ML16343A237

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Insp Repts 50-275/94-21 & 50-323/94-21 on 940524.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Activities Performed in Response to GL 89-13, Svc Water Sys Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment, Issued on 890718
ML16343A237
Person / Time
Site: Diablo Canyon  
Issue date: 07/06/1994
From: Howell A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML16342C618 List:
References
50-275-94-21, 50-323-94-21, GL-89-13, NUDOCS 9407130018
Download: ML16343A237 (8)


See also: IR 05000275/1994021

Text

'

APPENDIX

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Inspection Report:

50-275/94-21

50-323/94-21

Licenses:

DPR-80

DPR-82

Licensee:

Pacific

Gas

and Electric Company

(PG&E)

77 Beale Street,

Room

1451

P.O.

Box 770000

San Francisco,

California

Facility Name:

Diablo Canyon Nuclear

Power Plant, Units

1 and

2

Inspection At:

Pacific Gas

& Electric Corporate offices

333 Market Street

San Francisco,

California

94177

Inspection

Conducted:

Hay 24,

1994

Inspector:

P. Narbut,

Regional

Team Leader, Division of Reactor Safety

Approved:

owe

,

epu y

erector

Division of Reactor Safety

te

Ins ection

Summar

Areas

Ins ected

Units

1

and

2

Routine,

announced

inspection of PG&E's

activities performed in response

to Generic Letter 89-13,

"Service Water

System

Problems Affecting Safety-Related

Equipment,"

issued

on July 18,

1989.

The inspection

examined

some additional questions that

had arisen

subsequent

to the inspection reported in NRC Inspection

Report 50-275/94-08;

50-323/94-

08.

Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/118

and Inspection

Procedure

40500 were

used

as guidance during this inspection.

Results

Units

1

and

2

The licensee satisfactorily resolved the concerns

developed

subsequent

to the issuance of NRC Inspection

Report 50-275/94-08;

50-323/94-08.

Attachment:

~

Attachment - Persons

Contacted

and Exit Meeting

9407i300i8 940707

PDR

ADOCK 05000275

9

PDR

0

'

DETAILS

1

FOLLOWUP IWESTIONS REGARDING AUXILIARYSALT WATER SYSTEN OPERABILITY

1.1

~Back round

The

NRC issued

Generic Letter 89-13,

"Service Water

System

Problems Affecting

Safety-Related

Equipment,"

on July 18,

1989.

The generic letter described

recurring industry problems with the service water systems

at nuclear

power

plants.

Service water systems

are important to plant safety

as the ultimate

heat sink following a design basis event.

The generic letter recommended

certain actions to be taken

by licensees

and required that each licensee

advise the

NRC of the programs to be implemented

in response

to the generic

letter recommendations.

PG&E Letter No. DCL-90-027, dated January

26,

1990,

provided

PG&E's response

to the generic letter and: hommitted to perform

certain actions.

PG&E Letter No. DCL-91-286, dated

November 25,

1991,

provided

a supplemental

response

to the generic letter

and reported the

completion of the initial program actions.

NRC Inspection

Report 50-275/93-36;

50-323/93-36

examined the licensee's

actions taken in response

to Generic Letter 89-13.

The inspection report

identified

a number of unresolved

and followup items regarding the adequacy of

the licensee's

actions

taken in response

to the generic letter,

and requested

that the licensee

address

the items in a written response

to the

NRC.

The

licensee

provided

a response

to the inspection report in

PG&E Letter No. DCL-

94-037,

dated

February

15,

1994.

The response

addressed

each of the

inspection

items

and stated that there were instances

in 1987

and

1990 when

the Auxiliary Saltwater

System

(ASW) may not have

been operable.

The response

also stated that

a supplemental

response

would be provided when the results of

the past operability study were completed.

The results of that past

operability study were documented

in Licensee

Event Report

(LER) 1-93-012-01,

"Auxiliary Saltwater

System Outside Design Basis

Due to Fouling," dated

Harch 8,

1994.

NRC Inspection

Report 50-275/94-08;

50-323/94-08 followed up the issues

identified in NRC Inspection

Report 50-275/93-36;

50-323/93-36,

closed the

majority of the unresolved

items,

and described

three

apparent violations to

be addressed

by separate

correspondence.

This inspection

examined

several

concerns

regarding the licensee's

studies of

ASW operability which had arisen during the period subsequent

to the issuance

of NRC Inspection

Report 50-275/94-08;

50-323/94-08.

