ML17056A749

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Amend 13 to License NPF-69,revising Tech Spec Sections 3/4.3.3 & 3/4.3.5 & Associated Bases to Change Nominal Trip Setpoints & Allowable Values Re HPCS & RCIC Pump Suction Transfer
ML17056A749
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point 
Issue date: 04/05/1990
From: Capra R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML17056A750 List:
References
NPF-69-A-013 NUDOCS 9004160244
Download: ML17056A749 (24)


Text

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+**y0 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION DOCKET NO. 50-410 NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 13 License No.

NPF-69 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (the licensee) dated August 3, 1988, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No.

NPF-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:

9004160244 900405 PDR ADOCK 050004i0 P

PDC

4 (2)

Technical S ecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix 8, both of which are attached

hereto, as revised through Amendment No.

13 are hereby incorporated into this license.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMNISSION

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Project Directorate I-l Division of Reactor Projects - I/IJ Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of Issuance:

April 5, 1990

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT AMENDMENT NO.

13 TO FACILITY OPEPATING LICENSE NO.

NPF-69 DOCKET NO. 50-410 Revise Appendix A as follows:

Remove Pa es 3/4 3-32 3/4 3-37 3/4 3-38 3/4 3-42 3/4 3-55 3/4 3-57 3/4 3-58 B3/4 3-2 83/4 3-4 Insert Pa es 3/4 3-32 3/4 3-37 3/4 3-38 3/4 3-42 3/4 3-55 3/4 3-57 3/4 3-58 B3/4 3-2 83/4 3-2

TABLE 3.3.3-1 (Continued)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEH ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION TRIP FUNCTION C.

Division III Tri S stem 1.

'PCS SYSTEH MINIMUM OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP FUNCTION(a)

APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS ACTION a.

b.

C.

d.

e.f.

g-h.

Reactor Vessel Hater Level Low, Low, Level 2

Drywell Pressure High (d)

Reactor Vessel Hater Level High, Level 8

Pump Suction Pressure Low (Transfer)

Suppression Pool Hater Level - High HPCS System Flow Rate Low (Bypass)

Pump Discharge Pressure - High (Bypass)

Hanual Initiation (d) 4(b) 4(b) 4(e) 2(f) 2(f) 1 1

1/System 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2, 1, 2,

'1, 2, 4*

5A 3

3 4"

5" 4A 5A 4A 5A 3

4*

5" 3

4A 5*

3 4A 5*

36 36 32 37 37 31 31 35 D.

Loss of Power (Divisions I 5 II)

TOTAL NO.

OF CHANNELS CHANNELS TO TRIP HINIHUH CHANNELS OPERABLE APPLICABLE OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS ACTION 1.

4.16-kV Emergency Bus Under-voltage Loss of Voltage 2.

4.16-kV Emergency Bus Under-voltage Degraded Voltage E.

Loss of Power Division III l.

4.16-kV Emergency Bus Under-voltage Loss of Voltage 2.

4.16-kV Emergency Bus Under-voltage - Degraded Voltage Amentment No.

13 3/Bus 3/Bus 3/Bus 3/Bus 2/Bus 2/Bus 2/Bus 2/Bus 2/Bus 2/Bus 2/Bus 2/Bus I

2 3

4** 5'"

39 1, 2, 3, 4** 5'*

39 1, 2, 3

4* 5*'9 1, 2, 3, 4'*, 5**

39

TABLE 3.3.3-2 (Continued)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS TRIP FUNCTION C.

Division III Tri S stem 1.

HPCS SYSTEH TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUE a.

b.

C.

d.

e.f.

g-h.

Reactor Vessel Hater Level - Low, Low, Level 2

Drywell Pressure High Reactor Vessel Hater Level High, Level 8

Pump Suction Pressure Low (Transfer)

Suppression Pool Hater Level High HPCS System Flow Rate Low (Bypass)

Pump Discharge Pressure High (Bypass)

Hanual Initiation

>108.8 in.*

<1.68 psig

<202.3 in.*

>97 in.

H20

<201.0 ft. el

>825 gpm

>240 psig 8A

>101.8 in.

<1.88 psig

<209.3 in.

>94.5 in.

H20

<201.1 ft. el

>750 gpm

>220 psig NA D.

Loss of Power (Divisions I 5 II) l.

4.16-kV Emergency Bus Under-voltage - Loss of Voltage 2.

4.16-kV Emergency Bus Under-voltage - Degraded Voltage 4.16-kV basis-

>3148

<3.06-sec time delay a.

