ML16321A463

Palo VERDE-2016-10 Final Written Exam

ML16321A463
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	11/03/2016
From:	Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV
To:	Arizona Public Service Co
GADDY V
References
Download: ML16321A463 (429)

Text

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # CE/E02 EK2.2 Importance Rating 3.5 Reactor Trip/Stabilization/Recovery: Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Reactor Trip Recovery) and the following: Facilitys heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility Proposed Question: RO 1 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 was tripped from 100% power due to degrading condenser vacuum.

• Condenser vacuum degraded to 9.0 inches HgA and stabilized.

• 40EP-9EO02, Reactor Trip, has been implemented.

In this condition, Main Feedwater Pumps _____(1)_____ available for use, and maintaining SG pressures in their normal post-trip band _____(2)_____ be accomplished using only SBCS.

A. 1. ARE

2. CAN B. 1. ARE

2. can NOT C. 1. are NOT

2. CAN D. 1. are NOT

2. can NOT Proposed Answer: A Page 1 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct. Since Main Feedwater Pumps dont trip until 13.5 inches HgA, they are still available and although SBCS valves 1001-1006 are locked out due to the degraded vacuum, SBCS 1007-1008 are still available and can maintain SG pressure in the normal post-trip band.

B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the SBCS interlock actuates at 5.5 inches backpressure, however SBCS valves 1007 and 1008 are still available and will maintain SG pressures in their normal post-trip pressure band.

C. First part is plausible as Main Feed Pumps do trip on low vacuum, however not until vacuum degrades to 13.5 inches HgA. Second part is correct.

D. First part is plausible as Main Feed Pumps do trip on low vacuum, however not until vacuum degrades to 13.5 inches HgA. Second part is plausible since the SBCS interlock actuates at 5.5 inches backpressure, however SBCS valves 1007 and 1008 are still available and will maintain SG pressures in their normal post-trip pressure band.

Technical Reference(s) 40EP-9EO02, Reactor Trip Attached w/ Revision # See 40AL-9RK6A, Panel B06A Alarm Comments / Reference Responses Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 3051 - Given a reactor trip event, direct or perform instructions and contingencies per 40EP-9EO02, Reactor Trip Question Source: Bank Modified Bank x (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 2 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Original Question Revision 1 ID: Q44120 Points: 1.00 Given the following conditions:

• The BOP operator reports a degrading vacuum in the main condenser.

• The CRS has entered 40AO-9ZZ07, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.

Subsequently

• The Reactor is tripped due to the degrading vacuum.

• Alarm window 6A16B, SBCS COND INTLK, has annunciated.

• Alarm window 6A16D, COND VAC LO has annunciated.

• Condenser backpressure is 14.0" HgA (all shells).

What actions are required to control the listed secondary parameters?

Steam Generator level can be maintained by (1)

RCS temperature can be maintained by (2)

A. (1) AFW only (2) ADVs only B. (1) AFW or MFW (2) ADVs only C. (1) AFW only (2) ADVs or SBCVs D. (1) AFW or MFW (2) ADVs or SBCVs Answer: C Page 3 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO02, Reactor Trip Revision # 12 Comments /

Reference:

40AL-9RK6A, Panel B06A Alarm Responses Revision # 16 Page 4 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AL-9RK6A, Panel B06A Alarm Responses Revision # 16 Page 5 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 008 AA2.23 Importance Rating 3.6 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: Criteria for throttling high-pressure injection after a small LOCA Proposed Question: RO 2 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 was tripped from 100% power due to a Pressurizer Safety lifting and sticking open.

• SPTAs have been performed and the CRS has entered 40EP-9EO03, LOCA.

• The RCS is 35°F subcooled and stable.

• Indicated Pressurizer level is 90% and slowly rising.

• Both SGs are 15% NR and slowly rising, being fed from AFB-P01.

• QSPDS shows two HJTCs are uncovered in the vessel head (41% level in the head).

• Containment temperature is 150°F and slowly rising.

• Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitors RU-148 and RU-149 indicate 6.5 x 102 mR/hr and slowly rising.

The CRS directs you to determine whether or not HPSI throttle criteria is currently satisfied, per Standard Appendix 2, HPSI Throttle Criteria.

HPSI throttle criteria A. IS currently satisfied.

B. IS NOT satisfied due to voiding in the vessel head.

C. IS NOT satisfied due to insufficient level in the SGs.

D. IS NOT satisfied due to insufficient RCS subcooling.

Page 6 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer: A Explanation:

A. Correct. All criteria are satisfied per SA 2.

B. Plausible as there is voiding in the upper head, however level in the upper head needs to be 16%

or more to throttle HPSI, therefore with level in the upper head is at 67%, inventory is sufficient.

C. Plausible as level in the SGs is 30% less than the normal post trip SG level control band, however since level is being restored, it meets HPSI throttle criteria.

D. Plausible since subcooling would be insufficient if containment conditions were harsh, and it is plausible that containment conditions are harsh since temperature and radiation levels are significantly higher than normal levels, however containment temperature and radiation levels are below the threshold for declaring harsh containment conditions.

Technical Reference(s) 40EP-9EO03, LOCA Attached w/ Revision # See QSPDS System Tech Manual Comments / Reference 40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendix 2 Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8593 - Given condition of safety injection flow following a transient, analyze whether it is permissible to throttle HPSI flow Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 7 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO03, LOCA Revision # 36 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendix 2 Revision # 91 Comments /

Reference:

QSPDS System Tech Manual Revision #2 Page 8 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 009 EA2.36 Importance Rating 4.2 Small Break LOCA: Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: Difference between overcooling and LOCA indications Proposed Question: RO 3 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to a failed closed Economizer Isolation valve on SG #1.

• SPTAs have just been completed.

• The following conditions exist:

o Pressurizer level is 10% and lowering.

o Pressurizer pressure is 1700 psia and lowering.

o The 1A and 2A RCPs have been tripped.

o SG #1 level is 50% WR and rising.

o SG #2 level is 15% NR and rising.

o RCS subcooling is 20°F subcooled and slowly degrading.

o Containment pressure is 2.5 psig and slowly rising.

The CRS should enter _____(1)_____ and the crew should _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 40EP-9EO03, LOCA

2. maintain forced circulation with 1B and 2B RCPs B. 1. 40EP-9EO03, LOCA

2. trip the 1B and 2B RCPs and verify natural circulation C. 1. 40EP-9EO05, ESD

2. maintain forced circulation with 1B and 2B RCPs D. 1. 40EP-9EO05, ESD

2. trip the 1B and 2B RCPs and verify natural circulation Page 9 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer: B Explanation:

A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since two pumps were correctly tripped due to remaining below the SIAS setpoint, however since RCS subcooling has dropped below 24°F subcooled, the remaining RCPs need to also be tripped.

B. Correct.

C. ESD is plausible since Pressurizer level and pressure would lower and there would be a drastic difference between SG levels, however RCS subcooling would be abnormally high in an ESD instead of low. Second part is plausible since two pumps were correctly tripped due to remaining below the SIAS setpoint, however since RCS subcooling has dropped below 24°F subcooled, the remaining RCPs need to also be tripped.

D. ESD is plausible since Pressurizer level and pressure would lower and there would be a drastic difference between SG levels, however RCS subcooling would be abnormally high in an ESD instead of low. Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40EP-9EO01, Standard Post Trip Actions Attached w/ Revision # See 40EP-9EO03, LOCA Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8675 - Given conditions of a LOCA, analyze whether or not entry into the LOCA EOP is appropriate Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5 55.43 Page 10 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO01, Standard Post Trip Actions Revision # 20

• The main indication of an RCS break is that RCS subcooling is 20°F and lowering.

• None of the bullets below are present, making SGTR not plausible.

Page 11 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO03, LOCA Revision # 36 Page 12 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 011 EK3.13 Importance Rating 3.8 Large Break LOCA: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Large Break LOCA: Hot-leg injection/recirculation Proposed Question: RO 4 Following a large break LOCA, Standard Appendix 100, Hot Leg Injection, is implemented in order to _____(1)_____ and should NOT be initiated until a MINIMUM of _____(2)_____ have elapsed since the start of the LOCA.

A. 1. minimize the potential for boron precipitation which could restrict flow through the core

2. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> B. 1. minimize the potential for boron precipitation which could restrict flow through the core

2. 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> C. 1. ensure sufficient boron exists in the core to prevent core restart as RCS temperature lowers

2. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> D. 1. ensure sufficient boron exists in the core to prevent core restart as RCS temperature lowers

2. 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Proposed Answer: A Page 13 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. First part is correct. 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> is plausible since hot leg injection must be initiated no later than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> have elapsed since the LOCA, however the minimum wait time to initiate is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

C. First part is plausible since RCS temperature will lower which can result in reduced SDM, however the reason for hot leg injection is to minimize boron precipitation. Second part is correct.

D. First part is plausible since RCS temperature will lower which can result in reduced SDM, however the reason for hot leg injection is to minimize boron precipitation. 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> is plausible since hot leg injection must be initiated no later than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> have elapsed since the LOCA, however the minimum wait time to initiate is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Technical Reference(s) 40EP-9EO03, LOCA Attached w/ Revision # See 40DP-9AP08, LOCA Technical Guidelines Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8659 - Given conditions of a LOCA, describe the bases of the times associated with the initiation of simultaneous hot and cold leg injection Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 2 55.43 Page 14 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO03, LOCA Revision # 36 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9AP08, LOCA Technical Guidelines Revision # 25 Page 15 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 015/17 AK1.02 Importance Rating 3.7 RCP Malfunctions: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): Consequences of an RCPS failure Proposed Question: RO 5 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 3 was operating at 100% when RCP 1A experienced a sheared shaft.

1. Based on these conditions, the FIRST RPS trip signal received will be

2. During the performance of SPTAs, if RCS inventory and/or pressure control is challenged (but adequate RCP NPSH remains), the crew should also trip RCP A. 1. Low DNBR

2. 2A B. 1. Low DNBR

2. 2B C. 1. Low RC Flow SG 1

2. 2A D. 1. Low RC Flow SG 1

2. 2B Proposed Answer: C Page 16 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since the low DNBR trip will be received, however it will not be calculated and actuated until after the low RC flow trip comes in. Second part is correct.

B. First part is plausible since the low DNBR trip will be received, however it will not be calculated and actuated until after the low RC flow trip comes in. Second part is plausible since a loop 2 RCP will be tripped, however to avoid RCP bearing damage the correct pump to trip is 2A.

C. Correct. The reactor will trip on low RC flow as this will occur virtually immediately and low DNBR is a calculated value which would then result in a trip signal, however it will not be the first trip signal in this case. RCP 2A would be the next pump to be tripped since they are in opposite loops and RCP 2A running solely in conjunction with 1B can result in bearing damage.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since a loop 2 RCP will be tripped, however to avoid RCP bearing damage the correct pump to trip is 2A.

Technical Reference(s) PPS System Technical Manual Attached w/ Revision # See EOP Operations Expectations Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8339 - Given actual or simulated emergency events, apply the Operations Expectations to the EOP guidance in accordance with the EOP Operations Expectations Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 17 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PPS System Technical Manual Revision # 2 Comments /

Reference:

PPS System Technical Manual Revision # 2 Page 18 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

EOP Operations Expectations Revision # 21 Page 19 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 022 AA2.03 Importance Rating 3.1 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Failures of flow control valve or controller Proposed Question: RO 6 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 3 is operating at 100% power, MOC.

• Auto makeup to the VCT is in progress.

Which of the following failures (individually) would cause the auto makeup to the VCT to stop?

1. VCT level transmitter, CHN-LT-227, fails to 100%

2. CHN-FIC-210X, RMW to VCT flow controller, fails to 100% output

3. CHN-FIC-210Y, Boric Acid Makeup to VCT flow controller, fails to 100% output A. 1 ONLY B. 2 ONLY C. 1 and 3 ONLY D. 2 and 3 ONLY Proposed Answer: D Page 20 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible since high level in the VCT will stop auto make up, however LT-226 controls the auto make up signal, not LT-227.

B. Plausible since 210X failing to 100% output will stop auto make up, however 210Y failing to 100%

will also stop auto make up. The system is designed such that a flow deviation of +/- 10 gpm will stop auto makeup to prevent an inadvertent dilution or boration during auto makeup operations.

C. Plausible since high level in the VCT will stop auto make up, however LT-226 controls the auto make up signal, not LT-227. 210Y failing to 100% is correct.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) CVCS System Tech Manual Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 11295 - Describe the Control Room controls and indications associated with the Volume Control Tank Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 6 55.43 Page 21 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

References:

CVCS System Tech Manual Revision # 7 Page 22 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 025 G 2.2.44 Importance Rating 4.2 Loss of RHR System: Ability to interpret control room indications to verity the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

Proposed Question: RO 7 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is in MODE 5

• Train A LPSI Pump is being used for SDC

• Train B LPSI Pump suction is still aligned to the RWT.

Subsequently:

• 5B06A, Leg 1-3 RAS A Leg 2-4, annunciates (top and bottom halves).

• RWT level is 90% and stable.

What is the impact to SDC, and how should the crew restore SDC flow per 40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Actuations?

A. The A LPSI Pump will trip resulting in a loss of SDC. Restore SDC by placing Train B SDC in service.

B. The A LPSI Pump will trip resulting in a loss of SDC. Restore SDC by overriding and restarting the A LPSI Pump.

C. The A LPSI Pump will cavitate resulting in degraded SDC. Restore SDC by placing Train B SDC in service.

D. The A LPSI Pump will cavitate resulting in degraded SDC. Restore SDC by overriding and closing Containment Sump to SI Train A valves SIA-UV-673 and SIA-UV-674.

Proposed Answer: B Page 23 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Page 24 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible since the A LPSI Pump will trip causing a loss of SDC, and transitioning to Train B per the normal operating SDC procedure is a potential option, however the correct action is to override and restart the pump per 40AO-9ZZ17 .

B. Correct.

C. Plausible that the A LPSI Pump would cavitate since the suction valves from the containment sump open on a RAS signal, however the pump will trip.

D. Plausible that the A LPSI Pump would cavitate since the suction valves from the containment sump open on a RAS signal, however the pump will trip.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Attached w/ Revision # See Actuations Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2466 - Determine the impact of an inadvertent RAS actuation and the actions needed to restore plant stability Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 25 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ17 Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Actuations Revision # 21 Page 26 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ17 Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Revision # 21 Actuations Page 27 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ17 Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Revision # 21 Actuations Page 28 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 026 AA1.07 Importance Rating 2.9 Loss of Component Cooling Water: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: Flow rates to the components and systems that are serviced by the CCWS; interactions among the components Proposed Question: RO 8 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

• Both Nuclear Cooling Water Pumps have tripped on 86 lockout.

• 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water, Appendix A, Cross-Connect EW to NC, is in progress.

The RO will direct the AO to throttle EWA-HCV-53, SDCHX A Outlet Isolation, until cooling flow to each RCP has been restored to a MINIMUM of _____(1)_____ or EW system flow lowers to _____(2)_____, whichever happens first.

A. 1. 163 gpm

2. 8500 gpm B. 1. 163 gpm

2. 13,800 gpm C. 1. 491 gpm

2. 8500 gpm D. 1. 491 gpm

2. 13,800 gpm Proposed Answer: C Page 29 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible because this is the minimum required NC flow to the RCP HP Coolers, Thrust Bearing Lube Oil Coolers, and Seal Coolers, however the minimum flow to clear the low NC flow alarm is 491 gpm.

B. First part is plausible because this is the minimum required NC flow to the RCP HP Coolers, Thrust Bearing Lube Oil Coolers, and Seal Coolers, however the minimum flow to clear the low NC flow alarm is 491 gpm. Second part is plausible because 13,800 gpm is the low end of the normal EW system flow for manual EW Train A operations.

C. Correct.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible because 13,800 gpm is the low end of the normal EW system flow for manual EW Train A operations.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water Attached w/ Revision # See RC Pump Cooler Outlet Flow Instrument Comments / Reference Calculations 40OP-9EW01, Essential Cooling Water System Train A Nuclear Cooling System Technical Manual Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 6127 - Given a loss of NC, describe how flow to the RCPs is increased after EW has been cross tied in accordance with 40AO-9ZZ03 Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 30 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

RC Pump Cooler Outlet Flow Instrument Revision # 3 Calculations The values on the left are flow alarm actuation and reset. 450/459 are for NCA-F-474/475/476/477 and 475/481 are for NCB-F-494/495/496/497. Since the higher of the reset values is 481, and the range for this reset value is 470-490, I went with 480 gpm as the minimum flow to reset all of the NC LO FLOW alarms.

Page 31 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water, Revision # 9 Appendix A, Cross-connect EW to NC Page 32 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40OP-9EW01, Essential Cooling Water Revision # 9 System (EW) Train A The EW A System Operating Procedure shows that the normal flow rate band is between 13,800 gpm and 14,800 gpm.

Comments /

Reference:

Nuclear Cooling System Technical Manual Revision # 4 Page 33 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 027 AK2.03 Importance Rating 2.6 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction: Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions and the following: Controllers and positioners Proposed Question: RO 9 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

• RCN-HS-100, Pressure Control Channel X/Y Selector, is selected to Channel X.

Subsequently:

• RCN-PT-100X, Pressurizer Control Channel X, failed to 100%.

With no operator action, RCN-PIC-100, Pressurizer Pressure Control, output will go to

_____(1)_____ and Steam Bypass Control System _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 0%

2. Auto Modulate Permissive Light will illuminate B. 1. 0%

2. Auto Modulation Setpoint will lower by approximately 220 psig C. 1. 100%

2. Auto Modulate Permissive Light will illuminate D. 1. 100%

2. Auto Modulation Setpoint will lower by approximately 220 psig Proposed Answer: D Page 34 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part plausible that PIC-100 output would go to 0% since the system senses high pressure and PIC-100 controls proportional heater output, however 0% output on PIC-100 will produce maximum heating from the proportional heaters. Second part is plausible since auto modulate permissive signals would be received on a high failure of PT-100Y, however this is not the case if PT-100X fails high.

B. First part plausible that PIC-100 output would go to 0% since the system senses high pressure and PIC-100 controls proportional heater output, however 0% output on PIC-100 will produce maximum heating from the proportional heaters. Second part is correct.

C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since auto modulate permissive signals would be received on a high failure of PT-100Y, however this is not the case if PT-100X fails high.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) PPCS System Tech Manual Attached w/ Revision # See PVNGS Operator Information Manual Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8610 - Describe the response of the PPCS to a failure of an input transmitter Question Source: Bank Modified Bank x (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 35 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Original Question Revision 36 ID: Q44124 Points: 1.00 Given the following plant conditions:

• The Unit is operating at 100% power.

• The selected Pressurizer pressure transmitter, PT-100Y, fails HIGH.

Assuming NO operator action, which ONE of the following identifies the effect of this failure on the:

1) Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS)?

2) Output of the Master Pressure Controller?

