ML16341F424
| ML16341F424 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1989 |
| From: | Huey F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341F425 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-89-22, 50-323-89-22, NUDOCS 8912040091 | |
| Download: ML16341F424 (26) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1989022
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION
V
Report
No. 50-275/89-22
and 50-323/89-22
License
Nos.
DPR-80 and
Licensee:
Pacific
Gas
and Electric Company
77 Beale Street
Room 1451
San Francisco,
California 94106
Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon
Power Plant, Units
1 and
2
Inspection at:
PGSE General Offices,
San Francisco,
Cygna Corporation,
Walnut Creek, California
Inspection
Conducted:
August
21 - October
16,
1989
Inspectors:
F.
R.
Huey, Chief, Engineering Section
, R.
P. McIntyre,
NRR, Vendor Inspection
Branch
S.
M. Matthews~
NRR, Vendor Inspection
Branch
Approved by:
~Summa r:
Uey
1 e
ng 1
ectl OIl
a/zo It
ate
lgne
Inspection
During the Period of August
21 through October
16,
1989
(Report No. 50-275/89-22
and 50-323/89-22)
Areas
Ins ected:
One inspector
from Region
V and two inspectors
from the
Office of Nuc ear Reactor Regulation
conducted
a special
inspection to review
licensee
actions in response
to significant observed deficiencies
in the
quality assurance
program,
as it relates
to auditing of suppliers of safety
related
equipment.
Results
and General
Conclusions:
The inspectors
reached
the following general
conclusions
during this
inspection:
1.
The licensee's
approach for determining the extent of deficiencies
associated
with contractor performed supplier audits
appeared
to be
acceptable.
However, the inspectors
noted that
PGSE performed
audits also appeared
to be subject to the
same types of deficiencies
as those
noted for contractor performed audits.
Accordingly, the
inspectors
requested
that the licensee
expand the scope of their
evaluation to also consider
PGSE performed audits
and revise their
justification for continued operation
(JCO),
as necessary.
0
891117
ADOCK
Q
2.
The licensee's
analysis,
addressing
parts that have
been supplied
from
vendors with inadequate
audits
and installed in the plant,
appeared
to be
acceptable
subject to specific
comments
which are being resolved
by the
licensee.
3.
The licensee's
root cause
process,
for determining the cause
and
corrective actions for the observed
vendor quality assurance
program
deficiencies,
although not yet complete, identified significant findings
involving a -serious
breakdown of management
control
and overview within
the
PG8E Ouality Assurance
Department
and inadequate
PGSE management of
the supplier audit contract with Cygna.
This resulted in numerous audits
which were inadequate
in both scope
and content to meet
Appendix
B requirements.
Summar
of Violations or Deviations:
Several
deficiencies identified during this inspection
appear to involve
violations of NRC requirements
and will be the subject of separate
correspondence,
pending completion of the licensee
and
NRC review of this
matter.
0 en Items
Summar
None
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
PGSE
- J. Shiffer, Vice President,
Nuclear
Power Generation
- W. Kaefer, Assistant to Vice President,
NPG
- S. Skidmore, Quality Assurance
Manager
- R. Locke, Corporate Attor ney
- M. Tressler,
Ehgineering
Manager
- B. Lew, Licensing Manager
CYGNA Ener
Services
Richard Stuart,
President
and
Mike Schulman,
Executive Vice President
Bob Paedon,
Management
Services
Manager.
Tom Pehl, Quality Assurance
Manager
+Attended the Exit Meeting on August 25,
1989.
Backcaround
On July 25, 1989, the licensee
requested
a meeting with Region
V to
address
specific concerns
involving inadequacies
in
PGSE quality
assurance
controls over the procurement of equipment for safety related
use at Diablo Canyon.
In particular,
the licensee
advised that in
several significant instances,
PGSE contracted
audits of safety related
equipment suppliers
appeared
to be inadequate,
resulting in potentially
unqualified suppliers
being included
on the licensee Qualified Supplier
List (QSL).
During the meeting,
the licensee identified
a timetable for
specific actions to investigate this concern
and to implement warranted
corrective actions.
On July 27,
1989,
Region
V issued
a
10 CFR 50.54(f) letter to the
licensee,
requesting that, in light of the deficiencies
described
during
the July 25 meeting,
the licensee
provide the following:
l.
A justification for continued operation
(JCO) of the Diablo Canyon
facilities.
2.
3.
Specific plans
and schedules
to fully assess
the adequacy of the
vendor audit and quality assurance
program in general.
