSE:

associated pumps and align system valves Inboard MSIVs on panel 9-3 for injection using at least two pumps of the MSL Drains on panel 9-4 following systems: HPCI steam supply on panel 9-3 Main condensate/booster pumps on panel A RCIC steam supply on panel 9-4 RHR/LPCI loop A and/or B on panel 9-3 Core spray A and/or B

[Operator places affected ECCS pump(s) control switch(es) to START and valve control switches to OPEN (or CLOSE, if necessary)]

Performance Indication that the RPV is flooded to the main Indication for applicable isolation valves Green feedback steam lines may include one or more of the light illuminates and Red light extinguishes.

following indication on panels 9-3, 9-4, 9-5 or field reports by the booth operator:

  • Rising RPV pressure
  • Field report of water leakage from HPCI or Rev. 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 9 of 47 RCIC turbine shaft seals

  • HPCI/RCIC STM DRAIN POT LEVEL HI alarms
  • SRVs re-open and stay open at RPV pressures below 50 psig above torus pressure
  • If injection sources are aligned with torus suction, torus water level:

- decreases as RPV and steam lines are flooded

- stabilizes when steam lines are full

  • Local torus water temperatures near open SRVs Justification LOCA severity should result in a near linear Equipment damage due to cold water cannot for the chosen RPV level reduction that gives the crew an occur until water level reaches the main steam performance initial trend on all level instruments. Failing lines.

limit all of the level instruments should occur within about 30 seconds and should yield inconsistent indications such that there is no doubt level cannot be determined (e.g. LOCA conditions with operation in the possible boiling region of the RPVST curve, minimal RPV injection, level slowly lowering to -100 CFZ, then all level instruments fail upscale within 10 seconds, simulating all reference legs flashing).

BWR Owners App. B, Contingency #4. App. B, Contingency#4, step C4-2.2 Group Appendix Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 10 of 47 SIMULATOR SET-UP A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the simulator in IC 155, 100% power (EOL)

Batch File Name - none C. Change the simulator conditions as follows:

1. Auto Triggers Number File Name/Variable Description 1 zlorhrsws16b(1)==1 RHR-MO-16 Green light ON irf rh14 DE-ENER 9 zlorpsds1b==0 When RPS de-energizes, the feedwater leak goes to 100%

mmf fw18b 100 3:00 after 3 minute time delay

2. Malfunctions Number Title Trigger TD Severity Ramp rd08b CRD Pump B trip 2 N/A N/A N/A rr04a RR Pump A trip 14 4 min N/A N/A rr10a RR Pump A #1 seal failure 3 N/A 100 N/A rr11a RR Pump A #2 seal failure 4 N/A 15 N/A fw18b FW line B break 5 N/A 10 N/A hp01 Failure of HPCI to auto start A N/A N/A N/A rr33A Reference Leg 3A Failure 7 0 20% 2:00 rr44 NBI-LT-92 failure 7 0 80% 2:00 rr43 NBI- LT- 61(flood up level) 7 0 5% 2:00 rr41a NBI-LT-59A (wide range level A) 7 0 100% 2:00 rr41b NBI-LT-59B (wide range level B) 7 0 10% 2:00 rr41c NBI-LT-59C (wide range level C) 7 0 0% N/A rr41d NBI-LT-59D (wide range level D) 7 0 100% N/A rr42a NBI-LT-91a (Fuel Zone Level A) 7 0 20% 2:00 rr42b NBI-LT-91b (Fuel Zone Level B) 7 0 60% 2:00 rr27a NBI-LT-52a (narrow range level A) 7 0 0 2:00 rr27b NBI-LT-52b (narrow range level B) 7 0 60 2:00 Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 11 of 47 rr27c NBI-LT-52c (narrow range level C) 7 0 30 2:00

3. Remotes Number Title Trigger Value TD Ramp rh14 de-energize RHR-MO-16B 1 DE-ENER N/A N/A
4. Overrides Instrument Tag Trigger TD Value Ramp 9-3-2/B-5 Rx Low Water Level -

an:p1704 7 0 ON N/A 113 9-3-2/B-5 Rx Low Water Level -

an:p1705 7 0 OFF N/A 113 9-5-1/B-1 Rx Low Water Level -

an:p2103 7 0 ON N/A 113 9-3-2/A-5 Rx Low Water Level -

an:p1701 7 0 ON N/A 42 9-3-3/D-2 RHR-16 overload an:p1266 1 N/A ON N/A D. Panel Setup

1. Ensure PMIS IDTs are blank
2. Ensure RR Controllers are selected to P
3. Ensure RRMG A supplied from the SSST and RRMG B from the NSST
4. Have clean copy of 2.2.68.1 ready for turnover
5. Mark up Procedure 2.2.69.3 complete through Step 8.18. N/A Steps 8.20
6. Place B Loop RHRSW in service
7. Ensure CRD Pump B operating
8. Ensure REC TIC-451B MODE marked with AUTO and 75
9. At Panel 9-4-3, set SSST Y Voltage Adjust to Tap 2
10. At Panel C, set SSST X Voltage Adjust to Tap 5 Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 12 of 47

11. On STARTUP TRANSFORMER BACKUP VOLTAGE BUS, placard:

TAP POSITION: 5 MAX 4473 MIN 4372 Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 13 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Shift RRMG set oil pumps Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Direct the ATC to shift RRMG Set B Lube Oil Pumps B1 and B3 per CRS Procedure 2.2.68.1, section 20.

20. SHIFTING RRMG SET OIL PUMPS NOTE - Annunciators 9-4-3/F-2(F-6), RRMG A(B) FLUID DRIVE OIL LOW PRESSURE, may momentarily alarm during pump shifting.

20.1 Place and hold standby oil pump switch to START.

ATC 20.2 Place one operating oil pump's switch to STOP.

20.3 WHEN standby oil pump has started, THEN release standby oil pump switch and check it spring returns to NORMAL.

20.4 (Independent Verification) Place secured oil pump's switch to NORMAL.

END OF EVENT Notes Proceed to the next event.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 14 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Place RHR Loop B in Suppression Pool Cooling (Procedure 2.2.69.3)

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs BOP to place RHR Loop B in Suppression Pool Cooling per CRS 2.2.69.3, continuing at Step 8.19 Booth Role Play: If contacted, report suction line drain flush for hot spots Operator is not required.

BOP 8.19 Inform CRS LPCI Mode of RHR Subsystem B inoperable.

NOTE to Examiners: Annunciator 9-3-1/G-1, ADS AUX COOLING INTERLOCK, is an expected alarm when starting an RHR pump.

8.20 If not spot flush required, THEN perform following: Note to Examiner, Step is N/A.

8.21 IF required, with CRS permission, THEN place CONTMT COOLING 2/3 CORE VALVE CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL OVERRD. Note to Examiner, Step is N/A.

8.22 IF required, THEN place CONTMT COOLING VLV CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL. Note to Examiner, Step is N/A.

8.23 Open RHR-MO-39B, SUPPR POOL COOLING/TORUS SPRAY VLV.

8.24 IF reactor pressure 300 psig and injection not desired, THEN close RHR-MO-27B, OUTBD INJECTION VLV. Note to Examiner, Step is N/A.

