ML16341G671
| ML16341G671 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1992 |
| From: | Chaney H, Mcqueen A, Norderhaug L, Pate R, Qualls P, Russell J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341G668 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-92-15, 50-323-92-15, NUDOCS 9208250120 | |
| Download: ML16341G671 (26) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1992015
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-275/92-15
and 50-323/92-15
License
Nos.
DPR-82
Licensee:
Pacific Gas
and Electric Company
(PG&E)
77 Beale Street
San Francisco,
California 94106
Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Nuclear
Power Plant
(DCPP), Units 1 and
2
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site,
San Luis Obispo County, California
Inspection
Conducted:
July 6 - 10,
1992
YNe.
Inspectors:
. (( t(
K6~
A.
D. Mcgueen,
Emerge cy Preparedness
Analyst
v s~/Sz,
Date Signed
7/ ~/+
L.
R.
Nord r aug,
Physical
e urity Inspector
Date Signed
P.
M. squalls,
n-Power Reactor Inspector
so g2
Date Signed
H.
han
Sr.
Reactor
R
iation Specialist
Date Signed
J.
ussel
Licensing Examiner
7/~a('lx
Date Signed
L.
K. Cohen,
Emergency
Preparedness
Specialist,
U. S.
NRC,
NRR/PEPB
Approved by:
Ro ert J.
Pat
,
ief, Safeguards,
Emergency
Preparedness,
and Non-Power Reactor
Branch
at
Signed
~Summal
Areas Ins ected:
Announced inspection to examine the following portions of the
licensee's
emergency
preparedness
program:
follow-up on Open Items identified
during previous
emergency
preparedness
inspections
and observe the 1992 annual
emergency
preparedness
exercise
and associated
critiques.
During this
inspection,
Inspection
Procedures
82301,
92700
and 92701 were used.
9208250i20
920803
ADOCK 05000275
G
Results:
In the areas
inspected,
the licensee's
emergency
preparedness
program
appeared
adequate
to protect the public health
and safety.
The licensee
was
found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas
examined
during this inspection.
Two items of concern
were identified for review in
future emergency
preparedness
inspections.
Several
areas
were indicated to the
licensee
for potential
improvement.
An open item from the 1991 emergency
preparedness
exercise
was reviewed
and closed.
A strength
was identified in
the licensee's ability to conduct dose
assessment
and projections.
0
INSPECTION DETAILS
Ke
Persons
Contacted
"M. S.
Abr amovitz,
L'ead Power Production Engineer,
"T. A. Bennett,
Director-Outage
Manager,
"P.
A. Bishop, Administrative Assistant,
Emergency
Preparedness
(EP)
"S.
C. Blakely,
News Representative,
Corporate
Communications,
"R.
M. Bliss, Planner,
Technical
Support Center
"W.
G. Crockett,
Manager,
Technical Services,
W.
H. Fujimoto, Vice President,
Nuclear Technical Services,
"J.
E. Gardner,
Senior Engineer,
Radiological,
Environmental,
and
Chemical
Engineering
(RECE),
"J.
M. Gisclon,
Manager,
Nuclear Operations
Support,
"R. Gray, Director, Radiation Protection,
"J.
R. Harris, guality Assurance Auditor,
"W. J.
Keyworth,
"R.
P.
Kohout, Manager,
Safety,
Health and Emergency Planning
"L. G. Lundsford, Supervisor,
Security Training
"N. S. Malenfant,
Employee
Communications
Representative,
Corporate
Communications,
"T. J. Martin, Director, Training,
"D. B. Miklush, Assistant Plant Manager,
Operations
"R.
M. Morris,
EP Coordinator,
"C. B. Prince,
EP Coordinator,
"W. F.
Ryan, Security Supervisor,
"D.
P. Sisk,
Engineer,
"P.
A. Stein'er,
Supervisor,
Emergency Planning,
"C.
B. Thomas,
News Representative,
"R.
G. Todaro, Director, Security,
"J ~ Toresdahl,
EP Consultant
"D. A. Vosburg, Senior Operations
Supervisor,
"E. V. Waage,
Senior
Engineer,
"W.
R. White, Senior
GET Instructor,
"S.