A. 1) modulate signal biases downward

2) goes to MINIMUM output B. 1) modulate signal biases downward

2) goes to MAXIMUM output C. 1) permissive signal biases downward

2) goes to MINIMUM output D. 1) permissive signal biases downward

2) goes to MAXIMUM output Answer: D Page 36 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PPCS System Tech Manual Revision # 5 Page 37 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS Operator Information Manual Revision # June 2015 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS Operator Information Manual Revision # June 2015 Page 38 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 029 EK2.06 Importance Rating 2.9 ATWS: Knowledge of the interrelations between the following and an ATWS: Breakers, relays, and disconnects Proposed Question: RO 10 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 was operating at 100% power.

• Reactor Power Cutback System was out of service for testing.

• A Main Turbine trip occurred.

• The Reactor Protection System failed to trip the reactor, resulting in an ATWS.

How will the Supplemental Protection System (SPS) respond to trip the reactor?

SPS will open

1. Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers

2. L03 and L10 supply breakers

3. CEDMCS MG Set output contactors A. 1 ONLY B. 2 ONLY C. 1 and 3 ONLY D. 2 and 3 ONLY Proposed Answer: C Page 39 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible since the RTCBs do open and on an ATWS, however CEDMCS MG Set output contactors also open on an SPS signal.

B. Plausible since this is the manual action taken by the crew in the event of an ATWS, however SPS does not open these breakers automatically.

C. Correct.

D. Plausible since the CEDMCS MG Set output contactors do open on an SPS signal, and L03 and L10 breakers are manually opened by the crew in response to an ATWS, however L03 and L10 are not opened by SPS.

Technical Reference(s) PPS System Tech Manual Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2369 - Describe the output functions of the Supplementary Protection System initiation relays Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 6 55.43 Page 40 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PPS System Tech Manual Revision # 2 Page 41 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 038 G 2.4.31 Importance Rating 4.2 Steam Generator Tube Rupture: Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures Proposed Question: RO 11 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power, MOC.

• A SGTL is in progress on SG #1.

• RU-139, Main Steam Line - SG #1, is in HIGH ALARM.

• RU-141, Condenser Vacuum /Gland Seal Exhaust, is in HIGH ALARM.

• Both alarms have been confirmed to be valid.

Per 74AL-9SQ01, Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Validation and Response, the crew will _____(1)_____ in response to the high alarm on RU-139 and will _____(2)_____ in response to the high alarm on RU-141.

A. 1. secure blowdown from SG #1

2. perform 40DP-9ZZ14, Contaminated Water Management B. 1. secure blowdown from SG #1

2. ensure the Post Filter Mode Select Switch, is in the THRU FILTER MODE C. 1. ensure AFA-P01 is not running

2. perform 40DP-9ZZ14, Contaminated Water Management D. 1. ensure AFA-P01 is not running

2. ensure the Post Filter Mode Select Switch, is in the THRU FILTER MODE Proposed Answer: B Page 42 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since this action is directed in the Excessive RCS Leakrate (for SGTL) AOP and is a logical action to take in response to high activity in the main steam line, however this is not directed in the RM ARP.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible since use of AFA-P01 with a SGTL in progress creates a direct release to the environment, however this action is not directed in the RM ARP. Second part is plausible since this action is directed in the Excessive RCS Leakrate (for SGTL) AOP and is a logical action to take in response to high activity in the main steam line, however this is not directed in the RM ARP.

D. First part is plausible since use of AFA-P01 with a SGTL in progress creates a direct release to the environment, however this action is not directed in the RM ARP. Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) 74AL-9SQ01, Radiation Monitoring System Attached w/ Revision # See Alarm Validation and Response Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 14859 - As an operating crew, mitigate excessive RCS leakage into the SGs Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 11 55.43 Page 43 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

74AL-9SQ01, Radiation Monitoring System Revision 0 Alarm Validation and Response Comments /

Reference:

74AL-9SQ01, Radiation Monitoring System Revision 0 Alarm Validation and Response Page 44 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 054 EK1.1 Importance Rating 3.2 Loss of Main Feedwater: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Loss of Feedwater):

Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems Proposed Question: RO 12 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 has tripped from 100% power due to a loss of both Main Feedwater Pumps.

• AFA-P01 and AFB-P01 are unavailable for use.

• The CO has started AFN-P01 and commenced feeding both SGs.

Subsequently:

• An inadvertent Train A SIAS occurred.

• The CO has taken the AFN-P01 handswitch to the START position one time.

AFN-P01 A. is running and feeding both SGs.

B. is running, but not feeding either SG due to the Main Feedwater Block Valves losing power.

C. is NOT running. The handswitch must be taken to STOP then START to start the pump.

D. is NOT running. The pump can be started solely by taking the handswitch directly to START.

Proposed Answer: C Page 45 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible as this would normally start AFN, however the normal starting circuit is blocked due to the inadvertent SIAS. Since AFN was initially lined up to feed, feeding would recommence if AFN was running.

B. Plausible as this would normally start AFN, however the normal starting circuit is blocked due to the inadvertent SIAS. Plausible that the SG would not be feeding since SIAS does kill power to the block valves, however those valves fail as is.

C. Correct. Taking the handswitch to stop overrides the SIAS stop signal and taking the handswitch back to start will start the pump.

D. Plausible as the pump will need to be manually started following the SIAS signal, however it must be taken to stop first in order to start the pump.

Technical Reference(s) LOIT Aux Feedwater Lesson Plan Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 10480 - Describe the automatic functions / interlocks associated with AFN-P01 Question Source: Bank X - PVNGS Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? Yes, 2013 RO Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 46 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Aux Feedwater Lesson Plan Revision #6 Page 47 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 055 EA1.07 Importance Rating 4.3 Station Blackout: Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a Station Blackout: Restoration of power from offsite Proposed Question: RO 13

1. During a station blackout, the PREFERRED Class 4kV Bus to align an SBOG to is

2. Aligning the SBOG to the preferred bus within one hour of the blackout should provide enough electrical capacity to satisfy the coping time of ________ hours.

A. 1. PBA-S03

2. 4 B. 1. PBA-S03

2. 16 C. 1. PBB-S04

2. 4 D. 1. PBB-S04

2. 16 Proposed Answer: B Page 48 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> used to be the blackout coping time at PVNGS, however modifications have increased that time to 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.

B. Correct.

C. Plausible that the SBOG would be aligned to PBB-S04 since it is the fire hardened class bus and alignment to PBB-S04 is allowed, however PBA-S03 is preferred since energizing the battery chargers on train A ensures continued availability of the steam driven aux feedwater pump.

Second part is plausible since 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> used to be the blackout coping time at PVNGS, however modifications have increased that time to 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.

D. Plausible that the SBOG would be aligned to PBB-S04 since it is the fire hardened class bus and alignment to PBB-S04 is allowed, however PBA-S03 is preferred since energizing the battery chargers on train A ensures continued availability of the steam driven aux feedwater pump.

Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) LOIT Blackout Lesson Plan Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 16181 - Describe the blackout coping strategy.

Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 49 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO08, Blackout Revision # 23 Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Blackout Lesson Plan Revision # 6 Page 50 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Blackout Lesson Plan Revision # 6 Page 51 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 056 AK1.01 Importance Rating 3.7 Loss of Off-Site Power: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Offsite Power: Principle of cooling by natural convection Proposed Question: RO 14 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to a loss of off-site power.

• The crew is verifying natural circulation has been established.

As natural circulation flow develops, the crew should expect to see loop T indicating

_____(1)_____ 65°F and should expect a delay of approximately _____(2)_____ before the RCS temperature response of feeding and steaming adjustments can be verified.

A. 1. less than

2. 1 to 2 minutes B. 1. less than

2. 5 to 15 minutes C. 1. greater than

2. 1 to 2 minutes D. 1. greater than

2. 5 to 15 minutes Proposed Answer: B Page 52 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is correct. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since frequent adjustments of steaming and feeding are needed when controlling in manual (as is the case in a LOOP/LOFC) in order to maintain parameters within post-trip control bands, however in natural circulation conditions, the plant response to these adjustments will not be seen for ~ 5 to 15 minutes.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible since the driving head in natural circulation is developed by the difference in density between the hot and cold legs, therefore a higher delta-T than with forced circulation is plausible, however delta-T must be < 65°F (full power delta-T) in natural circulation conditions.

Second part is plausible since frequent adjustments of steaming and feeding are needed when controlling in manual (as is the case in a LOOP/LOFC) in order to maintain parameters within post-trip control bands, however in natural circulation conditions, the plant response to these adjustments will not be seen for ~ 5 to 15 minutes.

D. First part is plausible since the driving head in natural circulation is developed by the difference in density between the hot and cold legs, therefore a higher delta-T than with forced circulation is plausible, however delta-T must be < 65°F (full power delta-T) in natural circulation conditions.

Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40DP-9AP13 Blackout Technical Guideline Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 9861 - Given the conditions of natural circulation, identify the change in parameters associated with establishing single phase and two phase natural circulation Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 2 55.43 Page 53 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9AP13 Blackout Technical Guideline Revision #22 Page 54 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 057 AA1.01 Importance Rating 3.7 Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Manual inverter swapping Proposed Question: RO 15 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

• Inverter PNC-N13 Bypass Disconnect Switch is in the Static Switch to Load position.

• The supply breaker to inverter PNC-N13 was inadvertently opened at PKC-M43.

Based on these conditions, PNC-D27 will A. NOT automatically align to its alternate power supply. Power can be restored by manually pressing the Reverse Transfer pushbutton.

B. Automatically align to its alternate power supply and will automatically transfer back to its normal source when the inverter is re-energized.

C. NOT automatically align to its alternate power supply. Power can be restored by manually placing the Bypass Disconnect Switch to the Bypass Switch to Load position.

D. Automatically align to its alternate power supply and can be manually realigned to its normal source when the inverter is re-energized by pressing the Forward Transfer pushbutton.

Proposed Answer: D Page 55 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible that it will NOT auto align to the alternate source since unit 1 does not have static switches with automatic switching capabilities. Also, the examinee may very well think that the reverse transfer pushbutton reverses the last transfer, which would realign the bus to the normal source.

B. Plausible since it will auto transfer to the alternate source, however it will not auto transfer back to the normal source.

C. Plausible that it will NOT auto align to the alternate source since unit 1 does not have static switches with automatic switching capabilities. Also plausible that the transfer would not automatically happen since the bypass disconnect switch is in the STATIC (meaning not moving) position.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) LOIT Lesson Plan, 120 VAC Class IE Attached w/ Revision # See Instrument Power Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 10279 - Explain the operation of the Static Transfer Switch which is provided on Inverters in Units 2 and 3 Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 56 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan, 120 VAC Class IE Instrument Revision #4 Power Page 57 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 058 AA2.03 Importance Rating 3.5 Loss of DC Power: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: DC loads lost; impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems Proposed Question: RO 16 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 has tripped from 100% power due to a complete loss of feed water.

• A fault on PKA-M41 has caused the A Battery Charger Output Breaker, PKA-M4104, to trip.

• AFA-P01 and AFB-P01 are unavailable for use.

In order to start Auxiliary Feedwater Pump AFN-P01, the crew must dispatch an AO to manually _____(1)_____ and once AFN-P01 has been started, feed flow to both SGs

_____(2)_____ .

A. 1. open AFN-P01 Suction Valves HV-1 and HV-4

2. can be controlled from the control room B. 1. open AFN-P01 Suction Valves HV-1 and HV-4

2. must be controlled via manual valve operation in the field C. 1. align AFN-P01 control power to the alternate source

2. can be controlled from the control room D. 1. align AFN-P01 control power to the alternate source

2. must be controlled via manual valve operation in the field Proposed Answer: C Page 58 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since HV-1 and HV-4 must be open to start AFN-P01 and both valves are train A motor operated valves, however the control power is AC. Second part is plausible since AFA would require manual valve operation in the field to feed the SGs, however the feed valves from AFN-P01 would still be able to be controlled from the control room.

B. First part is plausible since HV-1 and HV-4 must be open to start AFN-P01 and both valves are train A motor operated valves, however the control power is AC. Second part is correct.

C. Correct.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since AFA would require manual valve operation in the field to feed the SGs, however the feed valves from AFN-P01 would still be able to be controlled from the control room.

Technical Reference(s) LOIT Lesson Plan, Aux Feedwater Attached w/ Revision # See 40AO-9ZZ13, Loss of Class Instrument and Comments / Reference Control Power Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8189 - Describe the Control Room controls associated with the Non-Essential Auxiliary Feedwater Pump AFN-P01 including its indications.

Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 59 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan, NKASYC012106 Auxiliary Revision #6 Feedwater System Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ13, Loss of Class Instrument and Revision 28 Control Power Page 60 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 062 AK3.02 Importance Rating 3.6 Loss of Nuclear Service Water: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: The automatic actions (alignments) within the nuclear service water resulting from the actuation of the ESFAS Proposed Question: RO 17 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

• There was a leak in the Nuclear Cooling Water System header which resulted in a complete loss of NC.

• Train A Essential Cooling Water has been cross-connected to NC per 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water.

1. Which of the following identifies the ESFAS signal that will automatically close EWA-UV-65 and EWA-UV-145, Cross-Tie Valves to/from Nuclear Cooling Water?

2. What is the purpose of these valves closing?

A. 1. SIAS

2. To ensure Containment Isolation is maintained during accident conditions.

B. 1. SIAS

2. To ensure adequate cooling flow to the SDCHX during accident conditions.

C. 1. CSAS

2. To ensure Containment Isolation is maintained during accident conditions.

D. 1. CSAS

2. To ensure adequate cooling flow to the SDCHX during accident conditions.

Proposed Answer: B Page 61 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the NC system is divorced from the EW system on the SIAS, however containment isolation is maintained by either the CIAS or CSAS signals.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible since CSAS does isolate NC valves to containment, however SIAS closes the EW-NC cross-tie valves. Second part is plausible since the NC system is divorced from the EW system on the SIAS, however containment isolation is maintained by either the CIAS or CSAS signals.

D. First part is plausible since CSAS does isolate NC valves to containment, however SIAS closes the EW-NC cross-tie valves. Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water Attached w/ Revision # See 40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Comments / Reference Actuations Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2517 - Describe the automatic features associated with the NC/EW Crosstie Isolation Valves Question Source: Bank X - PVNGS Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? Yes, 2015 RO Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 62 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water Revision #9 From Loss of Cooling Water AOP, EWA-UV-65 and EWA-UV-145 Close on a SIAS Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Revision # 21 Acutations Page 63 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Revision # 21 Acutations And CSAS only closes NCA-UV-402 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water Revision #9 Since cross connecting diverts flow from the SDCHX to the RCPs, Closing the Cross-connect valves ensures adequate flow to the SDCHX.

Page 64 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 065 AA2.08 Importance Rating 2.9 Loss of Instrument Air: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: Failure modes of air-operated equipment Proposed Question: RO 18 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 tripped from 100% power due to a seismic event.

• ADVs are being used to maintain SG pressures in their normal post-trip bands.

Subsequently:

• A complete loss of Instrument Air occurred in the Turbine Building.

1. Due to the loss of Instrument Air, ADVs will ________ .

2. When backup nitrogen is aligned, the ADVs can be operated for a MINIMUM of ________ .

A. 1. remain open due to backup nitrogen automatically aligning to the ADVs

2. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> B. 1. remain open due to backup nitrogen automatically aligning to the ADVs

2. 13.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> C. 1. drift closed until backup nitrogen is manually aligned to the ADVs

2. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> D. 1. drift closed until backup nitrogen is manually aligned to the ADVs

2. 13.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Proposed Answer: B Page 65 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is the amount of time the ADVs would remain operational following a loss of DC power, however on a loss of IA, there will be 13.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of operational time.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible since the ADV does fail closed on a loss of instrument air, and this would be the correct failure method if nitrogen had to be manually aligned, however nitrogen is automatically aligned keeping the ADV in its current position on the loss of IA. Second part is plausible since 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> is the amount of time the ADVs would remain operational following a loss of DC power, however on a loss of IA, there will be 13.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> of operational time.

D. First part is plausible since the ADV does fail closed on a loss of instrument air, and this would be the correct failure method if nitrogen had to be manually aligned, however nitrogen is automatically aligned keeping the ADV in its current position on the loss of IA.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ06, Loss of Instrument Air Attached w/ Revision # See 125 VDC Class Power Lesson Plan Comments / Reference Instrument Air Lesson Plan Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 9542 - Determine the major effects on plant operation as instrument air pressure degrades Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 66 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ06 Loss of Instrument Air Revision #40 Comments /

Reference:

125 VDC Class Power Lesson Plan Revision #

Page 67 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Instrument Air Lesson Plan Revision #

Page 68 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # 001 AK3.01 Importance Rating 3.2 Continuous Rod Withdrawal: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal: Manually driving rods into position that existed before start of casualty Proposed Question: RO 19 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 3 is operating at 2% power.

• CEAs are being withdrawn for a power ascension.

• On the last CEA pull, Regulating Group 4 CEA 18 continued to withdraw after releasing the Withdraw/Insert Switch on B04.

• CEDMCS Mode Selector Switch was placed in Standby and CEA 18 stopped moving.

• CEA 18 stopped moving at 64 withdrawn.

• All other Regulating Group 4 CEAs are 56.5 withdrawn.

• I&C was able to quickly determine and correct the issue with CEA 18.

1. Per 40AO-9ZZ11, CEA Malfunctions, the crew will restore group alignment by _____(1)_____ .

2. Per LCO 3.1.5, CEA Alignment, Condition A, the two-hour completion time for re-aligning CEA 18 starts _____(2)_____ was >6.6 inches from the rest of Group 4.

A. 1. inserting CEA 18 to within 6.6 of Regulating Group 4

2. the moment CEA 18 B. 1. inserting CEA 18 to within 6.6 of Regulating Group 4

2. no more than two hours after CEA 18 C. 1. withdrawing the other 7 Regulating Group 4 CEAs to within 6.6 of CEA 18

2. the moment CEA 18 D. 1. withdrawing the other 7 Regulating Group 4 CEAs to within 6.6 of CEA 18 Page 69 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5

2. no more than two hours after CEA 18 Proposed Answer: A Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since LCO 3.1.7, Regulating CEA Insertion Limits, contains a note stating This LCO is not applicable while conducting SR 3.1.5.3 or for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> following a reactor power cutback.

C. First part is plausible since Appendix I, CEA Realignment, allows for moving the non-affected CEAs to realign all CEAs to within 6.6 of each other, and since a power ascension is in progress, it would make sense to continue moving rods out instead of in, however this is only directed if the affected CEA cannot be moved. Compliance with LCO 3.1.5 is the correct reason for the CEA realignment. Second part is correct.

D. First part is plausible since Appendix I, CEA Realignment, allows for moving the non-affected CEAs to realign all CEAs to within 6.6 of each other, and since a power ascension is in progress, it would make sense to continue moving rods out instead of in, however this is only directed if the affected CEA cannot be moved. Second part is plausible since LCO 3.1.7, Regulating CEA Insertion Limits, contains a note stating This LCO is not applicable while conducting SR 3.1.5.3 or for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> following a reactor power cutback.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ11, CEA Malfunctions Attached w/ Revision # See Technical Specifications Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8710 - Describe the required action if any CEA(s) is deviating by 6.6 inches or more from its group Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 70 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ11, CEA Malfunctions Revision #23 Page 71 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications, LCO 3.1.5 CEA Revision #23 Alignment LCO 3.1.5 contains CEA alignment actions, where LCO 3.1.7 deals with PDILs and Transient Insertion Limits.

