ML17059A390

Advises That NRC Has Determined That Rv Overfill Protection Sys Not Taken Credit for as Primary Instrument for Providing Fuel Protection in Any of Design Basis Accidents or Transient Events.Nrc Considers All Efforts Completed

ML17059A390
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	08/12/1994
From:	Brinkman D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Sylvia B NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
References
TAC-M74966, NUDOCS 9408170113
Download: ML17059A390 (8)

Text

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555-0001 August 12, 1994 Docket No. 50-220 Hr. B. Ralph Sylvia Executive Vice President, Nuclear Niagara Hohawk Power Corporation Nine Hile Point Nuclear Station P.O.

Box 63

Lycoming, New York 13093

SUBJECT:

RESPONSE

TO GENERIC LETTER 89-19 REACTOR VESSEL OVERFILL PROTECTION, NINE NILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT NO.

1 (NHP-1)

(TAC NO. H74966)

By letter dated August 1,

1994, Niagara Hohawk Power Corporation (NHPC) responded to the NRC staff's Hay 27, 1994, request for additional information regarding additional Technical Specifications (TSs) governing the availability of the reactor vessel overfill protection system instrumentation for NHP-l.

NHPC's response stated that NHPC had determined that the instrumentation associated'ith the feedwater trip on high water level should not be added to the NHP-1 TSs.

The NRC's'inal Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors (58 FR 39132) established a specific set of objective criteria as guidance for determining which regulatory requirements and operating restrictions should be included in TSs.

Criterion 3 of the final policy statement would require that the reactor vessel overfill protection system instrumentation be included in the TSs if this instrumentation serves to protect any fuel safety limits.

However, NHPC stated in its August 1,

1994, response that the reactor vessel overfill protection system is not credited for fuel protection in any design basis accident or transient event described in the NHP-1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

Therefore, NHPC concluded that the instrumentation associated with the feedwater trip on high water level should not be added to the NHP-1 TSs.

The NRC staff has reviewed the August 1,

1994, response from NHPC and the analyses of the NHP-1 design basis accidents and transient events as described in the NHP-1 UFSAR and we have determined that the reactor vessel overfill protection system was not taken credit for as the primary instrument for providing fuel protection in any. of the design basis accidents or transient 9408i70ii3 9408i2 PDR ADOCK 05000220 F

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Hr. B. Ralph Sylvia August 12, 1994 events.

The August I, 1994, response also stated that the NHP-I plant procedures include provisions to periodically verify the operability of the automatic overfill protection system during power operation.

The procedures require quarterly channel functional testing and once per operating cycle calibration and operability testing of the feedwater pumps high water level trip functions.

In addition, operator training includes simulator practice demonstrations during normal and transient events to maintain reactor vessel water level within pr escribed bands to preclude vessel overfill.

Therefore, the NRC staff agrees that, inclusion of the reactor vessel overfill protection system instrumentation is not required in the NHP-I TSs.

We consider all efforts regarding TAC No. H74966 completed.

Sincerely, cc:

See next page Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Hanager Project Directorate I-I Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

1,

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Hr. B. Ralph Sylvia Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Nile Point Nuclear Station Unit No.

1 cc; Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire Winston

& Strawn 1400 L Street, NW Washington, DC 20005-3502 Supervisor Town of Scriba Route 8, Box 382

Oswego, New York 13126 Hr. Louis F. Storz Vice President Nuclear Generation Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station P.O.

Box 63

Lycoming, New York 13093 Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O.

Box 126

Lycoming, New York 13093 Gary D. Wilson, Esquire Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West

Syracuse, New York 13202 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Hs.

Donna Ross New York State Energy Office 2 Empire State Plaza 16th Floor

Albany, New York 12223 Hr. Richard B. Abbott Unit 1 Plant Manager Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station P.O.

Box 63

Lycoming, New York 13093 Hr. David K. Greene Manager Licensing Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station P.O.

Box 63

Lycoming, New York 13093 Charles Donaldson, Esquire Assistant Attorney General New York Department of Law 120 Broadway New York, New York 10271 Hr. Paul D.

Eddy State of New York Department of Public Service Power Division, System Operations 3 Empire State Plaza

Albany, New York 12223 Hr. Hartin J.

HcCormick, Jr.

Vice President Nuclear Safety Assessment and Support Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station P.O.

Box 63

Lycoming, New York 13093

T P

Hr. B.'alph Sylvia August 12, 1994 events.

The August 1,

1994, response also stated that the NHP-1 plant procedures include provisions to periodically verify the operability of the automatic overfill protection system during power operation.

The procedures require quarterly channel functional testing and once per operating cycle calibration and operability testing of the feedwater pumps high water level trip functions.

In addition, operator training includes simulator practice demonstrations during normal and transient events to maintain reactor vessel water level within prescribed bands to preclude vessel overfill.

Therefore, the NRC staff agrees that inclusion of the reactor vessel overfill protection system instrumentation is not required in the NHP-1 TSs.

We consider all efforts regarding TAC No. H74966 completed.

Sincerely, PgiGNAl SIGHTED BY~

cc:

See next page Donald S. Brinkman, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Distribution:

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