ML16342E064
| ML16342E064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/14/1998 |
| From: | Murray B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342E063 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-98-06, 50-275-98-6, 50-323-98-06, 50-323-98-6, NUDOCS 9804200318 | |
| Download: ML16342E064 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1998006
Text
DOCUMENT CONTAINS
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
ENCLOSURE
Docket Nos.:
License Nos.:
Report No.:
Licensee:
Facility:
Locatio
Dates:
Inspector.
Approved By:
Attachment:
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION IV
50-275
50-323
DPR-82
50-275/98-06
50-323/98-06
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
7 N miles NW of Avila Beach
Avila.Beach, California
March 16-20, 1998
Thomas W. Dexter, Senior Physical Security Specialist,
Plant Support Branch
Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
Supplemental Information
DOCUMENT CONTAINS
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
9804200318
980414
ADOCK 05000275
8
ENCLOSURE(S) CONTAIN(S)
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
UPON SEPARATION THIS
PAGE IS DECONTROLLED
0
-2-
DOCUMENT CONTAINS
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-275/98-06; 50-323/98-06
This special, announced inspection focused upon specific areas of the licensee's physical
security program. The areas inspected included Licensee Event Report 50-275; -323/98-S02-
0
which involved loss of security computers.
Other areas inspected included alarm stations;
~
access control of personnel, packages,
and vehicles; assessment
aids; compensatory
measures;
security program plans and procedures; response capabilities; and management
support.
Performance in the physical security area remained at a high performance level.
fa
Su
Strong senior management support forthe security organization was evident by providing
excellent security facilities. A thorough program for searching personnel and packages
was maintained.
Organization of the central and secondary alarm stations was excellent.
Assessment aids provided effective assessment
of the perimeter detection zones.
A
~ comprehensive
security event reporting program was in place.
Changes to security
prog
rograms and plans were reported within the required time frame (Sections S1.1, 1.2,
2.1, 3.1, and 6.1) ~ .
~
Aconcern was identified regarding changes made in the deployment of response officers
that was different from that observed during the 1996 operational safeguards
response
evaluation (OSRE). Specifically, on occasions, officers were assigned security duties
which brought in to question their abilityto respond to the external design basis threat
(Section S4.1).
A noncited violation was identified involving the failure to implement compensatory
measures for five vital area doors during the loss of the security computer (Section S8.1).
DOCUMENT CONTAINS
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
ENCLOSURE(S) CONTAIN(S)
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION
UPON SEPARATION THIS
PAGE IS DECONTROLLED