ML16342A527
| ML16342A527 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 05/26/1994 |
| From: | Murray B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342A526 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-94-12, 50-323-94-12, NUDOCS 9406060300 | |
| Download: ML16342A527 (26) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1994012
Text
APPENDIX B
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection
Report:
50-275/94-12
50-323/94-12
Licenses:
DPR-82
Licensee:
Pacific
Gas
and Electric Company
(PGIIE)
77 Beale Street
San Francisco,
California 94106
Faci 1 i ty:
Inspection
Inspection
Inspector:
Diablo Canyon
Power Plant,
Units
1 and
2
At:
San Francisco,
San Luis Obispo .County, California
Conducted:
April 11-15,
1994
Michael
Ci llis, Senior Radiation Specialist
Facilities
Inspection
Programs
Branch
Approved:
Blaine Hurray,
Ch ef
Reactor
Inspection
Branc
~Summa r:
Areas
Ins ected:
Routine,
announced
inspection of the radiation protection
program including:
audits
and appraisals;
changes;
training and
qualifications of personnel;
external
exposure control; internal
exposure
control, control of radioactive materials
and contamination,
surveys,
and
monitoring, maintaining occupational
exposures
as-low-as-i s-reasonably-
achievable
(ALARA); and tours of the licensee's
facilities.
Results:
'o
major changes
in the Radiation Protection
Program
had
been
made since
the previous inspection
(Section
1. 1) .
Very good survei llances of radiation protection activities
were
performed
(Section 1.2).
Contract radiation protection technicians
were qualified and trained
appropriately
(Section
1.3) .
An excellent
ALARA program,
ALARA awareness
and incentive program,
mock-up training program,
and
an aggressive
ALARA goal
program were
implemented for Refueling Outage
1R6 (Sections
1.4,
1.4. 1, 1.4.2,
and
1.4.3).
9402)060300
9'405>i
ADOCK 05000275
Good external
exposure
controls were implemented
(Section 1.5).
~
Good internal
exposure controls were implemented
(Section 1.6).
E
Respirator
usage
during the refueling outage
were significantly reduced
(Section 1.6).
~
Increases
in personnel
contamination
events
were noted during the
refueling outage
(Section 1.7).
~
Control of radioactive materials
and contamination,
surveys,
and
monitoring were generally
good (Section
1.7) .
~
Housekeeping
was generally
good (Section 1.8).
A poor ALARA practice in the auxiliary building,
a poor
OSHA safety
practice in the reactor containment building, and poor ALARA practice in
the reactor containment building were observed
(Section
1.8) .
~
A violation was identified for failure to post
(Secti on l. 9) .
Ins ection Findin s:
Violation 50-275/9412-01:
50-323/9412-01
was
opened
(Section 1.9).
Attachment:
Attachment
Persons
Contacted
and Exit Meeting
J
DETAILS
1
OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURES
DURING EXTENDED OUTAGES
(83729)
The radiation protection
program implemented during Refueling Outage
1R6 was
inspected to'etermine
compliance with Technical Specifications
and with the
requirements
of 10 CFR 19. 12 and 20. 1001-20.2401.
1.1
~Chan
es
No major changes
in the licensee's facilities and organization
had occurred
since the previous inspection.
The inspector reviewed
numerous
changes
in
procedures
that were
made since the previous inspection.
The changes
should
result in program improvements.
1.2
Audits and
A
raisals
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
quality assurance
schedule of radiation
protection related audits
and appraisals
for Unit 1, Refueling Outage
1R6.
At the time of this inspection,
quality assurance
had just initiated an
Audit 940117I to verify that the radiation protection
and dosimetry processing
programs
were being effectively implemented
and to provide for the evaluation
of radiation hazards
and protection of workers.
No quality- assurance
survei llances of outage activities
had
been conducted;
however,
one surveillance
activity was conducted
in December of 1993
(Surveillance
Report S(A-93-0063) to verify the licensee's
readiness
for
implementation of 10 CFR 20.1001-20.2401.
