ML16340E161
| ML16340E161 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 02/14/1984 |
| From: | Ebersole J Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| ACRS-R-1076, NUDOCS 8402230028 | |
| Download: ML16340E161 (4) | |
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+~*~4 UNITED STATES LEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI(f~g ADVISORYCOMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUXADS WASHINGTON, D. C. Z0555 February 14, 1984 The Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Dear Dr. Palladino:
SUBJECT:
ACRS REPORT; ON DIABLO.CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT.
~
5uring '.it's 286th
- meeting,
'February"9-11;
. 1984, the Advisory Committee:
on
"':"'- -::Reactor " Safeguards'."(ACRS)
. met.with..-re'presentatives
.of.:.the'Pacific',Gas 'and "..'...,..:..:-.'.;
Electric Company (PG8E) and the NRC Staff to discuss selected issues relating to the operation of the Diablo -Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.
A Subcommittee meeting was held in Los
- Angeles, California on January 19, 1984 to consider the safety significance of the deficiencies found and corrected by the Independent Design Verification Program and the PG8tE internal design review effort.
Members of the Subcommittee visited the plant on January 18, 1984.
During the Committee meeting, we explored the provisions made to ensure that the plant would not be severely damaged by a turbine missile generated by turbine overspeed resulting from failures of seismically nonquali fied turbine control equipment during an earthquake.
This question is not unique to the Diablo Canyon
- units, but may be of. somewhat greater concern here because of the higher frequency of seismic events at this site.
We believe that the question of whether the probability of such an event is acceptably low should be resolved in a
manner and on a
schedule satisfactory to the NRC Staff.
We wish to be kept informed.
We have noted the lack of significant Navy or commercial PWR operating experience in the shift foreman and senior control operator positions.
- However, the operating staff is otherwise well qualified with respect to
- size, years of work experience on the job site, hours of simulator opera-
- tion, classroom and on-the-job (prenuclear heat)
- training, licensing and relicensing performance, and experience in fossil steam operations.
PGSE has also provided additional start-up personnel and training.
We also noted the existence of a significant number of allegations regarding this plant.
These are being investigated, and we believe are being appro-priately considered by the NRC Staff.
Honorable Nunzio J. Palladino February 14, 1984 Based on the information developed in these
- meetings, and considering the above
- comments, we find no reason to alter the conclusions stated in the Committee's report dated July 14, 1978 regarding operation of this nuclear plant.
Sincerely, Jesse C. Ebersole Cha,i rman,
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- 1. U.'. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 'Supplements 18-21 t'o "Safety Evalua-tion Report Related to the Operation, of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, "
USNRC Report NUREG-0675 2.
Teledyne Engineering Services, "Independent Design Verification Program, "
Final Report dated 1983 3.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company,
'Phase I Final Report, Design Verifica-tion, " Submitted in sections from August 20, 1982 through October 19, 1983 4.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, "Phase II Final Report, Design Verifica-tion, " dated June 1983
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