ML17058A727

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Ack Receipt of 910412 Response to Insp Rept 50-220/91-02, Documenting Corrective & Preventive Actions Re Implementation of 10CFR50,App J Exception
ML17058A727
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/18/1991
From: Linville J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Sylvia B
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
References
NUDOCS 9105020014
Download: ML17058A727 (14)


See also: IR 05000220/1991002

Text

Docket No. 50-220

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

ATTN: Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia

Executive Vice President

Nuclear Operations

301 Plainfield Road

Syracuse, New York 13212

Subject:

NRC Region I Inspection Report No. 50-220/91-02

Dear Mr. Sylvia:

This refers to your letter dated April 12, 1991 (NMP1L 0578), in response to our letter dated

March 7, 1991.

Thank you for informing us of the corrective and preventive actions documented in your letter

related to the implementation of a 10 CFR 50, Appendix J exception.

These actions will be

reviewed during a future inspection in the operations area.

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely,

""'.t':"'"'~ 'igAed t,"li.

>" '-a

C. l.inttli

James C. Linville, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch No.

1

Division of Reactor Projects

OFFICIALRECORD COPY

a: Rpl91-02.NM1

~

'

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

APR i8 1991

CC:

J, Firlit, Vice President - Nuclear Generation

C. Terry, Vice President - Nuclear Engineering

J. Perry, Vice President - Quality Assurance

S. Wilczek, Jr., Vice President - Nuclear Support

K. Dahlberg, Unit 1 Plant Manager

M. McCormick, Unit 2 Plant Manager

D. Greene, Manager, Quality Assurance Operations - Unit 1

C. Beckham, Manager, Quality Assurance Operations - Unit 2

R. Tessier, Manager, Operations - Unit 1

M. Colomb, Manager, Operations

Unit 2

K. Thomas, Supervisor - Site Licensing

J. Warden, New York Consumer Protection Branch

M. Wetterhahn, Jr., Esquire

G. Wilson, Senior Attorney

Director, Power Division, Department of Public Service, State

State of New York, Department of Law

Public Document Room (PDR)

Local Public Document Room (LPDR)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident Inspector

State of New York, SLO Designee

of New.York

OFH~CIALRECORD COPY

a: Rpl91-02. NM1

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation

bcc:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

J. Joyner, DRSS

J. Linville, DRP

D. Vito, DRP

D. Haverkamp, DRP

T. Vegel, DRP

K. Brockman, EDO

R. Capra, NRR

D. Brinkman, NRR

WCook/mjd

4/l~/91

DHaverkamp

4/591

JL4ville

4)j5I/91

OFFICIALRECORD COPY

a: Rp191-02.NM1

7 NlA

RA

U MOHAWK

lose ph F. Firlit

Vice President

Nuclear Generation

NINE MILK POINT NUCLEAR STATION IP.O. BOX 32 LYCOMING,NEW YORK 13093/TELEPHONE (315) 343-21 10

April 12,

1991

NMP1L 0578

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Attn:

Document Control Desk

Washington,

D.

C.

20555

Re:

Nine Mile Point Unit

1

Docket No. 50-220

DPR-63

Gentlemen:

Attached is Niagara

Mohawk Power Corporation's

response

to the Notice of

Violation contained in Inspection Report

Numbers 50-220/91-02

and 50-410/91-

02 dated

March 7,

1991. If you have .any questions

concerning this matter,

please call me.

Very truly yours,

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

F. Firlit

'ice President

Nuclear Generation

NAS/rp

000975KK

xcs

Regional Administrator, Region

Mr.

W. A. Cook, Senior Resident Inspector

Records

Management

e

NINE MILE POINT UNIT 1

DOCE33T NO. 50-220

DPR-63

RESPONSE

TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION CONTAINED IN

INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-220/91-02

AND 50-410/91-02

VIOLATION

Nine Mile Point Unit

1 Technical Specification 6.8.1 states

that written

procedures

shall be established,

implemented

and maintained

that

meet or

exceed

the requirements

of Section 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972 which states,

in

part, that written procedures,

including revisions or changes,

shall be

reviewed for adequacy

and approved

by authorized

personnel.

Contrary to the above,

on May 7,

1990, Operating Procedure

Nl-OP-14,

Containment

Spray System Nos.

80

& 93,

was revised

to incorporate operational

alternatives

to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, testing of the containment

spray

(CS)

system discharge

check valves in a manner which conflicted with existing

procedures.

Specifically,

the revision to N1-OP-14:

Conflicted with the requirements

of Emergency Operating Procedure

(EOP)

4 regarding criteria for termination of containment

spray;

2.

Failed to identify that portions of Section H.8 of N1-OP-14 could not

be

performed,

in that post-LOCA radiation fields would likely prohibit

local operation of two of the

CS system's

cross-tie valves per EOP-10

(valves modified ta manual operation only, per the Appendix J exemption

Safety Evaluation 89-13);

and,

3 ~

Vas written in a manner which created

confusion

among oper'ators

interviewed

as to its applicability and implementation.