Wood,
EP Consultant
"D. Yows,
EG&G Inc.
The above individuals denoted with an asterisk
were present
during the
July 10, 1992, exit meeting.
The inspectors
also contacted
other members
of the licensee
s emergency
preparedness,
administrative,
and technical
staff during the course of the inspection.
NRC Personnel
at Exit Interview
H.
D. Chancy,
Senior Reactor Radiation Specialist,
RV
L.
C.
Cohen,
Emergency
Preparedness
Specialist,
NRR/PEPB
A.
D. Mcgueen,
Emergency
Preparedness
Analyst,
RV
L.
R. Norderhaug,
Physical Security Specialist,
RV
P.
M. gualls,
Reactor Inspector,
RV
J. Russell,
Licensing Examiner,
RV
0
z.
Action on Previous
Ins ection Findin s
MC 92701
Closed
Follow-u
Item
91-15-01
.
Licensee'
S stem for Authorizin
and
Issuin
PARs Caused
Some Dela
and Confusion.
An exercise
weakness
in the 1991 Annual Exercise (Inspection
Report 91-15)
indicated that the licensee's
system for making protective action
recommendations
(PARs),
as demonstrated
in that exercise,
appeared
to be
excessively
complicated
and could cause
delay in the issuance
of PARs
based
on plant conditions.
The licensee
system for transmitting
to
the County decision
makers
was not clearly specified
by procedure
and the
licensee
did not follow procedural
requirements
governing the
documentation of PARs.
The item was reviewed during this exercise at the
Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). It was concluded that the revised
procedure,
EP RB-10 (Protective Actions Recommendations),
dated
May 27,
1992, with proper implementation
as observed
during this exercise,
demonstrated
that the open item can
be closed.
3.
Exercise
Plannin
res onsibilit
scenario/ob
ectives
develo ment
control of scenario
The licensee's
corporate
Emergency
Preparedness
(EP) in conjunction with
the
EP staff has the overall responsibility for developing,
conducting
and evaluating the annual
emergency
preparedness
exercise.
The
corporate
EP staff developed
the scenario
and with the assistance
of
licensee staff from other organizations
possessing
appropriate
expertise
(e.g.
reactor
operations,
health physics, security,
maintenance,
etc.).
In an effort to maintain strict security over the scenario,
individuals
who had been involved in the exercise
scenario
development
were not
participants in the exercise.
The objectives
were developed in concert
with the offsite agencies.
NRC Region
V was provided
an opportunity to
comment
on the proposed
scenario
and objectives.
The complete exercise
document included objectives
and guidelines,
exercise
scenario
and
necessary
messages
and data (plant parameters
and radiological
information).
The exercise
document
was tightly controlled before the
exercise.
Advance copies of the exercise
document
were provided to the
NRC evaluators
and other persons
having
a specific need.
The players did
not have access
to the exercise
document or information on scenario
events.
This exercise
was intended to meet the requirements
of IV.F 2 of
Appendix
E to 10 CFR Part 50.
4
Exercise
Scenario
i
The exercise
objectives
and scenario
were evaluated
by the
NRC and
considered
appropriate
as
a method to demonstrate
Pacific Gas
and Electric
Company's capabilities to respond to an emergency in accordance
with their
Emergency
Plan
and implementing procedures.
The July 8, 1992, scenario
represented
a logical continuation of an earlier June 3, 1992, drill
scenario involving an injured security officer.
The officer had been
found unconscious,
apparently
as
a result of a fall. Subsequent
security
actions to allow expeditious entry of offsite medical aid and transport
of the victim to the hospital
was the nature of the earlier drill.
The exercise
scenario started with an event classified
as
an Unusual
Event
(UE) and ultimately escalated
to a General
Emergency
(GE) classification.
The opening event in the exercise
involved a report to the control
room by
security of the possible "planting of an electronic device" in a vital
area of the plant.
The information had been provided by a security
officer who had been physically attacked in that area of the plant when
noting two individuals placing the device.
This led to classification
and
declaration of an Unusual
Event and subsequently
to declaration of an
Alert.
During the next few hours, additional threat information was
received
and searches
were conducted
which revealed the location of two
devices
which were apparently explosives
or bombs.
