ML17055D866
| ML17055D866 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/13/1988 |
| From: | Blumberg N, Oliveira W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17055D865 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-410-88-10, NUDOCS 8805240037 | |
| Download: ML17055D866 (18) | |
See also: IR 05000410/1988010
Text
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U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report
No.
50-410/88-10
Docket
No.
50-410
License
No.
NPP-59
Licensee:
Niagara
Mohawk Power Cor oration
a>n
e
oa
gyracuse, Ve~wor
13212
Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station
Inspection At:
Scriba,
Inspection
Dates:
~A ri 1 4-8,
1988
Inspector:
>ve r ,
eactor
ngineer
Approved by:
-
j
um erg,
~ef,
Oper
ona
rograms
Section,
Operations
Branch,
DRS,
KIa B
Ins ection
Summary:
Routine unannounced
ins ection
on
A ri 1 4-8,
1988
I-
Areas Inspected:
Nonlicensed staff training which includes observation of work
I
g
- ,
AIIA/III\\
I
It t It g.
Tt
gt
based
inspector
reviewed the
INPO accredited
Nonlicensed Training Programs for:
( 1) Auxiliary
Operators;
(2) Mechanical
Maintenance;
(3) Electrical
Maintenance;
(4) Instrument
and
Control Technicians;
and
(5) Technical
Staff
and Managers.
Results:
No violations
or deviations
were
identified.
One
concern
was,
liowever,
identified
in
paragraph
2.4
regarding
the
lack
of timeliness
of
implementing the
INPO accredited
Nonlicensed Training Programs
reviewed during
this
inspection.
This
concern
is
increased
because
the
licensee
is
reorganizing
the site staff and the Training Department
has lost
some of their
training instructors.
8805240037
880516
RDOCK 050004l0
9
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
- R.
- S,
- CD
- J
- C~
- K
'W
p.
- W.
~L
- R.
- J
+A.
R.
- D
- J ~
~K.
Abbott, Station Superintendent
Agarwal Lead Licensing Engineer
Beckham,
Manager, Quality Assurance
(QA) Operations
Beratta,
Manager,
Nuclear Security
Cary, Instrument
and Control
( I8C) Training Supervisor
Dahlberg, Site Superintendent,
tiaintenance
Drews. Technical Superintendent
Eddy, Public Service
Commission Site Representative
Mansen,
tianager,
Corporate
Lagoe, Site
I8C Supervisor
NacEwan,
New York State
Electric
and
Gas
Corporation
Neild, Technical Assistant to the Station Superintenden
Perry,
Vice President,
Pinter, Licensino Engineer
Smith, Superintendent,
Operations
Wilcox, Maintenance Training Supervisor
Willis, General
Superintendent
Nuclear Generation
Zcllitsch, Superintendent,
Training
Representative
t
United States
Nuclear
Re ulatory Commission
- W
Cook, Senior Resident
Inspector,
~ Denotes
those
who attended
the exit meeting
on April 8,
1988
2.
Nonlicensed
Tr~einin
2.1
Re uirements
Appendix
B Criterion II, requires
in part that
a
licensee
Quality Assurance
(QA) program shall provide for indoctrination
and
training
of
personnel
performing activities
affecting
quality
as
necessary
to
assure
that
suitable
proficiency
is
achieved
and
maintained.
The
Quality
Assurance
Topical
Report for Nine Nile Point
Nuclear
Station Operations
(QATR-1) commits the licensee to train and qualify
plant
personnel
in
accordance
with
ANSI/ASNE NQA-1-1983,
"Quality
Assurance
Program Requirements for Nuclear Facilities," and Technical
Specification
(TS)
Section
6.5.3.8
requires
training to
be audited
annually to assure
the
commitments
are
met.
Additionally the
Chapter
13.2 commits the licensee
"Personnel
Selection
and Training," which endorses
ANSI N18. 1-1971.
2.2
~Sco
e
The effectiveness
of the implementation of the licensee's
nonlicensed
staff training
program
was
assessed
by reviewing the activities
in
operations,
maintenance
(mechanical,
electrical,
and
instrument
and
control), engineer ing, and auality assurance
(gA) areas.
To understand
and assess
the effectiveness
of training, the inspector
reviewed the:
2e3
Implementing
procedures
as
documented
in the Station
Procedures
and
the Training
Department
Lesson
plans.
