ML16341E801
| ML16341E801 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 09/13/1988 |
| From: | Fish R, Johnston K, Podolak E, Prendergast K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341E802 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-88-24, 50-323-88-22, NUDOCS 8810030219 | |
| Download: ML16341E801 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1988024
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-275/88-24
and 50-323/88-22
Docket Nos.
50-275
and 50-323
License
Nos.
and
Licensee:
Pacific Gas
and Electric Company
77 Beale Street
San Francisco,
94106
Facility:
Diablo Canyon Units 1 and
2
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site,
San Luis Obispo County, California
Inspection
Conducted:
August 22-25,
1988
Inspectors:
f>.
) i
K.
M. Prendedgast,
Emergency
Preparedness
Analyst
pi
Q
7r/<X~<<ll!. I~~uriJ
E.
Podolak,
Emergency
Preparedness
Analyst
NRC, Headquarters
fr~ K. Johnston,
Resident
Inspector
Team Member:
G. Martin, Pacific Northwest Laboratories
Approved By:
ki~J i//. ~~i>d~A
f~f R.
F. Fish, Chief
Emergency
Preparedness
Section
Date 'Signed
Date. Signed
4//~
W/Jr7
Date Signed
/j j~v
Date Signed
~Summer:
Areas Ins ected:
Announced follow-up on open items
and inspection of the
emergency
preparedness
exercise
and associated
critique.
Inspection
procedures
82301
and 92701 were covered.
Results:
Based
upon the scenario
used
and the response
of the licensee,
there
is reasonable
assurance
that in the event of an emergency
appropriate
protective measures
can
and will be taken.
No deficiencies
or violations of
NRC requirements
were identified.
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DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
"J.
Townsend,
Plant Manager
"G. Gisclon, Assistant Plant Manager,
Support Services
"W. Kaefer, Assistant to the V.P., Nuclear
Power Generation
- W. Fujimoto, Manager,
Nuclear Operations
Support
"B. Giffin, Supervising
Engineer
- E. Waage,
Senior Nuclear Generation
Engineer,
Corporate
Emergency
Planning
- W. Keyworth, Senior Power Production Engineer,
Emergency
Planning
"T. Mack, Senior Nuclear Generation
Engineer,
Health Physics
S.
Fahey-Benson,
Nuclear Generation
Engineer,
Onsite Safety
Review
J.
Hays,
Chemistry
and Radiation Protection
Foreman
~Indicates
personnel
attending the exit interview.
Action on Previous
Ins ection Findin s
(Closed)
Open Item (87-33-0l), Failure to make
a protective action
recommendation
(PAR) to local authorities at the general
emergency
classification.
This item was identified during the 1987 annual
emergency
preparedness
exercise.
During-.the. 1988 annual
exercise timely PARs were
- made to appropriate
state
and local authorities.
PARs based
upon plant
conditions
were disseminated
to appropriate
local officials at both the
site area
emergency
and the general
emergency classifications.
This item
is considered
closed.
(Closed)
Open Item (87-33-03), Failure to make
a timely PAR, based
upon
plant conditions,
to appropriate
local agencies.
Based
upon the results
of the 1988 exercise,
as stated
above, timely protective action
recommendations
based
upon plant conditions were
made to appropriate
local officials from the Technical
Support Center
(TSC) and
Emergency
Operations Facility (EOF).
This item is considered
closed.
Emerqenc
Preparedness
Exercise
Plannin
The licensee's
corporate staff has the overall responsibility for
developing,
conducting
and evaluating the annual
emergency
preparedness
exercise.
The corporate staff developed
the scenario
package with the
assistance
of appropriate plant personnel utilizing the resources
of the
simulator,
the Emergency
Assessment
Response
System
(EARs) and licensee
staff possessing
appropriate
expertise
(e. g.,reactor operations,
health
physics,
maintenance
and etc.)
In an effort to maintain strict security
over the scenario,
individuals who had been involved in the scenario
preparation
were not participants
in the exercise.
The corporate staff
established
the exercise objectives.
NRC Region
V and the Federal
Emergency
Management
Agency (FEMA), Region IX, were provided
an
opportunity to comment
on the proposed objectives.
The exercise
document
included the objectives
and guidelines,
exercise
scenario,
messages
used
during the exercise, initial and subsequent
plant parameters,
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meteorological
and radiological data, controller and evaluator
instructions,
and critique worksheets.
The exercise
document
was tightly
controlled before the exercise.
Advance copies of the exercise
document
were provided to the
NRC evaluators
and other persons
having a specific
need to review/examine it.
The players did not have access
to the
exercise
document or information on scenario
events.
The exercise
was
intended to meet the requirements
of IV.F.2 of Appendix
E to 10 CFR Part 50.
4.
Exercise Scenario
The exercise
scenario
started with an event classified
as
an alert and
ultimately escalated
to a general
emergency classification.
The
initiating condition 'for the alert was
a loss of both trains of the
residual
heat
removal
system.
A site area
emergency
was declared for the
occurrence
of a steam generator
tube rupture in conjunction with a loss
of condenser
vacuum.
A general
emergency,
the most severe
emergency
classification,
was declared
upon the occurrence
of significant fuel
damage with a direct release
pathway to the atmosphere.