8.25 Start RHR Pump B or D.

BOP 8.26 Throttle open RHR-MO-34B, SUPPR POOL COOLING INBD THROTTLE VLV, to obtain rated cooling flow or as directed by Control Room Supervisor.

8.27 Ensure RHR-MO-16B (min flow valve) closed.

8.28 Perform one of the following:

8.28.1 Close CM-38, LOOP B INJECTION LINE PRESSURE MAINTENANCE SHUTOFF (R-958-SW).

8.28.2 Maintain RHR Subsystem B pressure greater than Condensate Transfer System pressure to prevent filling Torus.

8.29 Throttle closed RHR-MO66B, HX BYPASS VLV, to obtain desired cooling rate.

8.30 IF PCIS Group 6 lights lit on Panel 9-5, at VBD-M, THEN ensure Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 15 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Place RHR Loop B in Suppression Pool Cooling (Procedure 2.2.69.3)

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior REC-MO-711 or REC-MO-714, CRITICAL LOOP SUPPLY (associated with an in service REC HX), open.

8.31 F additional cooling required, THEN ensure RHR Pump A or C running in Suppression Cooling Mode, if available. Note to Examiner, Step is N/A.

CRS Enter TS LCO 3.5.1 Condition A and declare RHR LPCI Loop B inoperable. Required Action is to restore the subsystem to an operable TS status within 7 days.

BOP Respond to alarm 9-3-3/D-2, RHR B VALVE OVLD Role Play: If contacted to check MO16 breaker, wait 1 minute and report the breaker overloads are tripped and the indicating lights are Booth out.

Operator If asked to report position of MO16, wait 2 minutes and report the valve looks half open.

Declare RHR-MO-16B inoperable per LCO 3.6.2.3, Condition A.

Required Action is to restore it to operable status within 7 days.

CRS Enter TS LCO 3.6.1.9 Condition A.

TS Required Action is to restore to operable status within 7 days.

Enter TS LCO 3.5.1 Condition A.

Required Action is to restore to operable status within 7 days.

NOTE to Examiners: Crew may elect to secure Suppression Pool Cooling and remain in TS LCO 3.5.1 due to minimum flow valve inoperability.

END OF EVENT Notes Proceed to the next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 16 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Operating CRD pump trips Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner, insert Trigger 2 causing CRD Operator Pump B trip.

Respond to alarm 9-5-2/C-6, CRD PUMP B BREAKER TRIP ATC Report trip of CRD Pump B.

Direct starting standby CRD Pump.

CRS Assign CRDM temperatures to BOP as monitored parameter.

Start CRD Pump A per alarm 9-5-2/C-6:

1.1.1 Place CRD-FC-301 in MAN.

1.1.2 Adjust CRD-FC-301 to minimum.

1.1.3 When FCV indicates closed on CRD-FC-301, start CRD Pump ATC A.

1.1.3.1 Note to Examiner, Step is N/A.

1.1.4 Slowly adjust CRD-FC-301 to obtain flow of 50 gpm.

1.1.5 Balance CRD-FC-301.

1.1.6 Place CRD-FC-301 to BAL.

Respond to alarm C-3/G-9 480V Bus 1G GROUND.

Direct investigation for identifying possible ground per Procedure 2.0.1, BOP Plant Operations Policy, Monitor CRDM temperatures on PMIS if directed.

END OF EVENT Notes Proceed to the next event at direction of the Lead Examiner.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 17 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Pump A #1 Seal failure and pump trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert Trigger 3 to cause RR Pump A Operator #1 Seal failure.

Recognizes and reports alarm:

9-4-3/A-3, Recirc Pump A Seal Trouble ATC Checks seal cavity pressures on panel 9-4. Diagnoses #1 seal failure based on seal cavity 2 pressure equalizing with seal cavity 1 pressure.

Refers to alarm procedure.

Enters 2.4RR.

Directs monitoring Recirc Pump A temperatures, seal parameters, drywell CRS pressure.

As necessary, directs reducing RR B speed to maintain seal cavity temperatures

<200°F IAW alarm card 9-4-3/E-4.

Lowers RR pumps A and B speed, as directed, by selecting S on RR A and B ATC speed controllers on panel 9-4 and rotating knobs counter-clockwise to lower speed demand (not less than 20% demand).

Monitors pump seal temperatures on RR-TR-31, RX RECIRC PUMPS AND BOP MOTOR TEMPERATURE RECORDER on panel 9-21.

Reports seal cavity #1 temp >200°F.

Recognizes and reports alarm due to seal cavity temperature high:

ATC 9-4-3/E-4, RECIRC A/B PUMP MOTOR HI/LOW TEMP PMIS alarm (1854) RECIRC A/B PUMP SEAL CAVITY TEMP HIGH IAW alarm procedure 9-4-3/A-3 step 1.4 and 9-4-3/E-4, step 1.5:

CRS IF Annunciator 9-4-3/E-4, (1854) RECIRC A/B PUMP SEAL CAVITY TEMP HIGH, alarms for RR Pump A concurrently with seal cavity temperature 200F, THEN remove RR Pump A from service per Procedure 2.2.68.1 or 2.4RR.

Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, Insert Trigger 14 causing RR Pump A Operator trip.

Identifies A RRMG TRIP by observing the RRMG breakers and parameter ATC/BOP indications and alarms on Panel 9-4.

CRS Directs the RO to monitor for instabilities, Updates the crew that this is an entry Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 18 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Pump A #1 Seal failure and pump trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior condition into 2.4RR and assigns it to the RO.

Updates the crew with Scram Actions of 2.4RR.

1.1 If both RR pumps are tripped and reactor power > 1% rated thermal.

SCRAM.

ATC Enter Procedure 2.1.5.

1.2 If abnormal neutron flux oscillations are observed while operating in the Stability Exclusion Region:

SCRAM.

Enter Procedure 2.1.5.

Monitor various independent/redundant parameters and power indications for proper plant response during all power changes; utilize the list below (as a minimum) as dictated by plant conditions:

Reactor Water Level.

Reactor Steam Pressure and Flow.

BOP/ATC Reactor Power, APRMs, RBMs, IRMs, or SRMs, as required.

Reactor Recirc Speed, Jet Pump, and Loop Flows.

Total Core Flow and Core Support Plate DP.

Reactor Feed Pump Flow and Speed.

Main Generator Output (Gross and Net).

AOP 2.4RR Attachment 1:

1. If one RR pump trips, perform following:

NOTE 1 - Core flow may indicate higher than actual if an RR pump is tripped and reverse core flow summer is not operating; the following indicate summer is operating:

Annunciator 9-4-3/E-3 (9-4-3/E-7), RECIRC LOOP A (B) OUT OF SERVICE, alarming.

BOP Indicated core flow is approximately equal to difference between NBI-FI-92A and NBI-FI-92B, JP LOOP FLOW.

NOTE 2 - It takes ~ 1 minute from time pump has tripped for indicated core flow to stabilize.

1.1 If operation in Stability Exclusion Region, concurrently enter Attachment 3.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 19 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Pump A #1 Seal failure and pump trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1.2 For tripped RR pump, ensure RRMG Set A(B) GEN FIELD BKR open.