The inspector
noted that supervisory
and management
oversight of work
activi ties were frequently conducted
during the outage.
The licensee's
management staff expects their first line supervision
and foremen to monitor
the performance of work activities.
Licensee Action Requests
generated
as
a
result of supervisory,
foreman,
and management
survei llances
were reviewed.
The surveillances
were of good quality and generally
focused in on procedure
compliance
issues.
Radiological
Occurrence
Reports written by the Radiation Protection
Branch for
the period of January
1 through Narch 31,
1994,
were reviewed.
The reports
identified problem areas
and required corrective actions
be implemented to
prevent
a recurrence
of the problems.
1.3
Trainin
and
ualifications
The qualifications
and training program for contract radiation protection
technicians
who were hired in support of Refueling Outage
1R6 were examined.
Selected
resumes
and training records
were reviewed
by the inspector.
It was
determined that the contract radiation protection technicians
met the
qualification requi rements
specified in Technical Specifications 6.3, "Unit
St'aff gualifications."
0
'
A standardized
screening
examination
was
used
by the licensee's
radiation
protection staff for the selection of returning radiation protection
technicians
and contract radiation protection technicians
who had not
previously worked at the site.
First time contract radiation protection
technicians
were required to demonstrate
their knowledge of health physics
by
taking
a written entrance
examination.
The licensee's
screening
process
was
effective in ensuring that the selection of radiation protection technicians
was in compliance with the Technical Specification.
Each
new hire radiation protection technician
and returning radiation
protection technician
attended
4 days of site-specific training.
Four written
examinations
were administered
during the site-specific training that was
provided.
All of the radiation protection technicians
were required to
demonstrate
their knowledge of the licensee's
procedures
before being assigned
to support the outage.
Most of the
100 senior radiation protection
technicians
and
10 junior radiation protection technicians
who were hired for
the outage
were returnees.
Approximately 25 radiation protection technicians
were
new hires.
The inspector interviewed the licensee's
training representatives
and
radiatio'n protection staff and determined that the training program for
contract radiation protection technicians
emphasized
lessons
learned
and
management's
expectations.
The licensee's
program for maintaining personnel
exposures
ALARA was examined
for compliance
with 10 CFR Part 20.
Planning
and preparation for Refueling
Outage
IR6 was previously addressed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-275/93-35;
50-323/93-35.
This inspection
focused
in on the implementation of licensee's
ALARA program.
The scheduled
57-day outage started
on March
12,
1994,
and
w'as approximately
4-5 days behind schedule
at the conclusion of this inspection.
The inspector
noted that the
ALARA program received direct attention
and
strong support of upper management.
Similar comments
were expressed
to the
inspector
by the licensee's
staff and contract workers during the inspection.
The licensee's
staff and workers were encouraged
by observed periodic
management
tours of work activities in the radiological controlled area during
the outage.
1.4. I
Worker Awareness
and Incentive Pro
ram
A high level of ALARA awareness
was present
among licensee's
management,
supervision,
and workers interviewed during facility tours.
Workers were well
aware of the
ALARA goals that were established
for the outage.
Workers
were
continually made
aware of the progress
being
made
towards achieving the
goals.
This was accomplished
by displaying posters
in appropriate
locations,
through plan-of-day meetings, craft group meetings,
and by supervision.
'
Each worker had
been provided with a refueling outage
handbook.
The handbook
contained
useful
information such as:
list of telephone
contacts,
diagrams of
Unit 1, outage
schedule,
site layout diagram,
emergency
signals
and responses,
radwaste minimization program,
ALARA program guidelines
and goals,
and
a list
of other useful information.
The licensee
developed
a formal worker awareness/recognition
program for the
outage.
The objective of this program
was to increase their competitive
edge
and enhance
the quality of worker awareness
by eliminating excessive
radiation
exposure
and encouraging
greater efficiency.
The strategy of the program was
to stimulate worker awareness
of the
ALARA program
and to recognize
suggestions.
Approximately 25 ALARA suggestions
were under review at the time
of this inspection.
