ML16342D801

Submits Summary of 970909 Meeting W/Util in Region IV Ofc to Discuss Status of Operations Programs at Plant.List of Attendees & Documents Used in Staff Presentation Encl

ML16342D801
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	09/22/1997
From:	Gwynn T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	Rueger G PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
References
NUDOCS 9709240269
Download: ML16342D801 (74)

Text

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UNIT ED STATES NUCLEAR R EGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE. SUITE 400 ARLINGTON,TEXAS 76011 6064 SEP 22 l997 Gregory M. Rueger, Senior Vice President and General Manager Nuclear Power Generation Bus. Unit Pacific Gas and Electric Company Nuclear Power Generation, B14A 77 Beale Street, Room 1451 P.O. Box 770000 San Francisco, California 94177

SUMMARY

OF MEETING WITH PACIFIC GAS 5 ELECTRIC COMPANY (DIABLO CANYON) ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1997

Dear Mr. Rueger:

A management meeting, open to public observation, was conducted on September 9,

1997, in. the NRC Region IV office. This meeting was conducted at your request to discuss the status of the operations programs at Diablo Canyon.

A listing of those attending the meeting is provided in Enclosure

1. The documents used in your staff's presentation are provided in Enclosure 2.

During the meeting, your staff presented the performance and leadership expectations in the operations department, which included a strong operations leadership role at Diablo Canyon and the practice of conservative decision making.

Your staff indicated that the focus on long-term goals and the safe operation of the plant would be. maintained through the state's electric deregulation process.

Examples were provided of the actions in the operations area which were indicative of continued focus on formality in the control room, leadership, responsibility for the plant, and the branching out of operations personnel into other Diablo Canyon organizations.

We encourage operations management's continued attention to provide the necessary leadership to assure the Diablo Canyon goals and expectations are met.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"

a copy of this letter will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Sincer homas

. Gwyn, Dire or Division of React Pr 'ects Docket Nos.:

50-275 50-323 License Nos.:

DPR-80 DPR-82 9709240269 970922 PDR ADQCK 05000275 P

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Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Enclosures:

1. Attendees

2. Presentation Documents cc w>enclosures:

Dr. Richard Ferguson Energy Chair Sierra Club California 1100 lith Street, Suite 311 Sacramento, California 95814 Ms. Nancy Culver San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace P.O. Box 164 Pismo Beach, California 93448 Chairman San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors Room 370 County Government Center San Luis Obispo, California 93408 Mr. Truman Burns>Mr. Robert Kinosian California Public Utilities Commission 505 Van Ness, Rm. 4102 San Francisco, California 94102 Robert R. Wellington, Esq.

Legal Counsel Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee 857 Cass Street, Suite D Monterey, California 93940 Mr. Steve Hsu Radiologic Health Branch State Department of Health Services P.O. Box 942732 Sacramento, California 94234 Christopher J. Warner, Esq.

Pacific Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120

Pacific Gas and Electric Company Robert P. Powers, Vice President and Plant Manager Diablo Canyon Power Plant P.O. Box 56 Avila Beach, California 93424 Managing Editor Telegram-Tribune 1321 Johnson Avenue P.O. Box 112 San Luis Obispo, California 93406

SEP 22 l997 Pacific Gas and Electric Company 4-bcc with Enclosure 2:

DCD (IE45)

RIV File WCFO File bcc distrib. by RIV without Enclosure 2:

Regional Administrator DRP Director Branch Chief (DRP/E, WCFO)

Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E, WCFO)

M. Hammond (PAO, WCFO)

J. Pellet, RIV S. Bloom, NRR Resident Inspector DRS-PSB MIS System Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

DOCUMENT NAME: R:t DC>DC9-gMS.DRP To receive copy of document, Indicate In box: "C" = Copy without enciosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy RIV:C:DRP/E HJWong 9/Ig /97 D:DRP TPGwynn 9/

/97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

SEP 22 l997 Pacific Gas and Electric Company bcc with Enclosure 2:

DCD (IE45)

RIV File WCFO File bcc distrib. by RIV without Enclosure 2:

Regional Administrator DRP Director Branch Chief (DRP/E, WCFO)

Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E, WCFO)

M. Hammond (PAO, WCFO)

J. Pellet, RIV S. Bloom, NRR Resident Inspector DRS-PSB MIS System Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

DOCUMENT NAME: R:5 DC>DC9-gMS.DRP To receive copy of document, indicate in box: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy RlV:C: DR P/E HJWong 9/ig /97 D:DRP TPGwynn 9/