4.16-kV basis-

>3847 volts b.

<8.16-sec time delay**

c.

<30.6-sec time delay

>3051 volts

<3.12-sec time delay

>3770 volts

<8.32-sec time delay **

<31.2-sec time delay Amendment No.

13

TABLE 3.3.3-2 (Continued)

EHERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEH ACTUATION INSTRUHENTATION SETPOINTS TRIP FUNCTION E.

Loss of Power (Division III) l.

4.16-kV Emergency Bus Under-voltage Loss.of Voltage TRIP SETPOINT a.

4.16-kV basis-

>3148 vol ts b.

<3.06-sec time delay ALLOHABLE VALUE

>3051 volts I

<3.12-sec time delay 2.

4.16-kV Emergency Bus Under-voltage - Degraded Voltage a.

b.

4.16-kV basis-

>3&47 volts

<12.24-sec time delay

>3770 vo 1 ts

<12.48-sec time delay See Bases Figure B3/4 3-1.

  • ~ Alarm only without LOCA signal present; Alarm and trip with LOCA signal present.

Amendment No.

13

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TABLE 4.3.3.1-1 (Continued)

E ERE C <<

"S<< <<E<<

t

~EE EE<<

TRIP FUNCTION B.

Division II Tri S stem (Continued) 2.

Automatic Oe ressurization S stem

<<t CHANNEL CHECK CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST CHANNEL CALIBRATION OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR HHICH SURVEILLANCE i g b.

C.

d.

e.f.

Reactor Vessel Hater Level-Low, Low, Low, Level 1

ADS Timer Reactor Vessel Hater Level-Low, Level 3 (Permissive)

LPCI Pump (8 and C) Discharge Pressure High (Permissive)

Manual Inhibit Manual Initiation NA S

NA NA M

M(a)

R(c) 0 R(c)

R(c)

NA NA 1, 2, 3

1, 2.

3 1,2,3 1,2,3 1, 2, 3

I, 2, 3

C.

Division III Tri S stem a.

Reactor Vessel Hater Level-Low, Low, Level 2

b.

Orywell Pressure High(b) c.

Reactor Vessel Hater Level High, Level 8

d.

Pump Suction Pressure-Low (Transfer) e.

Suppression Pool Hater Level - High f.

HPCS System Flow Rate - Low (Bypass) g.

Pump Discharge Pressure High (Bypass) h.

Manual Initiation(b)

M(a)

R(c)

R(c)

R(c)

R(c)

R(c)

R(c)

R(c) 1, 2, 3, 4*,

5',2,3 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*

4J 5A 1,2,3,4*,5" 1, 2, 3, 4",

5',

2, 3, 4*,

5',

2, 3, 4*.

5'mendment No.

13

r ~

TABLE 3.3.5-1 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEH ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIONAL UNITS 1.

Reactor Vessel Hater Level - Low, Low, Level 2

2.

Reactor Vessel Hater Level - High, Level 8(b) 3.

Pump Suction Pressure

- Low (Transfer) 4.

Manual Initiation(d)

MINIHUH OPERABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP SYSTEM(a) 2(c) 1/system(e)

ACTION 50 50 51 52 TABLE NOTATIONS (a)

A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for required surveillance without placing the Trip System 1n the tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same Trip System is monitoring that parameter.

(b)

The RCIC Level 8 trip may be bypassed to perform RCIC 150 psig operational surveillance test in accordance with Specification 4.7.4.c.2.

(c)

One Trip System with one-out-of-two logic.

(d)

Manual initiation is not required to be OPERABLE w1th indicated reactor vessel water level on the wide-range instrument greater than the Level 8

setpoint coincident w1th the vessel pressure less than 600 ps1g due to the hot calibration/cold operation level error.

(e)

One Trip System with one channel.

Amendment Ho.

13 NINE MILE POINT - UNIT 2 3/4 3-55

IE

TABLE 3.3.5-2 1

REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNITS 1.

Reactor Vessel Hater Level-Low, Low, Level 2

2.

Reactor Vessel Hater Level-High, Level 8

TRIP SETPOINT

>108.8 in.'202.3 in''LLOHABLE VALUE

>101.8 in.

<209.3 in.

3.

Pump Suction Pressure Low (Transfer) 4.

Manual Initiation

>102 in.

H20

>101 in.

H20

'ee Bases Figure B3/4 3-1.

Amendment No.

