ML16341A034

Draft Concern Items on Idvp Evaluation of L/B & S/B Piping & Pipe Support Design

ML16341A034
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	04/25/1984
From:	Yin I NRC
To:
Shared Package
ML16341A021	List: ML16341A020 ML16341A034 ML16341C173
References
NUDOCS 8406270177
Download: ML16341A034 (58)

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4 DRAFT DIABLO CANYON 1 Concern Items on IDVP Evaluation of L/B and S/B Pi in and Pi e

Su port Desi n

Prepared By:

Isa T. Yin April 25, 1984 8$06270177 840b20 PDR ADOCK 05000275

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'ONTENT Concern Items - ETR's 30 and 61, "S/8 Piping" Concern Items." ITR 59, "L/8 Piping" Concern Items - ITR 60, "L/8 8c S/8 Pipe Supports" Table 1 NRC Review of DCP S/8 Piping Analysis and Support Calculations - ITR 30 and 61

'able 2

S/8 Piping Stress Analysis - ITR 61 Table 3

Review of Computer Analyzed Piping - ITR 61 Table 4

Completion Review of Computer Analyzed Piping - ITR 61 Table 5

Review of Span Rule (N-40) Applications - ITR 61 Table 6

Completion Review of Span Rule (M-40) Applications-ITR 61 Table 7 L/8 Piping Stress Analysis - ITR 59 Table 8

~ L/8 Piping Local Stress Analysis - ITR 59 Table 9

Overall Reviews of DCP Piping Analysis - ITR 59 Table 10 Specific Reviews of DCP Piping Analysis - ITR 59 Table 11 L/8 Support Calculation - ITR 60 Table 12 Review of L/8 Pipe Support Analyses Performed by DCPO - ITR 60 Table 13 Review of L/8 Pipe Support Analyses Performed by Cygna and Imprell - 60 Table 14 L/8 Support Calculations Completion Review - ITR 60 Table 15 S/8 Support Calculation - ITR 60 Attachment 1

Attachment 2

Attachment 3

~Pa e

3ll 17 6

7 8

9 10 13 14 15 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 26 28

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Concern Items - ITR 30 and 61 "S/B Pi in "

DRAFT l.

In reference to Table 1, the justification for accepting 15,000'f S/B pipe and the associated 1,500 safety-related

supports, without further evaluation, is ba'sed on a review of a sample of piping. analyses for 5,000'f pipe using the ME-101 computer program.

Anal sis Methods Included in the 5 000'f Pi e

1 000'ot Pi e

4 000'old Pi e

Thermal " MEL 40 Sei smi c - PIPSD 600' PIPSD 3,400' File 44 19 ME-101 Anal ses were Performed on the 5000'f Pi e

10 ME-101 Included:

9 ME-101 Included:.

4 active valves 4 Code Breaks 5 SAM/TAMs How many feet of Pure File 44?

2.

In reference to Table 1, are all 15,000'/8 piping that were without additional review, 2" and below?

3.

'a DRAFT'

(

In conjuction with Item 2 above, are they all located below Fl. El.

140'n containment and auxiliary buildings?

(p. 15) 4.

The old span rules contained in PGRE Drawing 049243 for field run of Q" to 2" S/8 and Drawing 049239 for field run of 2<" to 4" S/8 do not address all p

piping configurations (p. 6).

The application of these drawings was largely based on undocumented engineering judgements (p. 6).

In view of the situation, the staff would like to know the basis of IDVP. acceptance of the 15,000'/8 that were designed by non-uniformly applied S/8 span rule criteria,. and were without design documentation.

5.

Mith the large amount of identified deficiencies (Tables 2 to 6), why were S/8 computer and span rule (H-40) piping analyses considered to be acceptable without expanding sample size of the IDVP review?

t gc TABLE 1 '- ITRs 30 and 61 NRC Review of DCP S/B Pi in Anal sis and Su ort Calculations Piping Analysis 1.

'Total footage of pipe(

based on summation of(

average measurement on piping isometrics 43,000 2.

Total ME-101 computer(

analysis 25,000'.

Total N-40 hand calculations 3,000'.

Total number of cook" book type analysis that were without design documentation and were not verified(

by PG8E 15 000 or 34.9X of total S/B piping Support Calculation 1.

Total estimated number of supports 3,715 2 8 3.

Total pipe supports(

evaluated

(

(

a.

Detailed analysis 1,800(

b.

Prequa 1 ified standard supports 415 (

(

2,215(

4.