Incentive awards
were given to those individual who
submitted
suggestions
that are adopted for implementation.
The inspector
reviewed the sixth refue'ling outage incentive program described
in a Pacific
Gas
and Electric Company
memorandum
dated
March 28,
1994.
The
memorandum described
the awards that all workers (e.g., contractors
and
'ermanent
staff) could receive for completing the outage
under schedule
and
also for completing the outage
under the person-rem
goals that were
established
for the outage.
The program provides workers with awards
(e.g.,
material
goods,
meal tickets,
and monetary
awards)
for good performance.
Workers interviewed during the inspection
were aware of the program and used
good
ALARA work practices
to maintain their exposures
as
low as possible
so
that they could avail themselves
of the incentive awards.
Except for the isolated observations
discussed
in Section
1.8, work practices
observed
during the inspection
appeared
to be consistent
with the
concept.
1.4.2
Mock-u
Trainin
During the outage,
the licensee
used
mock-up training as
a tool to reduce
person-rem.
The following mock-up training was provided in support of the
outage:
Hanway Cover
Removal'eactor
Coolant
Pump seal
Removal
Nozzle
Dam Removal
and Installation
Resistance
Temperature
Detector Modifications
Sludge
Lance
Reactor
Head Bolt Inspection
The inspector
observed
nozzle
dam removal
mock-up training
which was provided
on April 12,
1994.
The quality of the training was good.
1.4.3
ALARA Goals
and Results
At the beginning of the outage,
an
ALARA goal of 350 person-rem
was
established
for the Outage
1R6.
As of April 13,
1994,
the licensee
expended
approximately
280 person-rem.
This was
26 person-rem
under their expected
0
goal for the April 13,
1994 date
and
75 person-rem
under the outage
goal of
350 person-rem,
with only 2 more weeks remaining in the schedule.
ALARA in-progress
reviews for high exposure jobs,
such
as, for the resistance
temperature
detector
bypass
piping modifications
had already
been completed.
A review of the debrief package
disclosed that the,licensee's
staff was very
self critical with their performance.
Many useful
comments for improvements
should prove to be useful
in reducing person-rem
the next time similar work is
scheduled.
During the outage,
the licensee
used video cameras,
shielding,
and hydrolyzing
to reduce
person-rem.
ALARA prejob briefings were
a
common practice
used
by
the licensee
to reduce
person-rem.
Discussions
with the
ALARA coordinator
disclosed that the licensee
was considering
the purchase of a surrogate travel
technology
program.
The program
has
been
used with great
success
at*other
nuclear
power plants
as
a tool in reducing person-rem.
By using
an
interactive videodisc
system
areas
of the plant that are normally inaccessible
can
be viewed without entering the plant.
Low-dose areas
were posted
throughout the plant for workers to spend their
time when they were not actively engaged
in productive work.
Workers were
reminded
by the training group, radiation protection,
and supervision to stay
in a low-dose area
when they were not actively engaged
in work and can not
exit the area.
1.5
External
Ex osure Control
The inspector toured the radiological controlled areas,
reviewed
area
postings,
and performed
independent
radiation measurements.
All postings
except for the event discussed
in Section
1.9 were correct
and easy to
understand.
It was determined that high radiation areas
and locked high.
radiation area controls were in compliance with Technical Specification
6. 12,
and
10 CFR 20. 1902(c).
All personnel
observed
in the-radiological
controlled area
by the inspector
were equipped with proper dosimetry equipment,
The inspector also reviewed
personnel
exposure
records for the period of January
1993 through March 1994.
The review disclosed that personnel
exposure levels were well below the
occupational
exposure limits established
in licensee
procedures
and
1.6
Internal
Ex osure Control
The licensee's
respiratory protection
program was examined for compliance with
10 CFR Part 20 requirements
and consistency with the recommendations
of
Regulatory
Guide 8. 15,
"Acceptable
Programs for Respiratory Protection";
"Manual of Respiratory Protection Against Airborne Radioactive
Materials";
and American National
Standards
Institute
(ANSI) Z88.2, "Practices
for Respiratory Protection."