Mith the detonation
just before
noon of a third device which had been placed
on the reactor
head, plant conditions
degraded
rapidly and
a release
of radiation to the
atmosphere
was detected.
This led to declaration of a Site Area Emergency
and subsequently
to the declaration of a General
Emergency.
The remainder
of the exercise
consisted of attempting to stop the radiological release,
stabilizing or controlling plant conditions,
and disarming the
known bombs
while searching
the remainder of the plant to insure
no others existed.
Federal
Observers
Five
NRC inspectors
evaluated
the licensee's
response
to the scenario.
Inspectors
were stationed in the (simulator)
CR, Technical
Support Center
(TSC), Operational
Support Center
(OSC),
and in the
EOF.
An inspector in
the
OSC also accompanied
repair/monitoring teams.
Exercise Observations
82301
The following observations,
as appropriate,
are intended to be suggestions
for improving the emergency
preparedness
program.
All exercise
times
and
other times indicated in this report are Pacific Daylight Time (PDT).
Control Room/Simulator
The following aspects
of CR operations
were observed
during the exercise:
detection
and classification of emergency
events, notification, frequent
use of emergency
procedures,
and innovative attempts to mitigate the
accident.
The inspectors
observed
the operators,
and the facility controllers, in
the plant referenced
simulator.
The operators
were a two unit shift crew.
The inspectors directly observed
actions taken,
procedures utilized,
and
used follow-up questioning.
The exercise
began at 8:30 a.m.
and the
simulator was in an interactive
mode until 12:19 p.m. At this time the
simulator
was run from a tape
and operator interaction
was prohibited.
The
scenario
was
an initial bomb threat
and subsequent
bomb discovery.
At
ll:57 a.m.
a bomb explosion
caused
a reactor trip and safety injection due
to a small break loss of coolant.
The explosion disabled the
Power
Range
(PR), Intermediate
Range (IR), and Source
Range
(SR) Nuclear Instruments
(NIs). The explosion also disabled the Digital Rod Position
Instrumentation
(DRPI) and the core exit thermocouples.
The operators effectively implemented the emergency plan.
However, the
inspectors
noted the following areas
of concern:
Operators
did not properly verify that the reactor
was shutdown after
the reactor trip. Despite the clearly indicated failure of the
PR,
IR, and
SRNIs and of DRPI Step
1 of E-O, "Reactor Trip or Safety
Injection," was verified completed satisfactorily by the crew.
Subsequent
questioning
revealed
the operators
responsible for this
verification believed the NIs and
DRPI were operable
dur ing the
performance of step
1.
Step
1 involved verifying power was
decreasing
by using these
NIs, all rods are bottomed
by using DRPI,
and reactor trip breakers
were open.
DRPI was flashing indicating
failure and all NIs were pegged
low indicating failure.
breakers
were satisfactorily verified open.
Seventeen
minutes after
the trip the
SRNI was reported failed, to the Senior Control
Room
Operator
(SCO),
and 19 minutes after the trip the
DRPI was reported
failed to the
SCO.
In this instance
the operators
did not properly
verify the reactor
was shutdown.
At times, operators
demonstrated
ineffective communication
because
some orders
and information were not acknowledged.
This was
particularly evident during coordination
between the Control Operator
(CO) and Assistant
CO as
Feed
Bypass Valves were placed in Auto and
in reports to the
SCO during implementation of the Emergency
Procedures.
Operators
did not follow procedure in two instances.
Although
verbatim compliance
was not required, in these
instances
the
inspector
concluded that the operators
did not comply with the
intent of the procedures.
Step 6.2. 14 of OP-L4, "Normal Operation
at Power," directed
the operators
to place the Feedwater
Bypass
Valves in auto at 30X power during a downpower.
Contrary to this the
operators
placed the Feedwater
Bypass Valves in Auto at 100K power.
Also a note in OP-L4 directed the operators to borate
as necessary
to
maintain Axial Flux Difference
(AFD) within the target
band during a
Contrary to this the operators
maintained
AFD within the
Tech Spec Limits, but not the target band, during the downpower.