Total pipe supports that have not been reanalyzed 1,500 or 40.4% of total S/B supports Hardware Change 2 5 3.

Total support modifications including addi-tions, deletions, and component

, upgrading 1380, or 1380/2215

=

62.3~

4.

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TABLE 2 S/B Pi in Stress Anal sis " ITR 61 Review Analysis Method Computer

)Span Rule (M-40)

Total Ho.

of Anal ses

((o No. of Analyses Reviewed w/deficiencies B

(S) 4 (4)

Ho. of Completion Review w/deficiencies (2) 4 (4) 450 feet of S/B piping were evaluated in ITR 61.

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TABLE 3 Review of Com uter Anal zed Pi in

- ITR 61 I

'I I

I Analys i s I Ho.

IPi e

I Incorrect ThermalI I

Modes; Valve I

I IncorrectI Piping I weight; Support IIncorrectI Piping IInterference Size in.

IModelin SAM/TAMI SIF IGeomet INot ConsideredI I

7"301 I

8-305 I

8-306 I

8"310 I

8-311 I

9-304 I

9-307 I

10-301.

3/4, 1, 2

2 3/4, 2

3/4, 2

3/4, 2

3/4 3/4, 1, 2

1/2, 3/4, 2

X X

X X

XX

X I

I X

X X

X I

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'ompletion Review of Computer Anal zed Pipin

- ITR 61 I Anal sis No.

S-118 7-300 9-308 Pi e Size in.)

3/4, 1

3/4 Review Results No deficiencies identified.

Incorrect SIF.

Incorrect comparison of valve accelerations to allowables.

TABLE 5'eview of 5 an Rule M-40 A

lications - ITR 61 Analysis No.

3-3038 6"301H 9"3278 19-3078 Pipe Size (in.)

3/4 Incorrect Pipe and Component Flexibility Evaluation, Valve Weight; Span Weight,; Design Temperature Auxiliary Building'Flexible Slabs Not Considered Seismic Stress Acceptablity Not Documented SAM/TAM Support Loads Not Shown on Review Sheet Anchor Movement Not Considered (X)

Underestimate Support Loadings

, Active Valve gualification Not Documented (X)

An EOI was issued.

TABLE 6 Completion Review of S an Rule.

M-40) A lications - ITR 61 Anal sis No.

Pi e Size in.

Review Results 3-313H

~

p 8-324H 25-300H

.Incorrect spectral acceleration factors for support loads.

Incorrect support design loads.

Oid not use envelope of spectral acceleration factors of the elevations in the building for determining support loads.

26.-302H Same as 25-300H.

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,j Concern Items - ITR 59 "L/8'Pi in "

DRAFT 1

Did IDVP evaluate any L/B guick Fix dispositions that were performed

>n

DCP, SF office before and after June 30, 1983?

(p. 3-1) 2.

One of the factors in selecting sample weld attachment for evaluation is the group that performs the analysis.

Mhy was Imprell work not evaluated?

(p. 3"2) 3.

Mas IEB 79-14 requirements adequately implemented?

(p. 3-3) 4.

Since 'Cloud reviewed mostly. preliminary analyses, was there any measures taken to check whether or not the "final" package has changed the Cloud revie~ findings and resolutions?

(p. 3-4) 5.

Cloud field verification identified several piping interferences.

Mhat were the DCP's generic corrective measures?

(p. 9-1) 6 Heed to know the basis for determining the L/B piping analysis review'ample sizes that are disproportional to the work performed by the responsible organizations.

(Table 7) 7.

Mith the large amount of identified deficiencies (Tables 7 to 10),

why

,were the L/B piping analyses reviewed considered to be acceptable w>thout expanding review sample size

?

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DRAFT

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8.

Evaluation of M L/S piping analysis appears to be warranted.

(Tables 1

to 2; Attachments 1 to 3)

TABLE 7 L/8 Pi in Stress Anal'is - ITR 59 Review Design 0'r 'anization DCPO Cygna Imprell Total No.

of Anal ses 78 33 136 No. of Piping Analyses Reviewed w/deficiencies 0

11 (11) 17 (17) 0 1

(1)

S 1

1 2

(2 0

1 (1)

S 1

(1 2

(2) 0 Ho. of Completion Review Among the Selected Piping Analyses w/deficiencies 5

(2) 1 (0) 0 HRC Requested DCPO Analyses 8"102 8-111 0

-. Overall Review S - Specific Review 13

TABLE B L/B Pi in Local Stress Anal sis - iTR S9 Review Desi n Or anization DCPO

~

4 Cygna Imprell Total No. of Anal ses 699 162 89 Unknown No. of Analysis Reviewed w/deficiencies 15 (4) 8 (4) 0 0

TABLE 9 " ITR 59

.Overall Reviews of DCP Pi in Anal sis I

)Piping Analysis No.

