ML16342D264
| ML16342D264 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 04/05/1996 |
| From: | Murray B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342D263 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-96-01, 50-275-96-1, 50-323-96-01, 50-323-96-1, NUDOCS 9604190011 | |
| Download: ML16342D264 (24) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1996001
Text
ENCLOSURE
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
i
Inspection Report:
50-275/96-01
50-323/96-01
Licenses:
DPR-82
Licensee:
Pacific Gas
and Electric Company
77 Beale Street,
Room 1451
P.O.
Box 770000
San Francisco,
Calif'ornia
Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Nuclear
Power Plant.
Units
1 and
2
Inspection At:
San Luis Obispo County, California
Inspection
Conducted:
January
8 through March 29,
1996
Inspector:
D.
W. Schaefer,
Physical Security Specialist
Plant Support
Branch
Approved:
ai
urra
,
e
,
Division of Reactor
S
uppor
rane
a e
Ins ection
Summar
Areas
Ins ected
Units
1 and
2
Special,
announced
inspection to review
Licensee
Event Report 50-275/95-S02-00:
50-323/95-S02-00
which involved
'mproper
granting of unescorted
access
authorization to an individual.
Results
Units
1 and
2
Plant
Su
ort
~
An apparent violation was identified involving access
authorization
program.
An individual was improper ly granted unescorted
access
authorization
(Section
1. 11).
A weakness
was identified in the access
authorization
program.
In spite
.of the contractor's
requests
to place
a "hold" on
a person's file. the
licensee
badged the individual for unescorted
access
authorization
(Section 1.11) .
9604190011
960411
ADQCK 05000275
8
0
V
-2-
~
Three weaknesses
were identified in the implementation of the
contractor's
Access Authorization Program procedures.
Summar
of Ins ection Findin s:
Licensee
Event Report 95-S02-00
was closed
(Section
1. 1).
~
Apparent violation was opened
275/9601-01.
323/9601-01
(Section
1. 11).
Attachment:
~
Attachment
- Persons
Contacted
and Exit Meeting
DETAILS
1
ONSITE REVIEW OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS
(92700)
1. 1
Closed
Licensee
Event
Re ort 275/95-S02-00
323/95-S02-00:
Im ro er
Grantin
of Unescorted
Access Authorization
In accordance
with 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1)
and
~ the
licensee telephonically reported to the
NRC on October
11 '995 (event
number
29441). that Westinghouse
contract
Employee
S,
screened
under the Westinghouse
Electric Corporation
access
program,
was approved for unescorted
access
at
Diablo Canyon,
on October
5,
1995.
The unescorted
access
clearance
was
granted
based
upon
an October 2.
1995,
request for unescorted
access letter
(certification letter) from a Westinghouse
access
authorization coordinator.
The licensee stated that this certification letter did not contain all of the
derogatory information revealed
by the Westinghouse
background investigation.
Later. Westinghouse
advised the licensee that based
on
a recent psychological
reevaluation of the derogatory information obtained during the background
investigation,
a psychologist
no longer
recommended
Employee
S for unescorted
site access.
The licensee
immediately revoked
Employee S's unescorted site
access
authorization.
While inside the plant vital areas
from October 7-9.
1995.
Employee
S performed general
labor functions.
The licensee
reviewed
Employee S's work activities
and determined that his work had been closely
monitored by his supervisors
and co-workers'nd that the health
and safety of
the public were not affected
by
this event.
The licensee's
30-day Licensee
Event Report
No. 95-S02-00.
dated
November
9,
1995, accurately
summarized this
event.
1.2
Re ulator
Re ui rements
requi res,
in part, that the licensee establish
and maintain
an
access
authorization
program with the objective of providing high assurance
that individuals granted
unescorted
access
authorization are trustworthy and
reliable,
and do not constitute
an unreasonable
risk to public health
and
safety,
including the potential to commit radiological
sabotage.
This program
must include
a background investigation designed to identify past actions
which are indicative of an individual's future reliability within a protected
or vital area of a nuclear
power reactor.
The investigation should include
the development of information concerning
an individual's employment
and
credit history.
The licensee shall
base its decision to grant unescorted
access
authorization
on review and evaluation of all pertinent information
developed.
requires,
in part
~ that if a licensee
accepts
an access
authorization
program used
by its contractor.
the licensee is responsible f'r
granting.
denying.
or revoking unescorted site access
authorization to
employees of that contractor.