The examination
included
a review of the training program provided to users of
respiratory protection
equipment,
medical
examination requirements,
and
'
-7-
respirator fit-up testing program for respiratory
equipment
users.
Applicable
respiratory protection
program implementing procedures,
an inspection of the
respirator issuing facility, and various
emergency
use respirator
storage
locations
were also performed.
The inspector verified that the routine monthly inspections of several
self-contained
breathing apparatus
had
been
performed within the past
31 days.
The control
and issue of respiratory
equipment
were determined
to be
consistent with implementing procedures
and the documents
referenced
above.
Respiratory
usage
during Refueling Outage
1R6. had decreased
by approximately
82 percent.
The decrease
was attributed to the implementation of the
new
10 CFR Part 20 regulations
on January
1,
1994.
The licensee's
respiratory protection
program was determined
to be consistent
with regulatory requirements
and the other documents
referenced
above.
The licensee's
air sampling program
was examined
and determined
to be in
compliance with 10 CFR Part 20 and Licensee
Procedure
RCP D-420,
"Sampling and
t1easurement
of Airborne Radioactivity."
The inspector
observed that air
sampling of work evolutions being performed during the inspection
were
representative
of the workers'. breathing
zone.
1.7
Control of Radioactive Haterial
and Contamination
Surv'e in
and
~Monitorin
The inspector
observed
entrance
and exit access
control at the radiological
controlled areas
and found them to be good.
Selected
radiation
and contamination
surveys for 1994 were reviewed for
completeness,
use of appropriate
survey instruments,
and timely management
review.
Survey results
were documented
properly.
Records of clothing and skin contamination
events
were examined for
thoroughness.
Timely decontamination,
trending,
and followup actions* of the
events
appeared
to be. appropriate.
As of April 14,
1994,
a total of
226 clothing and skin contamination
events
were reported during the Refueling
Outage
1R6.
This represents
an increase
from personnel
contamination
events
that occurred during the Refueling Outage
2RS.
Clothing contaminations
outnumbered
skin contamination
events
by a 6: 1 ratio.
Each event receives
a
detailed
review for possible
dose
assessment,
probable
cause,
and corrective
actions.
The inspector verified that none of the personnel
contamination
events
reported during Refueling Outage
1R6 resulted in a significant internal
or external
exposure.
During the tours of the Auxiliary Building and Reactor Containment,
portal
monitors
and frisking equipment
appeared
to be used properly and were in
current calibration.
In addition,
the inspector
noted that monitoring
instrumentation
was in good supply and was in current calibration
and
had been
routinely performance
checked.
Individuals exiting the radiological controlled areas
were requi red to pass
through both
gamma
and beta sensitive
personnel
contamination monitor.
All
tools
and equipment
removed
from the radiological controlled areas
were
surveyed for release
by a qualified radiation protection technician.
Tool
monitors were also
used to survey equipment.
In general,
surveys,
moni toring,
and releases
of potentially contaminated
materials
to unrestricted
areas
were
good.
The licensee's
surveillance
program for verifying accountability
and leak
checks of sealed
sources
was examined
and
was
found to be in compliance with
Licensee
Procedure
RCP D-620, "Control of Radioactive
Sources";
and Technical
Specifications 3/4.7.8,
"Sealed
Source Contamination."
The licensee
had
completed its most recent
sealed
source surveillance
on January
12,
1994.
All
of the sources
were accounted for and
no leaking sources
were identified.
1.8 F~ili
T
Tours of the licensee's facilities were conducted
by the inspector.
Areas
toured included the Spent
Fuel Building, Auxiliary Building, Reactor
Containment,
and
Radi oacti ve Storage
Faci 1 ity.
Work evol uti ons observed
included:
Core reload
(Spent
Fuel Building and Reactor Containment)
Radioactive
waste
compaction
Steam Generator - manway cover inspection
Charging
system - hydrostatic testing
Pump restoration
Yalve refurbishment
Hot machine
shop activities
Preparation of a radwaste
shipment
Feed Mater
Pump overhaul
Other miscellaneous
activities
Areas toured were clean but were cluttered with material
from the outage.