A determination of reportability and generic applicability of the
identified problems.
The'icensee
submitted
a preliminary response
to the
NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f)
letter on August 7,
1989.
The
PGSE letter addressed
each of the above
requested
topics.
0
2
3.
Scope of Inspection
Following a review of the August
7 licensee letter,
Region
V initiated
an inspection to assess
the adequacy of PG&E 'identified actions.
The
primary focus of this inspection
was threefold:
a. 'valuate
the adequacy of PG&E's determination of the extent of
problems with safety related
equipment suppliers.
Ensure that
had focused their JCO attention in the proper areas.
b.
Evaluate
the adequacy of the'G&E JCO process.
Ensure that the
scope of the
JCO covered all suspect- components
and that
JCO
assumptions
and conclusions
were valid.
c.
Evaluate
the adequacy of the
PG&E root cause
process.
Ensure that
PG&E had properly defined the deficiencies
in the
OA organization
which allowed problems
(recognized
and unrecognized)
with contracted
vendor audits to go uncorrected for such
a lengthy period of time.
Ensure that
PG&E was taking effective corrective actions to preclude
recurrence
of these
problems.
'.
Management
Summary
The inspection
team concluded
the following with respect
to each of the
above inspection topics:
- ~
a.
Evaluation of the adequacy of PG&E's determination of the extent of
problems with safety related
equipment suppliers.
( 1)
The recently developed
PG&E progra'm for evaluating
the adequacy
of contracted
audits of vendors
(OANO T-1) appears
to be well
defined
and effective.
(2)
The basis for PG&E acceptance
(without further review) of 80
vendors, qualified by contractor audits,
was that these
vendors
had also
been audited
by
PG&E personnel.
NRC review-of a
sample of these
PG&E audits indicated that the
PG&E audits
included deficiencies similar to those involved with the
contractor audits.
On this basis,
PG&E was requested
to review
PG&E performed
audits
and de'termine whether
JCO 89-18 required revision to
address
additional
suspect
vendors.
The
NRC inspectors
noted
that the overview and supervision of the review of the
performed audits should
be independent of the
gA department.
b.
Evaluation of the adequacy of the
PG&E JCO process.
(1)
The
PG&E basis for continued operation
contained
in JC0.89-18
appeared
to be valid.
(2)
The
PG&E basis for accepting sensitized
impellers in Unit 1 and
2 ASW pumps
(JCO 88-07-R1), although qualitative in nature,
appeared
to be valid.
However, the
JCO did not appear
to
0
address
other critical components
(e.g.
keys, shafts,
which are also suspect.
For example,
dated
May 26,
1988 identified
ASW pump impeller keys, provided by Bingham,
which were discovered to be carbon
instead of stainless
steel,
as required
by the purchase
order.
The licensee
was requested
to evaluate
whether
a revision to the
JCO for the
ASW pumps or
any additional
pump inspection is required.
(3)
The
PGSE basis for accepting
ASTM A-325 bolts in the component
cooling water
(CCW)
pump pedestal,
based
on
a visual
examination did not appear to be sufficient.
The licensee
was
requested
to conduct specific material tests
to confirm the
critical physical characteristics
of the bolting material.
Evaluation of the adequacy of the
PGRE. root cause
process.
(I)
PGSE
had not completed their root cause
investigation of the
vendor audit problems, at the time of this inspection.
Final
conclusions
in this regard will be identified later in October,
per the
PGSE action plan.
(2)
Although the
NRC inspectors
spent only a few days reviewing
vendor audit problems with PGSE personnel, it was clearly
apparent that
a serious
breakdown of management
control
and
overview existed within the
PGSE
OA Department.
Although this
problem was most apparent
in the External Auditing Division, it
may extend elsewhere
within the
OA Department.
Assessment
of
this concern
and any resultant
enforcement action will be the
subject of future inspection
and correspondence,
following
completion of the
PGSE investigation.
Specific examples of
problems
noted within the External Auditing Division included:
(a)
The
OA Manager
had isolated himself from his staff such
that
he appeared
to discourage
his staff from coming to
him with problems
and
he did not take initiative to
inquire or, solicit input from his staff.
\\
(b)
There appeared
to be
a number of concerns,
which are
currently being investigated
by the
PGRE Internal Auditing
Department,
involving failure of key supervisors
and
managers
to take appropriate corrective actions for
observed
problems.