(See
Attachment I)
gualification, experience
and training of nonlicensed
personnel,
supervision,
and instructors.
guality of the on-the-job training (OJT).
Feedback
process
including
gA
as it affects
future training
plans.
The
inspector
observed
shift
turnovers,
a
routine
round
and
activities
by auxiliary operators
(AOs)
and Shift Technical
Advisors
(STAs),
routine activities
by
engineers,
electricians,
mechanics,
instrument
and control
( I8C) technicians.
Observation
of llork Activities and~Ffndin
s
A Senior Shift Supervisor
(SSS)
reviewed with the inspector his draft
of
an
Operations
Department
Instruction
(ODI) regarding
Mark-Ups.
The
ODI was part of the corrective action the licensee
was taking to
resolve
the
January
20,
1988 reactor
due to loss of feedwater
and
the
subseouent
reactor
vessel
overfill.
As
defined
in
the
licensee's
Accident Prevention
Rules,
"A Mark-Up means
the permission
given by the Controller to the Mark-Up man to begin work after taking
all necessary
precautions.
Therefore it continues to exist until the
Nark-Up
man
marks clear."
Later the inspector
called
upon
an
AO to
explain
how
he
processes
a
Mark-Up.
The
steps
he followed agreed
with the
ODI
being
drafted
and
the
steps
were
repeated
the
next
morning by another
AO processing
an actual
Mark-Up (No,047026) for a
Work Request
(WR) to Repair of Fire Door C-261-16.
An
AO was
observed
on site,
trouble shooting
the continuous lifting
of the
storage
tank relief valves.
He returned
to
the
control
room
and
reviewed
a
controlled
schematic
FSK-014-lA Flow
diagram for the Nitrogen
System.
The
AO then discussed
the relief
valve
problem with
one
of the
licensed
operators
and
they
sought
approval
of the
Station
Shift
Supervisot
to isolate
the
storage
tanks
and to test
the relief valves.
Upon approval
another
AO prepared
the
Nark-Up request
form to isolate
the tanks.
The
were
knowledgeable
and thorough
in their
work to determine
the best
course of action to take.
They were also
aware of the administrative
procedures
for
trouble
shooting
and
processing
the
proper
documentation.
A senior
IRC technician
was
observed
by the inspector
performing the
role of technical
advisor.
He
was advising
an
IEC technician
on
how
to conduct
a surveillance of the
Pressure
and
Level
Instrument
Channels
in accordance
with procedure
t(2-ISP-RDS-
103.
The
advice
given
was clear
and
was
acknowledged
by the
IEC
technician.
Another
ISC technician
was
observed
by the inspector
explaining to
his partner the importance of ensuring
that the test
plug connection
to
the
Suppression
Pool
llater
Temperature
Indication
Channel
be
absolutely
clean
to record true readings.
This fact was not in the
weekly surveillance
procedure
H2-ISP-CflS-H011.
The
IEC technician
had
performed
the test
a
week
ago
and recalled
the trouble
he
had
recording true readings with the specific test equipment.
During
the
Unusual
Event
declared
upon
commencing
a
Technical
Specification
(TS) required
shutdown; the inspector
observed
in part
the
performance
of
a
reactor
analyst
who
was
a
member
of
the
Emergency
Response
Team.
The analyst
was providing the operations
personnel
with information during
the
descension
and
ascension
of
power.
Information
included insertion of rods
versus
reduction of
~
flow.
Also
checked
by the analyst
was
the
assurance
that the
rod
insertion
was properly sequenced.
As for the training
and certifi-
cation
received
and
maintained
by
the
analyst, it consists
of
primarily General Electric training.
The analyst is also- a trainer.
During the
same
Event,
an off-site engineer
explained
his role in
assisting
the Technical
Superintendent
in calculating
the
leak rate
of
a
Type
B Test
of Penetration
Z-74,
whose
missed
surveillance
caused
the shutdown.
The leak rate test calculations
were within the
TS requirements
and the plant was returned to full power.
At the Training Center,
an instructor
was
observed
by the inspector
teaching
cyclical training to
an
Operations
Department
Shift.
He
was explaining the
January
20,
1988 scenario
where
an
AO inadvert-
ently isolated
the instrument air system
and caused
a reactor
This action
is in accordance
with licensee's
commitment to correct
and
minimize if not
prevent
this
incident
from recurring'.