1.3 For tripped RR pump, close RR-MO-53A(B), PUMP DISCHARGE VLV.

1.4 Continue with remaining steps in this attachment while waiting to open RR-MO-53A(B).

1.5 After RR-MO-53A(B) has been closed for 5 minutes, open valve.

1.6 Ensure operating RRMG is transferred to Startup Transformer, if available, per Procedure 2.2.18.

1.7 Throttle REC-49(51), MG SET A(B) OIL HX OUTLET (R-931-NW), to maintain oil outlet temperature 90F to 130F on RRLO-TI-2626A(B), MG SET HX A(B) OUTLET TEMPERATURE (R-931-NW NEAR HXs), for tripped RRMG.

1.8 Monitor loop cooldown rate on RR-TR-165, RR SUCTION &

FEEDWATER TEMP. If loop cooldown rate exceeds 100F/hr, initiate Condition Report and evaluate excessive cooldown rate prior to restoration of system normal operation.

1.9 Enter Single Loop Operation per Procedure 2.2.68.1.

2. Dispatch Operators to R-976-W and Non-Critical Switchgear Room to record lockout relays and targets for tripped pump.
3. Align RRMG H&V System per Procedure 2.2.85.

Role Play: If dispatched to R-976-W and Non-Critical Switchgear Room to record lockout relays and targets for tripped pump, tell them that you are on your way. In a few minutes call back and tell them that you have OVERLOAD Booth GROUND targets.

Operator If called to monitor and adjust Reactor Recirc lube oil temperature, tell them that you are on your way and will call them when you are ready. In a few minutes call back and tell them that you are standing by.

Displays the Power to Flow map on the CRT and evaluates the location of ATC operation. It will take approximately 1 minute for the screen to update real time data.

ATC Recognizes and reports operation NOT in the Stability Exclusion Region of the Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 20 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Pump A #1 Seal failure and pump trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Power-to-Flow Map.

Address Tech Specs and finds that with one RR Pump out of service, CRS Enter TS LCO 3.4.1 Condition B Required Action B.1 TS Satisfy the requirements of the LCO within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Notifies work control of the RR pump failure and need to contact Reactor CRS Engineering to insert GARDEL thermal limits for single loop operation.

Direct RRMG B power supply transferred to the Startup Station transformer.

If directed, transfer RRMG B drive motor supply to SSST. Per Procedure 2.2.18:

17.2 TRANSFERRING BUS 1D FROM NORMAL TRANSFORMER TO STARTUP TRANSFORMER 17.2.1 Ensure Startup Transformer energized.

CAUTION - Maximum load on Startup Transformer is 27 MWe.

NOTE 1 - Switch for Breaker 1DS must be held to START to allow time for synchro check Relay 25/1DN to pick up auxiliary Relay 25X/1DN which permits breaker to close.

NOTE 2 - Breaker 1DN will automatically trip when Breaker 1DS closes.

17.2.2 Close Breaker 1DS by placing and holding switch to START.

17.2.3 AFTER Breaker 1DS has closed, THEN release switch and check following:

ATC 17.2.3.1 Switch spring returns to NORMAL AFTER START (red flagged).

17.2.3.2 Breaker 1DN, DRIVE MOTOR BKR, has automatically tripped.

17.2.3.3 Amber tripped indicating light above Breaker 1DN switch turns on.

17.2.3.4 Annunciator 9-4-3/A-6, RRMG B BKR 1DN TRIP, alarms.

17.2.4 Place switch for Breaker 1DN to STOP and check following:

17.2.4.1 Switch spring returns to NORMAL AFTER STOP (green flagged).

17.2.4.2 Amber tripped indicating light above Breaker 1DN switch turns off.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 21 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Pump A #1 Seal failure and pump trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 17.2.4.3 Annunciator 9-4-3/A-6 clears.

Role Play: As the work control center, respond to the report and let the CRS Booth know that a work order will be initiated and a team put together to Operator investigate RR pump and Reactor Engineering will be informed of the need to insert GARDEL thermal limits for single loop operation.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to the next event at direction of the Lead Examiner.

Operator Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 22 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirculation Pump A Seal #2 failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert Trigger 4 causing RR Operator Pump A #2 seal to fail.

Recognizes and reports RR Pump A seal cavity #2 pressure lowering, ATC diagnoses seal #2 failure.

Recognizes and reports drywell pressure rising.

CREW Directs ATC to perform prompt isolation of RR Pump A IAW 2.4RR Att.

CRS 2.

Secures and isolates RR Pump A IAW 2.4RR Att. 2:

1. IF both seals have failed and affected RR pump requires prompt isolation, THEN perform following:

1.1 Ensure DRIVE MOTOR BKR 1CN, 1CS is tripped.

1.2 Close RR-MO-43A, PUMP SUCTION VLV.

1.3 Close RR-MO-53A(B), PUMP DISCHARGE VLV.

ATC 1.4 Close CRD-50, REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMP A SEAL FLOW REGULATOR 46A INLET (R-903-SE).

1.5 Following steps may be performed concurrently:

1.5.1 Enter Single Loop Operation section of Procedure 2.2.68.1.

1.5.2 Ensure RRMG Set A GEN FIELD BKR open.

1.5.3 Ensure RRMG B is powered by Startup Transformer per Procedure 2.2.18.

Enters 2.4PC.

CRS 4.3 Directs BOP to vent containment per 2.2.60 to maintain 0.25 to 0.45 psig.

BOP Vent the drywell per the Hard Card (2.2.60, Att.1) at VBD-H:

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 23 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirculation Pump A Seal #2 failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1.1 Ensure PC-AD-R-1B is open and PC-AD-R-1A is closed.

1.2 Start preferred SGT fan on VBD-K.

1.3 Open SGT-DPCV-546A(B) valve on VBD-K.

NOTE - Steps 1.4 and 1.5 may be performed in any order or concurrently, depending on plant conditions.

1.4 Vent Torus by performing following at VBD-H:

1.4.1 Ensure PC-MO-1308 is closed 1.4.2 Open PC-AO-245AV.

1.4.3 Open PC-MO-305MV.

1.4.4 WHEN Torus pressure ~ 0.25 psig, THEN close PC-MO-305MV.

1.4.5 Close PC-AO-245AV.

1.4.6 Place switch for PC-AO-245AV to AUTO.

1.5 Vent Drywell by performing following at VBD-H:

1.5.1 Open PC-AO-246AV.

1.5.2 While ensuring Torus pressure does not exceed Drywell pressure by > 0.1 psig, open PC-MO-306.1 1.5.3 WHEN Drywell pressure ~ 0.25 psig, THEN close PC-MO-306.

1.5.4 Close PC-AO-246AV.

1.5.5 Place switch for PC-AO-246AV to AUTO.

1.6 Place switch for running SGT fan to AUTO at VBD-K.

1.7 Place switch for SGT-DPCV-546A(B) to AUTO at VBD-K.

Checks and reports drywell pressure lowering.

NOTE to Examiners: If Drywell pressure exceeds 0.75 psig, TS 3.6.1.4 will apply. Due to scenario timing, the CRS may not refer to TS 3.6.1.4, so this may be asked as a follow-up Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 24 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirculation Pump A Seal #2 failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior question.