These perceived failures appeared
to
have significantly contributed to a lack of confidence in
management
by OA staff personnel.
(c)
OA staff personnel
were noted to be reluctant to raise
observed
concerns
and problems with their super vision and,
in several
instances,
had failed to comply with OA program
requirements.
In particular,
PGSE
OA personnel
failed to
initiate corrective action
documents
(AR) associated
with
observed
inadequate
performance
by Cygna
on contracted
vendor audits.
This is not in accordance
with PGSE
procedure
(PG&E Ouality Assurance
Manual, Section
16,
Corrective Action).
Assessment
of this concern
and any
resultant
enforcement
action will be the subject of future
inspection
and correspondence,
following completion of the
PGSE investigation.
(3)
Neither
PGSE nor Cygna management
appeared
to have provided
appropriate
management
of the
PGLE vendor audit contract.
A
primary contributor to this problem involved several
revisions
to the contract over
a period of years
which resulted in a
shift of emphasis
from a "task" type effort to primarily a
"staff augmentation"
type effort.
During this period,
Cygna
provided less
and less
management
overview of vendor audit
activities, although,
by contract,
Cygna retained full quality
assurance
responsibility for the work.
Assessment
of this
concern
and any resultant
enforcement action will be the
subject of future inspection
and correspondence,
following
completion of the
PGSE investigation.
The team noted the
following specific deficiencies:
(a)
The interface
between
Cygna
and
PG8E
on vendor audit
activities
was very informal and not documented.
In
several
instances,
PGSE appeared
to have provided verbal
direction to Cygna personnel
to modify the format for
performance of audits
such that the completeness
and
effectiveness
of the audits
was diminished (e.g. reduction
in the scope of review of important check list
requirements
based
on sample selection criteria).
(b)
Cygna did not appear
to provide appropriate attention to
the quality of selected
audit personnel.
Only one of the
auditors
was
a permanent
Cygna employee,
and in one
instance,
a Cygna temporary employee
was certified to be
qualified to perform vendor audits despite his
misrepresentation
of his academic
achievements
on his
employment application.
(c)
The documentation of the training for Cygna audit
personnel
was poor.
(d)
During the last two years there
had
been essentially
no
Cygna management
review of the audits submitted
by the
Cygna auditors.
(e)
Cygna operating
procedures
appeared
to be weak with
respect to providing clear definition of specific contract
management
requirements,
especially in the areas of
specific management
overview responsibilities
and
documentation
of client interface activities.
(4)
Cygna quality assurance
oversight of PGSE vendor audit
activities appeared
to have
been
inadequate.
Specifically,
there were
no Cygna corporate audits of this area during
the last three years,
and only two superficial
reviews
that led to no significant findings.
0
(5)
Cygna did not appear
to have provided sufficient resources
in
the area of corporate quality assurance
activities
and these
activities did not appear to be effectively integrated with
operating project quality oversight activities.
In particular:
(a)
The total staff of the corporate quality assurance
department
was
one individual.
(b)
Some corporate
and operating project quality oversight
activities appeared
to be redundant
and poorly
coordinated.
(c)
Corporate
and operating project quality oversight
activities appeared
to be poorly coordinated
and were not
structured
to reveal
the types of basic
management
problems
which were involved in the current
PGSE contract
difficulties.
(6)
In comparison with similar audits
performed for other utilities
during the
same
time as the
Cygna audits for PGSE, the
Cygna
vendor audits
performed for PGSE provided insufficient
objective evidence
to support the audit conclusions.
(7)
In several
instances
(allegedly at PGSE's
verbal direction) audit
scopes
were significantly curtailed to eliminate complete
evaluation of all applicable
implementation
requirements.
5.
Specific Inspection
Findings
a 0
Adequacy of PGSE Determination of the Extent of Procurement
Deficiencies with Safety Related
Equipment Suppliers
As noted above,
by letter dated August 7, 1989,
PGSE responded
to
the
NRC's July 27,
1989, 50.54(f) letter.
This letter included
PGSE's
plan and schedule for assessing
the adequacy of the vendor
audits
conducted
by CYGNA Energy Services
(CYGNA) and the quality
assurance
(QA) program in general.
The letter also included
PGSE's
justification for continued operation of the Diablo Canyon
facilities in light of the potential deficiencies identified in
PGSE's
contracted
vendor audits,
as well as
PGSE's
determination of
reportability and the generic applicability of the identified
potential deficiencies.
PGSE conducted
an evaluation of all supplier audits during the last
three
and half years
and identified 317 audits
performed
by outside
contractors.
