ML16340C959
| ML16340C959 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1982 |
| From: | Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Cooper W TELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICES |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8211170450 | |
| Download: ML16340C959 (50) | |
Text
Hog 3
1982
~
~
Di tribution:
ocument Control 50-275/323 NRC PDR L PDR p%
p
'io7'$,'g-')'8'2'L'n'-
..1+.,]../B2..
DL:
~JJ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ 0
~ ~ ~ ~
- TNova,
~
~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ I ~I~ 0 ~ Oft
..lg/.R../82.....
A SE gfit: '
~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~OHI~ ~
~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
~ ~ 0 ~
NRC FOAM 318 (10-80) NRCM 0240 0 FF ICIAL R ECOR D COPY USGPO: 1981 ~g-960
V
Diablo'anyon Mr. Malcolm H. Furbush Vice President - General Counsel Pacific Gas E Electric Company P. 0.
Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120 CC:
Philip A. Crane, Jr.,
Esq.
Pacific Gas 8 Electric Company P.
0.
Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120 Janice E. Kerr, Esq.
California Public Utilities Commission 350,McA11 ister S'treet San Francisco, California 94102 Mr. Frederick Eissler, President Scenic Shoreline Preservation Conference, Inc.
4623 More Mesa Drive Santa Barbara, California 93105 Ms. Elizabeth Apfelberg 1415 Cozadero San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Mr. Gordon A. Silver
.Ms
.Sandra:A..Silver 1760 Alisal Street San Luis Obispo, CA
"-3401 Harry M. Willis. Esq.
Seymour 8
Wi 1 1 i s 601 California Street, Suite 2100 San Francisco, CA 94108 Mr. Richard Hubbar'd MHB Technical Associates Suite K
1725 Hamilton Avenue
'an
- Jose, CA 96125 Mr. John Marrs, Managing Editor San Luis Obispo County Telegram Tribune 1321 Johnson Avenue P.
O.Box 112 San Luis Obispo, CA 93406 Resident Inspector/Diablo Canyon NPS c/o U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. 0.
Box 369 Avila Beach, California 93424 Ms.
Raye Fleming
~ 1920 Mattie Poad Shell Beach, California 93440 Joel
- Reynolds, Esq.
John R. Phillips, Esq.
Center for Law in the Public Interest 10951 West Pico Boulevard Third Floor Los Angeles, California 90064 Pau'1 C. Valentine, Esq.
321 Lytton Avenue Palo Alto, California 94302 Mr. Byron S.
Georgiou Legal Affairs Secretary Governor's Office State Capitol Sacramento, Cali ornia 95814 Herber t H. Brown, Esq.
Hi 11, Christopher 8 Phillips, P.'C.
1900 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.
C.
20036 Mr. Dick Blankenburg Editor 5 Co-Publisher South County Publishing Company P.
0 ~
Box 460 Arroyo Grande, California 93420 Mr. James
- 0. Schuyler Vice President - Nuclear Generation Department Pacific Gas 8 Electric Company P. 0.
Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120
Mr: Malcolm H.
Furbus, r
~
IJ I lo V I Ef V(a ltyi>I I Bruce Horton, Esq.
Suite 202 3216 Horth 3rd S'treet Phoenix, Arizona 85012 Mr.
W.
C. Gangloff
'westinghouse Electric Corporation P. 0.
Box 355 Pittsburg, Pennsylvania 15230 David F. Fleischaker, Esq.
P. 0.
Box 1178 Oklahoma City, Okl.ahoma
. 73101 Arthur C.
G hr, Esq.
Snell 8 Milmer 3100 Valley Center
- Phoenix, Arizona 85073 Mr. Owen H. Davis, Director Federal Agency Relations Pacific Gas and Electric Company 1050 17th Street, H.W.
Suite 1180 l]ashington, D.
C.
20036 Regional Administrator Region V
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1450 Maria Lane Suite 210 llalnut Creek, California 94596 Mr.
G.