CRS If Drywell pressure rises above 0.75 psig during this event, enters TS LCO 3.6.1.4 Condition A.

TS END OF EVENT Notes Proceed to the next event at the direction of the Lead Examiner NOTE to Examiners:

CRS actions start on the next page of the Scenario Guide.

ATC actions start on Page 31 of the Scenario Guide.

BOP actions start on Page 36 of the Scenario Guide.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 25 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6&7 Event

Description:

FW Line B Break Inside the Drywell & HPCI auto start failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner, activate trigger 5 (FW leak line Operator break inside primary containment and HPCI auto start failure).

Direct ATC to perform Procedure 2.1.5, Attachments 1, 2, and 3 and control RPV level +3 inches to +54 inches.

CRS Direct BOP to Perform Procedure 2.1.5, Attachments 4 and 5 and control RPV pressure between 800 psig and 1000 psig.

Direct the actions of 2.4MC-RF, CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER ABNORMAL Determine the B Feedwater line has failed and RCIC will need to be CRS used to restore Reactor Water Level.

Enter EOP 3A, Primary Containment Control and direct actions.

Direct Drywell FCUs placed in OVERRIDE.

NOTE to Examiners: RCIC injects into feedwater Line A.

HPCI injects into feedwater Line B. (Failure is in FW line B)

CREW Determine leak in FW Line B.

CREW Update Group 6 isolation.

Direct transfer of reactor level control from Condensate/Feedwater to CRS RCIC.

CRS EOP 3A EOP 3A CRS Direct Torus Sprays placed into service.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 26 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6&7 Event

Description:

FW Line B Break Inside the Drywell & HPCI auto start failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Direct maintaining containment pressure between 2 psig and 10 psig.

Role Play: When directed by BOP to install EOP PTMs97-100, wait Booth 3 minutes then put in the overrides for the PTMs. Report back to Operator BOP when PTMs installed.

EOP 3A CRS (CT-1): Initiate drywell sprays when torus pressure exceeds 10 psig, prior to drywell temperature reaching 280F and prior to torus pressure exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) curve.

EOP 3A CRS Direct Drywell Sprays placed into service.

Direct maintaining containment pressure between 2 psig and 10 psig.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 27 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6&7 Event

Description:

FW Line B Break Inside the Drywell & HPCI auto start failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRS EOP 3A END OF EVENT Notes Proceed to the next event at direction of the Lead Examiner.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 28 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Loss of RPV level instrumentation, RPV flooding to MSLs Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner, insert Trigger 7 to cause loss of Operator RPV level instrumentation CREW 1.1 Recognize RPV level instruments are diverging.

CRS 1.2 May direct BOP to enter Procedure 2.4RXLVL.

1.3 Role Play- If directed as a building operator to verify level indications on racks 25-5 and 25-6, wait about 3 minutes and then report as follows:

1.4 Rack 25-5 All indicators pegged high.

1.5 Rack 25-6 NBI-LIS-58A-Downscale 1.6 NBI-LIS-58B-Downscale Booth Operator1.7 NBI-LIS-72B-Upscale 1.8 NBI-LIS-72D-(-50 inches) 1.9 NBI-LIS-101C-Downscale 1.10 NBI-LIS-101D-Downscale 1.11 Rack 25-51 NBI-LITS-73A indicators pegged high.

1.12 Rack 25-52 NBI-LITS-73B pegged high.

1.13 Enter EOP 2B CRS EOP 2B 1.14 1.15 1.16 Request current PC water level:

CRS EOP 2B 1.17 (CT-2): When RPV level cannot be determined and torus level is above 6', open six SRVs before drywell radiation reaches 150 R/hr or entering PC Flooding.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 29 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Loss of RPV level instrumentation, RPV flooding to MSLs Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRS EOP 2B 1.18 1.19 (CT-3): When RPV level cannot be determined and the reactor has been depressurized below the shutoff head of the respective pump(s), inject into the RPV to flood to the Main Steam Lines before drywell radiation reaches 150 R/hr or entering PC Flooding CRS EOP 2B 1.20 1.21 Role Play: If sent into reactor building to check for flooding Booth conditions, depending on where sent, report there is water leakage Operator from the HPCI / RCIC turbine shaft seals.

CREW1.22 Report to CRS when RPV flooded to the Main Steam Lines.

(CT-4): When RPV level cannot be determined and at least 1 SRV is manually opened, isolate MSIVs, MSL drains, HPCI steam supply, and RCIC steam supply, prior to RPV water level rising to the bottom of the main steam lines.

CRS 1.23 Direct steam lines connect to the RPV isolated.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 30 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Loss of RPV level instrumentation, RPV flooding to MSLs Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1.24 As directed by the CRS, Close:

MSIVs ATC/BOP Main Steam line drain valves.

HPCI isolation valves RCIC isolation valves.

ATC/BOP 1.25 Control RPV injection as low as practicable.

1.26 END OF SCENARIO Notes Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, place the simulator in freeze Operator and tell the crew to stop operating.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 31 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 & 7 Event

Description:

FW Line B Break Inside the Drywell & HPCI auto start failure ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner, activate trigger 5 (FW leak line Operator break inside primary containment and HPCI auto start failure).

Respond to the reactor scram:

Provides scram report:

ATC Reactor Power:

Reactor Water Level and controlling system:

Reactor Pressure and controlling system:

Performs Procedure 2.1.5, Attachment 3 Reactor Water Level Control, actions:

1.1 IF STARTUP FCVs in MAN, THEN perform following; N/A if FCVs in AUTO:

1.2 After FW Sequence has reached Mode 2 or level has stabilized, place RFC-SW-S1, SETPOINT SETDOWN, switch to DISABLE/RESET.

1.3 Maintain RPV level in prescribed band using following systems, as required, based on plant conditions:

1.3.1 Verify preferred RFP is controlling level in FW Sequence Mode 2 with controlling RFP in RX PRESS FOLLOW Mode.

1.3.1.1 Note to Examiner, Step is N/A.

ATC 1.3.1.2 If EMER CLOSE button is yellow, press EMER CLOSE button on either FCV-11AA or FCV-11BB.

1.3.1.3 Ensure following controllers are in AUTO:

a FCVs 11AA and 11BB.

b STARTUP MASTER CONTROL.

1.3.1.4 IF RX PRESS FOLLOW is not desired or cannot be obtained, THEN maintain RPV level in prescribed band using following systems based on plant conditions: Note to Examiner, Step is N/A.

1.3.1.5 Adjust STARTUP MASTER controller using UP/DOWN arrows or RAMP FUNCTION to adjust LEVEL SETPOINT as desired.

a During plant cooldown, for further guidance, adjust Reactor Feedwater System/Condensate Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 32 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 & 7 Event

Description:

FW Line B Break Inside the Drywell & HPCI auto start failure ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior System per Procedure 2.2.28.1/2.2.6.

1.3.2 HPCI per Procedure 2.2.33.1.

1.3.3 RCIC per Procedure 2.2.67.1.

1.4 Trip non-preferred RFP, if not needed, or minimum flow is isolated.

1.5 Trip all but one condensate booster pump.

1.6 Trip all but one condensate pump.

NOTE to Examiners: RCIC injects into feedwater Line A.