The
instructor admitted that verification of valves
by AOs was not in his
lesson
plan
since
the objective of this part of the session
was to
prepare
the
class
for the
simulator
excercise
scheduled
the
next
morning.
The lesson
plan for nonlicensed
operator training program
for cycle
IY Schedule,
however,
includes
valve verification.
interviewed
by
the
inspector
have
been
made
well
aware
of
the
January
20,
1988 scenario.
2.4
Trainin
Pro ress
The
Site
Superintendent
of
Training
reports
to
the
General
Superintendent
Nuclear Generation
and is responsible
for nonlicensed
technical
training.
In April 1987 the Training
Department
received
INPO Board Accreditation for the last four of the ten training areas.
These
training
areas
are:
( 1)
Techncian;
(2) Electrical
Maintenance;
(3) Mechanical
Maintenance;
and
(4) Technical Staff and
Managers.
In
the
last
six
months
the
training
staff
has
lost
two
ISC
instructors,
two operations
instructors,
one
mechanical
instructor,
one chemistry
and
radcon
instructor
and three instruction analysts.
The Training Department
is
however
beino
supplemented
with contract
support
and management
is recruiting to fillthese positions.
The inspector reouested
and
was provided verbally the dates
when each
of
the
Nonlicensed
Training
Programs
reviewed
would
be
fully
implemented.
The information from the Training Department
personnel
included the following:
The Maintenance
Training Programs for mechanics
and electricians
is expected to be fully implemented in three years.
Initial training for Auxiliary Operators
is fully implemented.
On the job training
(OJT) is expected
to
be fully implemented
in this
calendar
year.
Continuing
training will
be fully
implemented within two years.
Initial training for
ISC technicians
is
expected
to
be fully
',mplemented
.in
18
months.
Indoctrination
for
wi 11
be
completed
in
June
1988.
Full
implementation
of the
is
expected
in
two years.
Indepth
continuing training
wi 11
be
fully implemented
in 28 months.
Technical
Staff
and
Managers
(TSQl) Training
Program will be
initially implemented
in June
1988
and is expected
to
be fully
implemented
in five years.
At the exit interview, the inspector
commented
on the above
schedule
for full implementation of the training programs
reviewed during this
inspection.
Concern
was raised
by the inspector that in the previous
inspection
(50-410/86-11)
conducted
in April
1986,
the
licensee
assured
the
inspector
that
they
would
have
an
implemented
accredited
Training Program
by the next annual
NRC inspection.
manuals for mechanics,
electricians
and
I8C technicians for example,
were to
be
issued
in April 1986
as
noted in the previous
inspection
report.
IAC technicians
have
not
received
their
individual
manuals
and wi'll instead
be completing their initial indoctrination
2.5
in the
use of the
OJT manual
in June
1988.
The previous
reasons for
the
delays
included
expedi t ious ly achi ev ing
commerci a 1
operation
status.
The
concern
is
multiplied
because
the
licensee
is
reorganizing
the Site Staff
and
the Training
Department
staff
has
recently
lost
some
of their
training
instructors.
The
General
Superintendent
of Nuclear Generation
and other
members
of his staff
acknowledged
the
inspector's
concern
and will develop
a
plan with
milestones
to
expedite
full
implementation
of their
nonlicensed
training programs.
The nonlicensed
training
and qua.lification effectiveness
is measured
by the licensee
primari ly through'student
'and instructor evaluations,
supervisory
feedback,
and periodic interface meetings.
QA audits
and
survei llances
and
inspections
provide
a
-secondary
means
for
measuring
the effectiveness
of personnel training and qualifications.
QA/QC Interface With The Nonlicensed Trainin
Pro
rams
Twelve
annual
QA audits
addressing
training
were
reviewed
and
the
audits
were
found
to
be
compliance
oriented,
i.e.,
dealing
with
documents
and
records.
All of
the
identified
deficiencies
were
corrected
in
a timely manner.
Nine Surveillance
Reports
(SRs)
and
their
accompanying
checklists
were
reviewed
and
found
to
be
comprehensive.
One
particular
SR
(87-10877)
ouestioned
the
I8C
management
regarding
an effective review of LERs during
a continue'd
training
session.
Twenty-one
(21)
items
including
15
LERs
were
reviewed
in one
hour
and the reviews
were general
in nature
and not
in sufficient detail
to identify the
exact
cause
and
the required
corrective
and preventive action.