Page 72 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Page 73 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # 024 AA2.02 Importance Rating 3.9 Emergency Boration: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration: When use of manual boration valve is needed Proposed Question: RO 20 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power.

• A boration is required to meet Reactivity Control acceptance criteria in SPTAs.

Assuming depressurizing the RCS for HPSI injection is NOT desired, which ONE of the following conditions or failures would require the use of local manual valve operation in order to borate the RCS?

A. Refueling Water Tank level of 65%.

B. A loss of BOTH Boric Acid Makeup Pumps.

C. Boric Acid Flow Controller CHN-FIC-210Y fails to zero output.

D. Makeup to CHRG PMPS (VCT Bypass) CHN-UV-527 seized closed.

Proposed Answer: A Page 74 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. Plausible since the normal boration flowpath utilizes at least one Boric Acid Makeup Pump, however in this condition a boration may still be performed using Appendix 103-D using CHE-HV-536, and all actions can be taken from the control room.

C. Plausible since the normal boration flowpath goes through CHN-FV-210Y (controlled by CHN-FIC-210Y), however if this controller is not available, the boration may still be achieved from the control room using Appendix 103-D using CHE-HV-536.

D. Plausible since the normal boration flowpath goes through CHN-UV-527, however if this controller is not available, the boration may still be achieved from the control room using Appendix 103-D using CHE-HV-536.

Technical Reference(s) PVNGS Operator Information Manual Attached w/ Revision # See 40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendices Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 6304 - Given plant conditions following a reactor trip, analyze whether the reactivity control safety function is met and what contingency actions are required if it is not, in accordance with 40EP-9EO01, SPTAs Question Source: Bank Modified Bank x (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 6 55.43 Page 75 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Original Question Page 76 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS Operator Information Manual Revision June 2015 Page 77 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendix 103 Revision #91 Manual Boration Valve operation not needed if RWT level is Page 78 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # 033 G 2.1.32 Importance Rating 3.8 Loss of Intermediate Range NI: Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions Proposed Question: RO 21 Given the following conditions:

• A reactor startup following a refueling outage is in progress on Unit 2.

• The reactor is at the ECP -1000 pcm position.

Subsequently:

• The Channel A Log Safety Channel NI failed low due to a transmitter failure.

Based on the listed conditions, what LCO actions, if any, must be taken in response to this failure?

A. Immediately determine RCS boron concentration per LCO 3.3.12, Boron Dilution Alarm System.

B. Immediately suspend positive reactivity additions per LCO 3.9.2, Nuclear Instrumentation.

C. Place the applicable RPS bistables in bypass or trip within one hour per LCO 3.3.1, RPS Instrumentation - Operating.

D. Place the applicable RPS bistables in bypass or trip within one hour per LCO 3.3.2, RPS Instrumentation - Shutdown.

Proposed Answer: D Page 79 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible since LCO 3.3.12 is applicable in MODE 3 and a failure of an NI will result in LCO 3.3.12 not being met, however the NIs which are required by LCO 3.3.12 are the startup NIs, not the log power NIs.

B. Plausible since LCO 3.9.2 requires two NIs to be operable, however LCO 3.9.2 is only applicable in MODE 6.

C. Plausible since this is the correct action to take, however LCO 3.3.1 is only applicable in MODEs 1 and 2 and at the -1000 pcm position, the unit is in MODE 3.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) Technical Specifications Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 6792 - Given conditions when an LCO is not met, apply Tech Spec Section 3.3.1 (RPS Instrumentation - Operating) for a Safety Channel NI Log Instrument failure, in accordance with Tech Spec 3.3.1 Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 80 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LCO 3.3.2 RPS Instrumentation - Shutdown, Revision #

Technical Specification Page 81 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LCO 3.3.12 BDAS, Technical Specification Revision #

Basis BDAS monitors startup neutron flux, not log power channels.

Comments /

Reference:

LCO 3.9.2 Nuclear Instrumentation Revision #

Page 82 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LCO 3.3.1 RPS Instrumentation - Operating Revision #

Page 83 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # 051 AK3.01 Importance Rating 2.8 Loss of Condenser Vacuum: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum:

Loss of steam dump capability upon loss of condenser vacuum Proposed Question: RO 22 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is operating at 50% power.

• Main Condenser vacuum is 7.0 inches HgA and slowly degrading.

• The CRS has entered 40AO-9ZZ07, Loss of Condenser Vacuum.

What action should the CRS direct and what is the reason for this action?

The CRS should direct a A. Reactor trip due to the imminent loss of both Main Feedwater Pumps.

B. Reactor trip due to the inability of SBCS to accommodate a load rejection at this power level.

C. Main Turbine trip to prevent damage to the Main Condenser due to the degrading vacuum.

D. Main Turbine trip due to the ability of the Reactor Power Cutback System and RCS to accommodate a turbine trip from this power level.

Proposed Answer: B Page 84 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible since the MFPs do trip on degraded vacuum, however the main turbine will trip first at 7.5 which will result in the reactor tripping on high RCS pressure within ~ 10 seconds of the turbine trip, therefore the loss of both main feedwater pumps will not happen until after the reactor trips on high RCS pressure.

B. Correct. Each SBCS valve can accommodate ~ 8% steam load and with only 2 SBCS valves available, a turbine trip would result in the reactor tripping on high RCS pressure and challenge primary relief valves.

C. Plausible since the condenser may incur damage due to degrading vacuum, however a turbine trip with only 2 SBCS valves available at 50% power will challenge primary relief valves.

D. Plausible since the RPCB system would be able to accommodate a load rejection from this power level, however RPCB is taken out of service at < 74% power, therefore a turbine trip at this level would result in a high RCS pressure reactor trip.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ07, Loss of Condenser Vacuum Attached w/ Revision # See SBCS System Tech Manual Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 9319 - Determine if a reactor trip OR a turbine trip is appropriate Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 85 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ07, Loss of Condenser Vacuum Revision #28 Since Condenser Vacuum is >5.5 HgA and degrading, YES is the correct answer Page 86 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

SBCS System Tech Manual Revision #3 Due to the SBCS Condenser Interlock at 5.5 HgA, SGN-HV-1007 and 1008 can only handle 14-20%

Page 87 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # 060 AK2.02 Importance Rating 2.7 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release: Knowledge of the interrelations between the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release and the following: Auxiliary building ventilation system Proposed Question: RO 23 Given the following conditions:

• A leak has occurred on a Waste Gas Decay Tank due to a crack in the tank wall.

• The waste gas is escaping to outside atmosphere through the Plant Vent.

Before the waste gas exits through the Plant Vent, the waste gas will be monitored by Radiation Monitor _____(1)_____ and will be filtered by _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. RU-12, Waste Gas Decay Tank Monitor

2. GRN-F01, Gaseous Discharge Filter B. 1. RU-12, Waste Gas Decay Tank Monitor

2. HRN-J01A/B, Radwaste Building Normal AFUs C. 1. RU-15, Waste Gas System Area Combined Ventilation Exhaust Monitor

2. GRN-F01, Gaseous Discharge Filter D. 1. RU-15, Waste Gas System Area Combined Ventilation Exhaust Monitor

2. HRN-J01A/B, Radwaste Building Normal AFUs Proposed Answer: D Page 88 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since RU-12 does monitor WGDT releases, however only during a normal WGDT release. Second part is plausible since the Gaseous Discharge Filter does filter WGDT release gas, however only during a normal release.

B. First part is plausible since RU-12 does monitor WGDT releases, however only during a normal WGDT release. Second part is correct.

C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the Gaseous Discharge Filter does filter WGDT release gas, however only during a normal release.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) Radiation Monitor System Tech Manual Attached w/ Revision # See Gaseous Radwaste System Tech Manual Comments / Reference Radwaste Building HVAC System Tech Manual Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 4056 - Describe the Gas Release Flowpaths Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 13 55.43 Page 89 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Radiation Monitor System Technical Manual Revision # 3 Comments /

Reference:

Radiation Monitor System Technical Manual Revision # 3 Page 90 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Gaseous Radwaste System Technical Manual Revision # 3 The gaseous discharge filter does filter the exhaust from the WGDTs, but only in a normal discharge.

RU-12 is the RM seen below which monitors the release of the WGDTs, but only in a normal discharge.

Page 91 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Gaseous Radwaste System Technical Manual Revision # 3 Comments /

Reference:

Radwaste Building HVAC System Technical Revision # 4 Manual Page 92 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Radwaste Building HVAC System Technical Revision # 4 Manual Waste gas from a tank leak will be sucked into the Radwaste HVAC exhaust line and will be monitored by RU-15 and filtered by the Radwaste Normal Air Filtration Units (AFUs) on its way to the plant vent.

Page 93 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # 074 EK1.01 Importance Rating 4.3 Inadequate Core Cooling: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Inadequate Core Cooling: Methods of calculating subcooling margin Proposed Question: RO 24 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 3 was tripped from 100% power due to a large break LOCA.

• On the trip, offsite power was lost.

• SPTAs have been completed.

• 40EP-9EO03, LOCA, has been entered.

• Containment temperature is 200°F and slowly rising.

• RCS pressure is currently 500 psia and stable.

• CET temperature is 530°F and stable.

• RCS Thot is 515°F and stable.

• QSPDS CET subcooling indicates 63°F superheat and stable.

• QSPDS RCS subcooling indicates 48°F superheat and stable.

Based on the current conditions, the crew should use _____(1)_____ to determine current subcooling and determine that core cooling is _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. QSPDS subcooling

2. adequate B. 1. QSPDS subcooling

2. inadequate C. 1. Standard Appendix 2, Figures

2. adequate D. 1. Standard Appendix 2, Figures

2. inadequate Proposed Answer: B Page 94 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible if RCS subcooling is used since RCS subcooling is less than the harsh containment value of 60°F superheat to determine adequate core cooling, however in natural circulation, CET subcooling is the correct parameter to use.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible since subcooling is determined using appendix 2, and appendix 2 is the required tool to use when RCS pressure is < 350 psia, however at 500 psia QSPDS subcooling is the correct tool to determine subcooling. Second part is plausible if RCS subcooling is used since RCS subcooling is less than the harsh containment value of 60°F superheat to determine adequate core cooling, however in natural circulation, CET subcooling is the correct parameter to use.

D. First part is plausible since subcooling is determined using appendix 2, and appendix 2 is the required tool to use when RCS pressure is < 350 psia, however at 500 psia QSPDS subcooling is the correct tool to determine subcooling. Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendix 2 Attached w/ Revision # See 40EP-9EO03, LOCA Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 3190 - Discuss the purpose and conditions under which the Qualified Safety Parameter Display System (QSPDS) is designed to function Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 95 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendix 2 Revision #91 Page 96 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO03, LOCA Revision #36 Page 97 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # 076 AA2.01 Importance Rating 2.7 High Reactor Coolant Activity: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity:

Location or process point that is causing an alarm Proposed Question: RO 25 An RMS alarm on _____(1)_____ , which monitor(s) radiation levels of the _____(2)_____ ,

is(are) the primary RMS indication(s) of high reactor coolant activity and possible fuel failure.

A. 1. Containment High Range Area Monitors, RU-148/149

2. 100 elevation inside Containment B. 1. Containment High Range Area Monitors, RU-148/149

2. 140 elevation inside Containment C. 1. Reactor Coolant Letdown Line Radiation Monitor, RU-155D

2. letdown line at the inlet of the Letdown Heat Exchanger D. 1. Reactor Coolant Letdown Line Radiation Monitor, RU-155D

2. letdown line between the Letdown Heat Exchanger and the Ion Exchangers Proposed Answer: D Page 98 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. RU-148/149 is plausible since they are used to determine the status of the Fuel Clad Barrier, however the primary indicator for high RCS activity is RU-155D. Monitored location is plausible since RU-1, another Containment Area RM monitors levels on the 100 elevation.

B. RU-148/149 is plausible since they are used to determine the status of the Fuel Clad Barrier, however the primary indicator for high RCS activity is RU-155D. Monitored location is correct.

C. RU-155D is correct. Plausible that RU-155D would detect radiation upstream of the letdown HX and downstream of the letdown containment isolation valve to provide earlier detection of high RCS activity than the actual monitoring point for RU-155D and while allowing for the isolation of letdown to determine if RU-155D was reading actual activity or the RM was providing false indications of high activity.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) Radiation Monitor System Tech Manual Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 4887 - Explain the operation of the Letdown Process Radiation Monitor (SQN-RE-155D) under normal operating conditions.

Question Source: Bank Modified Bank x (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 11 55.43 Page 99 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Original Question Comments /

Reference:

Radiation Monitor System Technical Manual Revision # 3 Comments /

Reference:

Radiation Monitor System Technical Manual Revision # 3 Page 100 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Radiation Monitor System Technical Manual Revision # 3 Page 101 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 1 to 25 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Radiation Monitor System Technical Manual Revision # 3 Page 102 of 102

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # CE/A13 AA1.2 Importance Rating 3.1 Natural Circulation: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations): Operating behavior characteristics of the facility Proposed Question: RO 26 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 3 was operating at 100% power.

• Fast bus transfer was blocked on NAN-S01 and NAN-S02 due to low grid voltage.

Subsequently:

• The Reactor was tripped due to a Steam Generator Tube Rupture on SG #1.

• SPTAs have been completed and the CRS has entered 40EP-9EO04, SGTR.

• The crew is preparing to conduct a cooldown and isolate SG #1.

Procedurally, the cooldown rate limit (averaged over one hour) prior to isolating SG #1 is _____(1)_____ and the cooldown rate limit following the isolation of SG #1 is _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 30°F/hr

2. 30°F/hr B. 1. 30°F/hr

2. 100°F/hr C. 1. 100°F/hr

2. 30°F/hr D. 1. 100°F/hr

2. 100°F/hr Proposed Answer: C Page 1 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible that 30°F/hr would be the cooldown rate for the entire cooldown since a rapid cooldown could potentially uncouple the primary and secondary during natural circulation, however the 30°F/hr limit is only when one SG is isolated.

B. Plausible that the cooldown rate would be limited prior to isolating the ruptured SG since we use both SGs for the initial cooldown and a 100°F/hr cooldown rate using the ruptured SG could make the tube break worsen, however the strategy is to cooldown as quick as possible to < 540°F to isolate the ruptured SG and then continue at 30°F/hr to ensure the primary and secondary do not become uncoupled with asymmetrical steaming following the SG isolation.

C. Correct.

D. Plausible that the cooldown rate would be unaffected following the SG isolation as this is true with forced circulation.

Technical Reference(s) EOP Operations Expectations Attached w/ Revision # See 40EP-9EO04, SGTR Comments / Reference 40DP-9AP09, SG Tube Rupture Technical Guideline Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8781 - Given that the SGTR EOP is being implemented, describe the SGTR EOP mitigation strategy in accordance with 40EP-9EO04, SGTR Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 14 55.43 Page 2 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

EOP Operations Expectations Revision # 21 Page 3 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO04, SGTR Revision # 30 At this point in the procedure, the most affected SG is already isolated, and the plant is operating on natural circulation, which is why the CD rate is limited to 30°F/hr.

Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan Non-Class IE Distribution Revision # 9 System Since fast bus transfer is blocked, NAN-S01 and NAN-S02 will not transfer to off-site power on the reactor trip.

Page 4 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9AP09, SG Tube Rupture Technical Revision #23 Guideline Page 5 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # CE/A16 G 2.4.35 Importance Rating 3.8 Excess RCS Leakage: Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects Proposed Question: RO 27 Per 40AO-9ZZ02, Excessive RCS Leakrate, when aligning all three Charging Pumps to the alternate discharge, what is the impact to Seal Injection and Auxiliary Spray?

Seal Injection is unavailable until _____(1)_____ and Auxiliary Spray is unavailable until _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. the alignment to the alternate header is complete

2. the alignment to the alternate header is complete B. 1. the alignment to the alternate header is complete

2. Charging Pumps have been realigned to the normal discharge header C. 1. Charging Pumps have been realigned to the normal discharge header

2. the alignment to the alternate header is complete D. 1. Charging Pumps have been realigned to the normal discharge header

2. Charging Pumps have been realigned to the normal discharge header Proposed Answer: D Page 6 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible since the driving force for aux spray and seal injection is the discharge of the charging pumps, and the charging pumps may be restarted when the alignment to the alternate header is complete, however when aligned to the alternate discharge header, seal injection and aux spray are not available.

B. Plausible since the driving force for seal injection is the discharge of the charging pumps, and the charging pumps may be restarted when the alignment to the alternate header is complete, however when aligned to the alternate discharge header, seal injection is not available. Second part is correct.

C. Plausible since the driving force for aux spray is the discharge of the charging pumps, and the charging pumps may be restarted when the alignment to the alternate header is complete, however when aligned to the alternate discharge header, aux spray is not available. First part is correct.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ02, Excessive RCS Leakrate Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 12400 - Describe the impact that the Charging Pump alternate discharge has on plant operations Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 3 55.43 Page 7 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ02, Excessive RCS Leakrate Revision #17 Page 8 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 003 K6.02 Importance Rating 2.7 Reactor Coolant Pump: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RCPS: RCP seals and seal water supply Proposed Question: RO 28 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

• Seal Injection Containment Isolation Valve, CHN-HV-255, has just failed closed and cannot be reopened from B03.

Assuming no operator action is taken, what will be the effect on the Reactor Coolant Pump System?

RCP HP Seal Cooler Inlet temperature will _____(1)_____ and all other seal temperatures monitored on B04 (HP Cooler Outlet temperature, Seal 1 Inlet temperature, Seal 2 Inlet temperature, Seal 2 Outlet temperature) will _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. exceed 250°F

2. exceed 200°F B. 1. exceed 250°F

2. remain normal C. 1. stabilize between 200 and 220°F

2. exceed 200°F D. 1. stabilize between 200 and 220°F

2. remain normal Page 9 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer: D Explanation:

A. Plausible that trip criteria of 250°F would be exceeded since HPSC inlet temp is the outlet temp from the RCP journal bearing and the loss of seal injection results in a partial loss of cooling to the seals, however with NC still in service, HPSC inlet temp will stabilize between 200 and 220°F and all other seal temps will rise but remain in their normal control bands.

B. Plausible that trip criteria of 250°F would be exceeded since HPSC inlet temp is the outlet temp from the RCP journal bearing and the loss of seal injection results in a partial loss of cooling to the seals, however with NC still in service, HPSC inlet temp will stabilize between 200 and 220°F.

Second part is correct.