Diablo Canyon Physical Security Plan.
Revision 18. dated
November 2,
1994,
paragraph
1.4. 1 ("Personnel
Reliability") states that "Personnel
screening tor
unescorted
security access
at the Diablo Canyon
Power Plant meets the
0
-4-
requirements
and all elements
of Regulatory Guide 5.66 (June
1991).
Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Plants
~ have
been
implemented
to satisfy the requirements
of 10 CFR 73.56."
1.3
Westin house
Access Authorization Pro
ram
Re ui rements
On October
15 '992 'he licensee
reviewed
and accepted
the Westinghouse
Electric Corporation's
Access Authorization Program,
revision 2, dated
March 6,
1992,
as meeting the licensee's
screening
requirements.
Paragraphs
7. 1 and 7.2 of this Westinghouse
procedure,
requi re, in part, that
complete the following actions
upon discovery of information that
adversely reflects
upon an individual's trustworthiness:
(1) not provide the
licensee with a request for unescorted
access until an investigation is
conducted:
(2) inform the licensee of adverse
(derogatory)
information;
and
(3) formally withdraw, if appropriate.
the request for unescorted
access until
an investigation is conducted.
As
a part of the licensee's
acceptance
of this
agreements
committed.
on April 22 '992, to attach to their
request for unescorted
access,
any substantial
derogatory information.
1.4
Event Chronolo
t~t9
1995
~
On August 9,
1995,
Employee
S was satisfactorily administered
a
psychological
examination.
Se tember
29
1995
On September
29,
1995,
Proudfoot Reports Inc.,
a subcontractor
to
provided Westinghouse with a 5-year
background
investigation for Employee
S.
Subsequently,
upon review, Westinghouse
determined that
some elements of the background investigation were
incomplete.
As
a result,
on October 2-4,
1995.
completed
the necessary
elements of the background investigation
by telephonically
contacting
"developed" personal
references
and recontacting
previous
employers of Employee
S.
The background investigation
documented
derogatory information for
Employee
S.
October
2
1995
On October 2.
1995.
access
authorization coordinator
determined that
a 5-year "full" background investigation of Employee
S
had been
completed
and faxed
a request for unescorted
access
to the
licensee
requesting that
Employee
S be granted
unescorted
access
authorization at Diablo Canyon.
The Westinghouse letter stated that
Employee
S had been:
"investigated in accordance
with the Westinghouse
Access
Authorization Program.
Rev.2.
Based
on this information, I
consider this person
(Employee
S) reliable and trustworthy."
-5-
The Westinghouse
October 2.
1995.
request for unescorted
access letter
did not inform the licensee of substantial
derogatory
(see October
11
'995)
information for Employee
S.
~
On the afternoon of October
2
~
1995,
discovered that
some
information had possibly
been left off the request
for unescorted
access
letter and twice telephoned
the licensee
and requested
that the licensee
lace
a "hold" on this individual's access.
A representative
of the
icensee's
access staff placed
a note
on the file to "hold" unti l they
heard from Westinghouse.
did not communicate to the
licensee
the reason for the hold.
From these
two telephone
conversations
the licensee
mistakenly
assumed that Westinghouse
had
decided that Employee
S was possibly not coming to work at Diablo
Canyon.
The licensee
access staff did not question or understand
the
meaning of the "hold" note.
October 3-4
1995
~
On October 3-4,
1995.
telephoned
some of the previous
employers of Employee
S to further clarify the derogatory information
previously obtained during the background investigation.
On October 4,
1995 (two days following issuance of the Westinghouse
request for
unescorted
access letter)
~ the Westinghouse Authorization Coordinator,
located in Waltz Hill, Pennsylvania,
concluded the following:
"After careful investigation of all derogatory information
and review of Westinghouse
Access
Programs adjudication
guidelines, it is
my assessment
that
(Employee
S) is
a
suitable candidate for unescorted
access
at this time.
Future evaluation will be conducted if warranted
by
additional negative information."
~
On October
4
~
1995 'pon arrival at Diablo Canyon.
the licensee
allowed
Employee
S to initiate his in-processing
in spite of the "hold" that had
been placed
on his file.
October
5
1995
~
On October
5.
1995,
Employee
S completed all training requirements
at
Diablo Canyon
and was issued
a badge granting
him unescorted
access
authorization.