The review period was
based
on PGSE's triennial audit
program.
The 317 supplier audit reports
represented
a total
population of 185 suppliers.
An evaluation of the suppliers
associated
with these
audits
was performed to determine
the effect
0
on plant operation.
The licensee
determined that these
185
suppliers
were considered
acceptable
based
upon various
classifications
such as:
~0uantit
60
21
80
Basis
No safety-related
purchase
order audits.
Contracted
audits
reviewed
and found
acceptable
Additional audits of these suppliers
were
performed
by
PG&E personnel
during the time
frame.
PG&E personnel
participated-
i.n the
contracted audit; or an audit followup was
performed
by
PG&E personnel.
PG&E stated
they were planning to review all 317 contracted
audits'or
technical
content
and adequacy.
As of the
NRC exit meeting
on
- August 25,
PG&E had reviewed approximately half of these audits.
- A major goal of this inspection
was to determine
the adequacy of
PG&E's evaluation of contracted
vendor audits.
'This included
a
review of the process
being used to conduct the evaluation.
On
'August 21,
1989,
PG&E implemented. Revision
0 of'emporary
Work
Instruction
OAMO T-1, "Evaluation of Adequacy of Contracted Audits
of Vendors."
The scope of OAMO T-1 was to provide the guidelines
for performing the adequacy
evaluation of the audit and reports of
the audits
performed
and supervised
by contracted
personnel
of
vendors listed on the
OSL.
The initial evaluations
are performed
by'
Review Team and then the
final assessment
is performed
by the Review Committee to determine
adequacy
and completeness
of the audit reports
and subsequent
impact
on the
OSL.
Both the Review Team and the Review Committee are
selected
by the
OA Manager.
The Review Team and the Review
Committee representatives
are looking at the audits to determine,
in
their judgement,
whether the contracted audit team did what it was
expected
to do, based
on the applicable specification
and documented
objective evidence
in the audit report.
Any problems identified during the evaluation
process
are placed in
one of six results categories
(such
as specifications
invoked on the
purchase
order)
and then ultimately determin'ed to be either
satisfactory or unsatisfactory.
The Review Team evaluations,
the
results,
and the Review Committee assessments
are all documented
on
a two page Audit Review Checklist.
Based
upon the vendor audits
which had
been reviewed
as of the time of the inspection,
stated that about
one third of the contracted
audits
were being
categorized
as unsatisfactory.
For these audits,
OSL impact is
evaluated
and follow-up action is determined.
"
The
NRC review of a sample of these evaluations
of contracted
audits
concluded that the
PG&E program
(OAMO T-1) appeared
to be well '
defined
and that the evaluations/assessments
documented
on the Audit
Review Checklist
as part of this process
appeared
to be aggressive
and effective in identifying inadequate
or incomplete audits.
The
inspector's
conclusion after reviewing
a sample of vendor audits
performed
by CYGNA was that in several
cases
the scope of some
. audits
was too narrow to fully determine
the effectiveness
of vendor
implementation of quality assurance
programs.
Also, the
documentation of the objective evidence
which would verify this
effectiveness,
was also lacking in many cases.
Adequacy of Licensee Justification for Continued Operation
The August
7
PGSE letter addresses
two separate
JCOs .associated
with the recently identified inadequate
audits of safety related
equipment suppliers.'he
need for a
JCO was not based solely on the
identification of inadequate
auditing of a supplier, if the licensee
could demonstrate
objective evidence
through other means
(e;g.
successful
reaudit of a supplier by
PGSE or by another nuclear
utility).
The two
PGRE
JCOs involved Sulzer
Bingham
(JCO 88-07 ),
Pacific
Pump,
ITT Barton, Parker Metal Bellows, Dresser
Industries
and Pacific Scientific Company
(JCO 89-18).
JCO 88-07
was issued in response
to a previously observed
component deficiency
(excessive
impeller corrosion
due to improper heat treatment).
JCO
89-18 was
issued in response
to specific program deficiencies
noted
during the reaudit of suppliers
who had received particularly
inadequate
qualifi,cation audits.
The licensee
JCOs
were reviewed
by
the inspectors
and were considered
to be satisfactory subject to the
following concerns:
( I)
The
PGSE basis for accepting
sensitized
impellers in Unit
1 and
2
ASW pumps
(JCO 88-07-R1), although qualitative in nature,
appeared
to be valid.