ADMISSION OR DENIAL OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION:

Niagara

Mohawk Power Corporation admits to the cited violation.

THE REASON

FOR THE VIOLATION:

Niagara

Mohawk has determined

that this violation occurred

due to inadequate

technical review.

The root cause for this inadequate

review was poor

definition of the roles

and responsibilities of the involved departments.

Management

overview of the Restart Action Plan focused

on defining the

Appendix J licensing requirements.

The same

emphasis

was not applied to the

technical review and implementation of these

requirements.

The reviewers of Safety Evaluation No. 89-13,

"Appendix J-Mater Seal"

(SE 89-13) failed to address

adequately

the impact of procedural

and technical

issues prior to its approval.

As a result, this review failed to identify the

inconsistencies

between Operating Procedure'1-0P-14,

"Containment

Spray

System"

(OP-14),

and Emergency Operating Procedures

(EOPs).

In addition,

SE

89-13 did not evaluate

the additional requirements

of operation of valves 80-

40 and 80-45 for mitigation or recovery

from an accident.

CORRECTIVE STEPS

VHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND THE RESULTS ACHIEVED:

Section H.7.0 of OP-14 has

been revised

to remove

the conflict between

N1-EOP-4 and

OP-14 regarding implementation of the water seal during a Design

Basis

Loss of Coolant Accident

(LOCA).

Steps

H.7.3 through H.7.8 which were

added

to provide a water seal during times without drywell spraying have

been

deleted.

SE 89-13 was revised

to clarify the implementation of a water seal

when containment

spray is in the spray

mode during the Containment

Design

Basis

LOCA.

SE 89-13 was also revised

to clarify that intertie valves 80-40

and 80-45 are not accessible

following an accident

and specified alternate

actions are required if these

valves

must

be closed.

In this regard,

Section

H.8 of OP-14 has also

been revised

to allow Drywell Flooding if intertie

valves 80-40 or 80-45 are inaccessible

due to radiological conditions.

'he

OP-14 revisions

have

been

reviewed under

the provisions of 10CFR50.59

and

no unreviewed safety question exists.

Shift briefings were held to provide operators

clear direction to enter

a

Limiting Condition of Operation for those activities requiring closure of a

containment

spray isolation valve and closing of one or both of the

two

normally open intertie valves.

These shift briefings eliminated

the confusion

among operators

regarding Limiting Condition of Operation for those activities

described

above.

On-shift training for all operating

crews on, the revised

OP-14 will be

complete

by April 19,

1991.

Reinforcement

training for the operators

on the

simulator will be complete

by August 1,

1991.

CORRECTIVE STEPS

VHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION:

The recently completed Niagara

Mohawk Nuclear Division reorganization

provides

for improved clarification of roles

and responsibilities.

The responsibility

for maintenance

and development

of the Operations

department

procedures,

including OPs

and

EOPs,,

now resides with'a single individual, the General

Supervisor of Operations

Support.

This organizational

feature will provide

better accountability,. for Operations

Department

technical review.

Safety

Evaluations

are

now prepared

by Nuclear Engineering rather

than the Licensing

engineer.

This allows Engineering

to more effectively interact

on technical

and licensing issues

with=-Nuclear Generation

and Nuclear Support.

The Nuclear Division will be implementing

two new Directives; Project

and Task

Management

(NDD-PTM) and Evaluation

and Corrective Action for Deviation/Event

Reporting

(NDD-ECA).

The Project

and Task Management Directive will establish

requirements

and define responsibilities for managing Nuclear'Division "Tasks"

and,"Projects"

in a uniform manner consistent

with governing regulatory

requirements

and the Nuclear Division Business

Plan.

The Nuclear Division

will also

implement

a Deviation Event Report

(DER) system.

A systematic

process will be applied to issues

requiring evaluation

and implementation,

such

as

10CFR50,

Appendix J.

Among other'things,

this process is designed

to

identify clearly the accountability for actions necessary

to disposition the

DER.

This process

also formalizes

a review of completed disposition actions

for effectiveness

in resolving the

DER issue.

New Administrative Procedures

for procedure

use

and control, procedure

preparation,

review and issue,

and procedure

change evaluations

are being

implemented

per the schedule of the Business

Plan.

These

procedures will

provide an improved

10CFR50.59

review process for procedures

and will identify

procedure

reviewers.

The 10CFR50.59

reviewers will attend additional training

on 10CFR50.59

before implementation of the new administrative

procedures.

DATE OF FULL COMPLIANCE:

On-shift training for all operating

crews

on the revised

OP-14 will be

complete

by April 19,

1991.

Full compliance will be achieved

by August 1,

1991 with the reinforcement training of operators

on the simulator.