During subsequent
questioning the facility agreed to evaluate
the
need for changing step 6.2. 14 of OP-L4 to match the actual operation
of the simulator
and the plant.
Operators failed to refer to all Annunciator Response
Procedures
(ARPs) during the exercise.
Out of 5 Annunciators received prior to
the reactor trip when it would have been appropriate to refer to the
ARPs,
ARPs were referred to once.
This did not effect plant status.
Facility controllers did not note or comment
on the
NRC inspector
concerns
mentioned
above during the critique conducted
immediately after the
exercise.
The inspectors
also noted that the simulator was not interactive for
approximately
90 X of the time the crew was utilizing the Emergency
Procedures.
This interfered with the inspectors
and the licensee
controllers'bility to evaluate
the crew's ability to implement the
emergency
procedures.
The simulator performed plant manipulations
as
programmed while the crew was prompted by the controllers
as to the
context of the plant changes.
The crew was not required to demonstrate
the
abilities to accomplish these
changes
during this period of time.
The inspectors
concluded that the operators effectively implemented the
emergency
plan based
on the limited observation that the simulator
mode of
operation provided.
However, the inspectors
also concluded that the
failure of the crew to properly verify the reactor
was shutdown
was of
major concern.
The other concerns identified above were of minor concern.
(92-15-01)
The problem regarding the use of a taped scenario for control
room actions
was identified by the team
as
an apparent
weakness
in scenario
implementation
and development.
NRC inspection procedure
82301
(Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors)
indicates that inspectors
will assess
the performance of the control
room staff as it conducts
the
task of "analysis of plant conditions
and corrective actions."
This could
not be appropriately
observed
during the most critical times of the
exercise (after the explosion leading to a General
Emergency)
since
reactor
control activity was taped
and fed to the staff rather than their
responding to the event in their normal manner.
This could result in an
inability for the licensee
and the
NRC to evaluate
the exercise
due. to
lack of observation opportunity.
Future scenerio activity will be
reviewed by
NRC to insure that ability of the control
room staff to
respond to degrading plan conditions is appropriate to effectively
implement the site emergency plan and to respond to plant
conditions, to
mitigate the event in progress,
and coordinate with other emergency
response facilities.
(92-15-02)
Technical
Su
ort Center
The inspection
team observed
and evaluated
the Technical
Support Center
(TSC) Staff as they responded
to the simulated
emergency.
The activities
evaluated
included
TSC activation,
assignment of priorities and
responsibilities,
management
and control, accident
assessment
and
classification,
dose
assessment
protective action recommendations,
and
providing support to the other
emergency
response facilities as requested.
The inspectors
noted that the
TSC was activated within approximately
30
minutes of the notification for staffing the
TSC.
Transfer of
responsibilities
from the control
room (CR) was prompt, yet precise.
The
TSC staff was frequently briefed of plant status at regular intervals by
the Emergency Coordinator.
Specific observations
of the inspector
are
note below:
The emergency siren cannot
be heard in the two north rooms in the
TSC.
There was confusion
when going to a General
Emergency
(GE) due to the
long sequence
of "and" paragraphs
in EPIP
G. 1 Section III.3.
They
then classified the
GE using Section G.2 instead.
Forms were sent
by facsimile to the
NRC Headquarters
Operations
Officer (HOO) which did not indicate that
a DRILL was in progress.
(This was recognized
by the licensee
during their critique.)
Late in the scenario
valves were operated
which had not been directed
by the
CR or by the
TSC resulting in confusion
as to who, why, or
when valve operation
was authorized.
(This was recognized
by the
licensee
during their critique.)
At about 1: 15 p.m., the wrong stability class
was
used in the dose
calculation resulting in an erroneous
low dose projections.
(This was
recognized
by the
NRC Site team and the licensee at the time.
The
licensee at their critique identified this as
a possible
software
problem.)
A strength
was apparent in the
TSC wherein dose
assessment
and projection
was performed in an exemplary
and professional
manner.
9.
0 erational
Su
ort Center
Three
NRC inspectors
observed activities conducted
by the
OSC;
one located
full time at the
OSC location on the turbine deck,
one observing security
scenario activity, and one that accompanied field teams
dispatched
from
the
OSC.
