ML16342A331
| ML16342A331 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1993 |
| From: | Mcqueen A, Pate R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16342A330 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-93-23, 50-323-93-23, NUDOCS 9312130303 | |
| Download: ML16342A331 (24) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1993023
Text
Report Nos.
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
50-275/93-23
and 50-323/93-23
Licensee:
License
Nos.
DPR-82
Pacific Gas
and Electric Company
(PGEE)
77 Beale Street
San Francisco,
California 94106
Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Nuclear
Power Plant
{DCPP), Units I and
2
Inspection. at:
Qiablo Canyon Site,
San Luis Obispo County, California
Inspection
Conducted:
October
18 - 23,
1993
Inspectors:
c ueen,
mergency
repare
ness
na yst
ate
cygne
~
~
Team Leader
P.
M. gualls,
Reactor Inspector
K. M. Prendergast,
Radiation Specialist
D. B. Pereira,
Licensing Examiner
A. S. Mohseni,
Emergency
Preparedness
Specialist,
NRR/PEPB
Approved by:
o ert
.
ate,
ie
,
a eguar s,
mergency
Preparedness,
and Non-Power Reactor
Branch
~Summar:
r&P
ate
gne
Areas
Ins ected:
Announced inspection to examine the following portions of
the licensee's
emergency
preparedness
program:
follow-up on Open Items
identified during previous
emergency
preparedness
inspections
and observe
the
1993 annual
emergency
preparedness
exercise
and associated
critiques;
and
Inspector Identified Items.
Dur ing this inspection,
Inspection
Procedures
82301
and
92701
were used.
Results:
The licensee
was found to be in compliance with
NRC requirements
within the areas
examined during this inspection.
One item was identified as
an exercise
weakness for review in future inspections
{Section 11).
Several
areas
were indicated to the licensee for potential
improvement (Sections
7
thru l2).
Two open
items from the
1992 emergency
preparedness
exercise
were
reviewed
and closed
{Section 2).
9312i30303 93iii9
ADOCK 05000275
9
INSPECTION DETAILS
Ke
Persons
Contacted
J.
S.
Bard, Director, Mechanical
Maintenance
R.
M. Bliss, Planner,
Technical
Support Center
- M.
Burgess,
Director, Technical
Services
- W. G. Crockett,
Manager,
Technical
and Support Services
S. J.
Foat,
Access Control Supervisor
- S.
R. Fridley, Director, Operations
- W. H. Fujimoto, Vice President,
Nuclear Technical
Services
.
J.
E. Gardner,
Senior Engineer,
Radiological,
Environmental
Chemical
Engineering
(RECE)
- C. R. Groff, Director, Plant Engineering.
- L. A. Hagen, Director, Safety,
Health
8 Emergency Services
J. A.-Hayes,
Supervising
Engineer
R. L. Honaker,
Outage Coordinator
'*K. A. Hubbard,'Regulatory
Compliance
- M. T. Hug, Supervisor,
Emergency
Planning
'. T. Moretti, Radiation Protection Supervisor
R.
M. Morris,
EP Coordinator
.
- J. B. Neale,
De'sign Engineer
- R. P.
Powers,
Manager,
Nuclear equality Services
C.
B. Prince,
EP Coordinator
G.
M. Rueger,
Senior Vice President
P. A. Steiner,
Supervisor,
Emergency
Planning
D.
R. Steamer,
System Engineer
- D. A. Taggart, Director, Site guality Assurance
(gA)
- R. G. Todaro, Director, Security
- J. D. Toresdahl,
EP Consultant
- J. D. Townsend,
Vice President
and Plant Manager
E. -V. Waage,
Senior Engineer
S.
Wood,
EP Consultant
D.
Yows,
EP Consultant
and
The above individuals denoted with an asterisk
were present during the
October
22,
1993, exit meeting.
The inspectors
also contacted
other
members of the licensee's
emergency
preparedness,
administrative,
and
technical staff during the course of the 'inspection.
