ML16341E517
| ML16341E517 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1988 |
| From: | Burdoin J, Mendonca M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16341E518 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-87-43, 50-323-87-44, NUDOCS 8802010125 | |
| Download: ML16341E517 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1987043
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report Nos.
50-275/87-43,
50-323/87-44
Docket Nos.
50-275,
50-323
License
Nos.
I
Licensee:
Pacific Gas
and Electric Company
77 Beale Street
Room 1451
San Francisco,
94106
Facility Name:
Diablo Canyon Units
1 and
2
Inspection at:
Diablo Canyon Site,
San Luis Obispo County, California
Inspection
Condu
ed:
Dec
ber
4-18,
7
47
Inspector:
Bur oin, React r Inspector
M.
M. Mendonca,
Chief
Reactor Project Section
1
ate Signed
r/r
~Z<d'ate
Signed
~Summa>
Ins ection Durin
Period of December
14-18
1987
Re ort Nos.
50-275/87-43
and
50-323/87-44
vital areas
and equipment in the plant,
and followup of enforcement
and open
items.
Inspection
Procedures
Nos.
25573,
30703,
36100,
71707,
90712,
92701
and 92703 were
used
as guidance for the inspection.
Results:
No violations or deviations
were identified.
8802010125
880115
ADOC< 05000275
G
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DETAILS
Individual s Contacted
Pacific
Gas
and Electric
Com an
PG&E)
- J.
D. Townsend,
Acting Plant Manager
"J.
A. Sexton,
Plant Superintendent
"J.
M. Gisclon, Assistant Plant Manager
D.
B. Miklush, Maintenance
Manager
- M. J.
Angus,
Work Planning
Manager
C.
N. Pendleton,
Lead Power Production
Engineer
S.
W. Hamilton,
Power Production
Engineer
W.
H. Yip, Power Production
Engineer
"R. Johnson,
Onsite Licensing Supervisor
T.
L. Grebel,
Regulatory Compliance Supervisor
T.
A. Nelson,
Regulatory Compliance
Engineer
S.
D. Wilson, Regulatory Compliance
Engineer
J.
M. Neill, Document Control, Supervisor
P.
W. Provence,
Records Analyst
S.
R. Fridley, Senior Operating Supervisor
M.
L. Smith,
Power Production
Engineer
D.
D. Malone, Sr.,
I&C Engineer
Various other engineering
and
gC personnel.
In addition,
one
NRC Resident
Inspector attended
the exit meeting.
"Denotes attendees
at exit meeting
on December
18,
1987.
Area Ins ection
An independent
inspection
was conducted
in Units 1 and
2 Turbine and
Auxiliary Buildings.
The inspection
examined
areas
and equipment for
debris, potential
hazards, oil and water leakage,
and equipment
condition, e.g., oil level, valve position,
and electrical
connection
configuration and cleanliness.
The equipment
and areas
inspected
included:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.I.
J.
K.
L.
Five Emergency Diesel Generator
Rooms
Six 4160 Volt Switchgear
Rooms
Combined Two-unit Control
Room
Four Containment
Spray
Pumps
Three Charging
Pumps, Unit 1
Four Safety Injection Pumps
Four
RHR Pumps
Six Component Cooling Water
Pumps
Pumps
Six Emergency Battery
Rooms
Six 480 Volt Vital Bus
Rooms
Two Cable Spreading
Rooms
~
'
M.
N.
0.
Two Hot Shutdown Panels
Two 480 Volt Load Center Areas
GW/GE Penetration
Areas Units 1 and
2 at Elevations 85'nd
100'ousekeeping
and equipment status
appeared
to be acceptable.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
3.
Followu
of IE Bulletins and
NRC Information Notices
Closed
50-275/323
"ASME Nuclear
Code
Pum
s and
S are Parts
Manufactured
b
the
Ha
ard T ler
Pum
Com an ."
When the Bulletin was issued,
the licensee
reviewed his records
and
determined that no Hayward Tyler pumps or spare parts manufactured
between
1977 and 1981 were used at the Diablo Canyon
Power Plant.
Therefore,
no response
to the Bulletin by the licensee
was required
at that time.
Consequently,
the bulletin was closed
by inspection
reports
50-275/84-24
and 50-323/84-14,
However, the licensee
recently purchased
and installed two pumps
manufactured
by the Hayward Tyler Pump
Company.
Since these
two
pumps
were manufactured within the time period specified in the
bulletin, the licensee
responded
to the requests
for information in
items
1 and
2 of the bulletin.
This information was forwarded to
the
NRC in the licensee's
letter DCL-87-290 dated
December
2, 1987.
Items
1 and
2 of the bulletin required the licensee to perform
certain tests
on the
new spent fuel cooling system
pumps
(one for
each unit) and system piping,
such
as
a service test,
a performance
test
and
a hydrostatic pressure test.
The inspector to verify the licensee's
response
to the bulletin
examined the test results for the service test,
performance test
and
hydrostatic pressure test for the two new pumps.
The test results
appeared
to be in order and supported
the licensee's
response
to IE
This bulletin is closed.
B.
(Closed
50-275/50-323
Sin le Failure
in Auxiliar
S stems
This notice alerted the licensee of two potential single failures of
pump start
and
pump protective trip circuitry
that could cause partial or complete loss of capability to supply
(AFW) in conflict with the design basis.