HPCI injects into feedwater Line B. (Failure is in FW line B)

Places Drywell FCUs in OVERRIDE as directed.

Perform the actions of 2.4MC-RF, CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER ABNORMAL as follows:

4.1 If system piping not intact, perform following:

4.4.1 If break is in Turbine Building, concurrently enter Procedure 5.1BREAK.

4.4.2 If break is endangering personnel or equipment necessary for safe operation:

4.4.2.1 Concurrently enter Procedure 2.1.5.

ATC 4.4.2.2 Ensure RFPs tripped.

4.4.2.3 Ensure RFP discharge valves closed.

4.4.2.4 At a RFPT/RVLC HMI, perform following:

4.4.2.4.1 Select RFPT-1A or RFPT-1B System.

4.4.2.4.2 Select STARTUP VALVE screen.

4.4.2.4.3 Press EMER CLOSE button.

4.4.2.4.4 Confirm pop-up screen.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 33 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 & 7 Event

Description:

FW Line B Break Inside the Drywell & HPCI auto start failure ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 4.4.2.5 Ensure condensate booster pumps tripped.

4.4.2.6 If necessary, trip condensate pumps.

4.4.3 Notify Plant personnel to stay clear of affected area via Gaitronics.

CREW Determine leak in FW Line B.

CREW Update Group 6 isolation.

Role Play: When directed by BOP to install EOP PTMs97-100, wait Booth 3 minutes then put in the overrides for the PTMs. Report back to Operator BOP when PTMs installed.

(CT-1): Initiate drywell sprays when torus pressure exceeds 10 psig, prior to drywell temperature reaching 280F and prior to torus pressure exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) curve.

END OF EVENT Notes Proceed to the next event at direction of the Lead Examiner.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 34 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Loss of RPV level instrumentation, RPV flooding to MSLs ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner, insert Trigger 7 to cause loss of Operator RPV level instrumentation CREW 1.27 Recognize RPV level instruments are diverging.

ATC/BOP 1.28 Send Reactor Building operator to check local racks.

1.29 Role Play- If directed as a building operator to verify level indications on racks 25-5 and 25-6, wait about 3 minutes and then report as follows:

1.30 Rack 25-5 All indicators pegged high.

1.31 Rack 25-6 NBI-LIS-58A-Downscale 1.32 NBI-LIS-58B-Downscale Booth 1.33 Operator NBI-LIS-72B-Upscale 1.34 NBI-LIS-72D-(-50 inches) 1.35 NBI-LIS-101C-Downscale 1.36 NBI-LIS-101D-Downscale 1.37 Rack 25-51 NBI-LITS-73A indicators pegged high.

1.38 Rack 25-52 NBI-LITS-73B pegged high.

(CT-2): When RPV level cannot be determined and torus level is above 6', open six SRVs before drywell radiation reaches 150 R/hr or entering PC Flooding.

When directed to ED, verify PC water level is above 6 ft. and open 6 ATC/BOP SRVS by taking their control switches to OPEN.

1.39 (CT-3): When RPV level cannot be determined and the reactor has been depressurized below the shutoff head of the respective pump(s), inject into the RPV to flood to the Main Steam Lines before drywell radiation reaches 150 R/hr or entering PC Flooding 1.40 Role Play: If sent into reactor building to check for flooding Booth conditions, depending on where sent, report there is water leakage Operator from the HPCI / RCIC turbine shaft seals.

Monitor SRV tailpipe temperatures on MS-TR-166 on Panel 9-21.

Monitor torus water level on Panel 9-4-1; level lowers as RPV and ATC/BOP steam lines flood and stabilizes when steam lines are full.

Monitor RPV pressure lowering and rising when the MSLs are full Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 35 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Loss of RPV level instrumentation, RPV flooding to MSLs ATC ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW 1.41 Report to CRS when RPV flooded to the Main Steam Lines.

(CT-4): When RPV level cannot be determined and at least 1 SRV is manually opened, isolate MSIVs, MSL drains, HPCI steam supply, and RCIC steam supply, prior to RPV water level rising to the bottom of the main steam lines.

1.42 As directed by the CRS, Close:

MSIVs ATC/BOP Main Steam line drain valves.

HPCI isolation valves RCIC isolation valves.

ATC/BOP1.43 Control RPV injection as low as practicable.

Return to Page 30 for completion of ATC actions.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 36 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 & 7 Event

Description:

FW Line B Break Inside the Drywell & HPCI auto start failure BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner, activate trigger 5 (FW leak line Operator break inside primary containment and HPCI auto start failure).

Performs Procedure 2.1.5, Attachment 4 Reactor Pressure Control, actions:

NOTE - Steps may be performed concurrently.

1.1 If necessary to stabilize or reduce reactor pressure, BPVs can be operated in manual by performing following:

1.1.1 Transfer bypass valve control from AUTO to MANUAL by pressing BPV MANUAL button and check it backlights.

BOP 1.1.1.1 Press BPV RAISE or LOWER buttons to adjust impulse pressure or reactor pressure.

1.2 Maintain RPV pressure in the prescribed band by using the following systems based on plant conditions:

1.2.1 DEH per Procedure 2.2.77.1.

1.2.2 SRVs per Procedure 2.2.1.

1.2.3 HPCI per Procedure 2.2.33.1.

1.2.4 RCIC per Procedure 2.2.67.1.

Performs Procedure 2.1.5, Attachment 5 Balance of Plant, actions:

1.1 Verify main turbine automatically tripped or perform following when main generator output 80 MWe:

1.1.1 At Panel B, simultaneously press TURB TRIP 1 and TURB TRIP 2 buttons, and verify turbine trips.

1.2 IF main turbine does not trip, THEN perform following (N/A if not performed): Note to Examiner, Step is N/A.

1.3 When main turbine trips, observe following valves close:

1.3.1 Both stop valves.

1.3.2 All governor valves.

1.3.3 All reheat stop valves.

BOP 1.3.4 All interceptor valves.

1.4 Verify station service is transferred to Startup Transformer.

1.5 Ensure PCB-3310 open (Panel C).

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 37 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 & 7 Event

Description:

FW Line B Break Inside the Drywell & HPCI auto start failure BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1.6 Ensure PCB-3312 open (Panel C).

1.7 Ensure GEN EXCITER FIELD BKR is open (Panel C).

NOTE to Examiners: RCIC injects into feedwater Line A.

HPCI injects into feedwater Line B. (Failure is in FW line B)

Determine failure of HPCI to initiate.

Start HPCI using the Hard Card:

1.1 Start Gland Seal Condenser Blower.

1.2 If necessary, depress REACTOR HI WTR LEVEL SIGNAL RESET pushbutton.

1.3 IF AUXILIARY OIL PUMP running NOTE Step is N/A 1.4 Open HPCI-MO-14.

1.5 Start AUXILIARY OIL PUMP.

1.6 Open HPCI-MO-19.

1.7 Adjust HPCI-FIC-108, HPCI Flow Controller, to maintain level.

BOP 1.8 IF HPCI is needed for RPV Pressure Control and RPV Injection is required, THEN perform following:

1.8.1 Ensure HPCI Initiation signal is clear.

1.8.2 Open HPCI-MO-24.

1.8.3 Throttle HPCI-MO-21 to control HPCI pump discharge pressure.

1.8.4 Adjust HPCI-FIC-108, HPCI Flow Controller, to maintain turbine speed.

1.9 If available, ensure REC-MO-711 or REC-MO-714 is open.

1.10 If available, ensure SGT System is in service.

Report HPCI failure to CRS.