C. First part is correct. Plausible that trip criteria of 200°F would be exceeded since the loss of seal injection results in a partial loss of cooling to the seals, however with NC still in service all other seal temps will rise but remain in their normal control bands.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40OP-9ZZ04, RCP Emergencies, Rev 25 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 9870 - Given an RCP with seal injection removed, determine the temperature response when seal injection is secured to an RCP in accordance with 40AO-9ZZ04 Question Source: Bank X - PVNGS Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 3 55.43 Page 10 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40OP-9ZZ04, RCP Emergencies Revision #25 Page 11 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 004 K1.06 Importance Rating 3.1 Chemical and Volume Control: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CVCS and the following systems: Makeup system to VCT Proposed Question: RO 29 With VCT Makeup in AUTO, makeup to the VCT will initiate when VCT level lowers to _____(1)_____ and will secure when VCT level rises to _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 15%

2. 44%

B. 1. 15%

2. 58%

C. 1. 34%

2. 44%

D. 1. 34%

2. 58%

Proposed Answer: C Page 12 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. 15% is plausible since at 15% the suction of the charging pumps is automatically aligned to the VCT, however 34% is when auto makeup to the VCT begins. 44% is when makeup stops.

B. 15% is plausible since at 15% the suction of the charging pumps is automatically aligned to the VCT, however 34% is when auto makeup to the VCT begins. 58% is plausible since there is an auto alignment at 58% in the VCT, however that is when letdown is aligned to the VCT.

C. Correct.

D. 34% is when auto makeup starts. 58% is plausible since there is an auto alignment at 58% in the VCT, however that is when letdown is aligned to the VCT.

Technical Reference(s) CVCS System Technical Manual Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2568 - Explain the operation of the Volume Control Tank under normal operating conditions Question Source: Bank X - PVNGS Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 13 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

CVCS System Technical Manual Revision # 7 Page 14 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 004 A4.06 Importance Rating 3.6 Chemical and Volume Control: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Letdown isolation and flow control valves Proposed Question: RO 30 While operating at power, the in-service Letdown Flow Control Valve can be throttled OPEN using Pressurizer Level Controller, RCN-LIC-110, by either _____(1)_____ the output in MANUAL, or by _____(2)_____ the setpoint in LOCAL-AUTO.

A. 1. raising

2. raising B. 1. raising

2. lowering C. 1. lowering

2. raising D. 1. lowering

2. lowering Proposed Answer: B Page 15 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since raising the setpoint would create a delta between actual level and desired level (setpoint), however with desired level higher than actual level, the letdown flow control valve would throttle closed.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible since lowering the output on LIC-110 will raise pressurizer level which would cause the letdown flow control valve to throttle open if in auto, however if in manual, lowering output will cause the letdown flow control valve to throttle closed. Second part is plausible since raising the setpoint would create a delta between actual level and desired level (setpoint), however with desired level higher than actual level, the letdown flow control valve would throttle closed.

D. First part is plausible since lowering the output on LIC-110 will raise pressurizer level which would cause the letdown flow control valve to throttle open if in auto, however if in manual, lowering output will cause the letdown flow control valve to throttle closed. Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) PLCS System Technical Manual Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 4930 - Describe the Control Room controls associated with the Pressurizer Level Control System Master Controller including its indications Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 16 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PLCS System Technical Manual Revision # 5 Page 17 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 005 A4.02 Importance Rating 3.4 Residual Heat Removal: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Heat exchanger bypass flow control Proposed Question: RO 31 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is in MODE 4, cooling down in preparation for a refueling outage.

• Shutdown Cooling is in service on Train A.

• The RO throttles SDCHX A Bypass Valve, SIA-HV-306, 10% in the open direction.

What is the effect on the Shutdown Cooling System?

The cooldown rate will _____(1)_____ and total SDC flow will _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. rise

2. rise B. 1. rise

2. lower C. 1. lower

2. rise D. 1. lower

2. lower Proposed Answer: C Page 18 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since total flow will rise, which would normally result cooldown rate rising, however the flow being diverted around the SDC HX will result in cooldown rate lowering. Second part is correct.

B. Plausible as this would be the correct answer if HV-306 was throttled closed, however when it is opened the opposite is correct.

C. Correct.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible if thought that SDC flow is the measure of flow actually being sent through the SDC HX, however total SDC flow is the sum of flow bypassed around the HX and flow through the HX. Also, plausible if thought that this is referring to the SDCHX warm-up bypass valve, in which this would be correct.

Technical Reference(s) Safety Injection System Technical Manual Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8813 - Describe the design characteristics of the Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers Question Source: Bank Modified Bank x (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 14 55.43 Page 19 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

References:

Original Question Comments /

Reference:

Safety Injection System Technical Manual Revision # 4 More flow through SIA-UV-306 mean s less flow through the SDCHX, therefore less C/D, and a higher system flowrate.

Page 20 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 005 A2.03 Importance Rating 2.9 Residual Heat Removal: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RHRS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: RHR pump/motor malfunction Proposed Question: RO 32 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 3 is cooling down for a refueling outage.

• Train A SDC is in service using the A LPSI Pump.

• RCS temperature is 275°F and slowly lowering.

• RCS pressure is 225 psia and stable.

Subsequently:

• The A LPSI Pump seizes due to a loss of lube oil.

How will the crew mitigate this event?

A. Place Train B SDC in service using the B LPSI Pump per 40OP-9SI01, Shutdown Cooling Initiation.

B. Place Train B SDC in service using the B LPSI Pump per 40EP-9EO11, Lower Mode Functional Recovery.

C. Maintain Train A SDC in service using the A CS Pump per 40OP-9SI01, Shutdown Cooling Initiation.

D. Maintain Train A SDC in service using the A CS Pump per 40EP-9EO11, Lower Mode Functional Recovery.

Proposed Answer: B Page 21 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible since transition to Train B SDC is correct, however these conditions require entry into the LMFR.

B. Correct.

C. Plausible since SDC is already aligned to Train A, however CS cannot be used for SDC in MODE

4. Also plausible that 40OP-9SI01 would be used to restore SDC, however these conditions require entry into the LMFR.

D. Plausible since SDC is already aligned to Train A, however CS cannot be used for SDC in MODE

4. LMFR is correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40EP-9E011, Lower Mode Functional Attached w/ Revision # See Recovery Comments / Reference 40OP-9SI01, Shutdown Cooling Initiation Technical Specifications Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8874 - Given plant conditions, determine whether or not entry into or exit from the LMFR is appropriate Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 22 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9E011, Lower Mode Functional Recovery Revision #29 Page 23 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40OP-9SI01, Shutdown Cooling Initiation Revision # 51 Page 24 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications Page 25 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 006 K2.04 Importance Rating 3.6 Emergency Core Cooling: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: ESFAS-operated valves Proposed Question: RO 33 What are the power supplies for the following SIAS actuated valves?

1. HPSI Header A to RC Loop 2B Valve, SIA-UV-627

2. Train A SI Pumps Combined Recirc to RWT Valve, SIA-UV-660 A. 1. Class 125 VDC power

2. Class 125 VDC power B. 1. Class 125 VDC power

2. Class 480 VAC power C. 1. Class 480 VAC power

2. Class 125 VDC power D. 1. Class 480 VAC power

2. Class 480 VAC power Proposed Answer: C Page 26 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since there are HPSI hot leg injection valves which are DC powered, however the cold leg injection valves are AC powered. Second part is correct.

B. First part is plausible since there are HPSI hot leg injection valves which are DC powered, however the cold leg injection valves are AC powered. Second part is plausible since the HPSI A recirc valve to the RWT is AC powered, however the combined recirc valve to the RWT is DC powered.

C. Correct.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the HPSI A recirc valve to the RWT is AC powered, however the combined recirc valve to the RWT is DC powered.

Technical Reference(s) Safety Injection Technical Manual Attached w/ Revision # See 40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent ESFAS Comments / Reference Acutations Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 7604 - Identify the power supplies to SI related equipment Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 8 55.43 Page 27 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Safety Injection Technical Manual Revision # 4 The combine recirc valve, SIA-UV-660 is DC powered.

The A HPSI injection valve to RC2B is AC powered.

Page 28 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Safety Injection Technical Manual Revision # 4 The A HPSI Pump recirc valve to the RWT is AC powered.

The A HPSI Pump hot leg injection valve is DC powered.

Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent ESFAS Actuations Revision # 23 Page 29 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent ESFAS Actuations Revision # 23 Page 30 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 007 A1.02 Importance Rating 2.7 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRTS controls including: Monitoring quench tank pressure Proposed Question: RO 34 Reactor Drain Tank Vent Valve, CHN-UV-540, will receive a(n) _____(1)_____ signal if RDT pressure rises to 10 psig, and if RDT pressure continues to rise, the rupture disk will blow to protect the RDT at a setpoint of _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. open

2. 30 psid B. 1. open

2. 120 psid C. 1. close

2. 30 psid D. 1. close

2. 120 psid Proposed Answer: D Page 31 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since most tanks will be vented when pressure rises to a certain level, however the RDT vent valve is normally open and receives a close signal when pressure reaches 10 psig. Second part is plausible as 30 psig is the setpoint for the EDT relief valve, however the RDT rupture disk will blow if D/P across the disk reaches 120 psid.

B. First part is plausible since most tanks will be vented when pressure rises to a certain level, however the RDT vent valve is normally open and receives a close signal when pressure reaches 10 psig. Second part is correct.

C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible as 30 psig is the setpoint for the EDT relief valve, however the RDT rupture disk will blow if D/P across the disk reaches 120 psid.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) CVCS System Technical Manual Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2705 - Describe the Control Room controls and indications associated with the Reactor Drain Tank (CHN-X02)

Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 32 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

CVCS System Technical Manual Revision # 7 Comments /

Reference:

CVCS System Technical Manual Revision # 7 Page 33 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 008 K3.01 Importance Rating 3.4 Component Cooling Water: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CCWS will have on the following:

Loads cooled by CCWS Proposed Question: RO 35 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

• NCW Containment Upstream Supply Isolation Valve, NCB-UV-401, has spuriously closed and cannot be reopened.

Which of the following describe the effect of this valve closure?

1. CEDM ACU outlet air temperatures will rise.

2. NCW temperature from the Letdown Heat Exchanger will rise.

3. NCW temperature from the Nuclear Sample Coolers will rise.

A. 1 ONLY B. 2 ONLY C. 1 and 3 ONLY D. 2 and 3 ONLY Proposed Answer: A Page 34 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. Plausible since the LDHX is cooled by NC and portions of the letdown and NC systems are located inside containment, however the LDHX and associated NC piping are located upstream of NCB-UV-401.

C. CEDM ACU air temp is correct. Plausible since the NC sample coolers are a priority load cooled by NC, and all loads inside containment are priority loads, however the sample coolers are still cooled following the closure of UV-401.

D. LDHX is plausible since the LDHX is cooled by NC and portions of the letdown and NC systems are located inside containment, however the LDHX and associated NC piping are located upstream of NCB-UV-401. Plausible since the NC sample coolers are a priority load cooled by NC, and all loads inside containment are priority loads, however the sample coolers are still cooled following the closure of UV-401.

Technical Reference(s) Nuclear Cooling System Tech Manual Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8692 - Describe the flowpaths to include these major components: NC Pumps, NC Heat Exchanger, components cooled Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 35 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Revision Outside Containment Containment Isolation Valve Inside Containment Outside Containment Page 36 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 010 K2.04 Importance Rating 2.7 Pressurizer Pressure Control: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Indicator for code safety position Proposed Question: RO 36 What is the power supply for the Pressurizer Safety Valve position indicating lights on B04?

A. Non-Class 120 VAC Instrument Bus NNN-D11 B. Non-Class 120 VAC Instrument Bus NNN-D16 C. Class 120 VAC Instrument Bus PNA-D25 D. Class 120 VAC Instrument Bus PNB-D26 Proposed Answer: A Page 37 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. Plausible since NNN-D16 powers control room indications such as multipoint recorders, and the relief valve indicating lights are powered from non-class instrument power, however the pressurizer reliefs are powered from NNN-D11.

C. Plausible that the pressurizer relief valve indicating lights would be class instrument power since the pressurizer relief valve positions indicators are required by the PVNGS TRM (3.3.105),

however these lights are powered from NNN-D11.

D. Plausible that the pressurizer relief valve indicating lights would be class instrument power since the pressurizer relief valve positions indicators are required by the PVNGS TRM (3.3.105),

however these lights are powered from NNN-D11.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ14, Loss of Non-Class Attached w/ Revision # See Instrument and Control Power Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 6334 - Describe the Control Room indications associated with the Pressurizer Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 38 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ14, Loss of Non-Class Instrument and Revision # 27 Control Power Page 39 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 012 A3.06 Importance Rating 3.7 Reactor Protection: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RPS, including: Trip logic Proposed Question: RO 37 A Channel B RPS trip bistable has just been placed in bypass in preparation for surveillance testing. What will happen if the same parameter RPS trip bistable is subsequently placed in bypass on Channel A?

The Channel A bistable will _____(1)_____ and the Channel B bistable will _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. go into bypass

2. come out of bypass B. 1. go into bypass

2. receive a trip signal C. 1. NOT go into bypass

2. remain in bypass D. 1. NOT go into bypass

2. receive a trip signal Proposed Answer: A Page 40 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct. Since the A channel has a higher priority, when it is placed in bypass, any other trip bistable already in bypass will come out of bypass.

B. Plausible since A will go into bypass and B will come out of bypass, and with two failed bistables the TS action is to place one in bypass and the other in trip, however this would have to be done manually.

C. Plausible since an interlock exists which prevents two bistables from simultaneously being in bypass at the same time, however since A is a higher priority, it would go into bypass and B would come out of bypass.

D. Plausible since both bistables cannot be placed in bypass simultaneously. Also plausible that the interlock would cause the one in trip, one in bypass to take two steps (i.e. B goes from bypass to trip, which would then allow the operator to place A in bypass).

Technical Reference(s) PPS System Technical Manual Attached w/ Revision # See LCO 3.3.1, Instrumentation - Operating Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 4905 - Describe the RPS Trip Channel bypass interlock Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 41 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PPS System Technical Manual Revision # 2 Comments /

Reference:

LCO 3.3.1, Instrumentation - Operating Page 42 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Page 43 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 012 G 2.4.2 Importance Rating 4.5 Reactor Protection: Knowledge of system set points, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions.

Proposed Question: RO 38 When operating at 100% power, which of the following plant parameters, individually, would result in BOTH an automatic reactor trip AND an automatic ESFAS actuation?

1. SG pressure of 950 psia.

2. SG level of 38% wide range.

3. Pressurizer pressure of 1850 psia.

A. 1 ONLY B. 1 and 2 ONLY C. 2 and 3 ONLY D. 3 ONLY Proposed Answer: A Page 44 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct. 960 psia is the Low SG Pressure reactor trip setpoint as well as one of the setpoints for MSIS.

B. Plausible since low SG pressure is correct and 38% WR level will result in a reactor trip, however the AFAS setpoint is 25.8% WR.

C. Plausible since 38% WR level will result in a reactor trip, however the AFAS setpoint is 25.8% WR.

Also, the reactor will trip on low DNBR at ~ 2080 psia in the pressurizer, however the RPS Low Pressurizer Pressure trip setpoint and SIAS setpoint (in MODE 1) is 1837 psia.

D. Plausible since the reactor will trip on low DNBR at ~ 2080 psia in the pressurizer, however the RPS Low Pressurizer Pressure trip setpoint and SIAS setpoint (in MODE 1) is 1837 psia.

Technical Reference(s) Plant Protection System Lesson Plan Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2578 - Describe the general design criteria of the Plant Protection System Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 45 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Plant Protection System Lesson Plan Revision Page 46 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Plant Protection System Lesson Plan Revision Page 47 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 013 K4.01 Importance Rating 3.9 Engineered Safety Features Actuation: Knowledge of ESFAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: SIS reset Proposed Question: RO 39 Given the following conditions:

• The crew is commencing a controlled cooldown and depressurization in preparation for a refueling outage.

• The CRS has directed resetting SIAS setpoints during the depressurization.

When the RO depresses the LO PZR PRESS SETPOINT RESET pushbutton on B05, the SIAS setpoint will lower to _____(1)_____ psia below _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. 200

2. the current SIAS setpoint B. 1. 200

2. current Pressurizer pressure C. 1. 400

2. the current SIAS setpoint D. 1. 400

2. current Pressurizer pressure Proposed Answer: D Page 48 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. 200 psia is plausible since the low SG pressure reset will lower the MSIS setpoint by 200 psia, however the SIAS reset lowers by 400 psia. Plausible that the SIAS setpoint pushbutton will lower the setpoint by a set amount from current setpoint, however the setpoint is lowered by a set amount from current pressurizer pressure.

B. 200 psia is plausible since the low SG pressure reset will lower the MSIS setpoint by 200 psia, however the SIAS reset lowers by 400 psia. Second part is correct.

C. First part is correct. Plausible that the SIAS setpoint pushbutton will lower the setpoint by a set amount from current setpoint, however the setpoint is lowered by a set amount from current pressurizer pressure.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) PPS System Technical Manual Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2622 - Describe the ESFAS controls and indications available for the operator at B05 Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 49 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PPS System Technical Manual Revision # 2 Page 50 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 022 A1.02 Importance Rating 3.6 Containment Cooling: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCS controls including: Containment pressure Proposed Question: RO 40 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 3 tripped from 100% power due to a large break LOCA.

• On the trip, PBA-S03 de-energized due to a fault on the bus.

Based on the listed conditions, Containment pressure should not exceed the Containment design pressure of _____(1)_____ psig, and should be reduced to 50% of the peak pressure within a maximum of _____(2)_____ hours of the LOCA initiation.

A. 1. 55

2. 24 B. 1. 55

2. 48 C. 1. 60

2. 24 D. 1. 60

2. 48 Proposed Answer: C Page 51 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. 55 psig is plausible since this is the CTPC safety function limit for a LOCA, however the DBA limit, however the containment design pressure is 60 psig. Second part is correct.

B. 55 psig is plausible since this is the CTPC safety function limit for a LOCA, however the DBA limit, however the containment design pressure is 60 psig. Second part is plausible if thought that the 24 hour/50% peak pressure reduction was based on two trains of CS and since we only have one train available the time would be doubled.

C. Correct.

D. First part is correct. Second part plausible if thought that the 24 hour/50% peak pressure reduction was based on two trains of CS and since we only have one train available the time would be doubled.

Technical Reference(s) LOIT Lesson Plan, Safety Injection Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2614 - Describe what automatically initiates the Containment Isolation Actuation System (CIAS) and its function Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 9 55.43 Page 52 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan, Safety Injection Revision # 8 Page 53 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 026 K1.01 Importance Rating 4.2 Containment Spray: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the CSS and the following systems: ECCS Proposed Question: RO 41

1. The Train A Containment Spray Pump can be aligned to inject into the ________

2. Per Standard Appendix 107, Aligning a Containment Spray Pump for Injection, a single Containment Spray Pump _____(2)_____ procedurally allowed to inject into the cold legs and spray header simultaneously .