The
SR requests site management
to
resolve this
problem
by providing the Training Department
with the
information
and
time
to
present
an
effective
review of events;
During the review of training records,
th'e inspector
also
noted that
the recorded training sessions
attended
by the nonlicensed
personnel
contained
many items of interest that were discussed
in a very short
time.
This matter
was raised
by the inspector at the exit interview
and
he
inquired
about
QA's
intention
to
follow
up
and
verify
management's
corrective action.
The
inspector
observed
a
QA surveillance
of the Technical
Specifi-
cation
required
shutdown
discussed
in paragraph
2.4.
The
monthly
surveillance
was
conducted
in accordance
with procedure
N-2-0P-006.
The
QA engineer
was
using
a
QA checklist
and
was well versed
with
procedural
and surveillance
requirements.
The
QA Surveillance
Group
now includes
former
and
AO personnel
and
nonlicensed
operator
training is provided to the group.
2.6
Conclusion
Progress
for full implementation 'of the
INPO Accredited
Nonlicensed
Training
Programs
has
been
delayed
for various
reasons
including
expeditiously achieving
commercial
operation
status.
An example of
delays
is
the
I&C technicians
not receiving their individual
manuals.
Additional
delays
include
a reorganization
of the site
staff
and
the
Training
Department
losing
some
of their training
instructors.
The personnel
observed
performing activities
and the supervisors
that
were
also
interviewed
were trained
and qualified.
They
were well
versed
with the administrative
procedures
as well
as
the technical
requirements.
Some,
especially
the
technicians,
though
experiencing
delays
in their training programs,
were optimistic that
their training program would be fully implemented.
3.0
Ylang ement heetin
s
Licensee
management
was
informed
of
the
scope
and
purpose
of
the
inspection
on
April 4,
1988.
The
findings
of
the
inspection
were
discussed
with
the
licensee
representatives
during
the
course
of the
inspection
and presented
to licensee
management
at the April 8,
1988 exit
interview (see
paragraph
1 for attendees).
At
no
time during
the
inspection
was written material
provided to the
licensee
by the
inspector.
The
licensee
indicated that
no proprietary
information was involved within the scope of this inspection.
PROCEDURES
ATTACHMENT I
Administrative Procedure
(AP) 3.3. 1 Control of Equipm'ent Mark-Ups,
Rev 3.
Procedure for Repair,
Rev 11.
AP-8. 1, Preventive
Maintenance,
Rev 3.
Operating
Procedure
(OP)
19, Instrument
and Service Air System,
Rev
1
OP 101C, Plant Shutdown,
Rev 3.
N2-ICP-GEN-001, Safety Related
Loop Calibration,
Rev 2.
N2-ISD-RDS-R103,
Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU) Accumulator Pressure
and Level
Instrument Channels,
Rev 2.
N2-ISP-CMS-M011, Monthly Functional Test of Suppression
Pool Mater
Temperature
Indication Channel,
Rev 0.
L
N2-0P-006,
Conduct of Operations
and Control
Room Activities
N2-PM-51, Operator
Rounds
Guide
Loo
Calibration
Re ort
IL2RHS-015, Reactor
Head Cooling Flow,
Rev 2.
LCR IL2SLS-'004, Standby Liquid Control
Pump PIA Discharge
Pressure
~W
133889,
Repair of Fire Door C-261-16.
135918,
Replace
Leaky Capacitors
in
DC Filter Bank (2VBB-UPS-10).
137619,
Replace
2VBB-UPS-10 Fans.
137709, Vibration Monitoring for Feed
Pump
and Condensate
Pump.
ualit
Assurance
A
Re orts
I
Audit Reports
NM-RG-IN-87001, 06, 07, NM-SP-IN-87003,
SY"RG-87005,
06,
10,
87023-RG/IN,
87026-RG/IN, 87027-RG/IN,
87032-RG/IN,
87029-SP/CO
1987 Surveillance
Reports
(SR)
10460,
61,
62,
63,
and 64,
10603,
10756
and
58,
10831,
and 77.
Attachment I
Miscellaneous
Lesson
Plan,
Nonlicensed Operator Training Program,
Cycle IV Schedule-
1988.
License
Event Report
(LER) 88-17,
Reactor
Scram to Level
8
Significant Operations
Experience
Report
(INPO) 85-1,
Reactor Cavity Seal
Failure.
Memorandum of April 6,
1988 regarding calculation of missed surveillance of
Z-74.