A. Maneatis Pacific Gas 5 Electric Company P. 0.
Box 7442 San Francisco, California 94120 R. L. Cloud Associates, Ines 125 University Avenue Berkeley, California 94710-R.
F.
- Reedy, Inc.
236 H Santa Cruz Avenue Los Gatos, California 95030
Ai
IHTERIt1 TEC8HICAL REPORT 1
REPORT TITLE:
Interim Technical Report on Additional Yerification and Additional Sampling Effective tray 27,
- 1982, Rev. 0, dated June 10, 1982 (P-105-4-839-001)
ORIGINATOR:
Robert L. Cloud Associates, Inc.
(RLCA)
INTRODUCTION ITR 1
was developed as a status report on the original generic sample.
In some areas e.g., buildings anu large bore piping, the results from the original 'sample were not felt to be sufficient to close the item.
Problem areas were identified and additional sampling was judged necessary to fully define the scope and severity of the problem.
Analyses of other samples were completed with results that were judged sufficient to close the item under review e.g.,
tanks.
ITR's on specific subjects are shown as being in preparation.
Other areas, e.g.
HYAC and conduit support, were still under review at the time the report was released.
Subsequent to the publication of ITR 1, PGE announced that their Internal Technical Program
( ITP) was to be expanded through a Corrective Action Program (CAP) by the joint PGE/Bechtel Diablo Canyon Project Organization.
Many of the items held open in ITR 1 are to be included.
The staff has received some information concerning 'the scope and content of the CAP.
The current staff understanding as to those recommendations of ITR 1 that are included in the CAP.is reflected in the following summary and status for each of the nine items discussed in ITR l.
'L I
4A>
1 W \\
ll 44
~ V'1&j IAJ,Wf& A
'0
)VAWA 44' h
J 4
% j45 '8 4,
I
~
~ SUf"iflARY OF REPORT l.
Bui Idi ngs The review of the buildings was based on the auxi;lunary building, including fuel handling building, for independent analysis.
Six issues were raised either as EOI's or generic concerns.
Interim Technical Report Ho.
6 on the auxiliary has since recently been issued and a total of 16 EOI's have been identified.
As a result of the concerns raised about the seismic analysis of the buildings relating to the structural configuration it was recommended that all of the safety-related buildings be reviewed to assess the impact of design changes on the analysis.
In addition selected changes would be field verified.
PG8E has incorporat d this component in their corrective action plan as stated in the PGSE Final Report sections 2.1.1 through 2.~.5.
Verification of this item will be performed by the IDVP.
2.
Piping The review of large bore piping discussed in ITR 1 was based on a sample of ten piping analyses chosen for independent analysis.
Approximately 40 issues were raised, either as EOI or generic concerns.
As a result of the large number of concerns identified a larger sample was specified for purposes of further defining the scope and extent of problems that might require corrective action.
The larger sample was to consist of five additional piping analyses which would represent lines connected to large pipes as analyzed
by others, other systems, and field-run computer analyzed pipe.
In addition, with regard to as-built configuration, it was recoranended that PGEE review and revise as necessary all piping design review isometrics and further that PGKE review and revise pipe and pipe support analyses as required.
This activity has been incorporated in the PGhE corrective action plan (Final Report sec i'on 2.2.1).
Verification that all aspects of the items identified in ITR 1 have been incluced and will be performed by
~he IDVP.
3.
Pipe Supports The review of pipe supports was based on a sample of twenty supports chosen for field verification and independent analysis.
The field verification is complete and the analysis is continuing.
Three.issues were raised as either EOI's or generic concerns.
The most pressing concern is the apparent omission of inertia loads associated with supports.
As a result of this concern of inertia load omission additional investigation is recommended.
This investigation consists of documenting the method employed by the computer programs
- used, run simple problems to verify the conclusions and review one or more of the initial pipe samples.
This activity has been included as a portion of the PGLE corrective action plan (Final Report section 2.2.1).
4.