A. 1. cold legs ONLY

2. IS B. 1. cold legs ONLY

2. is NOT C. 1. hot AND cold legs

2. IS D. 1. hot AND cold legs

2. is NOT Proposed Answer: B Page 54 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since it would be allowed to use one CS pump for injection and the other for spray, however each pump is only procedurally allowed to perform one function.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible since simultaneous hot and cold leg injection is performed, however this can only be performed using HPSI pumps. Second part is plausible since it would be allowed to use one CS pump for injection and the other for spray, however each pump is only procedurally allowed to perform one function.

D. First part is plausible since simultaneous hot and cold leg injection is performed, however this can only be performed using HPSI pumps. Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) Safety Injection System Technical Manual Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8812 - Describe the auxiliary flowpath/s associated with the SI system to include injection valves Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 55 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Safety Injection System Technical Manual Revision # 4 Page 56 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Standard Appendix 107, Aligning a CS Pump for Revision # 96 Injection Closure of SIA-UV-672 isolates the A CS Pump from the spray header as it is being lined up for injection.

Page 57 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 039 K5.01 Importance Rating 2.9 Main and Reheat Steam: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MRSS:

Definition and causes of steam/water hammer Proposed Question: RO 42

1. In a steam system, what is likely to CAUSE steam/water hammer?

2. In order to PREVENT steam/water hammer, when warming up the Main Steam lines 40OP-9SG01, Main Steam, directs.

A. 1. Introducing water into a steam void.

2. placing steam traps in a normal lineup PRIOR TO initiating the warmup.

B. 1. Introducing water into a steam void.

2. draining Main Steam lines by manually bypassing steam traps to the condenser.

C. 1. Slowly opening the MSIV Bypass Valves manual isolation valves.

2. placing steam traps in a normal lineup PRIOR TO initiating the warmup.

D. 1. Slowly opening the MSIV Bypass Valves manual isolation valves.

2. draining Main Steam lines by manually bypassing steam traps to the condenser.

Proposed Answer: B Page 58 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since 9SG01 directs placing steam traps in a normal lineup when header temperature reaches 300°F.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible since slowly opening the bypass manual isolation valves would introduce some fluid into the steam lines, however slowly opening these valves would aid in avoiding/minimizing steam/water hammer in the steam lines. Second part is plausible since 9SG01 directs placing steam traps in a normal lineup when header temperature reaches 300°F.

D. First part is plausible since slowly opening the bypass manual isolation valves would introduce some fluid into the steam lines, however slowly opening these valves would aid in avoiding/minimizing steam/water hammer in the steam lines. Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40OP-9SG01, Main Steam Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 7769 - Identify plant situations in which water hammer might occur and state how it can be prevented for each situation Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? Yes - 2015 RO Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5 55.43 Page 59 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40OP-9SG01, Main Steam Revision # 75 Page 60 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40OP-9SG01, Main Steam Revision # 75 Page 61 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 059 K3.02 Importance Rating 3.6 Main Feedwater: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MFW will have on the following: AFW system Proposed Question: RO 43 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 tripped due to a complete loss of Main Feedwater.

• AFB-P01 has been manually started and aligned to feed both SGs.

Subsequently:

• AFAS-1 actuates.

With no operator action, how will the AFAS-1 affect the current feed lineup?

AFA-P01 will start and feed _____(1)_____ and AFB-P01 will be feeding _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. SG #1 ONLY

2. SG #1 ONLY B. 1. SG #1 ONLY

2. both SGs C. 1. both SGs

2. SG #1 ONLY D. 1. both SGs

2. both SGs Proposed Answer: A Page 62 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since it will align to feed SG 1 and it was already aligned to feed SG 2, however on an AFAS-1, all feed will stop to SG 2 and both AFW Pumps will commence feeding SG 1.

C. First part is plausible since AFA-P01 is drawing steam from both SGs on an AFAS-1 or AFAS-2, however it will only feed the SG with the active AFAS signal. Second part is correct.

D. First part is plausible since AFA-P01 is drawing steam from both SGs on an AFAS-1 or AFAS-2, however it will only feed the SG with the active AFAS signal. Second part is plausible since it will align to feed SG 1 and it was already aligned to feed SG 2, however on an AFAS-1, all feed will stop to SG 2 and both AFW Pumps will commence feeding SG 1.

Technical Reference(s) Auxiliary Feedwater System Technical Attached w/ Revision # See Manual Comments / Reference Operator Information Manual Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8164 - Describe the System Response to a Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 63 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Auxiliary Feedwater System Technical Manual Revision #7 Page 64 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 059 K4.02 Importance Rating 3.3 Main Feedwater: Knowledge of MFW design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Automatic turbine/reactor trip runback Proposed Question: RO 44 A Reactor Power Cutback occurs in response to a loss of a Main Feedwater Pump.

The cutback signal is generated by Main Feedwater Pump _____(1)_____ and the associated Turbine Setback signal will lower turbine load _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. control oil pressure lowering to 75 psig

2. at 480%/min to ~ 60% turbine load B. 1. control oil pressure lowering to 75 psig

2. at 130%/min to match turbine power with reactor power C. 1. discharge flow lowering to 8% below setpoint

2. at 480%/min to ~ 60% turbine load D. 1. discharge flow lowering to 8% below setpoint

2. at 130%/min to match turbine power with reactor power Proposed Answer: A Page 65 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the turbine runback signal will reduce load at 130%/min to match turbine power with reactor power, however the initial drop to 60% is performed via the turbine setback signal.

C. First part is plausible since its plausible that the loss of feedpump signal would be generated by low flow from the MFP, and a feed flow deviation of 8% from setpoint will cause a FWCS Trouble alarm, however the RPCB is generated from low MFP control oil pressure. Second part is correct.

D. First part is plausible since its plausible that the loss of feedpump signal would be generated by low flow from the MFP, and a feed flow deviation of 8% from setpoint will cause a FWCS Trouble alarm, however the RPCB is generated from low MFP control oil pressure. Second part is plausible since the turbine runback signal will reduce load at 130%/min to match turbine power with reactor power, however the initial drop to 60% is performed via the turbine setback signal Technical Reference(s) 40AL-9RK6A, Panel B06A Alarm Attached w/ Revision # See Responses Comments / Reference LOIT Lesson Plan, Reactor Power Cutback System Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8149 - Describe the automatic initiation of a RPCB to include the following: Loss of Main Feedwater Pump Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 66 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AL-9RK6A, Panel B06A Alarm Responses Revision #16 Page 67 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan, Reactor Power Cutback Revision # 5 System Page 68 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 061 G 2.1.23 Importance Rating 4.3 Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater: Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation Proposed Question: RO 45 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is commencing a startup following a refueling outage per 40OP-9ZZ23, Outage GOP.

• The crew is preparing to place Auxiliary Feedwater in service.

The PREFERRED pump to operate is Auxiliary Feedwater Pump _____(1)_____ and per 40OP-9ZZ04, Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1, power can be raised to a MAXIMUM of

_____(2)_____ prior to having to place Main Feedwater in service.

A. 1. AFB-P01

2. 3%

B. 1. AFB-P01

2. 5%

C. 1. AFN-P01

2. 3%

D. 1. AFN-P01

2. 5%

Proposed Answer: C Page 69 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible that AFB would be preferred since it is an essential AFW pump, however AFN is preferred since the flowpath will help in warming the MFW system piping. 3% is correct.

B. Plausible that AFB would be preferred since it is an essential AFW pump, however AFN is preferred since the flowpath will help in warming the MFW system piping. 5% is plausible since the procedure in which this evolution takes place is the Plant Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1 procedure and 5% is where MODE 1 is declared.

C. Correct.

D. AFN is correct. 5% is plausible since the procedure in which this evolution takes place is the Plant Startup from Mode 2 to Mode 1 procedure and 5% is where MODE 1 is declared.

Technical Reference(s) 40OP-9ZZ04, Plant Startup Mode 2 to Attached w/ Revision # See Mode 1 Comments / Reference 40OP-9ZZ23, Outage GOP Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 10907 - Describe how power is increased from 1x10-3% to 20% power Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 70 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40OP-9ZZ04, Plant Startup Mode 2 to Mode 1 Revision #74 Comments /

Reference:

40OP-9ZZ23, Outage GOP Revision #71 Section 6.8 of 40OP-9ZZ23 is Mode 5 to Mode 3 Page 71 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 062 K2.01 Importance Rating 3.3 AC Electrical Distribution: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Major system loads Proposed Question: RO 46 13.8 kV Bus NAN-S01 supplies power to which two RCPs?

A. 1A and 1B B. 1A and 2A C. 1B and 2B D. 2A and 2B Proposed Answer: B Page 72 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible that the S01 bus powers the loop 1 RCPs, however S01 powers the A RCPs.

B. Correct.

C. Plausible that the S01 bus powers the B RCPs, however this is provided by NAN-S02.

D. Plausible that the S01 bus powers the loop 2 RCPs, however S01 powers the A RCPs.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ12, Degraded Electrical Power Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2942 - Describe the Control Room controls associated with the Reactor Coolant Pumps including indications.

Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 3 55.43 Page 73 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ12, Degraded Electrical Power Revision # 66 Page 74 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 062 A2.01 Importance Rating 3.4 AC Electrical Distribution: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Types of loads that, if de-energized, would degrade or hinder plant operation Proposed Question: RO 47 Given the following:

• Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

• NBN-S02 faults and is de-energized.

Based on these conditions, _____(1)_____ have tripped, and, in addition to 40AO-9ZZ12, Degraded Electrical Power, the crew will enter _____(2)_____ to mitigate this event.

A. 1. Condensate Pump C and Heater Drain Pump A

2. 40AO-9ZZ07, Loss of Condenser Vacuum B. 1. Condensate Pump C and Heater Drain Pump A

2. 40AO-9ZZ09, Reactor Power Cutback (Loss of Feedpump)

C. 1. Condensate Pumps A and B and Heater Drain Pump B

2. 40AO-9ZZ07, Loss of Condenser Vacuum D. 1. Condensate Pumps A and B and Heater Drain Pump B

2. 40AO-9ZZ09, Reactor Power Cutback (Loss of Feedpump)

Proposed Answer: B Page 75 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is Correct. Second part is plausible since condenser vacuum will initially degrade but will stabilize and recovery quickly when the B MFP trips and the RPCB actuates(~ 10 seconds into the event)

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible as the A and B condensate pumps trip on a loss of a non-class 4kV bus, however the bus that powers them is NBN-S01. Additionally the Heater Drain Pumps are counter-intuitively power, meaning that the A pump is from NBN-S02 and the B pump is from NBN-S01, adding to the plausibility of which loads are powered from which bus. Second part is plausible since condenser vacuum will initially degrade but will stabilize and recovery quickly when the B MFP trips and the RPCB actuates (~ 10 seconds into the event)

D. First part is plausible as the A and B condensate pumps trip on a loss of a non-class 4kV bus, however the bus that powers them is NBN-S01. Additionally the Heater Drain Pumps are counter-intuitively power, meaning that the A pump is from NBN-S02 and the B pump is from NBN-S01, adding to the plausibility of which loads are powered from which bus. Second part is correct Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ12, Degraded Electrical Power Attached w/ Revision # See Feedwater Pump System Technical Manual Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 9394 - Determine if the RPCB (LOFP) AOP should be executed Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 76 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ12, Degraded Electrical Power Revision # 63 Comments /

Reference:

Feedwater Pump System Technical Manual Revision # 4 Page 77 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 063 A3.01 Importance Rating 2.7 DC Electrical Distribution: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the DC electrical system, including: Meters, annunciators, dials, recorders, and indicating lights Proposed Question: RO 48 Given the following indications on B01:

Which ONE of the following conditions is indicated?

The A. B PK train is operating normally.

B. B Battery Charger output breaker has tripped.

C. BD Battery Charger supply voltage has been lost.

D. B Battery is being charged by the B Battery charger.

Page 78 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer: B Explanation:

A. Plausible if thought that the battery charger would only indicate current during a battery charge, however in a normal lineup the battery indicates zero amps and the charger shows ~ 100 amps.

B. Correct. Zero amps from the charger and the battery discharging is indicative of the charger output breaker having opened.

C. Plausible since the BD charger has zero volts and amps, however the BD charger input and output breakers would have already been open due to the B charger being in service (as indicated by

~130 VDC on the B charger).

D. Plausible since the B charger indicates ~ 130 VDC and the battery is indicating current, however if the battery was charging the current would be indicated on the left side of the battery ammeter, not on the right side (indicative of the battery discharging)

Technical Reference(s) PVNGS Operator Information Manual Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 1988 - Explain the operation of the Class IE 125 VDC Distribution Panels under normal operating conditions Question Source: Bank x - 2010 RO Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 79 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS Operator Information Manual Revision June 2015 Page 80 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 063 K4.02 Importance Rating 2.9 DC Electrical Distribution: Knowledge of DC electrical system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Breaker interlocks, permissives, bypasses and cross-ties Proposed Question: RO 49 Given the following conditions:

• Battery Charger 'EF', NKN-H21, is connected to NKN-M45.

• Battery F, NKN-F18, is under clearance for preventive maintenance.

Subsequently:

• Battery Charger 'F' (NKN-H18) trips.

Under these conditions, Battery Charger 'EF' cannot simultaneously be aligned to both NKN-M45 and NKN-M46 due to a(n) _____(1)_____ interlock and the loss of NKN-M46 will result in the loss of power to _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. electrical

2. the Main Turbine Emergency Oil Pump B. 1. mechanical

2. the Main Turbine Emergency Oil Pump C. 1. electrical

2. Main Turbine Generator Tripping circuitry D. 1. mechanical

2. Main Turbine Generator Tripping circuitry Page 81 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer: B Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since several breakers in the electrical distribution system have electrical interlocks, however, the interlock that prevents placing the EF on both NKN-M45 and NKN-M46 at the same time is a mechanical interlock. Second part is correct.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible since several breakers in the electrical distribution system have electrical interlocks, however, the interlock that prevents placing the EF on both NKN-M45 and NKN-M46 at the same time is a mechanical interlock. Second part is plausible since Main Turbine Generator Tripping is a load on the opposite DC bus, NKN-M45.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since Main Turbine Generator Tripping is a load on the opposite DC bus, NKN-M45.

Technical Reference(s) Operator Information Manual Attached w/ Revision # See 125 VDC Non Class Power System Comments / Reference Technical Manual Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 3127 - Describe the circuit paths to include these major components: Control Centers M45 and M46, Batteries, Battery Chargers, Distribution Panels Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 82 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Operator Information Manual Revision June 2015 Comments /

Reference:

125 VDC Non Class Power System Technical Revision # 0 Manual Page 83 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 064 K1.03 Importance Rating 3.6 Emergency Diesel Generator: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the ED/G system and the following systems: Diesel fuel oil supply system Proposed Question: RO 50 Given the following conditions:

• The B EDG is operating at full rated load.

• The associated Fuel Oil Transfer Pump has faulted.

• The B EDG Fuel Oil Day Tank is at its Technical Specification limit of 2.75 (550 gal).

Approximately how much longer can the B EDG operate at rated load?

A. 0.33 hours3.819444e-4 days <br />0.00917 hours <br />5.456349e-5 weeks <br />1.25565e-5 months <br /> B. 0.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> C. 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> D. 3.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> Proposed Answer: C Page 84 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible if thought that full load consumes 25 gpm, however this is the capacity of the fuel oil transfer pump, not the consumption of the EDG at full load.

B. Plausible if thought 550 gallons in the day tank could provide 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> total for both EDGs and thus could only provide 0.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> for each EDG.

C. Correct. Approximately 6.4 gpm at full load = 86 minutes for 550 gal (~ 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />).

D. Plausible if thought 550 gallons in the day tank could provide for 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> for each EDG at full load, then one EDG could run for 3.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />.

Technical Reference(s) Technical Specifications Attached w/ Revision # See LOIT Lesson Plan, Emergency Diesel Comments / Reference Generators Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 3210 - Discuss the purpose and conditions under which the Diesel Generator System is designed to function Question Source: Bank X - 2010 RO Exam Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 8 55.43 Page 85 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 26 to 50 Rev 16 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications, LCO 3.8.1 Revision Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan NKASYC012713 Revision #15 Emergency Diesel Generator Lesson Plan Page 86 of 86

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 064 K6.07 Importance Rating 2.7 Emergency Diesel Generator: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the ED/G system: Air receivers Proposed Question: RO 51 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

• The A EDG right bank Starting Air Receiver is tagged out.

Subsequently:

• An inadvertent Train A Containment Spray actuation occurs.

The A EDG left bank Starting Air Receiver and starting air subsystem will apply air to _____(1)_____ A EDG cylinder bank(s) and the A EDG will be running in the

_____(2)_____ mode.

A. 1. both

2. test run B. 1. both

2. emergency C. 1. only the left

2. test run D. 1. only the left

2. emergency Proposed Answer: A Page 1 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct. Starting air from each receiver will be applied to both banks of cylinders. On a CSAS, the EDGs start in the test run mode of operation.

B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the EDGs start in emergency mode on a LOP, SIAS, or AFAS.

C. Plausible that air would only be applied to the left cylinders since the right side air start system is tagged out, however air is applied to both sides of cylinders. Second part is correct.

D. Plausible that air would only be applied to the left cylinders since the right side air start system is tagged out, however air is applied to both sides of cylinders. Second part is plausible since the EDGs start in emergency mode on a LOP, SIAS, or AFAS.

Technical Reference(s) LOIT Lesson Plan, Emergency Diesel Attached w/ Revision # See Generators Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 3251 - Describe the operation of the Diesel Generator Air Starting Sub-system under normal conditions Question Source: Bank x - 2012 RO Exam Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 8 55.43 Page 2 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan, Emergency Diesel Rev # 9 Generators Page 3 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Same logic applies if one receiver is tagged-out, as in the stem of the question.

Page 4 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 073 A4.02 Importance Rating 3.7 Process Radiation Monitoring: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Radiation monitoring system control panel Proposed Question: RO 52 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power, MOC

• A 200 gpm SGTR has just occurred on SG #1.

How will the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) indications change in response to this event?

Radiation levels will begin to rise on RU-142, Main Steam Line N-16 Radiation Monitor, for

_____(1)_____ and then START to lower when _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. SG #1 ONLY

2. SG #1 is isolated B. 1. SG #1 ONLY

2. the reactor is tripped C. 1. SG #1 and SG #2

2. SG #1 is isolated D. 1. SG #1 and SG #2

2. the reactor is tripped Proposed Answer: D Page 5 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible if thought that only SG #1 N-16 RM would respond to a SGTR on SG #1, however the shine from the SG #1 steam lines will be sensed on the SG #2 N-16 RM as well (approximately 1/2 the magnitude). Also plausible if thought that N-16 rad levels would rise until the MSIVs are closed (i.e. SG #1 isolated).

B. Plausible if thought that only SG #1 N-16 RM would respond to a SGTR on SG #1, however the shine from the SG #1 steam lines will be sensed on the SG #2 N-16 RM as well (approximately 1/2 the magnitude). Second part is correct.