/97

~ f. '

f0 1 3 'FFICIALRECORD COPY

ENCLOSURE 1

ATTENDEES AT NRC/PGKE MEETING SEPTEMBER 9, 1997 NRC E. Merschoff, Regional Administrator T. Gwynn, Director, Division of Reactor Projects H. Wong, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch E

J. Pellet, Chief, Operations Branch S. Bloom, Project Manager D. Allen, Resident Inspector (via phone)

Pacific Gas & Electric Com an R. Powers. Vice President and Plant Manager, J. Molden, Manager, Operations Services J. Becker, Director, Operations T. Grebel, Director, Regulatory Services

ENCLOSURE 2 PRESENTATION SLIDES

OPERA TIONS PERFORMANCE

SUMMARY

September 9, 1997 Meeting with NRC Arlington, Texas

IWEETINGAGENDA Performancel leadership expectations

~ Strategic direction and focus

~ Operational performance

~ Summary R. Powers J. Molden J. Becker R. Powers

PERFORMANCEILEADERSHlP EXPEC TATIONS Robert P. Powers Vice President

- Diablo Canyon Operations and Plant Manager

PERFORlNANCEILEADERSHIP EXPEC TATIONS

~ Operations Leadership at Diablo Canyon

~ Expectation for Performance During Deregulation

OPERA TIONS LEADERSHIP AT DIABLOCANYON

~

Facility View of Operations Standard Setting Conservative Decision-making Dependable Think beyond today's shift Staffed with the best and the brightest

~

On Crew Conservative Decision-making Proficiency of Operation (routine/transient)

Embrace self-assessment/continual learning Supervision viewed as problem solvers Proactive Operation Satisfaction that skills are respected and sought after

EXPEC TATION FOR PERFORMANCE DURING DEREGULATION

~

Basic Performance Expectations

~

Key Issue:

Reinforce synergy between excellence in safety performance and competitive advantage Conservative Decision-making Self Assessment/Improvement Maintain Long-term Perspective

~ This is a Responsibility of Senior Management

STRATEGIC DIRECTION 8, FOCUS James E. Molden Manager - Operations Services

0

STRATEGIC DIRECTION &

FOCUS

~ Improving leadership

~ Enhancing performance

~ Increasing operational focus

IMPROVINGLEADERSHIP

~

Defined and reinforced shift supervisor expectations Plant ownership Formality of. operations Leadership

~ Enhance leadership of each shift supervisor

~ Leadership potential is a key consideration for future staffing in OPS License class on-going (complete 5i98) 2nd class scheduled to start in fall 1998 Beginning level operator class on-going

~ Operations taking a key role in planning and execution of outages

ENHANCINGPERFORIWANCE

~ Performance of operations during transients has been traditionally strong

~ Tools to improve performance Improved self assessment process Improved training Increased management involvement/accountability Focused on error reduction and improved communications

~

Have seen results already!

OPERA TIONALFOCUS

~ Defining "operationally focused" for NPG

~ Developing long term NPG staffing plan

~ Improving leadership in outages and scheduling

~ Increased attention on reducing operator burdens

OPERA TIONALPERFORMANCE James R. Becker Director - Operations

OPERA TIONALPERFORMANCE

~ Management involvement

~ Conservative decision making

~ Transient response

~ Reducing operator equipment burdens

~ Self assessment processes and results

~ Procedure quality and use

~ Error reduction initiatives and results

~ Outage performance

~ Training focus

MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT

~ Continued strong management. involvement

~ Shift management expectations meetings

~ Simulator and plant observations

~ Periodic leadership meetings

~ Day-to-day operations Operability evaluations Startups and critical activities Procedural questions

~

Operator training

CONSERVA TIVEDECISION MAKING

~ Consistently been recognized for conservative decision making

~ Examples Manual reactor trips July 1997 Unit 2 restart decision Unit 2 cold reheat crack shutdown More aggressively questioning operability

TRANSIENTRESPONSE

~ Continued excellent response

~ Supported by procedural guidance and simulator observations

~ Transient follow-up

~ Examples Main feedpump problems Intake debris response Post trip cooldowns Main bank transformer Industry operating experience

OPERA TOR BURDEN REDUCTION

~ Director sponsored operator workaround list

~ Control Board Action Request Statistics OPS Involvement

~ Out of spec round sheet monitoring/action

~ Future increased operations involvement in scheduling

~ Increased operator access to radiological areas

SELF ASSESSMENT

~ Sustainable program consisting of specific initiatives and performance metrics

~ Quality Plan

~ Inplant observations program

~ Benchmarking'of other utilities

~ INPO assist visit

~ Assist visits by other utilities

~ Training self assessments

~ Nuclear Quality Services assessments

~ Program audits

PROCEDURE QUALITY8 USAGE

~ Previously an area for improvement.