Small Bore Piping The review of small bore piping (less than 6 inch diameter) was based on a sample of 3 runs chosen for field verification and a review of the support spacing criteria.
Approximately 10 1
1' P
(gal 1
Qf tt v 1F R g p tp
~
% g'$.1%
8
)
"~
4 l
issues were raised, either as EOI's or generic concerns.
As as result of these findings additional verification was recommended.
This verification consists of reviewing and revising, as necessary, the isometrics and spacing criteria, analysis of 5 examples of axial pipe runs and lug designand rigorous analysis of 5 examples of small bore lines to verify the adequacy of the "engineering judge-ment" used in treatment of conditions other than those covered by PG8E criteria.
This activity is included in the PG8E corrective action plan (Final Report section 2.2.2).
5.
Equipment The review of the six equipment types was based on a sample of two
- valves, two items of electrical equipment, three tanks, one heat exchanger, three pumps and two HVAC components chosen for independent analysis.
Eleven issues were raised as either EOI's or generic concerns.
The results and recommendations of this original sample h ve been reported in ITR 3.
As a result of the concerns identified in the above review a larger sample was recommended so that the scope and extent of the problem could be defined.
The larger sample consists of review of the analytical qualification of the main control board, the remaining two Hosgri required tanks, the two remaining Hosgri safety-related pumps and an additional sample of two HVAC components.
PG8E is addressing this item in their corrective action plan (Final Report section 2.3).
6.
Shake Table Testing The review of equipment seismically qualified by shake table testing was based on a sample of 44 items divided into seven groups.
The grouping was based on seismic inputs, test procedure, location and mounting.
Five issues were raised either as EOI's or generic concerns.
S I
The results and recommendations of this original s"".,pie have been reported in ITR 4.
As a result of this sample it was reco;...>ended that the field location and mounting of all the equipment be field verified, excluding the HSSS equipment, and that the correct test spectra as specified be verified.
PG~E is addressing this item in their corrective action plan (Final Rapport section 2.3.2.3.3).
7.
Conduit Supports The review of the conduit supports consisted of a sample of twenty supports for field review and twenty analyses.
The field review has been completed,
- however, the twenty analysis samples have not been selected.
Three EOI's and three generic concerns were raised.
As a result of the findings, PGEE will perform a complete reevaluation of all of the supports and the IDVP will selectively verify the PGSE program.
8.
HVAC Duct The.review of the HVAC ducts consisted of a sample of two sections for field review and independent analysis.
The field review is complete and the independent analysis is underway.
Two EOI's have been issued and no generic concern has been identified to date.
PGSE is addressing this item on a generic basis in their corrective action plan (Final Report section 2.5).
9.
Hosgri Spectra The review of the seismic inputs into the design consisted of identifying and checking the spectra.
Approximately 20 issues were reaised, either EOI's or generic.
As a result of this review it was recommended that PGKE assemble and issue a controlled
l P
/
1 ~
Wl
~
~ 4 VA'-= 1<<4, PP'Q 6
%4 I 4
)
.h set of design spectra that carried a unique number for each spectrum.
Also PGSE is to review all Hosgri qualifications against the set of spectra including the HSSS vendor equipment.
Th IDVP will selectively verify the applicability of the controlled spectra.
A set of controlled spectra has been issued by PGGE as DCH-17.
EVALUATION ITR 1 presents the first compilation of the'error and open item (EOI) reports developed by the IDVP.
The grouping of the EOI's with the corresponding IDVP task from Phase I program plan section 5.4.2, as given in Figures 3-2 through 3-9, provides an effective summary of the IDVP.
Although the IDVP review for a number of items has not been completed, ITR 1 offers substantial evidence that the initial sampling plan is an ~,.~"c".iv,- means of examining the seispic adequacy of the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 plant features as considered in the sample.
It appears that the majority, if not all. of the concerns identified in ITR 1 will be considered in the corrective action program of the PGEE/Bechtel Diablo Canyon Project Organization.