13 NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 3/4 3-57

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TABLE 4.3.5.1-1 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS FUNCTIONAL UNITS 1.

Reactor Vessel Hater Level-Low, Low, Level 2

2.

Reactor Vessel Hater Level-High, Level 8

3.

Pump Suction Pressure-Low (Transfer) 4.

Manual Initiation '*

CHANNEL CHECK CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST CHANNEL CALIBRATION R'A, Perform the calibration procedure for the trip unit setpoint at least once per 31 days.

Manual initiation is not required to be OPERABLE with indicated reactor vessel water level on the wide range instrument greater than Level 8

setpoint coincident with the vessel pressure less than 600 psig because of the hot calibration/cold operation level error.

Manual initiation switches shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown.

All other circuitry associated with manual initiation shall receive a

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days as part of circuitry required to be tested for automatic system actuation.

Amendment No.

13 NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 3/4 3-58

INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3. 2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION <Cont t nued) high or low end of the setting has a direct bearing on safety, are established at a level away from the normal operating range to prevent inadvertent actuation of the systems involved.

Except for the MSIVs, the FSAR Chapter 15 safety analysts does not address individual sensor response times or the response times of the logic systems to which the sensors are connected.

For AC-operated valves, it is assumed that the AC power supply is lost and is restored by startup of the emergency diesel generators.

In this event, a time of 13 seconds is assumed before the valve starts to move.

In addition to the pipe break, the failure of the DC-operated valve is assumed; thus the signal delay (sensor response) is concurrent with the 13-second diesel startup.

The safety analysis considers an allowable inventory loss in each case which tn turn determines the valve speed in con]unction with the 13-second delay.

It follows that checking the valve speeds and the 13-second time for establishing emergency power will establish the response time for the isolation functions.

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within tts.specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is'n allowance for instrument drift speciftcally allocated for each trip in the safety analysis.

The Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value also contain additional margin for instrument accuracy and calibration capability.

3/4.3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to mitigate the consequences of accidents that are beyond the ability of the operator to control.

This specification provides the OPERABILITY requirements, Trip Setpoints, and response times that will ensure effectiveness of the systems to provide the design protection.

Although the instruments are listed by system, in some cases the same instrument may be used to send the actuation signal to more -than one system at the same time.

Operation with a trtp set less conservative than tts Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpotnt and the Allowable Value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip tn the safety analysts.

The Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value also contatn addittonal margin for instrument accuracy and calibration capability.

The HPCS pump suction pressure-low represents an analytical transfer level tn the condensate storage tank of 14 feet at maximum flow and 3.0 feet at minimum flow.

This is above the corresponding minimum tank level of 10.2 feet at maximum flow and 2.9 feet at minimum flow r'equtred to prevent vortexing.

Amendment No.

13 NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 B3/4 3-2

4

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INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUAT'IO" INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

The Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value also contain additional margin for instrument accuracy and calibration capability.

3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOI ATION COOLING SYSTEH ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The reactor core isolation cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initi'ate actions to assure adequate core cooling 1n the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel.

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but with1n its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is an allowance for instrument drift specifically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

The Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value also contain additional margin for instrument accuracy and calibration capability.

The RCIC pump suction pressure-low represents an analyt1cal transfer level in the condensate storage tank of 13.1 feet at maximum flow and 2.53 feet at minimum flow.

This is above the corresponding minimum tank level of 5.0 feet at maximum flow and 2.5 feet at minimum flow required to prevent vortexing.

3/4.3.6 CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION The control rod block functions are provided consistent with the requirements of the specifications in Section 3/4.1,4, Control Rod Program Controls, and Section 3/4.2, Power Distribution Limits.

The trip logic is arranged so that a trip in any one of the inputs will result in a control rod block.

Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Tr1p Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is an allowance for instrument dr1ft spec1fically allocated for each trip in the safety analyses.

The Trip Setpoint and Allowable Value also contain additional margin for 1nstrument accuracy and calibration capability.

The scram discharge volume water level-high setpo1nt is referenced to a scram discharge volume instrument zero level at elevation 263 feet 10 inches.

3/4.3. 7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.7.

1 RADIATION MbNITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the rad1ation monitoring instrumentation ensures that:

(1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels; (2) the alarm or automatic action is init1ated when the radiation level Trip Setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an acc1dent.

This capabil1ty is consistent with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Cr1teria (GDC) 19, 41, 60, 61, 63 and 64.

NINE HILE POINT - UNIT 2 Amendmene, No.

13 B3/4 3-4