CREW Update Group 6 isolation.

When RFPs/condensate booster pumps are tripped, use RCIC per BOP Procedure 2.2.67.1 to maintain RPV level.

Booth Role Play: When directed by BOP to install EOP PTMs97-100, wait Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 38 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 & 7 Event

Description:

FW Line B Break Inside the Drywell & HPCI auto start failure BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Operator 3 minutes then put in the overrides for the PTMs. Report back to BOP when PTMs installed.

2. CONTAINMENT SPRAYS 2.1 IF required, with CRS permission, THEN place CONTMT COOLING 2/3 CORE VALVE CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL OVERRD.

2.2 IF required, THEN place CONTMT COOLING VLV CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL.

2.3 Ensure RHR-MO-39A(B) open.

BOP 2.4 IF reactor pressure 300 psig and injection not desired, THEN close RHR-MO-27A(B), OUTBD INJECTION VLV.

2.5 Ensure RHR PUMP(s) running.

NOTE - RHR pump operation at minimum flow should be limited to

< 15 minutes or pump damage may result.

2.6 Throttle RHR-MO-38A(B) to maintain desired containment pressure.

2.7 Throttle RHR-MO-66A(B) to obtain desired cooling rate.

BOP Report containment pressure trend.

(CT-1): Initiate drywell sprays when torus pressure exceeds 10 psig, prior to drywell temperature reaching 280F and prior to torus pressure exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) curve.

2.8 IF Drywell Spray required, THEN perform following:

2.8.1 Open RHR-MO-31A(B).

2.8.2 Throttle RHR-MO-26A(B) to maintain desired containment pressure.

BOP 2.9 IF PCIS Group 6 lights lit on Panel 9-5, THEN ensure one of following open:

2.9.1 REC-MO-711; or 2.9.2 REC-MO-714.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 39 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 & 7 Event

Description:

FW Line B Break Inside the Drywell & HPCI auto start failure BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 2.10 Place RHR SW System in service:

2.10.1 Start SWBP(s).

2.10.2 Adjust SW-MO-89A(B) to maintain flow between 2500 and 4000 gpm.

2.11 Throttle RHR-MO-66A(B) to maintain desired cooling rate.

Monitor and control torus water level between +2 in. and -2 in. (refer to SOP 2.2.69.3 prior to discharging water) (SP/L-1).

BOP Monitor average torus water temperature, EOP 5.8.9, and control below 95°F using available suppression pool cooling (SP/T-1).

END OF EVENT Notes Proceed to the next event at direction of the Lead Examiner.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 40 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Loss of RPV level instrumentation, RPV flooding to MSLs BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner, insert Trigger 7 to cause loss of Operator RPV level instrumentation CREW 1.44 Recognize RPV level instruments are diverging.

1.45 If directed to enter 2.4RXLVL, goes to Attachment 3:

1.46 NOTE - Below guidance will aid in determining which level indicator(s) is reading accurately.

1. WHEN any wide range level indication at -30", THEN check status of following annunciators:

1.1 9-5-2/D-7, ATWS RPT CHAN A/B LEVEL TRIP.

1.2 9-3-2/A-5, RX LOW WATER LEVEL -42".

1.3 If both annunciators clear, actual level > -33".

1.4 IF both annunciators alarming, THEN check following alarm points in alarm:

1.4.1 (3074) ATWS RPT CHAN A LEVEL TRIP.

1.4.2 (3075) ATWS RPT CHAN B LEVEL TRIP.

1.4.3 (1700) RX LOW WATER LEVEL -42" ALARM (NBI-LIS-72A).

BOP 1.4.4 (1701) RX LOW WATER LEVEL -42" ALARM (NBI-LIS-72B).

1.4.5 (1702) RX LOW WATER LEVEL -42" ALARM (NBI-LIS-72C).

1.4.6 (1703) RX LOW WATER LEVEL -42" ALARM (NBI-LIS-72D).

1.4.7 If all alarm points in alarm, actual level < -33".

2. WHEN any wide range level indication at -100", THEN check status of following annunciators:

1.47 NOTE - RX low water level alarms on Panel 9-5 and associated annunciator points alarm when the respective RPS Bus is lost.

2.1 9-5-1/B-1, RX LOW LEVEL CHANNEL A -113".

2.2 9-5-1/B-2, RX LOW LEVEL CHANNEL B -113".

2.3 9-3-2/B-5, RX LOW WATER LEVEL -113".

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 41 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Loss of RPV level instrumentation, RPV flooding to MSLs BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 2.4 If all three annunciators clear, actual level > -104".

2.5 IF all annunciators alarming, THEN check following alarm points in alarm:

2.5.1 (2102) RX LOW LEVEL -113" CHANNEL A2 TRIP.

2.5.2 (2103) RX LOW LEVEL -113" CHANNEL A1 TRIP.

2.5.3 (2114) RX LOW LEVEL -113" CHANNEL B2 TRIP.

2.5.4 (2115) RX LOW LEVEL -113" CHANNEL B1 TRIP.

2.5.5 (1704) RX LOW WATER LEVEL -113" ALARM (NBI-LIS-72A).

2.5.6 (1705) RX LOW WATER LEVEL -113" ALARM (NBI-LIS-72B).

2.5.7 (1706) RX LOW WATER LEVEL -113" ALARM (NBI-LIS-72C).

2.5.8 (1707) RX LOW WATER LEVEL -113" ALARM (NBI-LIS-72D).

2.5.9 If all alarm points in alarm, actual level < -104".

BOP1.48 Report to CRS RPV level cannot be determined.

BOP/ATC 1.49 Send Reactor Building operator to check local racks.

1.50 Role Play- If directed as a building operator to verify level indications on racks 25-5 and 25-6, wait about 3 minutes and then report as follows:

1.51 Rack 25-5 All indicators pegged high.

1.52 Rack 25-6 NBI-LIS-58A-Downscale 1.53 NBI-LIS-58B-Downscale Booth 1.54 Operator NBI-LIS-72B-Upscale 1.55 NBI-LIS-72D-(-50 inches) 1.56 NBI-LIS-101C-Downscale 1.57 NBI-LIS-101D-Downscale 1.58 Rack 25-51 NBI-LITS-73A indicators pegged high.

1.59 Rack 25-52 NBI-LITS-73B pegged high.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 42 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Loss of RPV level instrumentation, RPV flooding to MSLs BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Per Procedure 5.8.19:

BOP 4.2 Verify that Annunciator 9-3-2/C-5, RX LOW PRESS 291-436 PSIG, is alarming prior to continuing with this section.

(CT-2): When RPV level cannot be determined and torus level is above 6', open six SRVs before drywell radiation reaches 150 R/hr or entering PC Flooding.

When directed to ED, verify PC water level is above 6 ft. and open 6 BOP/ATC SRVS by taking their control switches to OPEN.