I
Enclosure 2
INTERIH TECHNICAL REPORT 2
REPORT TITLE:
Evaluation. of the guality Assurance Program and Implementation
- Reviews, Rev. 0, dated June 23, 1982 (P 105-4-839-002)
ORIGINATOR:
Teledyne Engineering Services (TES)
INTRODUCTION ITR 2 addresses the evaluation of the quality assurance programs and their implementation for Diablo Canyon Unit l.
The report provides the Independent Design Verification Program
( IDYP) conclusions with respect to the gA-related work performed by R.
F.
- Reedy, Inc.
(RFR) in accordance with Section 3.0 and 4.0 of the Phase I Engineering Program Plan (DCNPP-IDVP-001).
The RFR review focused its attention on the quality assurance programs established and implemented by PGLE and six contractors who performed seismic design work.
The contractors are:
SUMJiARY OF REPORT l.
ANCO Engineers 2.
Cygna Energy Service 3.
EDS Nuclear, Inc.
4.
Harding Lawson Associates 5.
URS/J.
A. Blume and Associates 6.
l<yle Laboratories The Teledyne conclusion, based on the Reedy work performed for ITR 2, is that no additional verification or sampling, beyond that specified in ITR 1, is required in response to the RFR reports, in spite of the reported general lack of quality assurance controls during the safety-related design activities performed prior to June 1, 1978.
ITR 2
~
y ~
~,
states that additional design verification and additional sampling already specified in ITR 1 was based on a lack of gA controls as well as on the design verification which had been previously completed (ITR 2, page 5).
However, certain exceptions are identified for the Cygna (ITR 2, p. 33),
HLA (ITR 2, p. 33),
and URS/J.
A. Blume. (ITR 2, p.
- 34) areas of work where gA program elements were lacking.
It is concluded that no additional verification or sampling beyond that already identified is required solely on the basis of the reported lack of gA controls.
ITR 1, submitted by Robert L. Cloud Associates, Inc.,
recommends 30 additional review, check, verification or sampling activities based on the results of Phase I of the IDVP.
These recommendations are based primarily on those Phase I design verifications which had been completed but with the knowledge of the results of the RFR findings
':.-;-. '".."..izg gA deficiencies.
The recommendations appear to broaden the scope of the Phase I effort to provide reasonable assurance that the plant meets the criteria for licensing with respect to the areas covered by Phase I.
The recommendations include some verification effort.
EYALUATION Despite the general lack of certain quality assurance controls for PGSE in the gA programs and their implementation and several of its subcontractors as identified by the RFR review, the staff concludes that the recommendations of ITR 1
and the exceptions noted in ITR 2 (pp.
33 and 34),
when properly carried out and with proper follow-up, should adequately demonstrate
I I ~
the acceptability of the design effor. addressed by Phase I of the IDVP and should resolve the staff's concerns resulting from the lack of gA controls for certain design phase activities
~
I ~
I ~
I
INTERIH TECHNICAL REPORT 3
REPORT TITLE:
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 - Independent Design Verification Program - Tanks-Rev.
0, dated July 16, 1982 (P 'l05 839-003)
ORIGINATOR:
Robert L. Cloud Associates, Inc.
(RLCA)
INTRODUCTION The third interim technical report (ITR 3) for the Diablo Canyon Independent Design Verification Program
( IDYP) has been reviewed by the staff.
ITR 3 vias also selected for a staff audit for the ISVP process and of the activities of RLCA in particular.
The audit was conducted on September 8,
9 and lQ, 1982 at the offices of R.
L. Cloud Associates in Berkeley, California.
ITR 3 summaries the independent analysis and verification of the initial sample of tanks at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant - Unit 1.
The tank sample consists of the boric acid, starting air receiver, and the diesel
,"-=='"-.~..>r oil priming tank.
Based on this initial tank sample the IDVP cu>>ciudes that the tanks represented by the sample at Diablo Canyon meets the applicable licensing cri teria and that consequently no further sampling is required.
