ML17090A398

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Engine Systems, Inc. - Part 21 Report Regarding Identification of Failed Diode Surge Suppressor with Internal Manufacturing Defect
ML17090A398
Person / Time
Site: Perry, Harris, Grand Gulf  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/27/2017
From: Horner T
Engine Systems
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
10CFR21-0116, Rev. 0
Download: ML17090A398 (7)


Text

ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC.

175 Freight Road Rocky Mount, NC 27804 Date:

Company:

Fax Number:

Verification No.:

Reference:

From:

Page:

Dear Sir:

TELEFAX March 27, 2017 NRC Operations Center 301/816-5151 301/816-5100 Report No. 10CFR21-0116, Rev. 0 Tom Homer 1of5 Telephone: 252/977-2720 Fax: 2521446-1134 Following this cover is a copy of our report 10CFR21-0116, Rev. 0, for a 1 OCFR21 reportable notification on a diode surge suppressor, Allen-Bradley P/N 199-FSMZ-1.

A copy of this report will be mailed to the NRC Document Control Desk and to our affected nuclear customers.

Should you have questions, please let us know.

Sincerely, ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC.

~~~

Tom Homer Quality Assurance Manager

  • Quality Performance With Pride

ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC.

175 Freight Road, Rocky Mount, NC 27804 Telephone: 252/977-2720 Fax: 252/446-1134 Report No. 10CFR21*0116 Rev. O:

03/27 /17 COMPONENT:

10CFR21 REPORTING OF DEFECTS AND NON-COMPLIANCE Diode Surge Suppressor P/N: 199~FSMZ~ 1 SYSTEM:

Emergency Diesel Generator Control System CONCLUSION:

Reportable iri accordance with 1 OCFR21 Prepared By: _..,,.....~""+----LL AN\\."""'.

  • ....;......;;.\\. _ _ _ _ _ _

"-J Engineering Manager Date:

Reviewed By:~£ Date: 3-,27-/7 Quality Assurance Manager Qualitv Performance With Pride

Report No.

10CFR21*0116 Record of Revisions Page:

1 of~

REV DATE PAGE DESCRIPTION 0

03/27/17 Initial issue.

COMPONENT:

Diode Surge Suppressor Allen-Bradley P/N: 199-FSMZ-1

SUMMARY

Report No.

Revision:

Date:

Page:

1 OCFR21 -0116 o

03/27/17 1of2*

Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on February 10, 2017 after receiving notification from FirstEnergy Corp - Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) of a manufacturing defect in a diode supplied by ESI. The evaluation was concluded on March 27, 2017 and it was determined that this issue Is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21. The manufacturing defect identified was in a diode ofthe same date code as two diodes that failed while installed at PNPP. The failed diodes resulted in loss of class 1 E control power which could have prevented the emergency diesel generator set from performing its safety related fuootlon.

Discussion:

In January 2007, ESI supplied a governor system upgrade to PNPP. The upgrade replaced the existing Woodward EGB-35C governor/actuator, EGA control (w/ resistor box), and MOP with an EGB-35P governor/actuator, 2301A control, and DRU. The electrical components were housed in a control panel assembly.* To support the slow start feature of the new system, qty 4 relays were used, each of which used a surge suppressor (flyback) pl.ode.

PNPP*.experienced two failures in 2016 of the aforementioned diodes supplied by ESI. The diodes are Allen-Bradley part number 199-FSMZ-1 and they were Installed across the coils of Allen-Bradley 700DC series-relays. The Allen-Bradley date code stamped on the side of the diodes is BX9. The failure in both cases resulted in a short circuit condition that resulted in a Joss of class 1 E control power to the EOG. See below for a visual representation of a typical diode installation.

K2 K1 Figure 1: Typical Diode Installation

Report No.

Revision:

1 OCFR21--0116 0

Date:

03/27/17 Page:

2of 2 Root cause evaluation:

The root cause of the failure is determined to be a manufacturing defect internal to the diode. Though an analysis of the diodes that failed at PNPP was unable to be performed due to their condition, the analysis performed on a degraded diode of the same date code, BX9, detected an internal manufacturing defect.

Affected Users:

A listing of users with suspect diodes is provided in Table 1 below.

Customer Customer ESI Sales Qty Date.

C-of-C Comments PO#

Order Code Date FirstEnergy-Perry 45200506 8000748 8

BX9 1/04/2007 2 panels were supplied, atv. 4 diodes per panel FirstEnergy-Perry 45200506 8000748 4

BX9 1/12/2007 Spare parts for panels Entergy-Grand Gulf 10176857 8001068 12 ZX9 7/25/2008 2 panels were supplied, Qty. 6 diodes per panel Entergy-Grand Gulf 10188993 3004461 4

zxg 8/19/2008 JSpare parts order for panels Progress-Shearon Harris 00579428 8001830 2

zxg 3/14/2012 Subcomponent of relay ESl50239 Progress-Shearon Harris 00660586 3010513 2

MA9 5/21/2013 Subcomponent of relay ESl50239 Duke-Shearon Harris 03009489 3014560 2

YB9 3/30/2016 Subcomponent of relay ESl50239 TOTAL QUANTITY 34 Table 1: Affected Users Corrective Action:

All affected users (Identified in Table 1) should perform the following:

1. Review their Inventory fcir suspect diodes listed in Table 1. Any suspect diodes should be removed from inventory and discarded.
2. Determine if suspect diodes listed in Table 1 have been installed. Thus far, ESI has identified degraded diodes from date codes BX9 and zxg and it is possible that diodes from the other date codes are degraded as well.

ESI has been unable to determine an expected service life.

Therefore, the recommendation is to remove or replace any installed suspect diodes as soon as possible. Note that the applications for which this diode has been supplied (Enterprise engine control panels) used the same style Allen-Bradley relays as original equipment but without diode surge suppressors. It is therefore acceptable to remove the diodes and expect no change or impact to the existing equipment. '