Except
as noted below, personnel
interviewed
knew their assigned
tasks
and for
the most part,
used
good
ALARA work practices.
All workers interviewed
had
signed in on the appropri ate radiation work permi t.
Additional observations
by the inspectors
include the following:
~
On April ll, 1994, six workers were observed
performing a hydrostatic
test of the charging
system
on the 100-level of the Auxiliary Building.
It appeared
that the work could have easily been
conducted
by three
workers.
Radiation level in the work area
ranged
from 2 to 3 mrem/hr.
The observation
was brought to the attention of the lead mechanic
and
radiation protection
who instructed the workers to move to a lower dose
area.
On April 14,
1994,
core reload workers in the Reactor Containment
were
observed walking along the edge of the cavity without donning
a life
jacket and/or
a life-line as required
by the licensee's
safety manual.
On April 14,
1994,
a contract worker was observed picking up an alarming
dosimeter
from a tool
box located adjacent
Pump 1-2
on the 115-foot level of the Reactor
Containment.
Discussions
held with
the individual revealed that the individual had signed in on Radiation
Work Permit
94 01050
02 which provided the radiological control
requirements
for performing reactor cool ant
pump mai qtenance activities.
The radiation work permit required
an alarming dosimeter if entry into a
was expected..
As a precautionary
measure,
the
mechanic
signed out for an alarming dosimeter
even
though
he did not
expect to enter
The worker also
had
a
thermoluminescent
dosimeter
and
a low range pocket ion chamber which
were required
by the radiation work permit.
The worker stated that
he placed
the alarming dosimeter in the tool.box,
because
he
was afraid that it would fall off his person
when
he climbed.
on
some piping that was adjacent
to the tool box.
The worker added that
he had not actually entered
Radiation
measurements
taken in the area
by the inspector indicated
levels of approximately
10 mrem/hr by the tool
box and approximately
30 mrem/hr where the worker was
seen climbing off the piping.
These
dose rates
were subsequently
verified by the licensee's
radiation
protection staff.
The observation
was brought to the attention of the radiation protection
staff who implemented appropriate
corrective action.
On April 14,
1994,
the inspector
observed
a situation that did not agr ee
with good
ALARA practices.
A contract quality control inspector,
who
had signed in on Radiation
Work Permit 94 01006 00,
was observed
to be
lying down flat on his back.
The quality control inspector stated that
he was providing support for a welding operation that was being-
performed
on the 91-foot level of the Reactor Containment.
The worker
had his feet propped
up against
a stairwell structure,
and his eyes
were
closed.
The worker appeared
to be in an extremely restful position when
observed
by the inspector.
The worker jumped
up immediately when
he heard the inspector talking to
the welders working nearby.
Radiation measurements
in the area
were
approximately
2-3 mrem/hr.
The welders stated that they still had
approximately
20-30 minutes of welding to be performed before they would
need
the services
of the quality control inspector.
The observation
was reported to the lead radiation protection technician
who instructed
the worker to move to a low-dose area.
The radiation
protection technician
subsequently
instructed the Norker to exit the
Reactor Containment.
Subsequent
corrective action taken
by the individual's supervisor
appeared
to be satisfactory.
1.9
Unit
1 Letdown
S stem Hot
S ot Event
At approximately
2:50 a.m. Pacific daylight time
(PDT)
on April ll, 1994,
the
radiation protection staff was informed that the operations
group iritended to
'
-10-
fill and vent the let down line and the volume control tank.
The radiation
protection
group was informed that radiation levels could change
because
of
this planned activity and that the dose rates
may even
go down.
Approximately
20 minutes earlier, at 2:30 a.m.
(PDT)
on April ll, 1994, radiation protection
had just completed
a daily survey of the let down header
area
on the 100-foot
elevation of the Auxiliary Building.
