ML16341C025
| ML16341C025 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1983 |
| From: | Morrill P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Knighton G, Scherling H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8309260228 | |
| Download: ML16341C025 (10) | |
Text
SPP 2 0 i983 Docket Nos.
50-275 50-323 XE HQ. FILE COPY MEMORANDUM FOR:
1 G. Knighton, Chief, Reactor Licensing Branch No.3, NRR H. Scherling, Diablo Canyon Project Manager, NRR FROM:
Enclosure:
As stated P. J. Morrill, Reactor Inspector, RV DIABLO CANYON READINESS FOR OPERATION 'MEETING MINUTES, SEPTEMBER 7) 1983 The purpose of this memo is to forward our meeting minutes of the subject meeting.
We recommend that these minutes be incorporated with your observations and be issued to the licensee and public document rooms,to document the issues raised and the licensee's committments.
Should you have questions or comments please contact me at FTS 463-3740.
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P. J. Morrill Reactor Inspector cc w/enclosure:
J. Martin, RV T. Bishop, RV D. Kirsch, RV R. Scarano, RV J.
- Crews, RV P. Morrill, RV M. Mendonca, RV bcc:
RSB/Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Distributed by RV:
State of California Resident Inspector RV P.Mo rill:dh 9/ $ /83
, 8309260228 830920 PDR ADOCK 05000275 i P
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MEETING MINUTES Diablo Can on Readiness for 0 eration Se tember 7
1983 A meeting to discuss operational readiness of the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 nuclea plant was held on September 7,
1983, at the Licensee's Public Information Center.
Those present included representatives of the NRC, the licensee, the Governor of the State of California, and the Intervenors.
The principle attendees are listed below.
NRC:
H. R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- D.
G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, Nuclear Reactor Regulation J.
P. Knight, Assistant Director for Components and Structures, Division of.Engineering H. E. Schierling, Project Manager, NRR J.
B. Martin, Regional Administrator, Region.V T.
W. Bishop, Director, Division of Resident, Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs M. M. Mendonca, Senior Resident Inspector, Diablo Canyon P. J. Morrill, Reactor Inspector, Region V Licensee:
G. Maneatis, Executive Vice President, Facilities Development H. Friend, Project Completion Manager J. Schuyler, Vice President, Nuclear Power Generation J. Shiffer, Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations R. Thornberry, Plant Manager J.
Hoch, Project Manager BE Lew, Licensing Manager State of California:
R. B. Hubbard, MHB Technical Associates, Consultant to the Governor, Intervenors:
S. A. Silver, Mothers for Peace On September 6,
1983, the NRC personnel listed above visited the site to observe first hand the operational readiness of the facility.
Based upon PG&E's presentations and the facility tour, the NRC staff raised the following issues of concern for licensee consideration and action.
A.
Control Room Readiness for Operation:
The NRC staff observed that (1) the shift supervisor was in an office which is adjacent to the control
'room but does not have a good view of the control room, (2) operations personnel and their shift assignments were not identified either by name tags or by a status
- board, (3) the control room was occupied by a number of personnel who were not actively working and whose purpose was not
- clear, and (4) the licensee's shift turnover requires uncompenseated overtime.
The staff also stressed that any confusion regarding who was in charge of the facility or its operation would be totally unacceptable and that the PG&E management should consult with another, recently
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2 licensed utility to discuss the problems of starting up one nuclear plant while the adjacent plant was being constructed.
Licensee personnel acknowledged the NRC's comments.
They stated that they would consult with the other utility and would consider how to enhance control room conditions.
Operational Experience:
The staff questioned the licensee's personnel regarding operational experience and the augmentation of the operators with Westinghouse personnel.
The staff pointed out that this was PG&Es first large reactor plant and that well planned, deliberate, and controlled actions were essential to a safe and trouble free start-up test program.
The licensee's personnel concurred and stated that supplimentary personnel from Westinghouse would be used to augment their staff during the start-up testing.
1 Overall Facility Control and Management:
The staff stated that given the large construction and engineering presence on site it may be difficult for the licensee's operations staff to retain control of the facility and to manage the various activities occuring on-site.
The staff also observed that the licensee's ambitious schedule was similiar to that recently attempted by another California utility and which appeared to the staff to be a precursor to major items of noncompliance.
In the case of the other utility, the schedule was changed to delay the start-up of a second unit until the first unit's start-up was complete to ensure adequate management attention.
The staff stressed that PG&E should consult with management of the other utility to better define and understand the problems encountered and corrective actions required.
The PG&E personnel acknowledged the NRCs comments.
They stated that they would contact the other utility and were currently revaluating the schedule for Diablo Canyon Unit 2.
Need for On-site Engineering:
The NRC staff described the necessity for adequate on-site engineering support of the plant operating staff and the improvement in plant safety to be realized by a well staffed and qualified engineering support group.