C. First part is correct. Plausible if thought that N-16 rad levels would rise until the MSIVs are closed (i.e. SG #1 isolated).

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40DP-9AP09, SGTR Tech Guideline Attached w/ Revision # See 74AL-9SQ01 Radiation Monitoring System Comments / Reference Alarm Validation and Response Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 14684 - Describe the Control Room indications associated with the Radiation Monitoring System Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 11 55.43 Page 6 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9AP09, SGTR Tech Guideline Revision # 23 Page 7 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

74AL-9SQ01 Radiation Monitoring System Revision #0 Alarm Validation and Response Alarm Response for RU-142 Main Steam Line N-16 Monitor in High /

Alert Page 8 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 076 K1.09 Importance Rating 3.0 Service Water: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause- effect relationships between the SWS and the following systems:

Reactor building closed cooling water Proposed Question: RO 53

1. With the Essential Cooling Water System and the Spray Pond Cooling Water System in service, a tube leak in the Essential Cooling Water Heat Exchanger will send water from the

2. In the event of a loss of both EW Pumps while operating on Shutdown Cooling, the Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger can be cooled directly from the A. 1. Essential Cooling Water System to the Spray Pond Cooling Water System

2. Nuclear Cooling Water System B. 1. Essential Cooling Water System to the Spray Pond Cooling Water System

2. Spray Pond Cooling Water System C. 1. Spray Pond Cooling Water System to the Essential Cooling Water System

2. Nuclear Cooling Water System D. 1. Spray Pond Cooling Water System to the Essential Cooling Water System

2. Spray Pond Cooling Water System Proposed Answer: C Page 9 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since nominal system pressure of the SP system is ~ 50-55 psig compared to EW which has a nominal system pressure of ~ 95 psig, however the EW system is designed such that at the EW heat exchanger, EW pressure is lower than SP pressure to ensure that in the event of an EW HX tube leak, leakage goes from the SP system to the EW system to minimize the potential for environmental contamination. Second part is correct.

B. First part is plausible since nominal system pressure of the SP system is ~ 50-55 psig compared to EW which has a nominal system pressure of ~ 95 psig, however the EW system is designed such that at the EW heat exchanger, EW pressure is lower than SP pressure to ensure that in the event of an EW HX tube leak, leakage goes from the SP system to the EW system to minimize the potential for environmental contamination. Second part is plausible since the Spray Pond system is the cooling medium for EW, and thus the ultimate heat sink for SDC, however the Spray Pond system cannot be directly lined up to the SDCHX.

C. Correct.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the Spray Pond system is the cooling medium for EW, and thus the ultimate heat sink for SDC, however the Spray Pond system cannot be directly lined up to the SDCHX.

Technical Reference(s) 40OP-9SP01, Essential Spray Pond (SP) Attached w/ Revision # See Train A Comments / Reference LOIT Lesson Plan Essential Cooling Water Essential Cooling Water System Technical Manual Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2340 - Describe the design characteristics of the Essential Cooling Water Heat Exchangers Question Source: Bank Modified Bank X - PVNGS Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 10 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Original Question Revision #

Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan Essential Cooling Water Revision # 4 System Comments /

Reference:

Essential Cooling Water System Technical Revision # 6 Manual Page 11 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Essential Cooling Water System Technical Revision # 6 Manual Page 12 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Essential Cooling Water System Technical Revision # 6 Manual Page 13 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 078 K3.02 Importance Rating 3.4 Instrument Air: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the IAS will have on the following: Systems having pneumatic valves and controls Proposed Question: RO 54 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

• An Instrument Air rupture has occurred just downstream of the IA compressors.

• IA pressure is at atmospheric pressure throughout the system.

• The nitrogen backup supply valve has failed closed.

Based on these conditions, the Main Steam Isolation Valves A. will slow close due to the loss of IA.

B. will fast close due to the loss of IA.

C. will remain open and can only be slow closed.

D. will remain open and can only be fast closed.

Proposed Answer: D Page 14 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible that the MSIVs would fail closed as this is the fail safe position, and the valves are stroked open in slow speed and can be closed in slow speed, however the MSIVs remain open on a loss of instrument air.

B. Plausible that the MSIVs would fail closed as this is the fail safe position, and the valves are normally closed in fast speed, however the MSIVs remain open on a loss of instrument air.

C. Plausible since they will remain open, however slow close is not available on a loss of instrument air.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ06, Loss Of Instrument Air Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 9964 - Describe the Control Room controls associated with the Instrument Air System including their indications.

Question Source: Bank X - 2009 RO Exam Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 15 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ06, Loss Of Instrument Air Revision # 40 Page 16 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 103 A2.03 Importance Rating 3.5 Containment: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Phase A and B isolation Proposed Question: RO 55 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 was operating at 100% power.

• I&C testing was in progress on the PPS system.

Subsequently:

• A Train A CIAS, Leg 1-3 and Leg 2-4, actuated.

• Containment pressure is 0.3 psig.

Which of the following describes the impact to the plant and how will the event be mitigated?

A. NC flow will be isolated from the RCPs. Trip the Reactor and perform 40EP-9EO01, Standard Post Trip Actions.

B. Letdown will isolate. Letdown can be restored PRIOR TO resetting the CIAS signal per 40AO-9ZZ05, Loss of Charging or Letdown, Appendix A, Restoration of Letdown With a Pressurizer Steam Bubble.

C. Letdown will isolate. The CIAS signal MUST BE reset prior to restoring letdown per 40AO-9ZZ05, Loss of Charging or Letdown, Appendix A, Restoration of Letdown With a Pressurizer Steam Bubble.

D. NC flow will be isolated from the RCPs. Restore NC flow to the RCPs by overriding and opening NCA-UV-402, NCW Containment Downstream Return Isolation Valve, per 40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Actuations.

Page 17 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer: B Explanation:

A. Plausible that NC would be isolated to containment as this happens on a CSAS (Phase B containment isolation). Plausible that tripping the reactor would be the correct action as this is true if NC flow cannot be restored to containment within 10 minutes.

B. Correct. UV-516 can be overridden and opened to facilitate the restoration of letdown, therefore resetting the CIAS is not necessary to restore letdown.

C. Plausible since letdown will isolate on a Train A CIAS, however the CIAS does not need to be reset prior to letdown being restored using 40AO-9ZZ05.

D. Plausible that NC would be isolated to containment as this happens on a CSAS (Phase B containment isolation). If NC isolated on an inadvertent CSAS, this would be the correct action to restore flow to the RCPs.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Attached w/ Revision # See Actuations Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2614 - Describe what automatically initiates the Containment Isolation Actuation System (CIAS) and its function Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 18 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Revision # 21 Actuations Page 19 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Revision # 21 Actuations Page 20 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Revision # 21 Actuations Page 21 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 002 K5.08 Importance Rating 3.4 Reactor Coolant: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCS: Why PZR level should be kept within the programmed band Proposed Question: RO 56 What is the basis for the Pressurizer level control band of 33 - 53% while AT POWER?

The low end of the band is set high enough to ensure _____(1)_____ and the high end of the band is set low enough to ensure _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. the Pressurizer heaters remain covered

2. the Main and Auxiliary Spray nozzles are not submerged B. 1. the Pressurizer heaters remain covered

2. the proportional heaters can heat the water mass enough to maintain 2250 psia C. 1. Pressurizer pressure does not lower to the SIAS setpoint on an uncomplicated Reactor trip

2. the Main and Auxiliary Spray nozzles are not submerged D. 1. Pressurizer pressure does not lower to the SIAS setpoint on an uncomplicated Reactor trip

2. the proportional heaters can heat the water mass enough to maintain 2250 psia Proposed Answer: A Page 22 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. First part is correct. Second part if plausible since only the proportional heaters are normally used to maintain pressure while at power, and a larger water mass in the pressurizer could require more or larger heaters to maintain 2250 psia, however this is not the basis for 53%.

C. Plausible that a minimum level of 33% will prevent reaching the SIAS setpoint on an uncomplicated trip since the Pressurizer pressure bottoms out at a lower pressure from a lower starting level at the same power level, however this is not the design basis for 33%. Second part is correct.

D. Plausible that a minimum level of 33% will prevent reaching the SIAS setpoint on an uncomplicated trip since the Pressurizer pressure bottoms out at a lower pressure from a lower starting level at the same power level, however this is not the design basis for 33%. Second part if plausible since only the proportional heaters are normally used to maintain pressure while at power, and a larger water mass in the pressurizer could require more or larger heaters to maintain 2250 psia, however this is not the basis for 53%.

Technical Reference(s) Technical Specifications Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2904 - Describe LCO 3.4.9, Pressurizer, and its basis Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 3 55.43 Page 23 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

References:

LCO 3.4.9. Pressurizer, Tech Specs Revision #

Page 24 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 016 G 2.2.44 Importance Rating 4.2 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions Proposed Question: RO 57 Given the following control room indications:

Based on the indications, the crew should diagnose a loss of Non-Class Instrument Bus

_____(1)_____ and ensure Pressurizer Level and Pressure Control Selector Switches are selected to _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. NNN-D11

2. Channel X B. 1. NNN-D11

2. Channel Y C. 1. NNN-D12

2. Channel X Page 25 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 D. 1. NNN-D12

2. Channel Y Proposed Answer: D Explanation:

A. Plausible that NNN-D11 would power the 2A and 2B seal injection controllers since NNN-D11 and NNN-D12 power counter-intuitive loads, however the 2A and 2B seal injection controllers are powered from NNN-D12. Plausible that selecting channel X would be the correct action since channel X controls are on the left and the left hand side seal injection controllers are energized, however channel Y is the correct channel to select for a loss of NNN-D12.

B. Plausible that NNN-D11 would power the 2A and 2B seal injection controllers since NNN-D11 and NNN-D12 power counter-intuitive loads, however the 2A and 2B seal injection controllers are powered from NNN-D12. Second part is correct.

C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since it is plausible that selecting channel X would be the correct action since channel X controls are on the left and the left hand side seal injection controllers are energized, however channel Y is the correct channel to select for a loss of NNN-D12.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ14 Loss of Non-Class Instrument Attached w/ Revision # See and Control Power Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 9369 - Given a loss of non-class instrument power, describe how the loss impacts the operation of CVCS Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 26 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ14 Loss of Non-Class Instrument and Revision # 27 Control Power Page 27 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Page 28 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 027 K5.01 Importance Rating 3.1 Containment Iodine Removal: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CIRS:

Purpose of charcoal filters Proposed Question: RO 58 The amount of gaseous iodine in the containment atmosphere is minimized during normal conditions by the use of _____(1)_____ filters and is minimized during a LOCA by maintaining pH of the water in containment _____(2)_____ 7.0.

A. 1. HEPA

2. less than B. 1. HEPA

2. greater than C. 1. charcoal

2. less than D. 1. charcoal

2. greater than Proposed Answer: D Page 29 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since HEPA filters are used in several air filtration units throughout the plant and filter our micro particles from the air, however the iodine is filtered by use of charcoal filters.

Second part is plausible since the water injected into the core during a LOCA is a boric acid solution, and boric acid has a pH less than 7.0, however in order to maintain iodine in solution, trisodium phosphate is added to the water to raise the pH to greater than 7.0.

B. First part is plausible since HEPA filters are used in several air filtration units throughout the plant and filter our micro particles from the air, however the iodine is filtered by use of charcoal filters.

Second part is correct.

C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the water injected into the core during a LOCA is a boric acid solution, and boric acid has a pH less than 7.0, however in order to maintain iodine in solution, trisodium phosphate is added to the water to raise the pH to greater than 7.0.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) Containment HVAC System Technical Attached w/ Revision # See Manual Comments / Reference Safety Injection System LOIT Lesson Plan Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2020 - Explain the operation of the Containment Building Pre-Access Filtration AFUs (HCN-F01-A, & B) under normal operating conditions Question Source: Bank Modified Bank x (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 13 55.43 Page 30 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Original Question 1 Revision #

Comments /

Reference:

Original Question 2 Revision #

Page 31 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Containment HVAC System Technical Manual Revision # 6 Comments /

Reference:

Safety Injection System LOIT Lesson Plan Revision Page 32 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 028 K2.01 Importance Rating 2.5 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Hydrogen Recombiner.

Proposed Question: RO 59 Which of the following is the power supply to the B Hydrogen Recombiner?

A. NBN-S02 B. PBB-S04 C. PHB-M34 D. NHN-M20 Proposed Answer: C Page 33 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible as several B components are powered from NBN-S02, however the B Hydrogen Recombiner is powered from PHB-M34.

B. Plausible as several B components are powered from PBB-S04, however the B Hydrogen Recombiner is powered from PHB-M34.

C. Correct.

D. Plausible as several B components are powered from NHN-M20, however the B Hydrogen Recombiner is powered from PHB-M34.

Technical Reference(s) 40OP-9HP02, Containment Hydrogen Attached w/ Revision # See Control and Hydrogen Purge Exhaust Comments / Reference System 40AO-9ZZ12, Degraded Electrical Power Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank x - 2010 RO Exam Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 34 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40OP-9HP02, Containment Hydrogen Control Revision # 6 and Hydrogen Purge Exhaust System Page 35 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ12, Degraded Electrical Power Revision #63 Page 36 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ12, Degraded Electrical Power Revision #63 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ12, Degraded Electrical Power Revision #63 Page 37 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 029 K3.01 Importance Rating 2.9 Containment Purge: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Containment Purge System will have on the following:

Containment parameters Proposed Question: RO 60 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 3 is performing a core offload.

• Containment is closed.

• The fuel transfer canal is open.

Subsequently:

• The Area 3 operator notices that Spent Fuel Pool level is lower than it was when he started the shift.

Which ONE of the following would cause the lower level in the Spent Fuel Pool?

A. A Fuel Building supply fan tripped.

B. A Refueling Purge supply fan tripped.

C. A loss of Instrument Air to the Cask Loading Pit gate.

D. A loss of Instrument Air to the Decontamination Pit gate Proposed Answer: B Page 38 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible since a ventilation change with the fuel transfer canal can cause fuel pool level to change, however if the fuel building supply fan tripped, level in the fuel pool would rise.

B. Correct. The loss of a refueling purge supply fan will result in lower pressure in containment. This will cause water in the spent fuel pool to be pushed into containment due to the now higher pressure in fuel building relative to containment (manometer effect).

C. Plausible that a loss of air to the cask loading pit gate would result in the gate seals losing their seal pressure and water leaving the fuel pool to the cask loading pit, however the gate seals have an automatic nitrogen backup which would prevent this from happening.

D. Plausible that the loss of air to the decontamination pit gate would result in the gate seals losing their seal pressure causing water to leave the fuel pool, and this could occur if the cask loading pit gate was open during core offload, however the gate seals have automatic nitrogen backup to prevent this from happening.

Technical Reference(s) Containment Purge Lesson Plan Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 15914 - Explain the operation of the Containment Refueling Purge Supply and Exhaust Fans, CPN-A01, J01 and J02.

Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 9 55.43 Page 39 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Containment Purge Lesson Plan Revision Comments /

Reference:

Containment Purge Lesson Plan Revision Comments /

Reference:

Containment Purge Lesson Plan Revision The red arrow indicates the location of the decontamination pit (not shown in the provided drawing)

Page 40 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 041 G 2.2.44 Importance Rating 4.2 Steam Dump / Turbine Bypass Control: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions Proposed Question: RO 61 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

• SGN-PI-1024, Main Steam Common Header Pressure, is indicating 1050 psia.

• SGN-PI-1027, Main Steam Common Header Pressure, is indicating 900 psia.

• SGN-PIC-1010, SBCS Master Control, is in REMOTE / AUTO.

1. Which of the Main Steam Common Header Pressure transmitters has failed?

2. What action would the crew have to take in the event of a load rejection for SBCS to control RCS temperature in AUTO?

A. 1. SGN-PI-1024

2. Insert a SBCS Valve manual permissive as needed B. 1. SGN-PI-1024

2. Place the SBCS Master Controller in LOCAL / AUTO C. 1. SGN-PI-1027

2. Insert a SBCS Valve manual permissive as needed D. 1. SGN-PI-1027

2. Place the SBCS Master Controller in LOCAL / AUTO Proposed Answer: C Page 41 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible that 1024 is failed high since it is significantly higher than 1027, and 1024 is reading ~ 25 psia higher than normal, however 1027 is failed low. Second part is correct.

B. First part is plausible that 1024 is failed high since it is significantly higher than 1027, and 1024 is reading ~ 25 psia higher than normal, however 1027 is failed low. Second part is plausible since if 1024 was failed high, there would be a constant modulate signal to the SBCS valves and the examinee may believe that placing the master controller in local/auto would control the modulate signal based on the local (manual) setpoint.

C. Correct. Normal main steam common header pressure at 100% power is ~ 1025 psia, therefore 1027 has failed low. With 1027 failed low, the auto permissive setpoint will not be reached on a load rejection and giving the valves manual permissives will allow the valves to auto modulate to control RCS temperature.

D. First part is correct. Plausible that placing the master controller in local/auto will allow for manual control of permissive setpoints and automatic valve modulation, however the permissives will not come in and the valves will not be able to modulate.

Technical Reference(s) PVNGS Operator Information Manual Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 3898 - Describe how the SBCS generates its demand and permissive setpoints Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 42 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS Operator Information Manual Revision June 2015 The operator will have to give a manual permissive in the event of a load Page 43 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 055 K3.01 Importance Rating 2.5 Condenser Air Removal: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CARS will have on the following: Main condenser Proposed Question: RO 62 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

• Main Condenser shell A vacuum is 2.6 in HgA and degrading.

Which ONE of the following conditions would cause this response?

A. Ambient relative humidity lowering.

B. Circulating Water temperature lowering.

C. 86 lockout on the A Air Removal Pump, ARN-P01.

D. Vacuum breaker make-up isolation valve leaking by.

Proposed Answer: C Page 44 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible as changes in humidity will affect condenser vacuum, however lowering humidity will improve vacuum.

B. Plausible as changes in circ water temperature will affect condenser vacuum, however lowering circulating water temperature will improve vacuum.

C. Correct.

D. The vacuum breaker make-up isolation valve leaking by will have no impact due to supplying more water to the vacuum breaker, however if the drain valve were leaking by, the resultant air in-leakage would result in degrading vacuum.

Technical Reference(s) LOIT Lesson Plan, Air Removal System Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 1540 - Describe the Control Room indications associated with the Air Removal system Question Source: Bank X - 2010 RO Exam Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 45 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Revision Therefore, a loss of the A Air Removal pump will degrade vacuum in the A Condenser Shell.