Based on the staff review of ITR 3, in conjunction with the audit of the technical information assembled at RLCA for their review, the staff concurs in this conclusion.
In addition the audit allowed the staff to trace, in detail, the review process employed at RLCA and to assess this process and the level of confidence which this position of the IDVP provides.
The staff concludes that the RLCA review was thorough.
of high technical competence, well documented and carried out in full compliance with the approved program plan.
I
SUMMARY
OF REPORT The
.ank sample consisted of the 3 tank +ypes located inside various structures, namely the boric acid tank, diesel generator starting air receiver tank and the diesel generator oil priming tank.
This sample represents the spectrum of tank configurations within the plant.
There are four boric acid tanks at the Diablo Canyon Plant which are used to store a boric acid solution that will be injected into the reac.or primary coolant loop in the event that rapid shutdown of the reactor is required.
The tank shell is 3/8 inch thick and the material is ASME SA-240 Type '304 stainless steel.
Each tank is 10 feet in diameter and 15 fee 9 inches in height with a semi-elliptical bottom and a flat top.
Each tank rests on a skirt 3/8 inch thick and 4 feet 6 inches tall.
The plant contains four such tanks located in the auxiliary building on the 115 elevation floor.
The tanks are normally filled with a boric acid solution
\\ v 'w i in in 1 foot 3 inches of the top.
Each tank wei ghs
~ 9000 1 bs empty and 76400 lbs full.
The skirt is anchored to the concrete floor by 36 bol+s, 1 inch diameter ASTM A-307, distributed evenly along the skirt perimeter and cast into the concrete floor.
The boric acid is moved to and from the tank by attached piping.
The six diesel generator starting air receiver vertical tanks are used to store compressed air at 250 psi for starting the diesel engines.
Two tanks are located on opposite sides of each diesel generator unit which are positioned at the northwest corner of the turbine building.
Each tank consists of a 3 foot diameter, 1/2 inch thick cylinder with a 1/2 inch thick elliptical heat at both the top and bottom.
Overall height
is 8.5 feet and total weight is 2045 pounds.
The material is ASTf1 A-515 grade 70 stainless steel.
Each tank is supported by a skirt connected to a base plate anchored to the elevation 85 concrete floor by 4 bolts, 7/8 inch diame er, cast into the concrete floor.
The three diesel generator oil priming tanks are located at the north-west corner of Unit 1 turbine building at elevation 85.
Each tank consists of stainless steel cylinder, 16 inch diameter and 13.25 inch tall with a flat top and bottom.
The tanks are mounted on top of a steel pipe,'3 inch tall, 4 inch diameter, schedule 40 A-53.
The tank is supported laterally by two horizontal perpendicular braces anchored to the adjacent walls at elevation 92.
Each tank has a level indicator mounted external to the cylinder.
Each tank assembly weighs 198 lbs, filled with fuel oil, and the support pipe weighs 93 lbs.
The pipe support is anchored to the concrete floor at elevation 85 by four bolts.
'i.~
~ -cedure and methodology used by RLCA to evaluate the tank sample is summarized in the following steps.
l.
Acquire drawings and specifications and trace quality assurance for each document.
2.
Establish design criteria (FSAR, HOSGRI,CRITERIA,
- CODES, REG GUIDES).
3.
Establish envelope response spectra for each tank considering all tank locations, using the Hosgri Report response spectra and damping.
4.
Perform field inspection to confirm tank locations, mounting, apertenances and other design features'.
Estimate fundamental natural frequency using a simple, single lumped
- mass, single spring model.
The sloshing effect of the contained fluid was accounted for by using procedures from TID 7024 chapter six.
6.
Using the fundamental frequency estima.es, determine the corresponding acceleration from the envelope response spectra established above.
7.
Compare the seismic loading to that employed in the original design and adopt the more conservative loading.
8.
Use the equivalent static load method to evaluate the s.ructural adequacy of the tanks by:
a.
applying horizontal and vertical seismic loads at the center of gravity of the tanks, b.
evaluating the stresses at critical locations (based on the analyist's judgements) using s.andard engineering hand calcula ion formula and/or finite element computer program.