1.60 (CT-3): When RPV level cannot be determined and the reactor has been depressurized below the shutoff head of the respective pump(s), inject into the RPV to flood to the Main Steam Lines before drywell radiation reaches 150 R/hr or entering PC Flooding 1.61 Flood the RPV per Procedure 5.8.6

4. RPV FLOODING WITH CORE SPRAY LOOP A NOTE - EOP Flowcharts authorize exceeding CS System NPSH and vortex limits, if necessary, for RPV flooding.

4.1 Perform following (PNL 9-3):

4.1.1 Ensure CS-MO-5A, MIN FLOW BYP VLV, is open.

4.1.2 Ensure CS-MO-11A, OUTBD INJECTION VLV, is open.

4.1.3 Ensure CS PUMP A is running.

BOP 4.1.3.1 Ensure CS-MO-5A, MIN FLOW BYP VLV, remains open.

4.1.4 WHEN Annunciator 9-3-2/C-5, RX LOW PRESS 291-436 PSIG, alarms, THEN perform following:

4.1.4.1 Throttle open CS-MO-12A, INBD INJ THROTTLE VLV, as directed by EOPs.

4.1.4.2 Ensure CS-MO-5A, MIN FLOW BYP VLV, closes at > 1370 gpm system flow.

4.2 Inform CRS that CS Loop A is injecting as a RPV Flooding System.

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 43 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Loss of RPV level instrumentation, RPV flooding to MSLs BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

5. RPV FLOODING WITH CORE SPRAY LOOP B NOTE - EOP Flowcharts authorize exceeding CS System NPSH and vortex limits, if necessary, for RPV flooding.

5.1 Perform following (PNL 9-3):

5.1.1 Ensure CS-MO-5B, MIN FLOW BYP VLV, is open.

5.1.2 Ensure CS-MO-11B, OUTBD INJECTION VLV, is open.

5.1.3 Ensure CS PUMP B is running.

5.1.3.1 Ensure CS-MO-5B, MIN FLOW BYP VLV, remains open.

5.1.4 WHEN Annunciator 9-3-2/C-5, RX LOW PRESS 291-436 PSIG, alarms, THEN perform following:

5.1.4.1 Throttle open CS-MO-12B, INBD INJ THROTTLE VLV, as directed by EOPs.

5.1.4.2 Ensure CS-MO-5B, MIN FLOW BYP VLV, closes at > 1370 gpm system flow.

5.2 Inform CRS that CS Loop B is injecting as a RPV Flooding System.

6. RPV FLOODING WITH LPCI LOOP A WITH HX IN SERVICE NOTE 1 - EOP Flowcharts authorize exceeding RHR System NPSH and vortex limits, if necessary, for RPV flooding.

NOTE 2 - Step 6.1 may be performed concurrently with Steps 6.2 and 6.3.

6.1 Defeat automatic open interlocks for RHR-MO-27A, OUTBD INJECTION VLV, by performing following:

6.1.1 Install EOP PTM # 97, lift Wire RH197-13 from GG-84 (BAY-2, PNL 9-32).

6.1.1.1 EOP PTM # 97 installed (wire lifted).

6.1.2 Install EOP PTM # 98, jumper between Terminals GG-85 and GG-86 (BAY-2, PNL 9-32).

6.1.2.1 EOP PTM # 98 installed (jumper installed).

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 44 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Loss of RPV level instrumentation, RPV flooding to MSLs BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 6.1.3 Inform CRS that automatic open interlocks for RHR-MO-27A are bypassed for EOPs.

6.2 Ensure RR Pump A secured (PNL 9-4).

6.3 Ensure RR-MO-53A, PUMP DISCHARGE VLV (PNL 9-4),

closed.

6.4 Perform following at (PNL 9-3):

6.4.1 Close RHR-MO-27A, OUTBD INJECTION VLV.

6.4.2 Open RHR-MO-25A, INBD INJECTION VLV.

6.4.3 Ensure RHR-MO-16A, LOOP A MIN FLOW BYP VLV, is open.

NOTE - Unless plant conditions warrant, RHR pump operation at minimum flow should be limited to < 15 minutes or pump damage may result.

6.4.4 Ensure one or both RHR pump(s) running.

6.4.4.1 RHR Pump A.

6.4.4.2 RHR Pump C.

6.4.5 WHEN Annunciator 9-3-2/C-5, RX LOW PRESS 291-436 PSIG, alarms, THEN perform following:

6.4.5.1 Throttle open RHR-MO-27A, OUTBD INJECTION VLV, as directed by EOPs.

6.4.5.2 Ensure RHR-MO-16A, LOOP A MIN FLOW BYP VLV, closes when RHR flow raises to >

2107 gpm.

CAUTION - Maximum SWBP amps are 136 amps (PNL 9-3).

6.5 Start SW BOOSTER PUMP A or SW BOOSTER PUMP C (PNL 9-3).

6.6 Throttle SW-MO-89A, HX-A SW DISCH VLV, until a flow rate of 4000 gpm is seen on SW-FI-132A, SW FLOW (PNL 9-3).

6.7 WHEN conditions allow, THEN close RHR-MO-66A, HX BYPASS VLV (PNL 9-3).

6.8 Inform CRS that RHR Loop A is injecting for RPV flooding.

7. RPV FLOODING WITH LPCI LOOP B WITH HX IN SERVICE NOTE 1 - EOP Flowcharts authorize exceeding RHR System NPSH and Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 45 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Loss of RPV level instrumentation, RPV flooding to MSLs BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior vortex limits, if necessary, for RPV flooding.

NOTE 2 - Step 7.1 may be performed concurrently with Steps 7.2 and 7.3.

7.1 Defeat automatic open interlocks for RHR-MO-27B, OUTBD INJECTION VLV, by performing following:

7.1.1 Install EOP PTM # 99, lift Wire RH22-13 from GG-84 (BAY-2, PNL 9-33).

6.1.1.1 EOP PTM # 99 installed (wire lifted).

7.1.2 Install EOP PTM # 100, jumper between Terminals GG-85 and GG-86 (BAY-2, PNL 9-33).

7.1.2.1 EOP PTM # 100 installed (jumper installed).

7.1.3 Inform CRS that automatic open interlocks for RHR-MO-27B are bypassed for EOPs.

7.2 Ensure RR Pump B secured (PNL 9-4).

7.3 Ensure RR-MO-53B, PUMP DISCHARGE VLV (PNL 9-4),

closed.

7.4 Perform following at (PNL 9-3):

7.4.1 Close RHR-MO-27B, OUTBD INJECTION VLV.

7.4.2 Open RHR-MO-2BA, INBD INJECTION VLV.

7.4.3 Ensure RHR-MO-16B, LOOP B MIN FLOW BYP VLV, is open.

NOTE - Unless plant conditions warrant, RHR pump operation at minimum flow should be limited to < 15 minutes or pump damage may result.