NRC Per'sonnel
at Exit Interview
A. D.
A. S.
K. M.
P.
M.
Mcgueen,
Emergency
Preparedness
Analyst,
RV,
Mohseni,
Emergency
Preparedness
Specialist,
NRR/PEPB
Prendergast,
Radiation Specialist,
RV
gualls,
Reactor Inspector,
RV
2
Action on Previous
Ins ection Findin
s
HC 92701
Follow-up Item (92-15-01).
Failure to Verif
Reactor
Shutdown in the
1992 Annual
Emer
enc
Exercise.
It was observed
by an
MRC inspector during the
1992 annual
emergency
exercise that Control
Room operators
did not properly verify that the
reactor
was shutdown after
a reactor trip.
Despite the clearly
indicated failure of the
Power
Range
(PR), Intermediate
Range (IR), and
Source
Range Nuclear Instruments
(SRNIs)
and of Digital Rod Position
Indicator (DRPI), step
1 of E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," was
verified completed satisfactorily
by the crew.
Subsequent
questioning
revealed
the operators
responsible
for this verification believed the
NIs and
DRPI were operab']e during the performance of step
1.
Step
1
involves verifying power is decreasing
by using these
NIs and all rods
are bottomed
by using DRPI.
DRPI was flashing'indicating failure and
all NIs were pegged
low indicating failure.
Seventeen
minutes after the
trip, the .SRNI,was reported failed to the Senior control Operator
(SCO);
and nineteen
minutes after the trip, the
DRPI was reported failed to the
SCO.
In this instance the operators
did not properly verify the reactor
was shutdown.
The inspectors
concluded that the operators effectively
implemented the emergency
plan based
on the limited observation that the
simulator mode -of operation
provided.
However, the inspectors
also
concluded that the failure of the. crew to properly verify the reactor
was shutdown
was of major concern.
The licensee
followed up on this
item with an Action Request
(Number A0273101).
This item was reviewed
by the Control
Room inspector during this exercise
and the operating
crew positively determined that the reactor
was shutdown;
and observed
indications
by both the Source
Range Nuclear Instrumentation
and
by
panels
in the back.
This item is closed.
Follow-up Item (92-15-02).
Simulator or Ta
e Procedures
in 0 erator
Pla
in the
1992 Annual
Emer enc
Exercise.
A problem regarding the use of a taped scenario for control
room actions
was identified by the
NRC inspection
team during the
1992 annual
emergency exercise
as
an apparent
weakness
in scenario
implementation
and development.
NRC inspection
procedure
.82301
(Evaluation of
Exercises for Power Reactors)
indicates that inspectors will assess
the
performance of the control
room staff as it conducts
the task of
"analysis of plant conditions
and corrective actions."
This could not.
be appropriately
observed
during the most critical times of the exercise
(after the explosion leading to
a General
Emergency)
since reactor
control activity was taped
and fed to the staff rather than their
responding to the event in their normal manner.
This could result in an
inability for the licensee
and the
NRC to evaluate
the exercise
due to
lack of observation opportunity.
The licensee
followed up on this item
with Action Request
Number A0273101.
In order to assess
the performance
of the control
room staff as it conducted
the task of analysis of plant
conditions
and corrective actions; this item was reviewed during the
1993 annual
emergency exercise.
The operating
crew performed
satisfactorily during the critical tim'es of this exercise.
The scenario
0
-
3
events
and transients
were live during the degrading plant
conditions,'nd
were appropriate to effectively ensure that the crew could implement
the site emergency
plan
and respond to plant conditions.
Their
mitigation of the event in progress
appeared
appropriate.
This item is
closed.
Exercise Plannin
res onsibilit
scenario ob'ectives
develo
ment
control of scenario
The licensee's
Emergency
Preparedness
(EP) staff has the overall
responsibility for developing,
conducting
and evaluating the annual
emergency
preparedness
exercise.