The inspection
team observed
and evaluated
the
OSC staff as they performed
tasks in response
to the exercise.
These tasks
included activation of the
OSC, assembly of need personnel,
assignment of priorities, repair team
assembly,
team briefings, protective action decision making, periodic
notifications of OSC staff, documentation
of activities,
communications,
and interaction with other licensee
emergency organizations.
The licensee
identified early response
by overzealous
players,
which was traced to a
misinterpreted
control
room announcement
concerning start of the annual
exercise.
The inspector s noted that the
OSC was activated within approximately
40
minutes
and in accordance
with licensee
Emergency
Plan Implementing
Procedure
EP EF-2, "Activation and Operation of the Operational
Support
Center."
The
OSC Emergency
Maintenance
Coordinator provided periodic
briefings to the
OSC staff concerning plant status.
The
OSC staff was
generally proactive in their assessments
and anticipation of further
actions,
such as:
Recognizing that
a
LOCA was in progress
and electing to initiate Post
Accident Sampling system star tup.
The dispatching of HP technicians with fire fighting teams that were
on standby in various areas
of the plant early on in the scenario.
Having data transcribers
assigned
to the Emergency
Maintenance
Coordinator
and Site Radiation Protection Coordinator.
Dispatching of teams
was very well controlled, but at least
one team left
the
OSC without completing all necessary
paper work and authorizations.
This was recognized
by OSC personnel
and the team was stopped at the
access
control.
The subject
team
had been properly briefed prior to their
departure.
The inspectors
noted that the maintenance
personnel
assembly
and staging
facilities on the turbine deck were not equipped to receive control
room
announcements.
Someone
from the
OSC would periodically telephone
the
facility and brief whomever answered
the phone
on current plant/accident
status.
Announcements
made by the control
room over the plant/public
address
system were unintelligible throughout the turbine deck area.
The inspectors
noted that
OSC dispatched repair teams
expended
an
excessive
amount of time procuring radiological
survey equipment, tools,
protective clothing,
and respiratory protection.
Also, the radiological
controls for several
dispatched
teams far exceeded
what was
needed to
effectively carry out their mission in a safe
and timely manner.
The
limiting of personnel
to less
than 750 millirem exposure
could have
severely cut short any evaluation or repair efforts.
Concurrent with the
RCV-12 two man repair team (a
RP technician
and equipment operator)
efforts, approximately
50 Curies
per
second
were being released
to the
environs around the plant,
and downwind dose rates
exceeded
1,400 millirem
per hour; yet, personnel
were restricted to approximately
4 minutes stay
time at the valve (estimated
dose rate of 10 rem per hour).
This was
due
to the 750 millirem exposure limitation.
The RCV-12 team also spent
approximately
45 minutes obtaining equipment
and dressing out in
protective clothing to so they could enter the
RCV"12 area.
The inspectors felt that establishment
of a forward control point (in the
hallway near
RCV-12) and staffing of the repair team with a systems
engineer
and
a mechanical
maintenance
worker that were familiar with the
subject valve should
have
been considered
since it was imperative that
this valve be closed in a timely manner.
The following equipment should
have
been considered
during the initial planning for the
RCV-12 repair
operation
and would have greatly assisted
any further activities
concerning
RCV-12, if the initial plan failed (which it did):
Portable
two way communication.
Remote alarming dose rate monitoring equipment for placement at the
" valve and nearby staging area.
Remote video camera
and monitor for evaluation of the valve and
subsequent
repair.
Portable
continuous airborne radioactivity monitoring equipment.
Portable tool kits and
a small oxygen/acetylene
cutting setup.
0
The inspectors
noted that the controller sent with the
RCV-12 repair team
could not provide accurate
dose rates for the area around
RCV-12.
The
team felt that with a 50 Curie per second
release
rate the ambient
dose
rates at RCV-12 would have
been at least
a magnitude higher than the 300
millirem per hour dose rate provided by the controller to the players.
The licensee's
critique of OSC operations
by the players
and the
controllers
was satisfactory.
Some minor findings not observed
by the
inspectors
were identified by the licensee.