9.
Compare the computed stresses with allowable based on FSAR commitments as modified by the Hosgri Report.
lO.
Compare the computed stresses with those presented in the design reports.
Each step above was performed by one individual.and checked by another.
A complete documentation file was maintained.
LVALUATEON In some instances the RLCA calculations were'more detailed and comprehensive than the original PGSE design calculations, i.e.
RLCA computed stresses at more locations or considered more design features than did PGEE in their origial design calculations.
Specific examples are:
In ihe eva'luation of the di'esel generator starting air receiver tank support ski rt for buckling, RLCA considered the combined vertical and horizontal loads while PGSE considered only the ver%ical loads.
~
~
I.
In the evaluation of stress in the weld be':;een
-.he.diesel generator starting air receiver tank support skirt ar d the lower head, RLCA developed a detailed axis-symetric finite clem nt model of the skirt-tank head region, whereas PGEE relied on the composite overall tank model to produce the stress fields.
It should be noted however that the tanks were originally designed to Section VIII of the ASt1E Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code which could, by usual practice at the time of ttie'riginal aesign, be interperted to nol require as comprehensive an analysis as the one performed by RLCA.
RLCA followed good current engineering practice in performing this
. review.
The staff audit of RLCA was based on the ITR 3.
During the course of the audit, the staff reviewed the hand and selected computer calculations prepared by RLCA, the RLCA field notes and the construction drawings for the tanks.
The staff found that the hand calculations and computer analyses were well documented and reflected a full technical understanding of the design requirements for the equipment under review.
The calculations were properly based on the construction drawings and field verification of the actual tank configurations.
The calculations showed the tanks were able to withstand the postulated loadings using current ASME code requirements.
Based on our review of ITR 3 and the subsequent audit of the evaluation, procedures and methods used by RLCA, the staff concurs with the IDVP conclusions that the methodology, employed for desian of the class of tanks sampledwas appropriate and that the tanks
.are capable of withstanding the specified seismic loading.
Should subsequent reevaluation by the PG8E/Bechtel Diablo Canyon Project Corrective Action Program show that the input spectra are changed, the impact of that change must be assessed for the tanks evaluated.
I 4
INTERIH TECHNICAL REPORT 4
REPORT TITLE:
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 - Independent Design Verification Program - Shake Table Testing - Rev. 0, dated July 23, 1982 (P 105-4-839-004)
ORIGINATOR:
Robert L. Cloud Associates, Inc.
(RLCA)
INTRODUCTION The fourth interim technical report (ITR 4) for the Diablo Canyon Independent Design Verification Program
( IDVP) has been reviewed by the
'taff.
This report was also selected for a staff audit of the IDVP
,.process and the activities of RLCA in particular.
The audit was conducted on September 8,
9 and 10, 1982 at the offices of R. L. Cloud and Associates (RLCA) in Berkeley, California.
The purpose of ITR 4 was to determine if the seismic testing procedure for Class IE electrical equipment and instrumentation for Diablo Canyon conformed to the licensing criteria.
The equipment considered in ITR 4 was the electrical eqdipment and instruments listed in Table 10-1 of the Hosgri Report that were qualified by PGSE or a seismic service-related contractor.'he content of the report is not entirely consistent with the title.
ITR 4 addresses only verification of the spectra identified for use in the test programs, while the title may imply a complete verification of shake test methods including equipment test mounting and its correspondence to field conditions, test anomalies and test procedures.
The staff understands, that these matters will be the subject of a subsequent
4
'.v,
'<4>> ~
~~~A~
< w'sec a, '...l(vA wA s'".'
~
~ ~
J.
" a
-'s'" '
q o.,
g
~
~
~ ~r x.c. a'~
=
~
7s i, d.,
w
. w 'wcMse Aa>>cevil'mih SUiCIARY OF REPORT Seven groups of items tested at Myle Laboratories were chosen as the sample.