I,icensee representative explained that, with the exception of major modifications, engineering would be controlled and conducted by PG&E Nuclear Plant Operations, the same group responsible for the safe operation of the facility.
Public Address System:
The NRC staff questioned the PG&E personnel as to how personnel in the plant would be informed of plant casulties and the status of the plant announcing
The NRC personnel observed that, aside from the plant operators who have two way radios, the only way to communicate with personnel in the plant was with the bell system (similiar to those used in department stores) or by the use of emergency
'sirens.
PG&E personnel acknowledged that this item did not have high priority and that they would speed up their evaluation and implementation of a plant communication system.
NRC representatives stated that this should be complete prior to initial criticality.
Hot Functional Testing:
The NRC staff observed that the licensee's letter of August 10, 1983, did not contain a commitment to complete an additional hot functional test program prior to fuel loading.
In light
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of the extensive modifications made to the facility in safety-related
- areas, the large number of construction personnel on site, malicious mischief observed on-site, threats of sabotage, and the de-activitation of the security system, the staff questioned the decision by PG&E to not conduct a hot functional test prior to fuel load.
Licensee personnel stated that the surveillance tests, piping system stress walkdowns, and security inspections described in their letter of August 10, 1983 letter, would provide assurance that the plant was fully operational prior to fuel load.
G.
Post Core Load Construction Activities:
The NRC staff questioned PG&E personnel as to what construction activities would take place during and after core loading.
PG&E personnel stated that construction activity in the control room would be completed prior to fuel loading.
During following discussions the staff questioned the extent of work to be completed on the dome service crane in the containment.
PG&E personnel stated that the crane work area would be boxed in to preclude falling
- debris, would not be directly over the reactor (which was protected by the missle shield),
and the work would not be done during fuel loading.
When questioned, PG&E personnel stated that the heaviest structural members to be added would likely be steel plates weighing approximately 200 pounds.
H.
Systems Interaction Program:
The NRC staff questioned the status of the Systems Interaction Program.
Licensee representatives stated that the study had been given a lower priority, but that the study for Unit 1
would be completed six months after initial operation of Unit 1 and that Region V would be informed when the study was complete.,
Emergency Response Facilities:
The NRC staff stated that emergency facilities and their readiness should be closely followed by <he licensee.
At the conclusion of the NRC/licensee discussions representatives of the Governor and the Intervenors were offered the oppertunity to present their
. views, Mr. R. Hubbard, representing the Governor raised the following issues.
It was not clear how the operability of systems which had been modified would be verified.
The licensee was placing a great deal of reliance upon surveillance testing which was not the purpose of the surveillance tests.
During tours of the facility some calibration stickers over one year old were observed (impling that calibrations may be out of date).
K.
The PG&E approach has been to complete various activities in parallel, which saves time but may result in a questionable product unless integrated control of engineering, construction, and operations was utilized.
Because of this parallel approach and possible lack of integrated control, the PG&E approach is questionable.
L.
It was not clear when PG&E would be finished, or what the status of the project was since there was no presentation of how many items were left to be modified, the rate of closure of open issues and modifications was unspecified, and many items had been consolidated by PG&E.
1'"
M.
Diablo Canyon is PG&E's first large PWR.
The PG&E organization has a
lack of operating experience in this area and may not be competent to operate the facility.
Ms.
S. Silver, of the Mothers for Peace supported Mr. Hubbard's issues and raised the following issues of her own.
N.
It does not seem appropriate for PG&E to complete the Seismic Interaction Study and perform modifications while the plant is operating, and afterwards tell the NRC and the public the results.
(Mr., Denton of the NRC staff explained that the previous NRC silence did not indicate acceptance and that the staff would have to evaluate this situation.)
p.
Many items had been placed on the "back-burner" (such as the plant announcing system and the Seismic Interaction Study) and will not get done.
These items deserve the concern of all involved.
The emergency sirens are not seismically qualified.
Q.
Plant security should have been retained.
The sabotage event related to the gouges in the reactor coolant system, the bomb threats, and the presence of over 7000 personnel at the site are causes for concern.
R.
Personnel with allegations are reluctant to come forward since their candor endangers their jobs, places them in the hot seat,
- and, even if some of their allegations are true, results in their public ridicule.
(Mr. Denton of the NRC staff acknowledged the problem and stated that the U.S. Labor Department was now involved to eliminate the job threat problem.)
Loading the fuel before construction is complete is an item of concern.
In addition, holding hearings on the safety of the facility after fuel loading is inappropriate.
If the facility is to operate at all, then't must. be as safe as possible at all times.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Denton thanked Mr. Maneatis, the PG&E staff, Mr. Hubbard, representing the State, and Ms. Silver, representing the Mothers for Peace for their comments.