1.2

Case Studies with Low Flows

The licensee

had performed

a number of case

studies to demonstrate

ASW system

operability.

The cases

were numbered

"A" to "S" and were described

as

evolutionary in that the cases

evolved into the cases

the licensee

considered

to be realistic representations

of the relevant plant parameters

in effect

0

"

-3-

during the periods of high microfouling and high macrofouling.

Some of the

case

studies

which the licensee

performed

(Cases

C,

G, J,

and

L) had flows in

the 9000-10,000

gpm range,

whereas

the cases

the licensee

considered

to be

most representative

(Cases

0 and

P)

had flows in the 11,000

gpm range.

The

concern

arose

as to why the lower flow cases

weren't utilized.

The licensee

demonstrated

that the lower flow cases

were based

on the lowest

flow recorded for ASW flow Refueling Cycle 4.

This value was

11,008

gpm which

occurred

on January

5,

1990.

The flow value

was then projected

downward to

account for low tide,

a crosstie configuration,

instrument error,

and

maximum

macrofouling differential pressure.

The result

was

a flow of 9886

gpm used in

Cases

G and

L and

a slightly higher flow of 9968

gpm in Cases

C and J due to a

small error in the tide calculation.

The licensee utilized flows of 11,676

and 11, 196

gpm for Cases

0 and

P

respectively.

Case

0 was the study of the period of high microfouling in

August

1990

and

Case

P was the period of high macrofouling in 1987.

The

licensee utilized what they considered

to be more realistic flow data (rather

than the minimum recorded flow) which was

an average

flow derived from flow

data from their quarterly

ASHE pump performance tests.

The licensee

did not

use data from their monthly tests

because

the statistical

deviations for that

data were higher than the deviations for the quarterly test data.

This was

not

a conservative

decision since the monthly data

was generally slightly

lower than the quarterly data.

Both data sets

are derived from the

same

annubar flow instruments.

However, the inspector noted that the licensee's

study of data deviation

appeared

to support their decision that the quarterly

data

was more accurate.

During the inspection,

the licensee

performed 'an

estimate that use of the more conservative

monthly data would have resulted in

higher calculated

CCW temperatures

of only 0. 15-0.20 'F, which was not

significant to the conclusions of the operability study.

Additionally the licensee

corrected

the raw annubar

averages

upward by about

500 gpm, or about 4.5 percent of the total flow, based

on recently developed

flow measurement

correlation data which showed that the annubar data

was low

compared to actual flow as measured

by more accurate

dye dilution flow

measurement

methods.

The inspector concluded that although this could be

viewed

as another non-conservative

approach,

the licensee

had compensated

by

utilizing more conservative

time/temperature

blocks or envelopes

in their

equipment operability evaluations.

These time/temperature

blocks

conservatively

enveloped

the detailed time/temperature

curves which resulted

from the licensee's

calculations,

and were used to evaluate

the increased

temperature

effects

on equipment operability.

The inspector therefore

concluded that the Case

0 and

P flow data

used for the

licensee's

operability analysis

was reasonable.

The flow data

was not as

conservative

as it could have

been but the use of a more conservative

approach

would not have affected the ultimate conclusion that the system

had

been

operable

but not within design basis during the periods of high microfouling

and high macrofouling.

0

~TTACHNENT

1

PERSONS

CONTACTED

1.1

Licensee

Personnel

  • H. Angus,

Manager,

Technical

and Support Services

  • T. Grebel, Supervisor,

Regulatory

Compliance Supervisor

  • J. Kelly, Mechanical

Group Leader,

Nuclear Engineering Services

  • H. Leppke, Assistant

Manager,

Technical

and Support Services

  • J. Sexton,

Manager,

Nuclear Regulatory Services

K. Smith, Hechanical

Engineer,

Nuclear Engineering Services

G. Starnes,

Mechanical

Engineer,

Technical

and Ecological Services

1.2

Contracto

for Pacific

Gas

and

ectric

Com an

F. L. Steinert,

Senior Scientist,

Aquatic Systems

Inc.

  • Denotes those attending the exit interview on May 24,

1994.

2

EXIT MEETING

An exit meeting

was condu'cted

on Hay 24,

1994.

During this meeting,

the

inspectors

reviewed the scope

and findings of the report.

The licensee

acknowledged

the inspection findings documented

in this report.

The licensee

did not identify as proprietary

any information provided to, or reviewed by,

the inspectors.

'r

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