ML16340B777
| ML16340B777 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 05/27/1981 |
| From: | Eckhardt J, Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16340B778 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-275-81-10, NUDOCS 8106010361 | |
| Download: ML16340B777 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000275/1981010
Text
- U. S.'UCL~tR
REGULATORY CO,MISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEH:.siT
REGION V
. ~55-215
51-111
Do'cket No.
50-275
License
No.
CPPR-39
Safeguards
Group
Licensee:
Pacific
Gas
and Electric
Com an
P. 0.
Box 7442
San Franci sco
Cal ifornia
94106
Facility Name:
Diablo Can
on Unit
1
Inspection at: Diablo Can
on Site,
San Luis Obis
o Count
, California and Corporate Office
'Inspection
conducted:
Ma
15-21,
1981
Inspectors:
Approved By:
D.
F
Kirs
nspector.
.
H. Eckhardt,
Reactor
Inspector.-"
5
Date
igned
Date Signed
4
Date Signed
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,'u~ry:
5
D. F. Kirsch, Acting Chief, Projects
Section
1
Reactor Construction Projects
Branch
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Ins ection durin
eriod of Ma
15-21
1981:
Re ort No. 50-275 81-10),
S
Areas Ins ected:
Routine unannounced
i'nspection
by regional
based
inspectors=
o
construction
and modification activities including:
licensee action
,.
on previous inspection findings, 50.55(e)
items
and .IE Bulletins..'he
inspection involved 29 inspector
hours
by two
NRC inspectors.
Results:
Ro items ot'one'ompliance
or deviations vere identified.
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DETAILS
1;
Individuals Contacted
a.
Pacific
Gas
and Electric
Com an
+J.
B. Hoch, Nuclear Project Engineer
+M. R. Tressler,
Supervisory Project Control Engineer
+P.
D. Newell, Senior Nuclear Generation
Engineer
A. Malther, Supervising
Pipe/Mechanical
Engineer
R. C.
Howe, Senior Nuclear Generation
Engineer
J. Ante, Senior Engineer - Mechanical/Piping
T.
G. de Uriarte, Senior equality Assurance
Engineer
- R. D. Etzler, Project Superintendent
- D. A. Rockwell, Resident Electrical
Engineer
- M. E. Leppke, Resident
Mechanical
Engineer
- S. J. Foat,
gC Engineer
Various other Engineering
and
gC personnel.
b.
Pullman
Power
Products
H. Karner,
gA Manager
+
Denotes
attendees
at May 15,
1981 Exit Meeting held at the corporate office.
Denotes
attendees
at May 21,
1981 Exit Meeting held at the site.
2.
Licensee Action on Previousl
Identified Followu
Items
a.
Closed
Com letion of Com rehensive
Desi
n Reviews
Reference
I
Ins ect
on
Re orts
Nos.
-
5
-1
8-0
and
9-01
The inspector verified that the licensee
had completed the comprehensive
design
reviews for major systems,
components
and structures
by
examining the results of three quality assurance
audits addressing
this topic and
by discussions
with licensee
supervisory personnel.
The licensee
was continuing to provide minor modifications, as
required
by NUREG-0737,
and design reviews of these
smaller items
were being performed
by engineering.
The licensee
had established
a system to assure timely completion of these
design reviews using
the
Commitment
Control
System.
No items of noncompliance
or deviations
wer e identified.
C
f<~. y.
b.
Closed
En ineerin
Com letion of Pi
e
Su
ort As-Built Review
C.
The licensee
had established
a procedure for final as-built approval
of pipe supports
which addresses
frames, baseplates,
IE Bulletin 79-14 considerations
and documentation
requirements.
The procedure
assures
engineering
approval of as-built, conditions prior to field
installation
on a case-by-case
basis.
Discussions with licensee
personnel
indicated that 206 supports
had
been identified for modification, subsequent
to the licensee's
actions to resolve
IE Bulletin 79-14, includirig baseplate
modifications
required
by actions to resolve
IE Bulletin 79-02 specified concerns.
The licensee
had completed about 80Ã of the 206 modifications
and determined that no deviations
from design
had been required
for supports
completed
by the field.
(Closed
275/81-04-01
Followu
Item:
Concerns Identified
Re ardin
t e Insta
at on of Unit
1 Reactor
Vessel
Level Indication
S stem
R
S
The licensee
had taken action to increase
the Foley level of
in-process
inspections
on the
RYLIS installation.
The apparent
discrepancies,
identified in IE inspection report
50-275/81-04,
regarding Unistrut channel
tubing supports,
welding
and tube clip details
had
been adequately
resolved
by the licensee.
A Foley
NCR had
been prepared,
subsequent
to inspection/walkdown
of the
RVLIS installation, documenting
and resolving the identified
discrepancies.
The licensee
had modified the drawings of the
RVLIS to provide
welded tube fittings, instead of Swagelok fittings, wherever
possible to preclude,
to the maximum extent possible,
leakage
of contaminated
coolant from the fittings and
had
r evised
Foley
procedures
to adequately
require the installation of Swagelok
fittings in accordance
with manufacturers
recommendations.
3.
Licensee Actions on IE Bulletins
a ~
Closed for Unit I
IE Bulletin 79-13:
Crackin
in Feedwater
n
S stem
The licensee
response
to the subject bulletin was submitted
by
letter dated
December
12,
1979.
The inspector
examined
the specified
actions
and determined that they appeared
adequately
responsive
to bulletin requirements.
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b.
c,
The inspector
examined
documentation relating to the licensee's
actions on-site.