To prevent recurrence of this issue, the following has been implemented by ESI:

1. The test procedure fpr the.diode has been enhanced to increase the test voltage and decrease the allowable leakage current. Although this was not the cause of the failure, it may have prevented identification of a degraded condition. This corrective action has already been implemented.
2. A review has been performed of other diodes supplied by ESI and at this time only this one part number is affected. A typical diode would be procured and/or sold under the diode manufacturer part number; whereas in this case it was procured from the relay manufacturer. Testing was performed using typical relay values in lieu of the diode manufacturer's acceptance criteria.

0312712017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Pagel Part 21 (PAR)

Event#

52642 Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC.

Notification Date I Time: 03/27/2017 16:51 (EDT)

Si.ipplier: ENGINE SYSTEM~. INC.

Event Date I Time: 03/27/2017 (EDT)

Last Modification: 03/27/2017 Region: 1 Docket#:,

City: ROCKY MOUNT Agreement State:

Yes County:

License#:

State: NC I

NRC Notified by: TOM HORNER Notifications: EUGENE GUTHRIE R2DO HQ Ops Officer: BETHANY CECERE

/JAMNES CAMERON R3DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY THOMAS HIPSCHMAN R4DO 10 CFR Section:

PART 21/50.55 REACTORS EMAIL 21.21 (d)(3)(i)

DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 - IDENTIFICATION OF FAILED DIODE SURGE SUPPRESSOR WITH INTERNAL MANUFACTURING DEFECT The following information is excerpted from an Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) report received via fax:

"COMPONENT:

"Diode Surge Suppressor "Allen-Bradley P/N: 199-FSMZ-1

SUMMARY

"Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 1 OCFR21 evaluation on February 10, 2017 after receiving notification from FirstEnergy Corp - Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) of a manufacturing defect in a diode supplied by ESI. The

' evaluation was concluded on March 27, 2017 and it was determined that this issue is a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21. The manufacturing defect identified was in a diode of the same date code as two diodes that failed while installed at PNPP. The failed diodes resulted In loss of class 1 E control power which could have prevented the emergency diesel generator set from performing its safety related function.

"Discussion:

In January 2007, ESI supplied a governor system upgrade to PNPP. The upgrade replaced the existing Woodward EGB-35C governor/actuator, EGA control (w/ resistor box), and MOP with an EGB-35P governor/actuator, 2301A control, and DRU. The electrical components were housed in a control panel assembly. To support the slow start feature of the new system, qty 4 relays were used, each of which used a surge suppressor (flyback) diode.

0312712017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page2 "PNPP experienced two failures in 2016 of the aforementioned diodes supplied by ESI. The diodes are Allen Bradley part number 199-FSMZ-1 and they were installed across the coils of Allen-Bradley 700DC series relays.

The Allen-Bradley date code stamped on. the side of the diodes is BX9. The failure in both cases resulted in a short circuit condition that resulted in a loss of class 1 E control power to the EOG...

"Root cause evaluation:

"The root cause of the failure is determined to be a manufacturing defect internal to the diode. Though an analysis of the diodes that failed at PNPP was unable to be performed due to their condition, the analysis performed on a degraded diode of the same date code, BX9, detected an internal manufacturing defect.

Affected Users:

A listing of users with suspect diodes includes FirstEnergy - Perry, Entergy - Grand Gulf, Progress - Shearon Harris, and Duke - Shearon Harris. A total quantity of 34 diodes are suspect.

"Corrective Action:

"All affected users... [identified above]... should perform the following:

"1. Review their inventory for suspect diodes listed in Table 1. Any suspect diodes should be removed from inventory and discarded.

"2. Determine if suspect diodes listed in Table 1 have been installed. Thus far, ESI has identified degraded diodes from date codes BX9 and ZX9 and it is possible that diodes from the other date codes are degraded as well. ESI has been unable to determine an expected service life. Therefore, the recommendation is to remove or replace any installed suspect diodes as soon as possible. Note that the applications for which this diode has been supplied (Enterprise engine control panels} used the same style Allen-Bradley relays as original equipment but without diode*

surge suppressors. It is therefore acceptable to remove the diodes and expect no change or impact to the existing equipment.

"To prevent recurrence of this issue, the following has been Implemented by ESI:

"1. The test procedure for the diode has been enhanced to increase the test voltage and decrease the allowable leakage current. Although this was not the cause of the failure, it may have prevented identification of a degraded condition. This corrective action has already been implemented.

"2. A review has been performed of other diodes supplied by ESI and at this time only this one part number is affected. A typical diode would be procured and/or sold under the diode manufacturer part number; whereas in this case it was procured from the relay manufacturer. Testing was performed using typical relay values in lieu of the diode manufacturer's acceptance criteria."

If you have any questions, you may call:

Tom Horner Quality Assurance Manager Tel: (252) 977-2720 ESI Report ID: 10CFR21-0116, dated 03/27/17