We believe that progress has been made.

- ~ Specific component of Quality Plan

~ FSAR review to ensure alignment of operating precedes

~ Level of use to be established for each procedure

ERROR REDUCTION

~ Established human performance foreman position

~ Control room initiatives Shift foreman moved to control room Work co'ntrol shift foreman position established Reactivity management Peer checks Annunciator response enhanced BOP control operator position Three way communications 20

ERROR REDUCTION cont'd

~

Clearances enhancement initiatives Ben chmarking Self assessments Training Observations

OUTAGE PERFORMANCE

~ Previously a focus area.

We believe that recent outage performance has been enhanced.

~ Outage safety plan recognized as a strong point

~ Increased control room manning in 1RB

~ 1R8 performance strong - no LERs or TS violations

~ Clearance performance is a continuing area of focus

~ Critical evolutions thoroughly evaluated and training conducted

TRAINING

~ Training programs evaluated as quite strong

~ Recent INPO evaluation confirmed

~ Effective steering committees

~ Strong management involvement Director teaches industry operating experience Simulator observations

~ More just-in-time training 23

~ We have a strong Vision for Operations Leadership and Performance

/

~ We believe our Vision for Operations serves us equally well now and in a competitive future

~ We are committed to achieving the Vision Feel that substantial progress has been made to date Excited about the future 24

PAINT0 SVPKRSHIP Providing overall direction for prioritizing and following up on maintenance and engineering issues.

~

Maintaining, configuration control of plant.

~

Determination, followup, and approval of operability evaluations.

~

Providing constructive feedback to organizations when we meet our objectives and where we fall short of the mark.

FOMALWYOF OPFRA TIOLVS

~

Effective management of control room activities.

Managing jobs Managing resources Maintaining professional environment

~

Effective communications.

~

Attention to detail in all aspects of operation.

Timely TS entry Careful review ofjobs prior to approval Careful and complete review of work Appropriate comp measures

~

Effective Turnovers.

~

Effective management of abnormal and emergency conditions.

LEADZKSHIP

~

Prroritize, communicate and implement sound operational p]an.

~

Effective use of resources and budget.

~

Coach and hold individuals accountable when not meeting, objectives.

~

Motivate staff.

~

Solicit input on issues.

~

Monitorcrew performance and own initiatives to improve negative trends.

~

Call out maintenance and engineering groups and provide direction of what needs to be done.

I You are" the SS supervisor - exercise your authority - judiciously

~

Avoid discussing Operations or other departments in a negative tone, rather work positively to address concerns. Ifyou have issues and can't solve them ask for your director or manager's heir..

Operator Workarounds are defined as any equipment deficiency which gomplicates an operator's response to a transient.

Items that are likely to cause a transient are also included in this category.

Operator Burdens are defined as any equipment deficiency which causes routine compensatory measures to be taken by the operator, such that the daily workload of the operator is increased.

This list is intended to track the status of deficiencies for which a mod-ification, setpoint

change, or more investigative work must be completed in order to resolve the issue.

These deficiencies tend to be more long-term in nature..

Once the DCN or other required actions are in place to allow these items to be worked, they should be scheduled for repair.

For items that do not require such long-term measures, the Shift Sup-ervisor will ensure that the repair item is treated as emergent work, per AD7.ID4.

An example of this would be a malfunction that resulted in rod control being in manual.

In order to assess the cumulative impact of workarounds and burdens, the list designates for each deficiency the watchstation that is effected.

SECTION 1 -

WORKAROUNDS PGA panel does not have individual alarms in control room, delays response to and diagnosis of generator problems.

AO369019 (PGTN)

NOWLEN ECD - Funding approved.

Unit 1 was completed in-1R8.

Unit 2 to follow in 2R8.

Effected watchstation:

(SFM)

Screen refuse pps cycle excessively when the screens are.in service.

As a result, one pp is left in OFF when screens are in auto, and both pps must be selected to AUTO when the screens are in continuous oper-ation.

A0418235,415069.

(PGIE)

PUDAS Job Estimate is being prepared.

Effected watchstation:

(Intake) 3.

Steam dumps saturate, results in 10; dump actuation when unit comes off-line manually.

A0412274 (PGTN)

NOWLEN Hardware for potential upgrade to be built by January 1998.

Effected watchstation:

(CO)

Unit 1 turning gear difficult to engage.

This can result in the unit being at rest while hot, which causes the shaft to bow, and possible damage when it starts to turn again due to high eccentricity.