The
EP staff developed
the scenario
with the assistance
of licensee staff from other organizations
possessing
appropriate .expertise
(e.g. reactor operations,
heal.th.
physics, security,
maintenance,
etc.). 'n an effort to maintain strict
security over the scenario,
individuals who had
been
involved in the
exercise 'scenario
development
were not participants
in the exercise.
The objectives
were developed
in concert with the offsite agencies.
NRC
Region
V -and Federal
Emergency
Management
Agency
(FEMA) Region
IX were
provided
an opportunity .to comment
on the proposed
scenario
and
objectives.
The complete exercise
document
included objectives
and
guidelines,
exercise
scenario
and necessary
messages
and data (plant
parameters
and radiological information);
The exercise
document
was
tightly controlled before the exercise.
Advance copies of the exercise
document were provided to the
NRC evaluators
and,other
persons
having
a
specific need.
The players did not have
access
to the exercise
document
or information on scenario
events.
This exercise
was conducted
to meet
the requirements
of IV.F 2 of Appendix.
E to
Exercise Scenario
The exercise
objectives
and scenario
were evaluated
by the
NRC and were
considered
appropriate
as
a method to demonstrate
Pacific Gas
and
Electric Company's
(PGLE) capabilities to respond to an emergency in
accordance
with their Emergency
Plan
and implementing procedures.
The
exercise
scenario started with an event classified
as
an Unusual
Event
(UE)
and ultimately escalated
to a. General
Emergency
(GE)
classification.
The opening event in the exercise
involved
a
lubricating oil fire in a diesel
generator
room.
The room and hallway
filled with thick smoke that significantly impaired visibility and
respiration.
The California Department of Forestry
(CDF) was called to
help fight the fire, necessitating
the declaration of a UE.
Fire
fighters were unable to bring the fire under control within ten minutes,
meeting the criteria for declaration of an ALERT.
After 9:45 a.m.,
the
site experienced
a loss of all onsite
and offsite power.
A loss of
onsite
and offsite power lasting greater
than
15 minutes met the
criteria for declaration of a Site-Area
Emergency
(SAE).
After about
10:20 a.m.,
due to indications of a degraded
core with possible loss of
eoolable
geometry
as indicated
reading in
excess of 1200 degrees
Fahrenheit;
the criteria was met for declaration
of a
GE.
A subsequent
series of events
led to releases
of radioactive
gases offsite.
The plume initially traveled in
a southeasterly
4
direction.
Later in the scenario,
a wind shift carried the plume
through-southern
San Luis Obispo County and northern
Santa
Barbara
County depositing significant amounts of iodines
an'd particulates
over
portions of these counties.
The onsite
phase of the exercise
was
conducted
on October 20, followed by an ingestion
pathway drill on
October
21
and
22.
Federal
Observers
Five
NRC inspectors
evaluated
the licensee's
response
to the
scenario.'nspectors
were stationed
in the (simulator)
CR,
TSC, Operational
Support Center
(OSC),
~ and in the
EOF.
An inspector
in the
OSC also
accompanied
repair/monitoring -teams.
Offsite portions of this annual
exercise
were evaluated
by
FIRMA, Region IX, which will result in a
separate
inspection report by that agency.
Exercise Observations
82301
~
The following observations,
as appropriat'e,
are intended to be
suggestions
for improving the emergency
preparedness
program.
An
exercise
weakness
is
a finding identified as needing corrective action
in accordance
with 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph
IV.F.5.
All
exercise
times
and other times .indicated in this report are Pacific
Daylight Time (PDT).
Control
Room Simulator
CR
The following aspects
of CR operations
were observed
during the
exercise:
detection
and classification of emergency
events,
notification, frequent
use of emergency
procedures,
and innovative,
attempts to mitigate the accident.
At 9:47 a.m. in the scenario,
Unit
1 lost all
AC bus
power due .to
scenario
events.