A reinspection of supports
and snubbers
installed
on the feedwater
system inside Unit 1 containment
had
been completed
identifying three supports with gaps that could not be set until
Unit 1 was operational.
These three supports
were identified
on the Commitment Control
System to assure
completion of final
gap setting.
The licensee
had radiographically
examined
the feedwater
pipe to nozzle welds
on the Unit
in October,
1979.
The inspector
examined
those radiographs
and radiographic
reader
sheets for compliance with code specified requirements.
Wo items of noncompliance
or deviations were identified.
The Unit 2 reinspections
and radiography
had not been completed,
however, requirements
to do so
had
been listed on the Commitment
Control
System to assure
accomplishment of bulletin specified
actions for Unit 2.
(Closed for Unit 1
IE Bulletin 79-28:
Possible Malfunction
of Namco Mode
E 18
Lim t Sw tc es at
E evated
Tem eratures
The licensee's
r esponse
to the subject bulletin was submitted
by letter dated
January
28,
1980 and noted that 27
Namco limit
switches with affected date
codes
had been identified at Diablo
Canyon Units
1 and
2 and indicated replacement
would be completed
by April 1,
1980.
The inspector
observed that the licensee
had identified a total
of 21 affected
Namco limit switches
during on-site inspections
(9 in Unit
1 and
12 in Unit 2).
It was further identified to
the inspector that Unit 2 replacement
work had not been completed.
The licensee
stated that a letter would be issued appropriately
revising the original response.
The inspector
examined
documentation of gasket
replacement for
the
9 Unit 1 switches installed in safety related
systems.
Inspection
documentation of gasket
change,
torquing and position switch
retest
appeared
satisfactory.
(Closed for Units
1 and
2
IE Bulletin 80-21:
Yalve Yokes
Su
lied
a co
m Foun r
Com an
Inc.
The licensee's
response
to the subject bulletin was provided by
letter dated January
21,
1981 and indicated that a final response
would be submitted after steps
were taken to check whether any
of the subject valve yokes
had
been supplied
by Diablo Canyon
valve suppliers.
-4
The inspector determined,
from discussions
with licensee
representatives
and review of vendor responses
to licensee letters requesting
such information, that no valve yokes manufactured
by Malcolm
Foundry were installed
on active valves
used in safety related
systems
at Diablo Canyon.
This bulletin is closed
upon receipt of the licensee's
final response
letter.
4.
Licensee Action on 50.55
e
Items
a ~
Deficient Auxiliar
Switches in 4
KV Circuit Breakers
The licensee
submitted
a final 50.55(e) report, dated
May 12,
1980, regarding cracks
observed
in plastic castings
used to hold
auxiliary electrical contacts
in Unit-1 safety-related
4
KV circuit
breakers
manufactured
by General
Electric Company.
The problem
does not apply to Unit 2 since acceptable
switches
were installed
in the equipment supplied for Unit 2.
The final resolution
was
to replace the faulty (SBll) switches with type SB-1 and SB-12
switches.
The modification involved 29 cubicles
(Class
1E) which
required replacement of three switches
per cubicle.
Nonconformance report DC1-80-EM-N001 and the installation, inspection
and testing records
were reviewed to ensure
the- work was complete.
In addition, the following circuit breakers
were examined to
determine that the physical
replacement
of the switches
was as
specified:
52HF15 safety injection pump no. 1-1,. 52HG11 reactor
charging
pump no. 1-3,
52HG9 reactor
char ging pump no.
1-2 and
52HH11 residual
heat removal
pump no. 1-2,
Also, the calibration
records of the crimping tools used for these
switch installations
were reviewed.
This item is closed.
b.
Deficient Low Level
Am lifiers in the Reactor protection
S stem
The licensee
submitted
a final 50.55(e) report, dated
March 9,
1981, regarding defective operation of Hagan
Model
118 low level
amplifiers used in the reactor protection system.
The resolution
of the problem was to replace all 2N699 transistors
in the 914
location of each module with 2N4383 transistors.
Inspection of
the modules for Unit 1 r evealed that
16 of the 48 modules involved
contained
the correct transistor.
Of the remaining
32 modules,
all of the
2N699 transistors
have
been replaced,
and all but
twelve of these
modules
have
been loop tested.
The installation
and testing records
were reviewed to ensure this work had
been
performed.
Also, module
E-305 was examined to ensure
the transistor
was replaced
as specified.
The transistors
in the Unit 2 modules
have not yet been replaced.
This item is closed for Unit 1.
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c.
Reduced Ultimate Tensile Values for One-inch Hilti Ex ansion
Anchors
The licensee
submitted
a final 50.55(e) report by letter dated
Nay 5, 1981.
Discussions with the licensee
indicated that the
letter should
have only addressed
resolution to Unit
1 installations,
instead of Units
1 and 2.
The licensee
stated that
a revised
report would be issued providing the required clarifications
and addressing
the safety significance of the
one Unit 1 support
'eing modified.
The inspector
discussed
the corrective actions'aken
with engineering
personnel.
Those actions
appeared
appropriate
and comprehensive.
The Unit 2 design guide had
been revised to reflect the lower
tensile values for Hilti one-inch concrete
expansion
anchors.
Unit
1 supports
had
been reanalyzed
using the reduced ultimate
tensile values with account taken of the requirements
contained
This item is closed for Unit 1 upon receipt of the licensee's
revised response.
5 .
Exit Intervihw
The inspector
met with licensee representatives,
denoted
in paragraph
1,
on Nay 15 and 21,
1981 to discuss
the scope
and findings of the corporate
office and site inspections,
respectively.
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