I Performed By 4-100 9-108 1-119 2-111 9-110 4-102 4A-100 8-106 4-113 2-105 2-120 6-101 4A-133

~ DCP DCP OCP DCP DCP DCP DCP OCP Cygna DCP Imprell DCP OCP Incorrect Valve and

)

Component Meight X

(X)

Incorrect Design Pressure; Temper-ature; Load Cases; Load Coordination; SAM; and Response Spectrum Incorrect Piping Geometry; Support Location Incorrect SIF (x)

[Piping Interfer-lences Hot Cons)deredl I

I j

Incorrect Modeling J

of Support X

X X

(X)

An EOI was issued.

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'TABLE 10 - ITR 59 S ecific Reviews of DCP Pi in Anal sis f Piping Analysis No.

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Performed By

)

I 4-101 2-114 7-103 8"116 8-117 4A"111 8"102 12-101)

I I

DCP Cygna OCP OCP DCP OCP DCP Imprelll I

I Incorrect Valve Meight I

Incorrect Design (Pressure;

Response

Spectrum (x)

(x)

Incorrect Support Location Incorrect SIF (X)

An EOI was issued.

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+Jj Concern Items -.ITR 60 "L/8 8 S/8 Pipe Supports"

///

't mop 1.

Heed to know the basis for determining the L/8 support calculation review sample sizes that are disproportional to the work performed by the responsible organizations.

(Table 11)"

2.

With the large amount of identified deficiencies, why was the L/8 support wor k done.considered to be acceptable without expanding review sample size?

'(Tables 11 to 14) 3.

Evaluation of W L/8 piping support calculation appears to be warranted.

(Attachments 1 to 3)

II 1.

In reference to Table 10 with less than 2X S/8 support calculations evaluated, could it possibly represent all plant areas, original hardware conditions, support types, etc.?

Concern was addressed with 100K re-evaluation of computer calculated S/8 supports.

2.

62.3X S/8 support hardware modification was made as a result of re-evaluation of 2,215 supports.

Shouldn't the remaining 1,500 supports be looked at?

(Table 1) 17 S

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TABLE ll L/8 Su ort Calculation " ITR 60 Review Oesign Or anization DCPO Cygna Imprell Total No.

of Calculations 2089 516 894 505 No. of Calculations Reviewed w/deficiencies 17 (i3) 3 (3)

(1)

No. of Completion Review Among the Selected Pipe Suppports w/deficiencies 1

(1) 2 (z)

(0) 0

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.TABLE 12 " ITR 60 Review of L/B Pi e

Su ort Anal ses Performed b

OCPO Conditions Identified ISu ort No.ICalculation ICalculation on Mel ds I Incor rect or(Incorrect or)

I I

ILacking of ILacking of I

Lack of I'Steel or IStructural IReflection I

Lack of I

ISupport fn land Piping Iof As-BuiltICalculationINo DeficienciesI I

I I 10/70 SL I

10/104 SL 13/23 SL 41/15A 51/4V 51/10R 51/13R'5A/41A 56N/35A 56S/6A 57N/90V 58S/16V 58S/39V 58S/44Y 63/26V 85N/34R 98/134R X

X X

X X

X I

(X)

I X

X X

X X

X (x)

(X)

An EOI was issued.

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TABLE 13 - ITR 60 Review of L/B Pi e

Sup ort Anal ses Performed b

C na and Imp< ell Support No.

I 565/3A 85N/31R 92/11R 58S/37A 58S/69R Performed By Cygna Cygna Cygna Imprell Imprell Incorrect or Lacking of Steel or Support fn Calculation X

Incorrect or Lacking of Structural and Piping Calculation X

Lack of Reflection of As-Built Conditions Incorrect or Lacking of Calculation on Melds (X)

X Incorrect Base Plate Analysis I

No Deficiencies J

Identified (X)

An EOI was issued.

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'TABLE 14 - ITR 60 L/B Su port Calculations Completion Review Su ort No.41-39A

'56N-92R Performed B

OCPO Cygna Review Results Load sheets not included.

Incompl etc references for loads.

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I 57N"34R Cygna I

Stresses compared to incorrect allowables.

I 384-181R Imprell No deficiencies identified.