The inspection
team concluded that the
OSC staff responded satisfactorily
in their tasks
and in accordance
with their
EP implementing procedures
during the exercise.
However, the team felt that the licensee
could have
accomplished
the
RCV-12 task in a more efficient and timely manner while
still maintaining
a sufficient degree of radiological control considering
the in-plant and near site radiological conditions.
Emer enc
0 erations Facilit
The following EOF operations
were observed:
activation; functional
capabilities;
interface with offsite officials; event classification;
dose
assessment;
discussion of recovery
and reentry;
and the formulation of
protective action recommendations.
The following are
NRC observations
of
EOF activities.
The
EOF is collocated with the county Emergency Operations
Center
(EOC)
approximately ll miles from the plant site.
The first floor is the
EOC as
well as the
San Luis Obispo County Sheriff's watch commander
and dispatch
center.
The facility and equipment
appeared
well designed to serve
as the
interface
between the public, county and licensee.
It appeared
well
equipped with extensive
telephones,
computers
and radios, facsimile and
copying machines.
The layout of the facility permits close coordination
with the county in making and implementing protective action
recommendations
and communicating the latest plant conditions.
The inspector
observed
the interim activation of the
which occurred
within one hour of the declaration of the Alert.
The
EOF was activated
with the permanent staff at ll:51 AM.
The turnover and transfer of
control
was in accordance
with procedures.
The Recovery Manager
(RM) made the classification of the General
Emergency
in a timely manner.
He received appropriate
decision making information
from the Unified Dose Assessment
Center
(UDAC) and his engineering staff.
The
RM provided the status of the plant to the staff on a timely basis.
Information flow was generally good;
however,
several
erroneous
data
points were noted in some of the plant forms.
Some of these
numbers
were
identified by the licensee
during the facility critique.
The
RM generally demonstrated
good
command
and control, however,
the
inspector
noted
on one occasion that the
UDAC interface
was pushing for
PARs prior to the declaration of the General
Emergency which could have
delayed the declaration of the
GE under different circumstances
or
command.
In the area of dose
assessment,
the use of actual inplant measurements
and
field team measurements
to refine dose projections
was very well done.
Several critiques were held at the
EOF.
Individual critiques were held by
engineering
and the
UDAC.
The
RM then conducted
a combined critique.
Discussions
on recovery
and reentry were held at the end of the exercise.
Discussion
was not detailed:
however, it raised
some
good guidance
on the
direction the licensee
would need to follow once the plant was stabilized.
Securit
Scenario
An initial call
on June 8, 1992, to the Security Shift Supervisor
(SSS)
indicated that the officer had regained
consciousness
and
had related the
circumstances
of his "accident".
The officer reported that he had been
attacked
by two contract workers
who appeared
to be placing an explosive
device.
The
SSS correctly considered this
a credible
bomb threat which
initiated the declaration of an unusual
event.
Subsequent
discovery of
the "mock" explosive device,
discovery of a second device,
and the
simulated explosion of a third (which breached
the pressure
vessel,
released
fission products
and caused
a containment isolation valve to fail
open)
prompted
a progression
of the drill scenario ultimately to a general
emergency.
Security actions
and decisions
appeared
appropriate for the sequence
of
events
depicted
by the scenario.
Personnel
onsite accountability was
simulated although accountability sheets for each
assembly
area
were
generated.
Upon discovery of the first explosive device, the initial search
activities were centered
on the emergency
response facilities (the Control
Room/simulator,
the Operations
Support Center
(OSC) and the Technical
Support Center)
and
a further search of the area where the first device
had been found.
The nature of the equipment potentially affected
by the
surrogate
explosive prompted the early evacuation of major areas of the
auxiliary building which precluded further search of several vital areas.
The security organization's
request of operations
to identify crucial
vital areas for priority search is seen
as
a positive action.
However,
limited players
dedicated to the exercise
resulted in several
simulated
security actions.
Some confusion in logging of individual "simulated"
searches
leaves
uncertain the specific time that certain vital areas
not
affected
by the evacuation
were searched.
The apparent late "verification
of operability" had
no impact on the scenario
presented
and did not
compromise the subsequent
implementation of the emergency plan.