As directed
by the Control
Room Supervisor
(CRS), the
two shift foremen determined
a method to backfeed via the Unit
1 Startup
transformer across to the Unit 2 vital and non-vital buses.
This
determination
was completed at about
10:30 a.m.,
whereby the
requested
the Technical
Support Center
(TSC) to verify if the method
was
correct
and that breaker voltage
and current loadings would not be
exceeded.
At 10:50 a.m., directions
by the
TSC were given to the
CRS to use
ECA-0.3, Appendix H, instead;
which crossties vital buses
between units
using
an operable
Diesel Generator
at Unit 2.
Since the
TSC directed
the implementation of Appendix H, the crew proceeded
to perform Appendix
H.
Due to Scenario constraints,
at about ll:20 a.m.,
the
500
KV offsite
power was established
via backfeed
from the Unit 2 to Unit
1 by the
scenario controllers'irection to the simulator operators..
5
The issue or concern
by the
NRC inspector
was the extent of time (over
one hour) to determine the corrective actions to backfeed to Unit
1
buses.
The
AC Power was restored
at 11:20 a.m. via the simul.ator
operators
in order for the scenario
to progress
along directed
events.
.Credit should
be given to the two shift foremen for their determination
of a method of energizing Unit 1's vital buses via Unit 2's non-vital
buses.
Even though,
due to scenario faults, that method would not'ave
been
able to be completed,
the quick thinking and simplicity of their
method
was considered excellent.
Evaluation of their method
was
eventually conducted
and approval
was granted,
but this appeared
at the
same time as the Appendix
H solution,
which was determined
by the
TSC to
be the method to restore the
AC buses
to Unit 1.
The
NRC observer
considered that
a long tiine was used to determine
a method for restoring
AC Power,
when there should
have 3ieen
a readily available
method to
restore
AC power. to either unit by cross connecting
the
AC buses.
At a debriefing conducted
on Oct 21, 1993,-the licensee controllers
discussed
the length of, time to 'restore
AC bus power.
They considered
that the length of -time was appropriate for the scenario
and the
difficulties associated
with the Hotor Operator Disconnect
(NOD)- being
welded shut;
Using the word "weld'ed" in the scenario
discouraged
further attempts
at freeing the NODs, which was the true success
path
for restoring the units'C @uses.
Technical
Su
ort Center
The following aspects
of TSC operations
were observed:
activation,
accident assessment/classification,
notification,
and interactions
'between
the various emergency
response facilities.
The following
represent
the
NRC inspector's
observations
in the
TSC.
a.
The
HP Supervisor provided good anticipatory advice
as to the
effects of possible
changes
in the event; for example:
(1)
At 10:14 a.m.,
he recommended
to the Site Emergency
Coordinator
(SEC) that additional Protective Action
..Recommendations
(PARs)
be
made to the county based
on the
large inventory of material in containment
and the
possibility of containment
leakage.
(2)
At 1:30 p.m.,
he provided to the
SEC
a projected
plume
map
and
an explanation of a possible
change
in wind direction
and the effects of the change.
b.
The following TSC engineering
support staff issues
appeared
to
contribute to the licensee
not identifying the point of release
or
to properly characterize
the extent of core
damage.
(1)
The core damage
assessment
performed
by the staff showed
6Ã
core melt vice the actual
60X.
It appeared
to the inspector
that after the initial assessment
at the time water
was
restored,
no
new assessments
were made.
6
(2)
The
TSC staff was not effective in locating the source of
leakage
from the containment.
Instead
they concentrated
their efforts
on purge line penetration
leakage.-
(3)
The
TSC staff appeared
to not be aware that the
HP staff.had
information provided by inplant radiation monitors which
would have helped
them to localize the source of the leak.
{4)
The technical staff incorrectly told the
NRC Senior Resident
Inspector that Flow Element
700 had only local indication.