The licensee
stated to the inspector that unescorted
access
authorization would not have
been granted to Employee
S if
had previously provided all pertinent derogatory
information.
The licensee's
decision to grant site access
was not based
upon
a review and evaluation of pertinent derogatory information.
As a
result.
the licensee
improperly granted
Employee
S unescorted
access
authorization at Diablo Canyon.
October
6
1995
~
The background investigation file indicated that on October 6,
1995
(four days following issuance of the Westinghouse
request for unescorted
-6-
access letter)
~ the Westinghouse
Senior Access Coordinator.
at the
Central
Access
Programs office in Waltz Hill, Pennsylvania,
conducted the final adjudication for Emplo"ec S.
The investigation
documented
substantial
derogatory information that adversely reflected
upon the trustworthiness of Employee
S (see
October ll. 1995).
The
failure of Westinghouse to complete their investigation before issuance
of the October 2,
1995,
request for unescorted
access
did not comply
with the requirements
of the Westinghouse
access
program discussed
in
Section 1.3 above.
Additionally, upon confi rming that Employee
S had adverse
(derogatory)
information, Westinghouse
failed to formally withdraw their previous
October 2,
1995,
request for unescorted
access
for
Employee
S.
The
failure of Westinghouse to formally withdraw their previous'equest
for
unescorted
access
at Diablo Canyon did not comply with the requirements
of the Westinghouse
access
program discussed
in Section 1.3 above.
October
7-9
1995
~
On October 7-9,
1995,
Employee
S entered Unit
1 containment
and pi-pe
gallery vital areas.
October
9
1995
On October 9,
1995, the Westinghouse
Sr.
Access Coordinator notified the
licensee's
access
supervisor of a possible omission concerning
Employee
S's derogatory
employment history.
The licensee
immediately suspended
Employee S's unescorted
access
authorization
pending completion of an
evaluation
by a psychologist.
The licensee's
access
supervisor
and the
Sr.,
Access Coordinator, agreed
upon this psychological
reevaluation
in an effort to determine the trustworthiness of
Employee
S.
October
10
1995
~
Employee S,
completed his psychological
reevaluation.
October ll
1995
~
On October
11,
1995.
and the licensee
received notification
that after
reviewing all derogatory information, the psychologist
recommended
against granting
Employee
S unescorted site access.
The
licensee
immediately revoked the individual's unescorted
access
authorization
and completed
a 1-hour report to the
NRC.
Based
upon the
conclusion of the psychologist.
and after reviewing the information in
Employee S's file. the inspector determined that the adverse
information
in Employee S's background investigation file was "substantial."
As
such,
should
have previously reported this information to
the licensee.
1.5
Licensee's Initial Investi ation
-7-
~he licensee's
investigation determined that the immediate cause of this event
was
Employee
S being granted
unescorted
access
authorization
"without a
thorough review by the licensee of derogatory
remarks
received during the
background investigation."
The licensee stated that the root cause of this event
was "inadequate
internal
communications in the Westinghouse
access
control group.
and inadequate
communication
between
the Westinghouse
access
control group and (the
licensee's)
access
control group."
Based
upon Westinghouse's
self identification of i.'~e event
and their
subsequent
notification to the licensee to not grant unescorted
access.
the
licensee initially determined that this event
was
an inadvertent oversight
by
1.6
Licensee's Initial Cor rective Actions
The licensee's
corrective actions
were as follows:
~
Unescorted site access
authorization for Employee
S was revoked.
~
Employee S's supervisor
was interviewed.
The licensee
determined that
Employee
S was under job supervision while working in the protected/
vital areas.
~
The badge history for Employee
S was reviewed.
The licensee
and
determined that Employee
S had only entered vital areas
which were appropriate for his job duties.
~
reviewed background investigation files for other employees
at Diablo Canyon.
The licensee
and Westinghouse
determined that
no
other individuals were processed
for access
authorization that should
not have
been
badged.
The licensee's initial corrective actions to prevent recurrence
were as
follows:
has reinforced the access
authorization
process that
requires that the request for unescorted
access
letters not be written
and issued until all security file adjudications
have
been completed in
writing and the requi red signatures
are in place.
requires that communications with the licensee
regarding
an
employee's
access
status will be formal (written) and directly with the
licensee's
access
program lead or designee.
~
The licensee notified applicable
access
personnel
to be cautious in the
future when
someone
requests
a "hold" on an individual's access.