7.4.4 Ensure one or both RHR pump(s) running.

7.4.4.1 RHR Pump B.

7.4.4.2 RHR Pump D.

7.4.5 WHEN Annunciator 9-3-2/C-5, RX LOW PRESS 291-436 PSIG, alarms, THEN perform following:

7.4.5.1 Throttle open RHR-MO-27B, OUTBD INJECTION VLV, as directed by EOPs.

7.4.5.2 Ensure RHR-MO-16B, LOOP B MIN FLOW BYP VLV, closes when RHR flow raises to >

Rev. 2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 15-01 Scenario 4 Page 46 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 15-01 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Loss of RPV level instrumentation, RPV flooding to MSLs BOP ACTIONS Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 2107 gpm.

CAUTION - Maximum SWBP amps are 136 amps (PNL 9-3).

7.5 Start SW BOOSTER PUMP B or SW BOOSTER PUMP D (PNL 9-3).

7.6 Throttle SW-MO-89B, HX-B SW DISCH VLV, until a flow rate of 4000 gpm is seen on SW-FI-132B, SW FLOW (PNL 9-3).

7.7 WHEN conditions allow, THEN close RHR-MO-66B, HX BYPASS VLV (PNL 9-3).

7.8 Inform CRS that RHR Loop B is injecting for RPV flooding.

1.62 Role Play: If sent into reactor building to check for flooding Booth conditions, depending on where sent, report there is water leakage Operator from the HPCI / RCIC turbine shaft seals.

Monitor SRV tailpipe temperatures on MS-TR-166 on Panel 9-21.

Monitor torus water level on Panel 9-4-1; level lowers as RPV and BOP/ATC steam lines flood and stabilizes when steam lines are full.

Monitor RPV pressure lowering and rising when the MSLs are full CREW 1.63 Report to CRS when RPV flooded to the Main Steam Lines.

(CT-4): When RPV level cannot be determined and at least 1 SRV is manually opened, isolate MSIVs, MSL drains, HPCI steam supply, and RCIC steam supply, prior to RPV water level rising to the bottom of the main steam lines.

1.64 As directed by the CRS, Close:

MSIVs BOP/ATC Main Steam line drain valves.

HPCI isolation valves RCIC isolation valves.

BOP/ATC1.65 Control RPV injection as low as practicable.

Return to Page 30 for completion of BOP actions.

Rev. 2

INITIAL CONDITIONS A. Plant Status:

1. 100% power, near End of Cycle.
2. Rod Sequence Information: RO to provide B. Tech. Spec. Limitations in effect:
1. None C. Significant problems/abnormalities:
1. None D. PRA Risk:

Green E. Evolutions/maintenance for the on-coming shift:

1. After taking the watch the ATC is to shift B RRMG Oil Pumps B1 and B3 per Procedure 2.2.68.1, Section 20. The oil pump shift is to allow the oil pump to be tagged out later in the shift.
2. After RRMG oil pump shift, the BOP is to complete placing RHR Loop B in Suppression Pool Cooling in service per Procedure 2.2.69.3 which is complete to Step 8.19.
3. A hot spot flush is NOT required for RHR Loop B.
4. A HPCI run is planned for the next shift.

Rev. 2

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 3/6/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 APPLICANTS R2 R1 U1 I3 RO RO RO RO SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO ATC BOP CRS CRS 1 2 3 4 1 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 5,6, 4,5, 3,4, 3,4, Events and Conditions 7 6,7, 5,6, 5,6, 8 7 7 Comply With and 1,2, 4,5, 2,3, 2,3, Use Procedures (1) 5,6, 6,7, 4,5, 4,5, 7 8 6,7 6,7 Operate Control 4,5, 4,5, N/A N/A Boards (2) 6,7, 6,7, 8 8 Communicate ALL ALL ALL ALL and Interact Demonstrate N/A N/A ALL ALL Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and N/A N/A 3,5 3,5 Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

Rev 2 Page 1 of 6

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 3/6/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 APPLICANTS I1 I2 RO RO RO RO SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO ATC BOP 1 2 3 4 1 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 5,6, 4,5, Events and Conditions 7 6,7, 8

Comply With and 1,2, 4,5, Use Procedures (1) 5,6, 6,7, 7 8 Operate Control 4,5, 4,5, Boards (2) 6,7, 6,7, 8 8 Communicate ALL ALL and Interact Demonstrate N/A N/A Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and N/A N/A Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

Rev 2 Page 2 of 6

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 3/6/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 APPLICANTS R5,R4 R3 U2 I2,I4 RO RO RO RO SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO ATC BOP CRS CRS 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 2,3, 2,3, 2,3, 2,3, Events and Conditions 4,5, 4,6, 4,6, 4,6, 6,7 7,8 7 7 Comply With and 2,3, 1,3, 1,2, 1,2, Use Procedures (1) 4,5, 4,6, 3,4, 3,4, 6 7,8 5,6 5,6 Operate Control 2,3, 1,3, N/A N/A Boards (2) 4,5, 6,7, 6,8 8 Communicate 2,3, 1,3, ALL ALL and Interact 4,5, 4,6, 6,8 8 Demonstrate N/A N/A ALL ALL Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and N/A N/A 1,3 1,3 Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

Rev 2 Page 3 of 6

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 3/6/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 APPLICANTS I3 I1 U3 RO RO RO RO SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO ATC BOP BOP 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 2,3, 2,3, 2,3, Events and Conditions 4,5, 4,6, 4,6, 6,7 7,8 7,8 Comply With and 2,3, 1,3, 1,3, Use Procedures (1) 4,5, 4,6, 4,6, 6 7,8 7,8 Operate Control 2,3, 1,3, 1,3, Boards (2) 4,5, 6,7, 6,7, 6,8 8 8 Communicate 2,3, 1,3, 1,3, and Interact 4,5, 4,6, 4,6, 6,8 8 8 Demonstrate N/A N/A N/A Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and N/A N/A N/A Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

Rev 2 Page 4 of 6

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 3/6/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 APPLICANTS R1,R3 R2,R4 U1,U2,U3 I1 RO RO RO RO SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO ATC BOP CRS CRS 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 3,4, 2,4, 2,3, 2,3, Events and Conditions 5,6, 5,6, 4,5, 4,5, 8 7,8 6,7, 6,7, 8 8 Comply With and 1,3, 2,4, 2,3, 2,3, Use Procedures (1) 4,5, 5,6, 4,5, 4,5, 6,8 7,8 6,7 6,7 Operate Control 1,3, 2,4, N/A N/A Boards (2) 5,6, 5,6, 8 7,8 Communicate 1,3, 1,2, ALL ALL and Interact 4,5, 4,5, 6,8 6,7, 8

Demonstrate N/A N/A ALL ALL Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and N/A N/A 2,4 2,4 Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

Rev 2 Page 5 of 6

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 3/6/2017 Operating Test No.: 1 APPLICANTS I2,I4 I3 U3 RO RO RO RO SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO ATC BOP BOP 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 3,4, 2,4, 2,4, Events and Conditions 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 8 7,8 7,8 Comply With and 1,3, 2,4, 2,4, Use Procedures (1) 4,5, 5,6, 5,6, 6,8 7,8 7,8 Operate Control 1,3, 2,4, 2,4, Boards (2) 5,6, 5,6, 5,6, 8 7,8 7,8 Communicate 1,3, 1,2, 1,2, and Interact 4,5, 4,5, 4,5, 6,8 6,7, 6,7, 8 8 Demonstrate N/A N/A N/A Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and N/A N/A N/A Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

Rev 2 Page 6 of 6