Page 46 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 011 A4.05 Importance Rating 3.2 Pressurizer Level Control System: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Letdown flow controller Proposed Question: RO 63 Per 40OP-9CH01, CVCS Normal Operations, when shifting RCN-LIC-110, Pressurizer Level Control, from REMOTE / AUTO to LOCAL / AUTO, the board operator shall ensure the LOCAL setpoint is _____(1)_____ the REMOTE setpoint, and RCN-LIC-110 _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. matched to

2. must be placed in MANUAL prior to selecting LOCAL / AUTO B. 1. matched to

2. may be taken directly from REMOTE / AUTO to LOCAL / AUTO C. 1. ~ 5% below

2. must be placed in MANUAL prior to selecting LOCAL / AUTO D. 1. ~ 5% below

2. may be taken directly from REMOTE / AUTO to LOCAL / AUTO Proposed Answer: A Page 47 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since with both setpoints matched and the controller remaining in automatic control that going to manual would not be required, however since the LOCAL/REMOTE selector switch is break before make, there may be a brief period of time in which the controller output will lower resulting in reduced letdown flow. This is plant PVNGS OE from 2014 and the temporary reduction in controller output resulted in letdown flow lowering and PZR level exceeding the TS limit of 56%.

C. First part is plausible since shifting to a lower setpoint would result in letdown flow rising initially and provide some margin between the normal full power PZR level setpoint of 53% and the TS limit of 56%. Second part is correct.

D. First part is plausible since shifting to a lower setpoint would result in letdown flow rising initially and provide some margin between the normal full power PZR level setpoint of 53% and the TS limit of 56%. Second part is plausible since with both setpoints matched and the controller remaining in automatic control that going to manual would not be required, however since the LOCAL/REMOTE selector switch is break before make, there may be a brief period of time in which the controller output will lower resulting in reduced letdown flow. This is plant PVNGS OE from 2014 and the temporary reduction in controller output resulted in letdown flow lowering and PZR level exceeding the TS limit of 56%.

Technical Reference(s) 40OP-9CH01, CVCS Normal Operations Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2679 - Discuss the purpose and conditions under which the Pressurizer Level Control System is designed to function Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 3 55.43 Page 48 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40OP-9CH01, CVCS Normal Operations Revision 77 Page 49 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 075 K4.01 Importance Rating 2.5 Circulating Water: Knowledge of circulating water system design feature(s) and interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Heat sink Proposed Question: RO 64 Given the following conditions:

• An attempt to start a Circulating Water Pump has been made.

• The pump failed to start.

Which of the following conditions would have prevented the pump from starting?

The Circulating Water A. Intake canal level is too low.

B. Pumps discharge valve is closed.

C. Loops condenser outlet valve is closed.

D. Loops cross-tie valve, CW-HV-11, is closed.

Proposed Answer: C Page 50 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible since low canal level could cause low suction pressure and low flow, but will not prevent a pump start. Additionally, there are several administrative limits in 40OP-9CW01, Operating the CW System, related to intake canal level. Low canal level also causes the CIRC WTR SYS TRBL alarm to come in in the control room.

B. Plausible since there is an interlock between the pump discharge valve and the pump, however the discharge valve must be closed to allow the pump to start.

C. Correct.

D. Plausible since there is an interlock on CW-HV-11 which closes the valve when there is unbalanced flow between CW loops, however this valve being closed will not prevent a pump start.

Technical Reference(s) LOIT Lesson Plan, Circulating Water Attached w/ Revision # See System Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 7663 - Describe the automatic interlocks associated with the Circulating Water Condenser Outlet Valves Question Source: Bank x Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? 2015 RO Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 4 55.43 Page 51 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan, NKASYC010105 Circulating Water Revision # 5 System Page 52 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 086 K1.02 Importance Rating 2.7 Fire Protection: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the Fire Protection System and the following systems: Raw service water Proposed Question: RO 65 Normal makeup to Fire Protection System water tanks is supplied by the _____(1)_____, and if needed, a Fire Truck can utilize connections provided at the _____(2)_____ to pump to the fire water system.

A. 1. Demineralized Water System

2. Circulating Water System Canal B. 1. Demineralized Water System

2. Water Reclamation Facility Reservoirs C. 1. Domestic Water System

2. Circulating Water System Canal D. 1. Domestic Water System

2. Water Reclamation Facility Reservoirs Proposed Answer: C Page 53 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since the DW system provides make-up to several systems at the plant, and each unit has a DW storage tank, however fire water makeup is from DS.

Second part is correct.

B. First part is plausible since the DW system provides make-up to several systems at the plant, and each unit has a DW storage tank. Second part is plausible since the fire water storage tanks are located near the WRF plant boundary, and the WRF reservoirs are the makeup supply to the circ water system.

C. Correct.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the fire water storage tanks are located near the WRF plant boundary, and the WRF reservoirs are the makeup supply to the circ water system.

Technical Reference(s) LOIT Lesson Plan, Demineralized / Attached w/ Revision # See Domestic Water Systems Comments / Reference LOIT Lesson Plan, Fire Protection Systems Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 4494 - Describe the Fire Water Sub-system of the Fire Protection System Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 8 55.43 Page 54 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan NKASYC013602 Demineralized Revision #2

/ Domestic Water Systems Page 55 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan, NKASYC016404 Fire Protection Revision #4 Systems Page 56 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.1.14 Importance Rating 3.1 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plant-wide announcements, such as pump starts, reactor trips, mode changes, etc.

Proposed Question: RO 66 Per ODP-01, Operations Principles and Standards, which of the following evolutions would REQUIRE a plant announcement?

A. Starting a Spray Pond Pump for a surveillance test.

B. Starting an Emergency Diesel Generator during SPTAs.

C. Commencing a hydrogen on-load from a vendor supply truck.

D. Commencing a Containment Purge to lower Containment pressure.

Proposed Answer: A Page 57 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct. A planned operation of a 4kV breaker requires a plant announcement.

B. Plausible as starting an EDG would normally require a plant announcement, however not during SPTAs.

C. Plausible that a chemical on-load would require a plant announcement, however this is not an evolution which requires an announcement per ODP-1.

D. Plausible if thought that purging air from containment would warrant a plant announcement, however an announcement is not required for this evolution.

Technical Reference(s) Operations Department Practices, ODP-1 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 72275 - Routine Shift Operations Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 58 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Operations Department Practices, ODP-1 Revision #32 Page 59 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.1.26 Importance Rating 3.4 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen)

Proposed Question: RO 67 When working at heights in the RCA, fall protection is required for any work being performed above a MINIMUM height of _____(1)____ feet, and RP must be contacted to evaluate the need to perform a survey for any work being performed above a MINIMUM height of

_____(2)_____ feet.

A. 1. 4

2. 6 B. 1. 4

2. 8 C. 1. 6

2. 6 D. 1. 6

2. 8 Proposed Answer: A Page 60 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since an average height adult plus the length of a survey instrument is ~ 8 feet, thus anything above that height would require a survey prior to commencing work, however the requirement is 6 feet.

C. First part is plausible since 6 feet was the minimum height which required fall protection until 2015, however the current minimum height requiring fall protection is 4 feet. Second part is correct.

D. First part is plausible since 6 feet was the minimum height which required fall protection until 2015, however the current minimum height requiring fall protection is 4 feet. Second part is plausible since an average height adult plus the length of a survey instrument is ~ 8 feet, thus anything above that height would require a survey prior to commencing work, however the requirement is 6 feet.

Technical Reference(s) Site Specific Radiation Worker Training Attached w/ Revision # See Lesson Plan Comments / Reference Palo Verde Safety Manual Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 72275 - Routine Shift Operations Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 61 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

01DP-0IS20, Safety at Heights - Fall Protection Revision #4 Comments /

Reference:

Site Radiation Worker Training Revision Sept 2015 Page 62 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.1.34 Importance Rating 2.7 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of primary and secondary plant chemistry limits Proposed Question: RO 68 Per 40AO-9ZZ10, Condenser Tube Rupture, which of the following secondary chemistry parameters requires the CRS to direct a manual reactor trip?

A. 5 ppm Sodium in the Condenser Hotwell with a corresponding rise in cation conductivity.

B. 200 ppb Sodium in either Steam Generator with a corresponding rise in sulfates or chlorides.

C. 1.1 ppm Chloride in the either Steam Generator with a corresponding rise in cation conductivity.

D. 10 µmho/cm Cation Conductivity in either Steam Generator with a corresponding rise in sulfates or chlorides.

Proposed Answer: C Page 63 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible since > 1.5 ppm sodium in the hotwell requires entry into the condenser tube rupture AOP, however a reactor trip is not required until > 35 ppm in the hotwell.

B. Plausible since > 100 ppb sodium in a SG requires entry into the condenser tube rupture AOP, however a reactor trip is not required until > 1 ppm (1000 ppb) in a SG.

C. Correct.

D. Plausible since > 2 µmho/cm Cation Conductivity requires entry into the condenser tube rupture AOP, however a reactor trip is not required until > 15 µmho/cm Cation Conductivity.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ10, Condenser Tube Rupture Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 9582 - Determine if a reactor trip is necessary and if so, what actions are required after the trip Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 64 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ10, Condenser Tube Rupture Revision #25 Page 65 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ10, Condenser Tube Rupture Revision #25 Page 66 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.2.1 Importance Rating 4.5 Equipment Control: Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity Proposed Question: RO 69 Per 40OP-9ZZ03, Reactor Startup, when the Reactor goes critical with CEAs BELOW the Power Dependent Insertion Limit (PDIL) but ABOVE the -500 pcm position, what action(s) is/are required?

A. Trip the Reactor and emergency borate.

B. Insert Regulating Group CEAs to their lower group stop ONLY.

C. Insert Regulating Group CEAs to their Lower Electrical Limit.

D. Withdraw Regulating Group CEAs above the PDIL within 15 minutes.

Proposed Answer: A Page 67 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. Plausible since this is the correct action to take if the reactor unexpectedly goes subcritical, however if critical below the PDIL, trip and borate is the correct action.

C. Plausible since this is directed if conditions change during the startup and it is decided to terminate the startup, and going critical below the PDIL is an unexpected condition, however the trip and borate direction for being critical below the PDIL is more conservative and must be taken.

D. Plausible since this is the completion time for both LCO 3.1.1 (inadequate SDM) and LCO 3.1.7 (CEA insertion limits) condition B, however trip and borate is the correct answer.

Technical Reference(s) 40OP-9ZZ03, Reactor Startup Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 5497 - Describe the required actions if the reactor goes critical below the PDILs Question Source: Bank X - 2010 RO Exam Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 68 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40OP-9ZZ03, Reactor Startup Revision # 62 Comments /

Reference:

40OP-9ZZ03, Reactor Startup Revision # 62 Comments /

Reference:

40OP-9ZZ03, Reactor Startup Revision # 62 Page 69 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40OP-9ZZ03, Reactor Startup Revision # 62 Page 70 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.2.13 Importance Rating 4.1 Equipment Control: Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures Proposed Question: RO 70 The use of an air-operated valve, which fails open on a loss of air, as part of an isolation boundary is A. never permitted.

B. permitted ONLY if a separate air cylinder is installed to ensure the valve has air.

C. permitted ONLY if the valve has a manual jacking device installed to keep it closed.

D. permitted ONLY if the air line to the valve actuator is tagged in a way to ensure air cannot be isolated to the valve.

Proposed Answer: C Page 71 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible since the valve fails open and that personnel safety could be impacted by the use of a valve which fails open, however this is permitted with additional action.

B. Plausible since the contingency action to ensure the valve remains in its clearance position is taken, however this is not the approved method for using a fail-open air valve in a clearance.

C. Correct.

D. Plausible since the contingency action to ensure the valve remains in its clearance position is taken, however this is not the approved method for using a fail-open air valve in a clearance.

Technical Reference(s) 40DP-9OP29, Power Block Clearance and Attached w/ Revision # See Tagging Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 14754 - Given a permit and tagging situation, describe the rules of use of tags, in accordance with PVNGSD permit and tagging procedures Question Source: Bank X - PVNGS Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 72 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9OP29, Power Block Clearance and Revision # 59 Tagging Page 73 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.2.12 Importance Rating 3.7 Equipment Control: Knowledge of surveillance procedures Proposed Question: RO 71 Per 40ST-9ZZM1, Operations Mode 1 Surveillance Logs:

1. Appendix B, Mode 1 SHIFTLY Surveillance Logs Data Sheets, must have the Acceptance Review completed NO LATER THAN

2. Appendix C, Mode 1 DAILY Surveillance Logs Data Sheets, is directed to be performed during A. 1. 0800 on day shift and 2000 on night shift

2. day shift B. 1. 0800 on day shift and 2000 on night shift

2. night shift C. 1. 1100 on day shift and 2300 on night shift

2. day shift D. 1. 1100 on day shift and 2300 on night shift

2. night shift Proposed Answer: D Page 74 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since 0800 is the earliest the shiftly logs can be completed and reviewed, however the latest is 1100. Second part is plausible since some of the Mode 1 daily surveillances are done on the day shift (i.e. ISFSI daily checks), however the Daily Surveillance Logs Data Sheets are done on the night shift.

B. First part is plausible since 0800 is the earliest the shiftly logs can be completed and reviewed, however the latest is 1100. Second part is correct.

C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since some of the Mode 1 daily surveillances are done on the day shift (i.e. ISFSI daily checks), however the Daily Surveillance Logs Data Sheets are done on the night shift.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40ST-9ZZM1, Operations Mode 1 Attached w/ Revision # See Surveillance Logs Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 4609 - Given conditions of operating in Mode 1, perform the Mode 1 surveillance logs in accordance with 40ST-9ZZM1 Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 13 55.43 Page 75 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40ST-9ZZM1, Operations Mode 1 Surveillance Revision # 68 Logs Comments /

Reference:

40ST-9ZZM1, Operations Mode 1 Surveillance Revision # 68 Logs Page 76 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40ST-9ZZM1, Operations Mode 1 Surveillance Revision # 68 Logs Page 77 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.3.12 Importance Rating 3.2 Radiation Control: Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

Proposed Question: RO 72 Given the following conditions:

• Operators are preparing to perform work inside Containment during a refueling outage.

• Current conditions in the work area are as follows:

o Area radiation is 150 mrem/hr.

o Highest contamination level in the area is 30,000 dpm/100cm2.

Based on current radiological conditions, the MINIMUM Protective Clothing (PCs) required is a _____(1)_____ and continuous RP coverage _____(2)_____ required.

A. 1. single set of PCs

2. IS B. 1. single set of PCs

2. is NOT C. 1. double set of PCs

2. IS D. 1. double set of PCs

2. is NOT Proposed Answer: B Page 78 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since continuous RP coverage is required in high rad areas, but only if they are locked high rad areas.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible since double PCs are required in high contamination areas, however 30,000 dpm/100cm2 doesnt meet the threshold for a high contamination area. Second part is plausible since continuous RP coverage is required in high rad areas, but only if they are locked high rad areas.

D. First part is plausible since double PCs are required in high contamination areas, however 30,000 dpm/100cm2 doesnt meet the threshold for a high contamination area. Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) Site Specific Radiation Worker Training Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: EO State the site specific administrative limits for radiation dose EO Discuss the site specific use of protective clothing to prevent contamination of personnel and areas Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 12 55.43 Page 79 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Site Specific Radiation Worker Training Page 80 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.3.15 Importance Rating 2.9 Radiation Control: Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

Proposed Question: RO 73 When using a frisker to check for potential personal contamination, the area background radiation level must be less than a MAXIMUM of _____(1)_____ cpm, and RP must be called if a MINIMUM of _____(2)_____ cpm above background is detected during the frisk.

A. 1. 100

2. 100 B. 1. 100

2. 300 C. 1. 300

2. 100 D. 1. 300

2. 300 Proposed Answer: C Page 81 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since 100 cpm above background is the limit to call RP, however the maximum background radiation to use the frisker is 300 cpm. Second part is correct.

B. First part is plausible since 100 cpm above background is the limit to call RP, however the maximum background radiation to use the frisker is 300 cpm. Second part is plausible since 300 cpm is the max background radiation level, however if personal frisker readings are 100 cpm above background, RP must be called.

C. Correct.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since 300 cpm is the max background radiation level, however if personal frisker readings are 100 cpm above background, RP must be called.

Technical Reference(s) Radiation Worker Training Lesson Plan Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: EO Explain the site-specific methods to monitor personnel for contamination, including the use of friskers and personnel contamination monitors Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 11 55.43 Page 82 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Radiation Worker Training Revision Page 83 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.4.3 Importance Rating 3.7 Emergency Procedures / Plan: Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation Proposed Question: RO 74 Which transmitters shown below are Post Accident Monitoring Instruments (PAMI) and/or qualified for use during harsh conditions in containment?

A. HCA-PI-351A and HCA-PI-352A B. HCA-PI-351A and SGA-LI-1114A C. HCA-PI-352A and SGA-LI-1113A D. SGA-LI-1113A and SGA-LI-1114A Proposed Answer: D Page 84 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible if thought that Containment Pressure transmitters would be post-accident instruments, and some containment pressure transmitters are PAMI, however these two are not.

B. Plausible if thought that the two NR instruments shown would be post-accident since the NR are more accurate, and SGA-LI-1114A is PAMI, HCA-LI-351A is not.

C. Plausible if thought that the two WR instruments shown would be post-accident since the WR indicate over a larger scale, and SGA-LI-1113Ais PAMI, HCA-PI-352A is not.

D. Correct. PAMI instruments in the control room are indicated with a white stripe below the placard.

Technical Reference(s) 40DP-9AP16, EOP Users Guide Attached w/ Revision # See Control Board Drawing Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 2608 - Describe the RPS controls and indications available for the operator at B05 Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Page 85 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9AP16, EOP Users Guide Revision # 9 Page 86 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Control Board Drawing Revision Page 87 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Control Board Drawing Revision Page 88 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.4.14 Importance Rating 3.8 Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of general guidelines for EOP usage Proposed Question: RO 75 Given the following conditions:

• SPTAs are in progress.

• The CO recognizes a contingency action needs to be taken for the RCS Heat Removal safety function due to an automatic actuation of MSIS.

• The CRS and RO are currently verifying Vital Auxiliaries acceptance criteria.

Per PVNGS EOP Operations Expectations, the CO can take the contingency action

_____(1)_____ , and the contingency action may be taken _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. without CRS concurrence

2. immediately B. 1. without CRS concurrence

2. ONLY after the CRS has addressed all higher safety functions C. 1. ONLY with CRS concurrence

2. immediately D. 1. ONLY with CRS concurrence

2. ONLY after the CRS has addressed all higher safety functions Proposed Answer: C Page 89 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible that the action can be taken without concurrence since that is true for an exceeded PPS or ESFAS setpoint, however this is not the case in this situation. The action can be taken immediately, but only with CRS concurrence.

B. Plausible that the action can be taken without concurrence since that is true for an exceeded PPS or ESFAS setpoint, however this is not the case in this situation. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the safety functions are generally performed in order, however an exception can be made if contingency actions need to be taken.

C. Correct. Contingency actions may be pulled forward and performed outside of the normal safety function hierarchy, however it requires CRS concurrence.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the safety functions are generally performed in order, however an exception can be made if contingency actions need to be taken.