Access
personnel
are to have
a questioning attitude
and request
a complete
explanation.
0
-8-
The licensee
formally instructed
Westinghouse that all derogatory
information must
be presented
in writing when
a request for access
is
presented.
The inspector verified that the licensee
had completed all corrective actions.
1.7
The inspector confirmed that the licensee
had received
and reviewed
NRC
"Problems With Access Authorization Programs,"
dated
September
23,
1991.
This Notice alerted
licensees
to continuing problems with
access
authorization
programs,
including the fai lure of licensee contractors
or subcontractors
to comply with all requirements
for background
investigations.
and falsification of records.
Additionally, on February 8,
1994 'he licensee
provided Westinghouse
a copy of this Notice,
and formally
reminded Westinghouse that they
"may be subject to criminal prosecution for
intentional wrongdoing."
1.8
Prior Audit of Westin house Files
The licensee participated in a joint (NEI) utility audit of Westinghouse
access
authorization
program from August 14-17,
1995.
A total of
203 Westinghouse files were reviewed during the audit.
The inspector
determined
from a review of the audit that no discrepancies
similar to this
event were identified.
1.9
Review of Other Westin house Files
B
NRC
During this inspection,
the inspector
reviewed two additional
background
investigation files completed
by Westinghouse.
No discrepancies
were
identified in these files.
1. 10
Licensee's
Subse
uent
Cor rective Actions
During the exit meeting
on January
12,
1996, the licensee
stated that the
access
authorization
program at Diablo Canyon
has
been
suspended
pending the licensee's
continued
review of this event.
On January
16,
1996,
Hessrs.
W.
Ryan and
D. Sisk, Diablo Canyon
Power Plant,
telephonically reported to the inspector
that the licensee's
Security Review
Group had convened that date
and had considered
additional corrective actions.
The licensee
conducted
an audit of the Westinghouse
access
authorization
program from February 5-9
~ 1996.
This audit,
conducted
as
a followup to this
event,
reviewed background investigations
and psychological
evaluations
performed
by Westinghouse facilities in Waltz Hill, Pennsylvania
and Orlando,
The licensee's
3-man audit team reviewed
a sample of the background
investigation screening files for Westinghouse
employees that had been granted
unescorted
access
at Diablo Canyon from October through
December
1995.
Additionally, this audit verified that Westinghouse
provided appropriate
derogatory information to the licensee
subsequent
to this event.
Upon
reviewing the audit findings and observations,
the licensee
questioned
the
-9-
attention to detail
in the Westinghouse
access
authorization
program.
The
licensee
concluded that the Westinghouse
program appeared to be complete
as
written,
and should meet all regulatory requirements if implemented
as
written.
However, the licensee
believed that Westinghouse
needed to make
significant improvements
in the attention to detail given to the
implementation of the program to assure that the types of problems identified
during the audit did not recur.
From Harch
21
- 29,
1996,
Region
IV conducted
an in-office review of the
licensee's
audit.
dated February
29,
1996.
1. 11
Ins ection Findin s
A
arent Violation.
On October 2,
1995,
faxed
a request
for unescorted
access
letter to the licensee
requesting that Employee
S
be granted
unescorted
access
authorization at Diablo Canyon.
This
letter did not provide the licensee with substantial
and
previously identified derogatory information.
Consequently,
on
October 5,
1995. the licensee's
decision to grant unescorted
access
authorization to Diablo Canyon was not based
upon
a review and
evaluation of all pertinent information developed
during the
investigation.
Instead,
the licensee relied upon incomplete information
provided by Westinghouse,
a licensee
approved self-screening
contractor.
The licensee
would not have granted
Employee
S unescorted
access
authorization at Diablo Canyon if Westinghouse
had provided all
pertinent information to the licensee.
However,
from October 5-9.
1995,
Employee
S was improperly granted unescorted
access
authorization to
plant protected
and vital areas,
and from October 6-9,
1995.
Employee
S
entered
the protected
and vital areas of the plant.
Consequently.
an individual was improperly granted
unescorted
access
authorization to Diablo Canyon
~ contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56(b)
and Section 1.4.1 of the licensee's
physical security plan.
(VIO 275/9601-01,
323/9601-01)
Licensee
Weakness.
On October
2.
1995,
placed
a hold on
Employee S's file.
On October 5,
1995, in spite of this "hold." the
licensee
badged
Employee
S for unescorted
access
authorization at Diablo
Canyon.