Results of this survey indicated the
expected
normal
dose rate of approximately 0.2 mr/hr to 0.5 mr/hr adjacent
to
the let down header
area.
The next survey of the area
was scheduled
to be
accomplished
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> later
on the morning of April 12,
1994.
The vent-and fill operation
was performed
between
the hours of 2:58 a.m.
and
4:03 a.m.
(PDT)- on the morning of April 11,
1994.
Radiation surveys
were not
performed during the evolution,
because
radiation protection expected
the
same
or possibly that the radiation levels would go down.
At approximately
4 p.m.
(PDT)
on April 11,
1994,
a contractor junior radiation
protection technician while performing routine work activities noted that her
Eberline Hodel
RO-2 dose rate meter
pegged
on the low range (e.g.,
0-5 mr/hr)
as
she
was walking adjacent
to the let down header
area located
on the
100-foot level of the auxiliary building.
The junior radiation protection
technician notified her supervisor
and took immediate action to assess
the
problem and assigned
personnel
to guard the area to prevent inadvertent entry.
The radiation protection staff responded
immediately.
A radiation survey-of
the area
was conducted.
The results of this survey indicated that there
was
a
5 R/hr hot spot
on the let down header piping and dose rates at 30
cm ranged
from
1 R/hr to 1.5 R/hr.
Dose rates of 350 mr/hr at
a meter were also
detected.
The area
was immediately posted in accordance
with Technical
Specification,
Section
6. 12, requirements
and
a licensee's
investigation
was
started.
The licensee
quickly determined that the probable
cause for the elevated
radiation levels
was associated
with the vent fill operation of the liquid
hold up tank and volume control tank that had taken place approximately
12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> earlier.
Increased
radiation levels were also noted
on the volume
control tank and piping adjacent
to Residual
Heat Removal
RHR-1-8804A.
These
areas
were isolated
from normal traffic.
The vent and fill lines in question
were flushed,
and the radiation levels
were returned
back to normal approximately
2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after the unposted
high
radiation
area
was discovered.
It was determined that. the unposted
high
radiation went undetected
for about
a 12-hour period.
Indications
from a
continuous air sampler confirmed this assumption.
The air sampler indicated
a
rise in the general
area
background during this time period.
During this
period of time, personnel
who had logged. into the radiological controlled area
had
no appreci'able
dose indicated
on their pocket ionization chambers.
It was
also determined that no work had
been
performed in the area during the 12-hour
period,
and any
new jobs would have required the completion of a prejob
radiation survey.
This substantiates
the licensee's
belief that no one was
overexposed.
The inspector
agreed with the licensee's
assumption
that
no one
was overexposed
but concluded that this
was
a readily accessible
area
and that
-11-
a potential for an overexposure
did exist for the 12-hour period that the
elevated
dose rates
went undetected.
A review of Emergency
Procedure
EP G-I, "Accident C'lassification
and Emergency
Plan Activation" was conducted
by the Manager of Operations
Services
and
Director of Radiation Protection
to determine reportabi lity.
Attachment
7. 1
of Emergency
Procedure
EP G-1 stated that passageways,
occupied areas,
accessible
areas
<100 mR/hr, outside
boundaries of radiological controlled
areas
in which unplanned
or unanticipated
increase of,l R/hr or greater is
encountered
is reportable
as
an Alert.
This event
was not reported
as
such
based
on information found in NUREG 0654,
HUHARC/NESP-007, Regulatory
Guide
1. 101 and
Emergency
Procedure
EP G-1.
The rational for reaching this
decision
was discussed
during
a conference call held by the Vice
President/Plant
Manager
and his staff with the NRC's staff on April 14,
1994.
The
NRC staff determined that licensee's
decision to not declare
an Alert was
'appropriate
under the circumstances;
however,
Emergency
Procedure
EP G-1
needed
to be clarified.
The licensee initiated Nonconformance
Report DC1-94-HP-N017,
Revision 0,
on
April 12,
1994.
The Nonconformance
Report described
that
an unexpected
high
radiation areas
was
found on the west
end of the 100-foot elevation hallway of
the Unit Auxiliary Building.