The individual groups contained i ems from a common plant location.
Fourty-four individual items were evaluated.
The seven groups are listed below.
1.
switchgear area of the turbine building, eleva.ion 119 2.
diesel generator area of theturbine building, elevation 85 3.
- cable spreading and control room area of the auxiliary building, elevations 128 5 140 4.
battery area of auxiliary building, elevation 115 5.
switchgear area of the auxiliary building elevation 100 6.
adjacent to switchgear areas of turbine building elevation 119
\\
7.
control room of auxiliary building elevation 140 The verification of spectra used for shake table testing was undertaken follow --.he.compilation of the spectra set.
The procedures and methodology used by RLCA to evaluate the shake table testi ng sample is summarized in the following steps.
l.
Acquire a list of all PGSE and the'ir contractor supplied equipment qualified by shake table testing.
2.
Determine the locations of all equipment.
3.
Field verify all equipment locations.
4.
Establish worst case spectra for each equipment group by:
a.
following the PGSE procedures in which all equipment was segregated into seven
- groups, b.
selecting a spectrum that exhibits the greatest amplification considering all equipment locations,
s'i
's
c.
using a Hosgri Report damping value (or.he one selec ed by PGRE if the PGKE value is more conservative).
In some cases PGGE used a lower damping value which would produce a higher load and is, therefore, more conservative.
5.
Compare worst case spectra to PGFE test spectra:
a.
test spectra were considered acceptable if a line drawn through'inimum spectral acceleration values enveloped the worst case spectra by a margin of 10~ in acceleration at all frequencies except those frequencies less than.2 Hz.
Motion at frequencies less than 2
Hz was judged to be unimportant in the qualifica-tion of equipment for Diablo Canyon because either the required spectrum has a very low acceleration value at less than 2 Hz or because the equipment did not have a significant modal frequency at less than 2 Hz.
b.
for those frequencies where the 10K rule was violated, the
'e
"; spectra were accepted if a line drawn through the local mean of the test spectra exceeded 'the worst case spectra by 105 (peak accelerations with significant frequency span were grossly underestimated by the minimum curve).
6.
Compare worst case spectra to PG&E target spectra.
EVALUATION The staff review of ITR 4 was performed in conjuction with an audit of the IDVP review process of RLCA.
The audit of RLCA included review of the compilation of Hosgri spectra by RLCA, review of RLCA field audit notes taken to record actual equipment location and configuration, review of the
I
~
l
procedures for generation of target test spectra, and comparison of target spectra with actual test spectra and test procedures.
Throughout this audit, the staff found that RLCA has insti tuted a good quality control program to track the comprehensive documentation used as the evaluation basis.
The staff concludes that the procedures used by RLCA to veri 5 the shake table testing of the Class IE electrical equipment are technically sound and the conclusions reached by RLCA are supported by the facts developed.
Based on our review of ITR 4 and subsequent audit of the evaluation procedures and methods used at RLCA, the staff concurs with the IOVP conclusions that the response spectra used for shake table of Class IE electrical equipment were correctly employed.
0 Enclosure 5
IHIERIM TECHNICAL REPORT 5
REPORT TITLE:
Diablo Canyon Unit 1 - Independent Design Verification program-Design Chain-Rev.
0, August 19,
- 1982, (P 105-4-839-005)
ORIGINATOR:
Robert L. Cloud Associates, Inc.
(RLCA)
INTRODUCTION The fifth interim technica'I report
( ITR 5) "for the Diablo Canyon Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP) has been reviewed by the staff.
ITR 5 presents the Phase I design chains for Diablo Canyon.
It also summarizes the methods used by Robert L. Cloud and Associates (RLCA) to develop the design chains.
The design chains defined by RLCA illustrate the structure of the PGEE evaluation of buildings, equipment and components for the postulated 7.5M Hosgri earthquake.
The purpose of the design chains is to show internal and external PG8E interfaces, describe information passing between interfaces, and list the responsiblilities of seismic service-related contractors and PGSE internal design groups prior to June 1978.