This represents
a weakness
in the licensee's
access
authorization
program.
Westin house
Weaknesses
(1)
On October
2.
1995, four days prior to completing their
investigation,
requested
unescorted
access
authorization for Employee
S at Diablo Canyon.
did
not complete their adjudication of Employee S's
background
investigation until October 6.
1995.
The Westinghouse
access
authorization
program,
which the licensee
had formally accepted,
required that unescorted
access
authorization for individuals
having information that adversely reflected
upon their
trustworthiness,
not be requested until an investigation
was
-10-
conducted.
The failure to conduct
an investigation in the
1'.ght'f
derogatory information being available represents
a weakness
in
the Westinghouse
access
authorization
program.
(2)
On October 2,
1995,
submitted their Request for
Unescorted
Access
and did not inform the licensee of substantial
derogatory information in the records for Employee
S.
The
Access
Program,
which the licensee
had formally
accepted,
required that the Request for Unescorted
Access
include
substantial
derogatory information.
This represents
a weakness
in
the Westinghouse
access
authorization
program.
(3)
On October 6,
1995,
upon determination that Employee
S had
derogatory information in his background investigation,
failed to formally withdraw their request to Diablo
Canyon for unescorted
access
of Employee
S.
This represents
a
weakness
in the Westinghouse
access
authorization
program.
ATTACHMENT 1
1
PERSONS
CONTACTED
1. 1
Self-Assessment
Team Members
J.
Roberts,
Director Nuclear Safety
& Licensing,
Team Leader
S.
Chesnut,
Pacific Gas
and Electric, Diablo Canyon
G.
Hughes,
Union Electric, Callaway
D. Shehadeh,
Entergy Operations,
Nuclear
One
P.
Gropp,
Entergy Operations,
Waterford 3
M. Stein,
Entergy Operations,
River Bend
C. Fite. Entergy Operations,
Nuclear
One
R. Logan'ntergy Operations'chelon
M. Reis,
Washington Public Power Supply System,
Washington Nuclear Project
2
B. Wellborn'ouston Lighting and Power,
South Texas Project
B. Jones,
Entergy Operations,
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
1.2
Exit Attendees
Licensee
Personnel
D.
C.
D.
J.
L.
C.
R.
H.
W.
C.
C.
A.
W.
D.
J.
T.
Boston
Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering
Bottemi lier. Superintendent.
Nuclear Safety
and Regulatory Affairs
Cupstid,
Technical Coordinator,
Performance
and System Engineering
Czaita,
Nuclear Specialist,
Nuclear Safety
and Regulatory Affairs
Daughtery,
Technical Coordinator'uclear
Safety
and Regulatory Affairs
Dugger,
Manager.
Outage
Management
and Work Control
Errington
~ Superintendents
Performance
and System Engineering
Farris,
Chairman,
Nuclear Plant Engineering
Garner,
Supervisor Audits. Quality Programs
Harris, Superintendents
System Engineering
Hayes.
Director
. Quality Assurance
Holifield. Licensing Engineer,
Nuclear Safety
& Regulatory Affairs
Khanifar, Manager.
Materials Purchasing
and Contracts
McDowell, Operations
Superintendent
.
Meisner, Director, Nuclear Safety
and Regulatory Affairs
Mosby, Technical Specialist,
Quality Program Audits
Pace,
General
Manager,
Operations
Roberts'irector
Nuclear Safety
and Licensing'chelon
Shelly, Technical
Coordinator,
Training
Tankersley.
Radiation Control Superintendent
NRC Personnel
B.
K.
Murray, Branch Chief
Weaver's
Resident
NRC inspector
-2-
2
EXIT MEETING
The
NRC inspectors
presented
the inspection results
on February
9.
1996.
The
licensee
acknowledged
the findings as presented.
Licensee
personnel
disagreed
with the
NRC inspector's
observation that operation of the plant service water
system
pumps in manual
was
a long-standing operator
work-around.
While they
agreed that design
improvements
were possible,
they did not think that
a
modification to improve the automatic control system operation
was war ranted
based
upon the
number of years of successful
operation with the system in the
manual
mode.
The licensee further stated that they would be reviewing the
issue
and make
a cost/benefit decision regarding modifications to this system.
The
NRC inspectors
asked the licensee
whether
any materials
examined during
the inspection should
be considered
proprietary.
No proprietary information
was identified.
I
I
~l~
)k