However, the
JCO did not appear to
address
other critical components
(e.g.
keys, shafts,
which are also suspect.
For example,
dated
May 26,
1988, identified
ASW pump impeller keys, provided by Bingham,.
which were discovered
to be carbon instead of stainless
steel,
as required
by the purchase
order.
The licensee
was requested
to evaluate
whether
a revision to the
JCO for the
ASW pumps or
any additional
pump inspection is required.
(2)
The
PGSE basis for accepting
ASTM A-325 bolts in the component
cooling water
(CCW)
pump pedestal
(JCO 88-07-Rl), based
on a
visual examination,
did not appear to be sufficient.
The
licensee
was requested
to conduct specific material tests to
confirm the critical physical characteristics
of the bolting
material.
Interviews of Ouality Assurance
Personnel
to Evaluate
Licensee
Root
Cause
and Corrective Actions
The inspectors
interviewed ten (10) members of the
PGSE Ouality
Assurance
department staff involved in the external auditing
program.
The interviews
encompassed
Engineers
and Auditors,
Supervisors,
Senior Engineer, Director of Auditing, and the Manager
of the guality Assurance
Department.
Present
during these
interviews
were current staff and individuals who previously held key positions
in the External Auditing Section.,
These interviews depicted
the
External Auditing Section
as having low morale, with a working
environment in which no one,
except the Director of Auditing, had
access
to the Manager of the guality Assurance
Department.
From
these
interviews, it was determined that the concerns
regarding
the
adequacy
and completeness
of the
CYGNA performed audits
were first
identified in the latter part of 1987.
These
concerns
were raised
at the engineer
and auditor level
and were discussed
on numerous
occasions
among the Supervisors
and Senior Engineers
and repeatedly
brought to the attention of the Director of Auditing.
The low
morale
was
due in part to the perception that, although these
concerns
were widely known and discussed
at the Senior Engineer
level
and below, the Director of Auditing was not taking adequate
corrective action with CYGNA.
An Action Request
(AR), which is the
document
by which personnel
report problems,
request
assistance,
and
implement changes,
as described
in guality Assurance
Procedure,
gAP-15.A, was not initiated by anyone.
Additionally, the inspectors
interviewed four (4) members of the
Management
Services
Division of CYGNA directly involved with the
vendor audits
performed for PGIIE.
These interviews consistently
revealed that Until July 7,
1989,
PGSE expressed
no concerns
to
CYGNA staff regarding the'dequacy
and completeness
of the vendor
audits.
Prior to July 7, 1989,
PGIIE had offered to
CYGNA only
editorial
and typographical
comments to the audit reports.
CYGNA
auditors
were routinely given verbal instruction with very specific
detail
about the audit report format and content.
These verbal
instructions
came from various personnel
and organizational
levels
within the
PGIIE external
auditing group and were not documented
by
either
PGIWE or CYGNA.
These instructions often resulted in the
auditor performing and documenting
on the audit checklist
a narrow
scope audit of the vendor.
During the course of the contract,
PGIIE
co~ducted training for CYGNA auditors.
These training sessions
were
understood
by
CYGNA as instruction in the requirements
of the
PGIIE
vendor audit program.
Training sessions
were performed
as the
PGSE
audit program evolved
and
as
new acceptance
criteria were developed.
From these
interviews
and the other inspection activities,
CYGNA
appeared
to understand
that the audits
performed for
PGI%E complied
with the direction and guidance
given by
PGIWE, until the concerns
were raised
by PGIIE on July 7, 1989.
The audit reports
had always
received multiple levels of PGSE review, with approval
signatures
by
the External Auditing Section Supervisor,
Senior Engineer,
Director
of Auditing, and the Manager of the guality Assurance
Department.
Conversely,
many of the
PGIIE External Auditing staff, from the
Senior Engineer
and below,
had concerns that began in late 1987,
with the adequacy
and completeness
of CYGNA performed audits.
The
PGI%E staff had raised
these
concerns with the Director of Auditing
on several
occasions.
The Manager of the guality Assurance
9
Department indicated that
he did not know of his staff's
concerns
over the
CYGNA audits until June
1989.
d.
Review of PG&E Audits of Cygna
The inspectors
conducted
a review of the five audits that the
External Auditing Section
had performed at
CYGNA since
1986.
These
audits
were
done at Cygna's offices in Boston, Massachusetts
and
Walnut Creek, California.