The design chains were developed by RLCA between October 1981 and March 1982.
Six seismic service-related contractors employed by PGKE prior to June 1978 were identified.
These contractors became the basis for the quality assurance
- audit, done by R.
F.
- Reedy, Inc.
(RFR), which was also specified in the Phase I plan and is the subject of ITR 2.
SUMMARY
OF REPORT RLCA developed the design chains using the following method.
First, the Hosgri Report was reviewed to define the sample space.
- Second, a
PG&E seismic service-related contractor list was developed.
- Third, a
1 ~
selection process was used which screened out those contractors who had no significant effect on the final Hosgri plant design.
Also eliminated were contractors who performed work to establish Hosgri criteria or were involved in construction or field modifications.
In early October,
- 1981, RLCA met with PG&E management and engineering personnel to develop an initial list of PG&E contractors who performed
- analysis, design or testing for the plant from the project inception to
- June, 1978.
As a result of these
- meetings, a list was established which consisted of PG&E contract numbers, start and end dates, and brief description of work scope.
This list served as a basis for additional meetings to discuss contractor work scope in detail.
For each of the contractors, RLCA attempted to meet with the staff member responsible for the PG&E interface.
In many cases, the exact scope of the contractor's work could not be established.
Five slightly different preliminary lists were also developed by PG&E between October, 1981 and f1arch 1982.
RLCA compared these lists to the initial list.
When differences were encountered, RLCA resolved them through further meetings and discussions.
In April 1982, PG&E formally issued a list of contracts listed, "Diablo Canyon Consultant Contracts - Revision 2" ~
This list included the contract
- number, work scope, contract dollar amoun PG&E department interface an indication as to whether the work was safety-related.
RLCA verified that PG&E's formal list was consistent with the previously gathered information and adopted the formal contractor lis. for the design chain.
The design chains presented in ITR 5 are organized according to the items evaluated by PG8E for the postulated Hosgri earthquake.
Each chain represents the sequence for the evaluation of major groups of items.
Design chains for he following sixteen groups are provided:
I 1.
Bui1 ding s 9.
Electr>cal Equipment 2.
Piping 3.
Pipe Supports 4.
Heat Exchanger 5.
Tanks 6.
Pumps 7.
HVAC Equipment 10.
Instrumentation ll.
Outdoor Water Storage 12.
Buried Piping 13.
HVAC Duct Supports 14.
Buried Tanks 15.
Cranes 8.
Valves 16.
Electrical Raceway Supports Generally, the chain begins with the supplier of the drawings and response spectra generated by URS/Blume and ends with the qualification of
- -
- =- ~quipment.
Internal and external PGaE interfaces are shown in relation to the information they transmit, review. analyze or test.
ITR 5 presents the IDVP conclusion that only the following six contractors
.had,a significant effect on the seismic design and qualifications of the Diablo Canyon plant.
Applied Nucleonics Incorporated (ANCO)
Cygna Energy Services (EES)
EDS Nuclear, Inc.
(EDS)
Harding Lawson Associates (HLA)
URS/John A. Blume and Associates, Engineers (Blume)
Hyle Laboratories (Wyle)
EVALUATION The staff concurs that the format-and general content of ITR 5 satisfies the NRC requirement for definition of the design chain network required
4 v I
by Commission Order CLI-81-30 of November 19, 1981 in Phase I of the IDVP.
In the course of the staff review inquiries were made with RLCA as to the criteria for exclusion of seismic service-related contractors that were judged to have no significani effect on final plant design.
RLCA identified 2 broad categories for excluding contractors.
The first was highly specialized consultants who only participated at random times and for small dollar value contracts.
The second category was consultants or contractors whose work has been superseded by PGSE efforts or others.
The staff concludes that these were appropriate criteria for exclusion.
The staff also concurs therefore that the six contractors listed i s the appropriate group to be considered in the independent quality assurance and design qualification review.
,0 li P'4>
1