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o ww, "TABLE 15 S/B Su ort Calculation - ITR 60 Review Design Or anization "DCPO - OPEQ Total No.

of Calculations 1,800" Ho. of Calculations Reviewed w/deficiencies 8

(6)

Ho. of Completion Review

{w/deficiencies Estimated Numbers:

w/Detai 1 ed Cal cul ati ons 1,800

'Standard Supports 415 Old Supports w/o Analyses

~1500 3,715 Total 22

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION aFFICE OZ INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 4C pytgp REGION III Reports No. SO-266/81-09; 50-301/81" 10 Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; CPR-27 Licensee:

Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan

, Milwaukee, WI 53201 s

Facility Name:

Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:

Bechtel Power Corporation, San Francisco, CA Inspection Conducted:

May

-8, 1981 Inspector:

. T. Yin Approved By:

D. H. Danielson, Chief Materials and Processes Section

'is/PI S'id'j Ins ection Summa Ins ection on Ma 7-8 1981 (Re orts No. 50-266/81-09 50-301/81-10)

Areas Ins ected:

Licensee actions relative to IE Bulletin 79-'14, including general discussion on NRC requirements, work procedure

review, and review of analysis and calculations.

The inspection involved 12 inspector-hours at the A-E's office by one NRC inspector.

Results:

No items od noncompliance or deviations vere identified.

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Westin house Work Most parts of the Westinghouse (W) stress calculations, such as computer configuration models and output details were considered to be proprietary information.

To verify the adequacy of W evaluations Bechtel re-ran two of the stress calculations on their HE-101 computer program.

W Calculation, No. P>>136, "SI From Penetration P>>22 to RPV (SI-601R-2, SI-2501R, RC-2501R-5):

dated January 3, 1980 was compaied in the areas of system modesffrequencies,

stresses, forces,

moments, and defections, on January 14, 1981 and was determined to be acceptable by the Bechtel engineers.

The second W Calcula-tion, No. P-120, "SI from P27 to RCS", dated November 21, 1979 was deter-mined to be unacceptable, and the W calculation was subsequently superseded.

The inspector reviewed the W 1etter, WEP-81-10, to Bechtel Power Corporation, dated March 17, 1981, which stated that W performed a thorough comparison between its internal analysis packages and the data previously'rovided by

Bechtel, and had found no differences, except P"120.

The second W submittal of P-120 calculation was evaluated by Bechtel engineers on January 13,

1980, and was considered to be acceptable,.

In review of the W and Bechtel calculation packages, including the com-parison data and in discussions held with the licensee and Bechtel representatives, the inspector considers the licensee measures taken to resolve the subject concern to be adequate.

Such consideration was based on:

a.

Since the original 38 W calculations were made, there were some system modifications that invalidated the W analysis.

The affected systems vere re-calculated by Bechtel.

As of the date of the inspection, there were 23 W packages in fina1 status.

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I b.

A licensee audit of.W vas performed at the W Design Engineering office on September l6, 1980..

No problem areas vere observed by the licensee.

The licensee audit included three stress calculations pertaining to piping isometric dravings P-143 and P-128.

c.

The load combination methods utilized by.W, i.e., the absolute value summation, vas considered more conservative than Bechtel's method of using the square root of the sum of the squares.

'"d.

For some of the stress values vhere Bechtel exceeded the W computation, the explanation vas that frequencies calculated 'for W and Bechtel vere slightly different in the first five vibration modes.

The differences in stress and deflection magnitudes evaluated vere not considered to be significant.

The inspector concurred vith"Bechtel's determination.

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No items of noncompliance or deviations vere identified as a result of the record reviev.

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 50-454/83-06(DE);

50-455/83-05(DE)

Docket Nos. 50-454; 50"455 Licenses No.

CPPR-130; CPPR-131 Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:

Inspection At:

Byron Station, Units 1 and 2

Byron Site, Byron, Illinois Sargent

& Lundy Engineers (S&L), Chicago, Illinois Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo),

Chicago, Illinois Inspection Conducted:

December 27"29,

1982, and January 27-28, 1983 at site January 11-13, and 17, 1983 at S&L January 19, 1983 at Commonwealth Edison Company Inspector: /

. T. Yin

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Approved By:

D. H. Danielson, Chief Materials

& Processes Section Ins ection Summar e

Inspection on December 27-29 1982 and Janua 1]-13 17 19 and 27-28, 1983 (Re orts No. 50-454/83-06(DE) 50-455/83-05(DE))

Areas lns ected:

Inspection of piping suspension system installation and

. inspection program including site hanger design control, and S&L design pro-visions for the pipe whip restraints.