This can complicate operator response to a unit trip.

A0386771.

Update

- snubber was installed to dampen response of pressure switch.

Loop test was performed.

The problem persists.

(PTEL) Nelson/Yip Further work planned for 1R9.

Effected watchstation:

(U-1 TB)

Heater 2 Drain Tk level control is subject to power supply failures.

This causes secondary plant transients and represents a possible reactor trip risk.

AT-MM's written to replace with pneumatic controller.

The pneumatic controller was installed during 1R8.

Unit 2 to follow in 2R8.

(PGIE)

WASHINGTON

MFP suction reli tend to lift after plan

rips, may not reseat.

This is a potential personnel hazard and complicates the post-trip response.

(PTES)

BARD Update

- valves removed in 1R8.

Unit 2 to follow in 2R8.

A0421173.

Effected watchstation:

(U-2 TB) 7.

The main annunciator system has several grounds existing on each unit.

This can cause loss of parts of the system if new grounds feed into a multiplexer with an existing ground.

A0414657,410662,410695,410818,410747,422414,A0422728.

(PGTN)

NOWLEN Update

- CCU-B on unit 2 has been replaced.

Unit 1 field grounds worked in 1R8.

Ground detector cards on Mux-3,7 have been removed on Unit 2.

Further ground work to occur in 2R8.

Effected watchstations:

(CO) 8.

Cylinder Heating Steam PCV's will not control in auto.

Previous att-empts to resolve this by replacing valve internals have not been successful.

A0437598 (PTEL)

EXNER Scope for 2R8/1R9 needs to be determined.

Effected watchstations:

(TB)

RCP vibration monitors are not installed in the control room.

Instead, they are on the 4th floor of the Admin Building.

This delays operator response to RCP vibration alarms.

DCP J-43449 is approved for 1998.

AR A0338595 (PGIE)

WEIR Effected Watchstations:

(CO)

SECTION 2 -

OPERATOR BURDENS Polisher vessel 1-7 inlet bypass valve FCV-977 leaks by.

Requires manual isolation.

A0416027.

Working to schedule with OPS Foreman Tardiff.

Effected watchstation:

(U-1 Pol) 2.

2-1C MSR LCV-161 leaks by, will not maintain level at low'power.

A0416471.

Attempted to work 2/25/97 and clearance would not hold.

Will have to be done in 2R8.

Effected watchstation:

(U-2 TB) 3.

Unit 2

MBT B phase is leaking nitrogen.

This requires frequent monitoring by operator.

A0407964.

Unable to find leak so far. Can't check top of transformer due to proximity of 500 KV lines.

Transformer scheduled to be replaced during 2R8.

Effected watchstation:

(U-2 TB)

CND-2-2171 and CND-2-2184 'leak. by.

This requires another iso. valve to be closed, with extensive climbing required to access.

A0424524/a0424518.

Update:

valves were repaired on 2/10/97. It appears the valves are still leaking or there is another problem. Tardiff and Keeling evaluating.

These valves have leaked soon after repair several times.

Effected watchstation:

(U-2 pol) 5.

FS/90 is bringing'n many spurious alarms at the fire annunciator typewriter.

A0372597.

Eng.

B. Brown working with Telecom to redesign phone ckt.

. Effected watchsta ion:

(SCO) 6.

Waste Recovery Sy em Backwash Sump does not always come on when sump pumps down.

Requires operator to manually push relay inside panel to start pumps.

A0420563.

Eng. Burror to redesign circuit.

Effected watchstation:

(U-2 Pol) 7.

8.

Cond pol vessel outlets leakby.

Requires manual isolation by operator.

FCV-913,924,935.

A0410974,409022,410975.

Working with OPS Foreman Tardiff to schedule repairs.

Effected watchstation:

(U-2 pol) il Both Units Caustic Storage Tank TC/TCV-11 do not control temperature and results in operators having to manually isolate steam.

A0405432/A0393116.

Problem is in design.

Eng.

Cucco asigned to redesign.

Effected watchstations:

(U-1/U-2 pol.)

DEFICIENCIES THAT HAVE BEEN RESOLVED IN THE LAST TWO YEARS FCV-420 setpoint adjusted for both units.

This better allows operators to place the condensate system on long recirc after a

trip or plant shutdown.

A0353713, 374797.

1-TCV-23 controller would not work in automatic.

The actuator was rebuilt and recalibrated in 1R7.

A0376015.

After further work in 1T8, it now works in automatic.

3.

Unit 2 Main Bank Transformer phase B cooling groups would not control in automatic.

This was repaired during September 95 forced outage.

A0361852, 372470.