Later the Site
Emergency Coordinator
(SEC) directed the
staff to look on,the
Emergency
Assessment
and Response
System
(EARS) where there.was
remote indication.
. (5)
The technical -staff appeared
to focus
on proving that their
first solution to a problem was correct
and did not appear
to adequately
widen the search for other possible solutions.
0 erational
Su
ort Center
Two
NRC inspectors
observed activitie's conducted
by the
OSC;
one located
part time at the
OSC location
on the turbine deck
and
one who
accompanied field teams
dispatched
from the
OSC and part time observed
activities in the
OSC.
The following represent
the
NRC inspector
observations
in the
OSC.
a 0
b.
The
OSC was activated
promptly within twelve minutes of the Alert
declaration
in accordance
with Emergency
Plan Implementing
Procedure
(EPIP)
EP EF-2, "Activation and Operation of the
Operational
Support Center."
Briefings were performed for all teams prior to dispatch to ensure
personnel
were infor'med and capable of performing their mission in
a safe manner.
c.
-
Surveys to determine
the habitability of the
OSC were performed
throughout'the
exe} cise
and records
were maintained.
d.
The
OSC staff and persons
who performed the briefings of teams
prior to dispatch
were not kept fully informed of release
conditions.
Consequently,
at I:25 p.m.,
a team was dispatched
outside the plant in
a path directly under the release.
The team
was not provided instructions to wear Protective Clothing
(PC) or
a suitable respirator for this mission.
The respirator
was not
worn because
of the limitations of the standard
30-minute tank.
The team concluded that the walk around the plant would have
used
up most of the supply of oxygen
and left them unable to complete
their mission.
There appears
room for improvement in the method
of disseminating
release
information to the
OSC.
Also,
alternative solutions to cope with the restrictions of the 30-
minute air tanks should
be considered.
)l
7
e.
9,
h.
The
OSC was not observed
recording
and tracking the doses received
by persons
returning to the
OSC from missions
in the plant.
The
ability to quickly determine
doses
accumulatdd
during plant
response
missions
would be beneficial in long term recovery
operations
or high dose rate entry or activity. It was indicated
by the licensee that most persons
would be processed
through
access
control
and
use the automated
access
(ACAD) system.
However, in an emergency
there
may be occasions
where individuals
are,not
processed
by access
control or there
may be problems with
the
ACAD system.
There was
a shortage
of iodine cartridges for team use at the 85
foot level access
control point.
The problem resulted in a number
of delays
in teams
accomplishing their mission.
The
OSC staff did not issue
personal
dosimeters
to the personnel
staged
in the elevation trailer awaiting
OSC needs.
The operations
of. the
OSC were hampered
by the'ack of appropriate
plant drawings in the
OSC.
Briefings were held
up on several
occasions
whil'e trying to locate
a drawing for a certain
area to
be visited (e.g., ventilation ducting for survey, etc.)
and to
determine
the best path to follow and the location of certain
equipment.
The results of onsite monitoring may have
been
delayed
due to the
instructions for "turn back" at
25 millirem for high'iodine
release.
This standard
appeared
to inhibit actions
by plant
personnel
in the course of missions to identify, quantify, or
mitigate
a release
If the results of monitoring would be
beneficial in the veri'fication of dose-projection .or damage
assessment,
then the dose to provide release
data should
be
considered
when discussing
the conditions at which the team would
be turned
back due to dose limitations.
J
~
As. discussed
Py
monitoring team
performing soil
soil or vegetati
verification of
the onsite
team
appropriate.
the licensee
in their player meeting,
the onsite
does
not have procedures
or equipment for
or vegetation
sampling.
Again, if the results of
on sampling are necessary
to aid in comparison
or
dose
assessment
or damage
assessment;
providing
procedures
and equipment for such sampling
appears
10.
Emer enc
0 erations Facilit
The following EOF operations
were observed:
activation; functional
capabilities;
interface with offsite officials; dose
assessment;
discussion of recovery
and reentry;
and the formulation of protective
action recommendations
(PARs).