The inspection involved a total of.38 inspector-hours on site, at the A-E's office, and at CECo office by one NRC inspector.

Results:

within the areas inspected, four apparent violations vere identified

( ep dr ae tmtmnemorandum vere used to docmsent friction anchor design procedure

- Paragraph 2; lack of site hanger nonconformance control - Paragr'aph 3; lack of licensee corrective action to prevent snubber damage during installation-Paragraph 4; lack of S&L pipe whi'p restraint design control - Paragraph 6).

2.

L4 Desi n of Friction Anchors The inspector reviewed the V Dispositioa of Hunter Field Problem No.

FC 05119A, Revision A, dated November 29, 1982 and Q calculation "Unit 1 Auxiliary Bui)ding Drawing No.

1FC05119A, Line No. 1FC22A-2" Area 6, Interface with Hanger 1FC501011,"

dated December 17, 1982.

In checking the design methods for the friction anchor, the inspector observed that the procedure was documented ia a Structural Design Engineering Department Hemorandum to G. J.

O'Hare aad J. Shulmann, "ELCEN Friction Anchor Capacities",

dated December 13, 1982.

This memoraadum was not included in the BPSS Group" SANJI Approved Structural Reference List", Revision 0, dated November 5, 1982.

The use of inter-department memorandum to document design procedures bypasses the site document control system.

This is a violation (454/83-06-02; 455/83-05-02).

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Report No. 50"454/83-20(DE); 50-455/83-17(DE) a Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 I,icenses No.

CPPR-130; CPPR-131 Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:

Byron Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At:

Byron Site, Byron, IL Sargent

& Lundy Engineers (S8tL), Chicago, IL Inspection Conducted:

May 3-4, 9-10, 1983 at site May 12, 1983 at SGL Inspector'I.

T. Yin.

/'i Approved By:

D. H. Danielson, Chief

~L Materials 8 Processes Section Ins ection Summa Ins ection on Ma 3-4 9-10 and 12 1983 (Re ort No. 50-454/83-20(DE)

I ->>o )i Areas Inspected:

Inspection of pipe whip restraint (WR) installation and gC inspection program; steam generator snubber specification, testing, and installation; Westinghouse (W) snubber system design.

The inspection

. involved a total of 36 inspector-hours on site and at the AE's office by one

. NRC inspector.

Results:

Within the areas inspected, four apparent violations were identified

~inadequate QC for WR installation Parag-raph 2.

ianadequate CECo audit of site WR activities-Paragraph 2.a. (3); nonconforming steam generator snubber conditions were not identified, controlled, and corrected in a timely manner-

.Paragraph 2.b; lack of adequate measures to prevent steam generator snubber damage after installation-Paragraph 2.b).

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I Ins ection of Westin house (W) Snubber Desi n During inspection of steam generator snubbers in Byron Unit 1, the inspector also checked piping snubber installations on the four main feedwater lines that connect to the f'our steam generators.

No abnormalities were identified except with snubber M-1FW09001S, a

PSA 35 snubber with a faulted condition loading of 35,240 lbf.

The snubber was installed on the other end of the 6" pipe IFW87CD-6" elbow that was welded directly to the SG nozzle.

The inspector dis-

,cussed the following concerns with the W site management, including:

(1) if there is a difference between the steam generator snubber or pipe snubber lock-up rates, the SG nozzle could experience excessive "lock-in" stresses (2) if the piping stress analysis modeled the nozzle as a pipe

anchor, as is normal industrial practice, the small amount of dynamic/seismic movements may not be sufficien't to cause the snubber to lock-up and perform its intended function.

The W engineers reviewed the piping stress analysis and concluded that'he steam generator snubber will lock up ahead of the PSA snubber, however, piping seismic motions (anchor movement of 0.079",-SSE of 0.026" and OBE of 0.008") were insufficent to ensure snubber functionability, and as a result the snubber was deleted in ECN No. 48436, dated May 9, 1983.

The W engineers further stated, that with the removal of the

snubber, the pipe stresses were still within code allowable at both the OBE and SSE conditions.

In review of a W internal letter from the Manager, Commonwealth Edison Projects to Projects Engineering

Manager, Byron and Braidwood Projects, "Byron Station Unit 1, Review for Snubber Close to Equipment.",

dated May 10, 1983, the inspector concurred with the W proposed 'sample review plan to be completed by June 10, 1983 for reviewing similar problems.

Followup inspec-tions are planned.

This is an unresolved item (454/83-20-08; 455/83-17-08).

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