Each
potential single failure was reviewed
and is discussed
separately
be 1 ow.
Indian Point Unit 2
At Indian Point Unit 2, the
AFW pump start circuitry was designed
so
that the steam generator
(SG) level
and loss of feedwater start
'
signals
were routed through contacts of the safety injection inhibit
relays.
If the contacts of either inhibit relay failed in the open
position, neither the low SG level nor the loss of feedwater starts
signals
would cause
the motor driven
AFW pumps to start
automatically.
No common
mode failure mechanism
has
been identified by the licensee
for the auto-start relay logic, in question, for motor-driven
pumps.
The subject relays at
DCPP are
on separate
SSPS trains for
each
pump.
Therefore,
the concerns identified were not applicable
to DCPP as
no single failure can affect more than
one
pump.
Salem Generatin
Station Unit I and
2
A design review conducted
in 1985 of Salem's
AFW pump trip circuitry
identified several
potential single failures that could stem from a
single test switch,
a single suction pressure
instrument,
and
a
single low suction pressure
output relay.
Failure of any one of
these protective features
associated
with the low suction pressure
pump trip could have resulted in tripping all three
AFW pumps.
The motor driven
AFW pump control circuitry does not include
a low
suction trip feature.
Also, the licensee's
review determined that
the control
schemes for the three
AFW pumps
(two motor driven and
one turbine driven) are totally independent
and
no single failure
can effect more than
one
pump.
Therefore the concerns identified at
Salem are not applicable to DCPP.
This notice is closed for Units I and 2.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
4.
Followu
of Part
21
Re ort
s
and 0 en Item s
A.
Closed
86-28-P Contromatics Actuator With Jackscrew
Emer enc
Overrs
e 0 erator
A 10 CFR 21 report discusses
Pacific Air Products
Company furnished
dampers with Contromatics actuators.
Some of the Contromatics
actuators
have
been provided with an extended
threaded
rod travel
stop with a handwheel for emergency
manual
operation of the damper.
The manufacturer,
Pacific Air Products
had emphasized
that the
handwheel/jackscrew
is strictly intended for infrequent use,
only
during emergency
manual
operation of the damper.
Frequent
usage of
this device
may cause
wearing or fouling of the threads
in the
actuator
end caps resulting in failure of the actuator.
The inspector reviewed licensee
documentation
which verifies that
safety-related
provided by Pacific Air Products for DCPP
were provided with either Limitorque, Barber Colman, or manual
actuators.
However, nine fans (four for auxiliary building and five
for the fuel handling building) supplied
by Buffalo Forge were
supplied with Contromatics actuators.
However, the licensee
stated
that the actuators
are not equipped with the manual/jackscrew
0
emergency
design feature.
Therefore this 10 CFR 21 report is not
applicable to DCPP.
This item is closed for Units 1 and 2.
0 en
50-275/87-01-02
Control of
U -to-.Date Vendor
Manuals
An INPO inspection of document control during the
summer
1985
resulted in the following evaluation,
"Obsolete
and Superseded
Information is Contained in Some Vendor Manuals
Used for Plant
Work "
The inspector
examined the revisions to procedure
NPAP E-14, along
with other documentation
to assure
the licensee
was capturing all
vendor provided information,
and concluded that the issue
has
been
addr essed.
The inspector
reviewed the status of the general
concern with the
licensee
and learned that this overall topic of vendors
manuals,
is
under review and is to be elevated to the list of top ten
significant problems at
DCPP.
It .is expected that when the vendor
manuals topic is added to the top ten list more effort will be made
available to accelerate
the resolutions of the remaining concern.
Inspection in this area,
control of up-to-date
vendor manuals,
shall
be continued during
a future inspection.
This item remains
open.
(0 en
- "Motor-0 crated Valve
Common
Mode Failures
Durin
Plant Transients
Due to Im ro er Switch
~Settin s"
The status
of this temporary instruction was last reported in
inspection reports
50-275/87-31
(50-323/87-31)
~
The licensee
in August,
1987 negotiated with the valve manufacturers
to furnish for those valves identified in licensee
submittal
DCL-86-262, dated
September
2, 1987, the maximum design thrust;
and,
to identify that part of the valve (stem, disc, stem/disc
connection
etc.) to which the
maximum thrust applies.
Four valve manufactures;
Anchor, Crane,
Velan and
CCI supplied the subject valves.
Anchor,
Crane
and
CCI supplied the information request with Velan promising
to respond
by March 1988.
The inspector
examined the documentation
submitted
by the valve
manufacturers
and found that maximum thrusts for the weakest parts
of the valves (stem/disc/etc.)
exceeded
the
maximum thrusts required
to operate
the valves,
by factors of three/five to as high as ten.
The final dispositioning of this TI will take place following the
receipt of NRR's safety evaluation of the licensee's
final response
to Item f of IE Bulletin 85-03.
This TI will continue to be tracked
as
open item TI 2515/73.
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No violations or deviations
were identified.
The inspector
conducted
an exit meeting
on December
18,
1987, with the
members of the plant staff as indicated in paragraph
one.
During this
meeting,
the inspector
summarized
the scope of the inspection activities
and reviewed the inspection findings as described
in this report.
The
licensee
acknowledged
the concerns identified in the report.
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