The Manager of Operations
Services
assigned
his
staff to perform
a thorough investigation of the event to determine
why the
vent and fill operation resulted in unexpected
high radiation levels.
The
Operations
Services
Manager identified the following areas
that were in need
of improvement:
Communications
between
operations
and radiation protection
~
Emergency
Procedure
EP G-1 needed
to be clarified
~
A better
method for surveying future vent and fill operations
needed
to
be developed
by the radiation protection group.
The possibility of
utilizing a remote monitoring system
was discussed.
The licensee's
investigation indicated that the hot spots
appeared
to
occur when the flow was diverted to
LHUT 1-1 for a period of
1 to
2 minutes.
The 0.2 micron letdown filter was subsequently
found to be
ruptured.
The
NRC Senior Resident
Inspector will examine
the
operational
aspects
of the vent and fill operation that was performed
on
the morning of April 11,
1994.
The results of this examination will be
addressed
in
NRC Inspection
Report 50-275/94-11.
The failure to post
a high radiation area is
a violation of 10
CFR
Part.20.1902(b)
(VIO 275/9412-01;
323/9412-01)
.
1. 10
Conclusions
Very good radiological control surveillances
were performed.
No significant
changes
in the licensee's
organization or facilities had
been
made since the
previous inspection.
-12-
The selection,
training,
and qualification program for contractor radiation
protection technicians
hired in support of the refueling outage
was excellent.
The licensee's
overall performance
during Refueling Outage
1R6 appeared
to be
good.
Reduction in outage
exposures
was excellent.
The licensee's
program for controlling occupational
exposure
in the aspects
reviewed appeared
to be good in accomplishing
the licensee's
safety objectives
and in achieving the aggressive
ALARA exposure
goals.
Both external
and
internal radiation exposure
controls
were generally
good.
An excellent job of
reducing respirator
use during the outage
was performed.
Control
and labeling of radioactive materials
were consistent with 10 CFR Part 20 requirements.
Surveys
and monitoring were generally good.
However,
personnel
contamination
events
had increased
and
was
an area that was in need
of improvement.
Several
poor health physics
work practices
and
one poor safety practice
were
noted during the tours.
The licensee
took prompt corrective action in each
event.
In general,
posting of work areas
was good.
A violation was identified
concerning
the failure to post
A potential for an
existed for the period of time that the high radiation area
was
undetected.
ATTACHMENT
I.l
Licensee
Personnel
J.
Townsend,
Vice President/Plant
Manager
- D. Miklush, Manager,
Operations
Services
- D. Taggart, Director
equality
Assurance
- K. Hubbard,
Engineer,
Regulatory Compliance
- M. Somervi 1 le, Senior
Engineer,
Radiation Protection
(RP)
- S. Ehrhart,
Engineer,
Radiation Protection
- C. Helmen,
Engineer,
Radiation Protection
R. Gray, Director, Radiation Protection
- R. Rogers,
Foreman,
Radiation Protection
- W. Rising, Auditor, Site guality Assurance
- R. Flohaug,
Supervisor,
Site guali ty Assurance
"T. Bast, Director,
Work Planning
- H. Persky,
Instructor, Training
'G.
Boi les,
Dosimetry Supervisor
- R. Snyder,
Chemistry/Radiation
Protection Training Supervisor
T. Grebel,
Supervisor,
Regulatory Compliance
M. Lemke, Shift Supervisor
- J. Hays, Director, guality Control
1.2
NRC Personnel
M. Tschi ltz, Resident
Inspector
N. Hiller, Senior Resident
Inspector
- Denotes personnel
that attended
the exit meeting.
The inspector
met and held
discussions
with additional
members of the licensee's
staff during the
inspection.
2
EXIT MEETING
An exit meeting
was held
on April 15,
1994.
During this meeting,
the
inspector
reviewed the scope
and findings of the report..
The licensee
did not
identify as proprietary,
any information provided to, or reviewed
by the
inspector.
~
f
0