Increased staffing for those positions significantly affected
by the
exercise
scenario to allow demonstration
of security actions
was
identified as
an improvement item.
However,
an actual security emergency
would have resulted in the immediate closing of several
nonessential
security operations.
This would have provided ample security resources
to
expeditiously search
remaining vital areas
(1) to identify other safety
equipment potentially at risk or (2) to verify the uncompromised condition
of other
systems.
10
From a security standpoint,
sorties into the plant, whether for search
or
bomb disposal,
could have benefitted
from a security liaison person in the
OSC from which all such entries rightly departed.
This was identified as
an improvement item.
For much of the drill, the Security Shift Supervisor's
desk was
a "hotbed"
of activity.
Every action from personnel
accountability, to arranging for
prompt access
of FBI support
and including logistic planning for future
relief personnel
(in addition to direct scenario activities),
appeared
to
be centered at that one location.
Emergency planning to allow more
division of responsibilities
(perhaps to include
a security
advisor/coordinator
at the Emergency Operations Facility) was also
identified as
an improvement item.
In summary, three suggestions
were offered to the licensee for possible
improvement:
Increased staffing for those security activities significantly
affected
by the exercise
scenario
may be needed to demonstrate
security capability.
Sorties into the plant, whether for search
or bomb disposal,
could
have benefitted
from a security liaison person in the Operational
Support Center.
Emergency planning should provide for more division of
responsibilities
(perhaps to include a security advisor/coordinator
at the Emergency Operations Facility).
12.
Licensee Criti ues
A series of exercise critiques
was conducted
by the licensee
upon
completion of the exercise.
First,
a facility critique was conducted at
each
emergency
response facility with players
and controllers,
immediately
following the exercise.
These critiques were evaluated
by the
NRC
inspectors
as:
Satisfactory
and appropriate
to the exercise at the TSC,
OSC and the
EOF.
Not thorough at the Control
Room (Simulator), in that none of the
shortcomings
noticed by the
NRC inspector
were discussed.
The security scenario activities critique was held the day following the
exercise
and was considered
comprehensive
and appropriate.
The day following the exercise,
a general
player and controller critique
was conducted at the site to review the major items surfaced at the
facility critiques.
On July 10, 1992,
a formal corporate critique was
conducted at the
PG8E Community Center to cover significant exercise
problems,
strengths
and observations.
The licensee
had noted several
of
the items also identified by the
NRC observers,
as well as several
other
exercise strengths
and areas for improvement.
11
13.
Review of Actual Unusual
Event
~
~
Two unusual
events
(UEs)
had been reported to the
NRC Headquarters
Operations Officer (HOO) since the last routine emergency
preparedness
inspection at the site.
On June
20, 1992, the licensee
informed the
NRC Headquarters
Operations Officer (HOO) via the
NRC Emergency Notification System
(ENS) that
a
UE had been declared at
DCPP at 9:55 p.m.
because
between
100 and 200 gallons of sulfuric acid was spilled during
condensate
bed demineralizer regeneration.
No one
was injured in the
incident.
The Unusual
Event was terminated at 2: 10 a.m.,
June 21,
1992,
when general
access
was restored to the turbine building (NRC
b.
On June
28, 1992, the licensee
informed the
NRC Headquarters
Operations Officer via the
ENS that a
UE had been declared at the
DCPP at 5:24 a.m.
as
a result of an earthquake.
At approximately
4:59 a.m., the earthquake
had been felt in the control
room by
operators.
Seismic alarms
had activated.
The Unusual
Event was
terminated at 9:25 a.m. after performing system walk downs
and
finding no evidence of damage or problems
as
a result of the
(NRC
In both of the above events,
a review of the circumstances
and
documentation pertaining thereto indicated that the event classifications
appeared
appropriate
and that timely initial and follow-up notifications
were made to the county, state
and the
NRC in accordance
with approved
procedures.
14.
Exit Interview
An exit interview was held on July 10, 1992, to discuss
the preliminary
NRC findings.
The licensee
wa's informed that no deficiencies
or
violations of NRC requirements
were identified during the inspection.
Items discussed
are summarized in Sections
2 and
7 through
12 of this
report.