Screen Wash alarms have been upgraded to provide better information as'o the status of the system, and to reduce the number of unnecessary alarms.

This makes it easier for operators to respond quickly to screen problems.

A0376363.

5.

Screen d/p indication is now available in the control room via the PPC.

This will make it easier for operators to respond quickly to screen problems.

A0385574.

FCV-31 would not control in auto on unit 1.

It was worked extensively in 1T8, and retuned on-line.

It now works acceptably in automatic.

A0390480.

8, Unit 2 H2 seal oil drain tank LCV's were worked in 2R7.

During turbine rollup to 1800 rpm, tank level control was satisfactory.

This had been a repeated problem prior to the outage.

A0361271.

Letdown filter d/p indication was not available for certain alignments.

The instrumentation tubing was changed and instrumenation installed to provide d/p indication at all times.

A0367186, 367188.

9.

Main annunciator software upgrades and ground detector card replacement was completed by October of 1996.

Based on operator

feedback, per-formance of the system has improved.

A0407957, 381420, 405097.

Safety Parameter ~play System upgrade has ~n completed as of 1/24/97.

This ass for the system to be usted more easily, so it is now current with the present Emergency Procedures.

The STA can now use SPDS to verify status trees.

A0215385.

DC Bus Ground alarm relays were replaced on 2/6/97.

This allowed the alarm setpoint to be raised to a value that grounds can be located by TM.

AR gA0392906, 324443.

12.

U-2 'Caustic Day Tank Heater control TC-121 replaced 1/17/97.

Heater controls tank temperature in auto.

now.

13.

14.

DG 2-1 crankcase vacuum alarm was OOS requiring operator verification when DG started.

Repaired 2/27/97.

AR gA0412348.

2-1 MFP oil reservoir hi/lo alarm has been cleared.

This was accomplished by raising the setpoint and swapping pumps.

Repair effective 4/97.

Ref: A0405040.

15.

MSR safety valves had problems lifting at low power.

To correct this, the sealing steam supply check valves were replaced on both units in 2R7 and 1R8.

A0365237,389024,389277.

16.

Spurious letdown isolations were occurring on unit 1.

This was believed to be caused by a defective pzr level channel selector switch.

The switch was refurbished during 1R8.

A0429340.

17.

Site Emergency alarm testing was resulting in spurious ector alarms in Security D/G area.

This was corrected replacing the flame detector with a thermal detector.

A0424591.

flame det-by 18.

D/G 11 priming tank was unable to be 'kept full.

Found RV-266 leaking by and replaced i'imer was also broken and was fixed.

A0391244, A0421161.

19.

20.

21

~

RCDT on Unit One would not pump down in auto.

This was recalibrated during 1R8.

Ref: A0384418, A0396134.

Unit One RCP thermal barrier low flow would alarm at the wrong point.

This was recalibrated during 1R8.

Ref: A0410970.

TCV-130 would not control in auto on Unit 1.

This could lead to temperature transients on the letdown system, which in turn resulted in changes to reactor power and temperature.

During 1R8, a new section of pipe was installed in parallel with the existing TCV, and a new valve was installed.

The new valve is properly controlling in automatic.

A0344283.

For changes, additions or deletions, please contact Jim Becker (JRB1@Ops) or ex.

3462/4325

'1

FACT SHEET Ops Quality Plan Areas trended:

Significant errors. Alignment Errors, Surveillance Errors, Clearance Errors, Tech Spec/ECG tracking errors. Procedural Adherence Errors, Test Pass Rate Overall improvement being shoivn, comparing nonwutage months.

IR8 performance ivillbe trended closely against 2R8, svhich starts in Fcb 98.

Areas of Significant Improvcmcnt, (greater than 30%): Surveillance Errors, Significant Errors, Clcarancc Errors Control Board AR's Overall number rcduccd by approximately 50% since March 1997.

Operator IVorkaround List Over 20 items on this list have bccn rcsolvcd since January 1995.

(attached)

Rcccnt Industry Events Training Operations Director routinely tcachcs Industry Events to Operations ere>vs. This provides for discussing managcmcnt pcrspcctivc on important issues, and allo>vs managcmcnt to rcinforcc concepts of procedural adhcrcncc and conscn ativc decision-making.

Events discussed in past 18 months:

IVolfCrcck fragile icing of intake Catawba loss ofoff-site popover Zion reactivity cvcnt SOER 96-01 Comanche Peak fccdivatcr hcatcr bypass/overpower Fermi sivitchyard brcakcr failure DCPP 4 kv brcakcr issues DCPP dcgradcd gcncrator seal

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