The following are
NRC observations
of
EOF activities.
0
8
An Alert was declared
at 8:35 a.m.,
and the
EOF was declared
operational
wi-th .the interim minimum staff at 9:27 a.m. in
accordance
with EPIP
EP EF-3A.
The
EOF interim staff performed
its functions in accordance
with its procedures
and at 9:51 a.m.,
. the Interim Advisor to the County
the
SEC.
At 10:25 a.m.,
the Recovery
Hanager
(RH) and his team arrived.
The turnover activities were performed efficiently and in
accordance
with procedures.
At ll:00 a.m.,
when the
EOF staff
were. adequately
briefed
and ready to assume
command
and control,
the
RH declared
the facility activated.
and in charge of the.
functions established
in his procedures.
~
In facility management
and control, the status
boards
were kept
up
to date.
The
RH and the Assistant
RH performed their functions
efficiently despite several
changes
in command during the
exercise.
Periodic briefings were held.
The emergency classifications
were
made at the Control
Room
(Simulator)
and the
TSC, prior to Long-term
EOF activation.
Reactor conditions were continuously assessed
by the
engineering
personnel.
The engineering staff at the
EOF and the
TSC did not accurately
assess
core
damage
and the release
pathway.
Containment
high range radiation readings
and results
from a Post
Accident Sampling
System
(PASS)
sample,
core uncovery, time,
and
other indicators in the plant were not used to adequately
assess
core damage.
The engineering staff did not accurately
determine
the release
pathway using the area radiation monitors
and
therefore
reduced the chances
of successful
mitigation.
The
engineering staff considered
the release
to have potentially
occurred through
two pathways
and attempted to terminate the
release
through those.
Considerations
were not given to radiation
monitors which would have assisted
them in identifying the real
pathway.
Offsite dose .assessment
and quantification of the release
rate
were timely and accurate.
It appeared,
however, that air sample
results
from the field to confirm iodine levels were slow and few.
This was important because
it"was the iodine levels that were
driving the
PARs beyond the
10 mile EPZ.
The development of Protective Action Oecisions
were timely and
appropriate.
Notifications and communications
were generally performed
effectively and periodically.
It was noted,
however, that the
status of the release
of radioactive material into the environment
communicated
to offsite officials was not entirely accurate.
This
inaccurate
information appeared
in the I:15 p.m..press
release.
9
h.
Despite .the instructions
given to the players in the area of
drillmanship prior to and during the exercise
by the Plant
Hanager,
the
RH,
and his assistant
RH, it was noted that
some
players
were too quick to blame the scenario for events that were
not readily explainable.
ll.
Exercise
Meakness
One area of activity was identified by the
NRC inspectors
as
an exercise
weakness.
Based
on observations
by the inspectors
in the
TSC and
EOF;
there
was
a concern that technical
support provided by the engineering
staff at the -TSC, and the
EOF did not appear to provide emergency
management
with appropriate
assessments
regarding the areas of core
damage
and probable release
path.
Accurate information in this area is
.
needed to mitigate the event
and to estimate the magnitude of offsite
releases
and environmental
consequences.
Specifics
on which this
weakness
categorization is based
are indicated .in sections
S.b
and lO.d
above.'he-applicable
sections of the approved
Emergency
Plan are
listed below:
Section 6.2,
ASSESSHENT ACTIONS, indicates in part:
....This section contains
a more- detailed discussion of the
four most important assessment
functions;
namely,
the proper
functioning of emergency cooling systems for emergencies
involving possible degradation of the core heat sink, the
assessment
of core condition in such
a circumstance,
the
estimation of the magnitude of a release,
and the
determination of the environmental
consequences
of a
release.
Section 6.2.3,
Assessin
Core
Oama e, states
in part:
Preliminary core
damage
assessment
uses
parameters
such
as
reactor vessel
water level
and core temperatures
to confirm
that conditions exist which can lead to clad and/or core
failure.