These audits, generally conducted
in one
day by one or two-person audit teams,
were to verify that the
CYGNA
gA program
had
been established
and effectively implemented in
accordance
with the specifications identified in the service contract.
The audits in general
appeared
to be very cursory, especially in
their verification of CYGNA implementing procedures.
An example of
this was that no audit identified the fact that
CYGNA did not have
a
procedure for. handling nonconformances
and corrective action related
to services until the January
25, 1989, Audit No. 890345.
Another
peculiarity identified was that the October 15-16,
1986, Audit No.
862425, of the Boston office was performed
by the audit team member
who at the time of the inspection
was
a
CYGNA employee
assigned
to
the
PG&E gA Department staff in San Francisco.
This
CYGNA employee
became
a full time direct
PG&E employee
on October 31,
1986.
The
audit team leader did not perform or sign off on any of the audit
check list pages.
After reviewing the
PG&E audits of CYGNA, as well as other audits of
vendors
conducted by'he
PG&E External Auditing Section, it appeared
to the
NRC inspectors
that there
was not
a discernible difference in
the level of documented
objective evidence
between
the
CYGNA and the
PG&E audits.
This would seem to make
sense
since the
same
management
chain that reviewed
and approved
the inadequate/incomplete
CYGNA .
audits,
reviewed
and approved
the audits
performed
by PG&E;
Due to
this potential deficiency,
PG&E committed to review all vendor
audits
conducted
by
PG&E during the
same
time frame discussed
earlier,
using the
same
process
previously described
(CAMO T-l).
6.
Documents
Reviewed During the Inspection
During the inspection't
the
PG&E General
Offices and
Cygna the following
documents
were reviewed:
gA Policy, Policy Statement
2, "guality Assurance
Program," Revision July 30,
1987
gA Policy, Policy Section
16, "Corrective Action," Revision July
30,'987.
gA Policy, Policy Section
18, "Audits," Revision June
20,
1985.
10
QA Procedure,-
QAP-2.B, "Quality Assurance
Program Assessment,"
Revision June 25,
1987, Effective July 24,
1987.
QA Procedure,
QAP-15.A, "Quality Problems,"
Revision June
24,
1988,'ffective
October 1,
1988.
QA Procedure,
QAP-18.A, "Audit Program," Revision October
25,
1985,
Effective November 1, 1985.
QA Procedure,
QAP-18.B, "Audit Process,"
Revision June
24,
1988,
Effective October 1,
1988.
Quality Assurance
Department
Procedures
for Nuclear
Power Plants,
QADP-18.2, "Quality Assurance Audits," Revision 9, dated
March 10,
1987; Revision
10, dated April 1, 1988; Revision ll, dated April 25,
1988;
and Revision 12, dated October 1, 1988.
Quality Assurance
Department
Manager's Office Temporary
Work
Instruction,
QAMO T-l, "Evaluation of Adequacy of Contracted Audits
of Vendors," Revision 0, dated August 21,
1989.
Specification for Supplier's Quality Assurance
Program,
Spec.
No.
SP-A-2, Revision 4, dated
February 27,
1984.
Specification for Supplier's Certification Program,
Spec.
No.
Revision 1, dated October -10,
1986.
P
Specification for Supplier's Quality Assurance
Program,
Spec.
No.
Revision 2, dated
March 15,
1989.
Specification for Supplier's Quality Assurance
Program,
Spec.
No.
SP-D-O, Revision 6, dated July 22,
1987,
and Revision 7, dated
June
1,
1989.
Contracts for vendor audits
performed
by
CYGNA for PGSE, Contract
.No. Z37-003A-86,
No. Z37-003A-87,
No. Z37-003A-88,
and
No.
Z37-08SA-89.
CYGNA
Quality Assurance
Manual, Section
X, "Inspection,"
Revision
14
Quality Standard
Operating
Procedures,
QSOP-18.03,
"Performance of
Vendor Audits for PGSE", Revision 2, dated April 14, 1988.
CYGNA Operating Procedure,
COP No. 5.02, "Control of Instructions
and Drawings," Revision 0, dated
September
11, 1987.
CYGNA Operating
Procedure,
COP. No. 18.02, "Auditor Qualification,"
Revision 0, dated
September ll, 1987.
11
7.
Exit Meeting
An exit meeting
was held with the licensee staff on August 25, 1989,
and
a 'subsequent
followup meeting
was held in Region
V on October
16,
1989.
The specific concerns
addressed
in this report were discussed
with the
licensee
during the above meetings
and were acknowledged
by the licensee.
~