5.
Federal
Evaluators
Five
NRC inspectors
evaluated
the licensee's
response
to the scenario.
Inspectors
were stationed
in the Control
Room (simulator),
TSC,
Operations
Support Center
(OSC),
and in the
EOF.
The
NRC inspectors
in
the
OSC also
accompanied
repair/monitoring
teams
t'o evaluate their
performance
in responding. to the scenario.
FEMA, RIX did not evaluate
the offsite portion of this exercise
because
state
and local participation
was not required.
6.
Control Room/Simulator
The following aspects
of Control
Room (CR) operations
were observed
during the exercise:
detection
and classification of emergency
events,
assessment
of plant conditions, notification to state,
local
and federal
agencies,
frequent
use of emergency
procedures,
and innovative attempts
to mitigate the accident.
The following are
NRC observations
of the
CR
activities.
(a)
The
CR staff properly classified the the first event
and
expeditiously carried out official notifications to state
and local
agencies.
(b)
The
CR staff operated
in an efficient manner to respond to the
numerous
and varied events
characterized
by the scenario
and
effectively utilized plant emergency
procedures
to respond to the
scenario
events.
(c)
The
CR staff did a good job in their efforts to anticipate failures
and plan contingencies,
respond to the events of the scenario with
numerous
innovative methodologies
designed
to mitigate the
consequences
of the accident,
and to keep the
TSC well informed on
plant events.
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(d)
Command
and Control
was effectively demonstrated
in the
CR and the
transfer of responsibilities
from the
CR to the
TSC went smoothly.
7.
Technical
Su
ort Center
The following aspects
of TSC operations
were observed:
activation,
accident assessment/classification,
dose
assessment,
notification,
effective control
and utilization of resources,
and support of the
CR.
The following represent
the
NRC findings in the
TSC.
(a)
The
TSC staff operated well as
a team
and did a good job of
prioritizing their resources
to respond to the events of the
scenario.
(b)
Coordination with the
OSC was effectively demonstrated.
The
individual functional areas
in the
TSC kept the Site
Emergency
Coordinator
(SEC) well informed on plant events
in their respective
areas.
(c)
The
TSC staff effectively demonstrated their capabilities to
properly classify the scenario
events,
make timely notifications,
and
make timely and appropriate
PARs.
Also, the licensee's
concern
f'r personnel
safety
was conspicuously
demonstrated.
(d)
Communications
and coordination were excellent
between
the
CR,
OSC,
and,
EOF. throughout the course of the exercise.
(e)
Precautions,
including activating the
TSC ventilation
system
and
surveys,
were taken to insure the habitability of the
TSC.
8.
0 erations
Su
ort Center
The following aspects
of OSC operations
were .observed:
activation of the
facility, functional capabilities
and the disposition of various
in"plant monitoring teams.
The following are
NRC observations
of the
activities.
(a)
The
OSC staff responded
to the events of the scenario
and displayed
effective management
control, radiation protection,
and problem.
solving abilities.
(b)
Plant teams
were well briefed and tracked.
Radiological briefings
demonstrated
ALARA principles
and an understanding
of current
and
potential radiological
hazards.
Good efforts were
made to maintain
communications with all teams.
9.
Emer enc
0 erations Facilit
The following EOF operations
were observed:
Activation of the facility,
functional capabilities,
accident
assessment,
notifications, coordination
with the Corporate Incident Response
Center,
and the interface with
offsite officials.
The following are
NRC observations
of EOF activities.
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(a)
The Recovery
Manager demonstrated
an understanding
of the importance
of making a timely PAR at the general
emergency
and communicating it
directly to local
and state officials.
(b)
There
was
a good turnover between interim and long term
staffing.
(c)
The
EOF staff demonstrated
the ability to identify problems
resulting from inconsistent data/results
and resolve their
differences.
(d)
Communications
and coordination
between
the
TSC and the
EOF were
well maintained throughout the course of the exercise.
10.
Cri~iques
Immediately following the exercise,
critiques were held in each of the
emergency
response facilities (ERFs).
The critiques were candid
and the
self criticism was very effective in identifying areas for improvement.
A formal critique involving site and management
personnel
was conducted
on August 25,
1988.
The purpose of the formal critique was to summarize
the findings of the earlier critique sessions
and to present
them to
plant and corporate
management.
The following represent
some of the
findings discussed
during this meeting.
(a)
The time frame for the initial press
releases
could be improved.
(b)
The
OSC Foreman's
work area
near access
control
was congested
and
noisy.
This problem
may have distracted
the
OSC Foreman
and
interfered with the timeliness of team dispatch.
(c)
Some
improvements
involving dose
assessment
methodology, training on
the licensee's
Emergency
Assessment
Response
System
(EARs) and
source
term will improve the overall
program.
ll.
Exit Interview
An exit interview to discuss
the preliminary
NRC findings was held on
August 25,
1988.
Licensee
personnel
present at this meet'...g
have
been
previously identified in Section
1 of this report.
The
NRC was
represented
by five evaluator
team members.
The licensee
was
complimented
on their efforts regarding this exercise
and informed that
no violations were identified during the 'inspection.
Other items
discussed
during this meeting are described
in Sections
2 through
10 of
this report.