This is quantified through the use of containment
and area radiation monitor readings.
Long-term core
damage
assessment.
methodology
uses reactor
coolant
and containment air sample analysis to determine
the
extent of clad and/or core failure more accurately.
Section 5.2.2.2.b.l),
En ineerin
and Technical
Anal sis
under
(Engineering Advisor) states
in part:
Perform systems
analysis,
resolve core/thermal
hydraulics...and
diagnose
plant conditions.
Ft
10
Table 5.2-1),
Section A.Z.e), Onsite
Emer enc
0 eratin
Or anization
Res onsibilities
Authorit
and Duties, states,
in part,
regarding
Operations:
This includes collecting
and analyzing technical
information
to assess
plant operations,
providing technical
counsel
in
support of the Control
Room (CR), assessing
radiological
release
potential,
determining actual
or potential release
rates,
on-site exposure monitoring and contamination
contro1,
repairing plant components
or systems
as required
by the emergency
and or consequences.....
A preliminary core
damage
assessment
at about 10:45 a.m. estimated
core
damage
as between
about
2X and
20X, with 100X gap release.
At about
12:44 p.m., the figure was refined to.about .7X and reported to the
where it was
so posted for virtually the remainder of the plume phase
portion of the exercise;
The
7X figure was questioned%y
several
individuals during the exercise
as being unrealistically low.
Statements
by individuals in the
TSC and
EOF indicated their belief that
core
damage
was
much higher.
This core
damage
assessment
was not
updated until after 4:00 p.m.
when
PASS sample results
were received
by
the Corporate
Incident Response
Center verifying much higher core
damage.
Since the request
For
a
PASS sample
was initiated b> controller
prompting at about 12:30 p.m., the results of the
PASS analysis
would
not have
been available until later had the controller not intervened.
Concentration of the
TSC and
EOF engineering staffs
on the "purge line
release
path concept"
precluded their searching
for and identifying the
true release
path for virtually the entire plume phase of the exercise.
This. occurred despite the availability of area radiation alarms in the
vicinity of the containment leak area to the HP-oriented staff. at the
TSC.
Amount of core
damage
and release
pathways
are significant because
they
have
a direct impact
on offsite consequences.
Accurate
assessment
of
radioactive inventory -available for release,
which is
a function of core
damage,
and .identificati,on of potential
release
pathways,
including
filtration and other in-containment
removal
processes,
are critical for
assessment
of ongoing
and potential offsite consequences.
This area will be reviewed in future inspections of licensee
emergency
drills and exercises.
(Exercise
Meakness
Item 93-23-01)
Licensee Criti ues
A series of exercise critiques
were conducted
by the licensee
upon
completion of the exercise.
First,
a facility critique was conducted
at
each
emergency
response facility with players
and controllers
immediately following the exercise.
The following day,
a critique was
conducted with players
and controllers
from all emergency facilities.
A
formal corporate cr'itique. was conducted
at the site to cover significant .
problems,
strengths,
and observations.
NRC inspectors
observed
the
I
11
facility critiques immediately following the exercise
and the formal
corporate critique.
These critiques were evaluated
by the
NRC
inspectors.
~
Facility critiques immediately following the exercise termination
appeared
satisfactory
and appropriate
to exercise activities.
Some of the shortcomings
noticed
by the
NRC inspectors
were also
noted
by the licensee
and were discussed
in critiques.
~
The corporate exercise critique on October
21 also appeared
satisfactory
and appropriate
to exercise activities.
Exit Interview
An exit interview was held
on October
22,
1993, to discuss
the
preliminary
NRC findings.
The licensee
was- informed of the exercise
weakness
identified during the inspection'and
discussed
in -Section
11
above.
Items discussed
are
summarized
in Sections
2 and
7 through
12 of
this report.
r
0