Technical Reference(s) EOP Operations Expectations Attached w/ Revision # See 40DP-9AP16, EOP Users Guide Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 8339 - Given actual or simulated emergency events, apply the Operations Expectations to the EOP Guidance in accordance with the EOP Operations Expectations Question Source: Bank Modified Bank (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 Page 90 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

EOP Operations Expectations Revision # 21 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9AP16, EOP Users Guide Revision # 9 Page 91 of 92

ES-401 PVNGS 2016 NRC Written Exam Worksheet 51 to 75 Rev 12 Form ES-401-5 Page 92 of 92

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 038 EA2.15 Importance Rating 4.4 Steam Generator Tube Rupture: Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a SGTR: Pressure at which to maintain RCS during S/G cooldown Proposed Question: SRO 76 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is performing a cooldown and depressurization per 40EP-9EO04, SGTR, due to a SGTR on SG #1.

SG #1 has been isolated per Standard Appendix 113.

One RCP in each loop has been secured.

The CRS has directed lowering RCS pressure to < 1135 psia and to within +/- 50 psid of the most affected SG while maintaining RCP NPSH limits.

The RO has just informed the CRS that he is approaching the RCP NPSH limit and asks if maintaining RCP NPSH limits or reducing RCS pressure to within 50 psid of affected SG pressure takes precedence.

RCS pressure is currently 1400 psia.

The CRS should inform the RO that per 40DP-9AP09, SGTR Technical Guideline, A. reducing RCS pressure to < 1135 psia and to within +/- 50 psid of the most affected SG takes precedence to prevent filling the Main Steam piping with water.

B. maintaining adequate RCP NPSH takes precedence to ensure the adverse effects of RCS dilution are minimized when backflow of secondary water into the RCS is established.

C. reducing RCS pressure to < 1135 psia and to within +/- 50 psid of the most affected SG takes precedence to minimize contamination and radiation levels in the Main Steam piping.

D. maintaining adequate RCP NPSH takes precedence to ensure Main Spray is available to maximize the depressurization rate and precisely control RCS pressure when equalized with the most affected SG.

Page 1 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer: B Explanation:

A. Plausible since the mitigating strategy of the SGTR EOP is to lower RCS pressure in order to minimize the leakrate and backflow from the SG to the RCS in order to minimize contamination of the Main Steam Piping; however, it should not be accomplished at the expense of violating NPSH of the RCPs.

B. Correct.

C. Plausible since the mitigating strategy of the SGTR EOP is to lower RCS pressure in order to minimize the leakrate and establish backflow from the SG to the RCS in order to minimize contamination of the Main Steam Piping; however, it should not be accomplished at the expense of violating NPSH of the RCPs.

D. Plausible since securing RCPs will prevent Main Spray since RCPs are the motive force, however this is not the basis for RCP NPSH taking precedence. Additionally, Main Spray is much better for fine adjustments to RCS pressure which Aux Spray is more of a course adjust control.

Technical Reference(s) 40DP-9AP09, SGTR Technical Guideline Attached w/ Revision # See 40EP-9EO04, Steam Generator Tube Comments / Reference Rupture Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 11226 - Given the SGTR EOP is being used and given plant conditions, determine an appropriate pressure target for depressurization and state the basis for this value, in accordance with 40EP-9EO04.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 2 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision 10 Page 3 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO04, SGTR Revision 30 Page 4 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9AP09, SGTR Technical Guideline Revision 23 Page 5 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9AP09, SGTR Technical Guideline Revision 23 Page 6 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 015/17 AA2.10 Importance Rating 3.7 RCP Malfunctions: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): When to secure RCPs on loss of cooling or seal injection Proposed Question: SRO 77 Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

An inadvertent Train A CSAS has just occurred.

NCA-UV-402, NCW Containment Downstream Return Isolation Valve, is closed.

NCA-UV-402, NCW Containment Downstream Return Isolation Valve, must be overridden and opened within a MAXIMUM of _____(1)_____ or the reactor must be tripped.

When NCA-UV-402 is overridden and opened, the penetration must be isolated within a MAXIMUM of _____(2)_____ to comply with LCO 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves.

A. 1. 3 minutes

2. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> B. 1. 3 minutes

2. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> C. 1. 10 minutes

2. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> D. 1. 10 minutes

2. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Proposed Answer: C Explanation:

Page 7 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 A. First part is plausible since this is correct if the loss of NC is concurrent with a loss of seal injection, however seal injection is not isolated on a CSAS. Second part is correct.

B. First part is plausible since this is correct if the loss of NC is concurrent with a loss of seal injection, however seal injection is not isolated on a CSAS. Second part is plausible as there is a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> completion time in LCO 3.6.3, however this is for purge valves, not NC containment isolation valves.

C. Correct.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible as there is a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> completion time in LCO 3.6.3, however this is for purge valves, not NC containment isolation valves.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water Attached w/ Revision # See Technical Specifications Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 89789 - Given plant conditions and Technical Specification action statements that are greater than one hour, apply the action statements that are greater than one hour for T.S. 3.6, in accordance with Tech Spec 3.6.

Question Source: Bank # X Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? Yes, 2015 SRO Q #76 Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 2 Page 8 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision # 10 Page 9 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water Revision #9 Page 10 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications, LCO 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves.

Page 11 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 025 G 2.2.42 Importance Rating 4.6 Loss of RHR System: Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications Proposed Question: SRO 78 Given the following conditions:

Unit 3 is in MODE 4, cooling down for a refueling outage.

Train A and Train B LPSI Pumps are being used for Shutdown Cooling.

All RCPs are secured.

Subsequently:

The B LPSI Pump indicates no flow and lower than normal amps.

In order for the unit to be in compliance with LCO 3.4.6, RCS Loops - MODE 4, at least one RCP must be OPERABLE _____(1)_____ and the associated SG must be at a MINIMUM level of 25% _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. ONLY

2. wide range B. 1. ONLY

2. narrow range C. 1. AND running

2. wide range D. 1. AND running

2. narrow range Page 12 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer: A Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since 23.5% narrow range is the top of the SG u-tubes and below the top of the u-tubes will provide less than maximum heat transfer, however only 25% wide range is required for the RCS loop to be OPERABLE.

C. First part is plausible since there were previously two trains of SDC in service and placing the RCP loop in operation would match the previous condition, however LCO 3.4.6 only required one train of SDC or RCS loop to be in operation and one train/loop to be available. Second part is correct.

D. First part is plausible since there were previously two trains of SDC in service and placing the RCP loop in operation would match the previous condition, however LCO 3.4.6 only required one train of SDC or RCS loop to be in operation and one train/loop to be available. Second part is plausible since 23.5% narrow range is the top of the SG u-tubes and below the top of the u-tubes will provide less than maximum heat transfer, however only 25% wide range is required for the RCS loop to be OPERABLE.

Technical Reference(s) Tech Spec LCO 3.4.6 Attached w/ Revision # See LCO 3.4.6 Tech Spec Bases Comments / Reference EOP Setpoint Document Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 55211 - Given conditions when an LCO is not met, apply Technical Specification Section 3.4.6 (Loops - Mode 4), in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.6.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 2 Page 13 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision # 10 Page 14 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications Revision # 178 Page 15 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications Bases Revision # 52 Page 16 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specification Bases Revision # 56 Page 17 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS EOP Setpoint Document Revision # 9 Page 18 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 040 G 2.4.6 Importance Rating 4.7 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer: Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies Proposed Question: SRO 79 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to an ESD inside containment.

The faulted SG has just been isolated.

Containment pressure is 22 psig and slowly lowering.

RCS temperature is 475°F and stable.

RCS pressure is 2100 psia and slowly rising.

Pressurizer level is 72% and slowly rising.

One Charging Pump is running.

The crew is preparing to perform a cooldown and depressurization to SDC.

Shutdown margin has NOT yet been verified.

Per 40DP-9AP10, Excess Steam Demand Technical Guideline, the cooldown _____(1)_____

commence prior to verifying shutdown margin and the running Charging Pump should be

_____(2)_____ .

A. 1. MAY

2. secured B. 1. MAY

2. maintained in operation C. 1. may NOT

2. secured D. 1. may NOT

2. maintained in operation Page 19 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer: B Explanation:

A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since pressurizer level is above the safety function limit for inventory control, and the charging pump is causing pressurizer level to continue to rise, however with an ESD inside containment, NC cooling to the RCPs is lost and the seal injection flow provided by the running charging pump is required.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible since the ESD procedure says, if the RCS boron concentration is sufficient to maintain the reactor 1% or more shutdown during the entire cooldown, then cooldown to SDC entry conditions however since the cooldown is the only currently available method to lower pressurizer level, verification of SDM is not required to commence the cooldown. Additionally, the ESD tech guideline says maintaining RCP seal integrity to prevent complicating the emergency has priority over establishing shutdown margin. Second part is plausible since pressurizer level is above the safety function limit for inventory control, and the charging pump is causing pressurizer level to continue to rise, however with an ESD inside containment, NC cooling to the RCPs is lost and the seal injection flow provided by the running charging pump is required.

D. First part is plausible since the ESD procedure says, if the RCS boron concentration is sufficient to maintain the reactor 1% or more shutdown during the entire cooldown, then cooldown to SDC entry conditions however since the cooldown is the only currently available method to lower pressurizer level, verification of SDM is not required to commence the cooldown. Additionally, the ESD tech guideline says maintaining RCP seal integrity to prevent complicating the emergency has priority over establishing shutdown margin. Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40EP-9EO05, Excessive Steam Demand Attached w/ Revision # See 40DP-9AP10, ESD Technical Guideline Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 9147 - Given conditions of an ESD, analyze RCS inventory control to determine if the SFSC acceptance criteria is satisfied in accordance with 40EP-9EO05.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 20 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision # 10 Page 21 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO05, Excess Steam Demand Revision # 31 Page 22 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO05, Excess Steam Demand Revision # 31 Page 23 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9AP10, ESD Technical Guideline Revision # 23 Page 24 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 055 G 2.4.21 Importance Rating 4.6 Station Blackout: Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.

Proposed Question: SRO 80 Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 tripped from 100% power due to a loss of offsite power.

Both EDGs failed and the CRS has just transitioned to 40EP-9EO08, Blackout.

The ECC reports that an offsite power source should be available in the next 30 minutes.

The RO reports the following Containment parameters:

o Containment pressure is 2.8 psig and slowly rising.

o Containment temperature is 210°F and slowly rising.

Based on these parameters, the CRS should determine that the Containment Temperature and Pressure Control safety function is not met due to Containment _____(1)_____ and the CRS should _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. pressure ONLY

2. remain in 40EP-9EO08, Blackout, and direct the RO to perform Appendix 53, Align De-energized Buses, in anticipation of the restoration of offsite power B. 1. pressure ONLY

2. transition to 40EP-9EO09, Functional Recovery, and take action per MVAC-3, SBOG, to aid in restoring the CTPC safety function C. 1. pressure AND temperature

2. remain in 40EP-9EO08, Blackout, and direct the RO to perform Appendix 53, Align De-energized Buses, in anticipation of the restoration of offsite power Page 25 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 D. 1. pressure AND temperature

2. transition to 40EP-9EO09, Functional Recovery, and take action per MVAC-3, SBOG, to aid in restoring the CTPC safety function Proposed Answer: D Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since the SFSC for containment pressure is exceeded; however both pressure and temperature are above their SFSC limits for blackout. Second part is plausible since Appendix 53 would be directed, however transition to the FR is required due to not meeting the CPTC safety function.

B. First part is plausible since the SFSC for containment pressure is exceeded; however both pressure and temperature are above their SFSC limits for blackout. Second part is correct.

C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since Appendix 53 would be directed, however transition to the FR is required due to not meeting the CPTC safety function.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40EP-9EO08, Blackout Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective:

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 26 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision # 10 Page 27 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO08, Blackout Revision # 22 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO08, Blackout Revision # 22 Page 28 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 K/A # 077 AA2.05 Importance Rating 3.8 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: Operational status of offsite circuit Proposed Question: SRO 81 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

Unit 2 is in a refueling outage.

Unit 3 has just tripped.

Annunciator 1B03B, LAST UNIT ON - LINE, has just alarmed in Unit 1.

Unit 1 Main Generator is boosting 50 MVAR.

LCO 3.8.1 Condition G has been entered in Unit 1 due to both offsite circuits not meeting required capability.

Switchyard voltage is currently 523 kV.

1. In this condition, to comply with LCO 3.8.1 Condition G, the CRS can direct either blocking fast bus transfer on NAN-S01 and NAN-S02, OR ________

2. The PREFERRED AVAILABLE option per the LCO 3.8.1 Technical Specifications Bases is to ________ .

A. 1. boosting additional MVAR to raise switchyard voltage

2. blocking fast bus transfer on NAN-S01 and NAN-S02 B. 1. boosting additional MVAR to raise switchyard voltage

2. boosting additional MVAR to raise switchyard voltage C. 1. transferring the Class 4kV buses to their respective EDGs

2. blocking fast bus transfer on NAN-S01 and NAN-S02 D. 1. transferring the Class 4kV buses to their respective EDGs

2. transferring the Class 4kV buses to their respective EDGs Page 29 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer: C Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since this would be an acceptable method to comply with 3.8.1 G and is the preferred method per the TS bases, however since Unit 1 is the last unit online, this method is not allowed. Second part is correct.

B. First part is plausible since this would be an acceptable method to comply with 3.8.1 G and is the preferred method per the TS bases, however since Unit 1 is the last unit online, this method is not allowed. Plausible as this raising switchyard voltage is preferred in the TSB, however since it is not allowed in this condition, it is not an available option.

C. Correct.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible as this method is an acceptable method to comply with 3.8.1 G, and this would result in maintaining forced circulation in the event of a subsequent loss of offsite power, however since this option would result in the inoperability of offsite sources, TSB lists this option as less preferential than blocking fast bus transfer.as Technical Reference(s) Technical Specification 3.8.1 Attached w/ Revision # See Technical Specification Bases Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 89755 - Identify the basis of Technical Specification LCOs for section 3.8 in accordance with Tech Spec 3.8 basis Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 2 Page 30 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision # 10 Page 31 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications Revision # 123 Page 32 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specification Bases Revision # 34 Page 33 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specification Bases Revision # 41 Page 34 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specification Bases Revision # 41 Page 35 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specification Bases Revision # 2 Page 36 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # 032 G 2.1.7 Importance Rating 4.7 Loss of Source Range NI: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation Proposed Question: SRO 82 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in MODE 6.

Core reload is in progress.

Subsequently:

Audible indication of count rate for the Startup Range Monitors (SRMs) is lost inside Containment.

Audible and visual SRM indications remain available in the Control Room.

Based on these indications, the core reload A. MAY continue provided audible AND visual source range indications are available in the control room.

B. MUST be suspended in accordance with LCO 3.3.12 Boron Dilution Alarm System, Condition A, for two required SRMs inoperable.

C. MAY continue provided audible source range indication is available in the control room AND the Refueling machine maintains constant communications with the control room.

D. MUST be suspended and action must be taken to restore audible indication in containment in accordance with LCO 3.9.2 Nuclear instrumentation, Conditions A and B for two required SRMs inoperable.

a Proposed Answer: D Page 37 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible since visual and audible indications will be maintained in the control room, and there is nothing to indicate that the SRM is not functioning (i.e. only the speaker in Containment is faulted),

however in order for the SRM to be operable, audible indications are required in both the control room and containment.

B. Plausible that LCO 3.3.12 would not be met in this situation as inoperability of an SRM normally makes BDAS inoperable, however if SRMs are inoperable SOLELY due to the loss of audible indication, BDAS remains operable.

C. Plausible since audible indications will be maintained in the control room, and maintaining constant communication with the refueling machine could be interpreted as meeting the requirement for audible indication in containment, however communication from the control room to the refueling machine is not credited for meeting the operability requirement of LCO 3.9.2..

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) Technical Specifications Attached w/ Revision # See Technical Specifications Bases Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 94058 - Given a set of plant conditions, identify whether or not LCO 3.9.2 is satisfied and any actions or surveillance requirements that would prevent core alterations, per Tech Spec 3.9 and its basis.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 2 Page 38 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision # 10 Page 39 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications Revision # 138 Page 40 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications Bases Revision # 61 Page 41 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # 036 AA2.03 Importance Rating 4.2 Fuel Handling Accident: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: Magnitude of potential radioactive release Proposed Question: SRO 83 Given the following conditions:

At time = 1017: The Fuel Handling Supervisor notified the control room that a fuel handing accident has occurred.

Fuel Building Radiation Monitor readings are provided.

Based on these conditions, the event should be classified as _____(1)_____, and a Protective Action Recommendation _____(2)_____ required.

A. 1. RA1.1

2. IS B. 1. RA1.1

2. is NOT C. 1. RA2.2

2. IS D. 1. RA2.2

2. is NOT Proposed Answer: D Page 42 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible because RU-146 is exceeding the limit stated in RA1.1, and it is very likely that this condition will exist for > 15 minutes, however the time limit of 15 minutes to classify based on RA2.2 parameters will have elapsed prior to exceeding the radiation levels in RA1.1 for 15 minutes. The second part is plausible since a fuel handling accident could lead to a release to the public and PARs are designed to help mitigate the effects of releases, however a PAR is only required during a general emergency.

B. First part is plausible because RU-146 is exceeding the limit stated in RA1.1, and it is very likely that this condition will exist for > 15 minutes, however the time limit of 15 minutes to classify based on RA2.2 parameters will have elapsed prior to exceeding the radiation levels in RA1.1 for 15 minutes. The second part is correct.

C. First part is correct. The second part is plausible since a fuel handling accident could lead to a release to the public and PARs are designed to help mitigate the effects of releases, however a PAR is only required during a general emergency.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) EAL Hot Chart Attached w/ Revision # See Release Evaluation Flowchart Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: Hot and Cold EAL Charts, Release Flowchart, RU monitor charts Learning Objective: 58622 - Given an Emergency Plan condition, use the EAL tables and basis document to determine the emergency plan classification, in accordance with EPIP-01, STSC Actions.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 7 Page 43 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision # 10 Page 44 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

EAL Hot Chart Revision #

Page 45 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PAR Flowchart Revision #

If a GE is not declared, evaluation of the PAR chart is N/A Page 46 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # 067 AA2.16 Importance Rating 4.0 Plant Fire On-site: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: Vital equipment and control systems to be maintained and operated during a fire Proposed Question: SRO 84 Given the following conditions:

The Unit 2 Control Room is being evacuated due to a fire in the Unit 2 Satellite Technical Support Center (STSC).

The reactor has been manually tripped.

The crew has evacuated to the Remote Shutdown Panel.

Fire Department declared the fire extinguished 20 minutes after the start of the fire.

Damage is limited to the STSC.

Per 40AO-9ZZ19, Control Room Fire, and 40DP-9ZZ04, Time Critical Action Program, the crew must ensure they _____(1)_____ within a MAXIMUM of 5 minutes from the reactor trip, and the Emergency Coordinator should classify the event as _____(2)_____.

A. 1. place the ADV disconnect switches to LOCAL

2. HA2 B. 1. place the ADV disconnect switches to LOCAL

2. HA5 C. 1. close CHB-UV-515, Letdown to Regen HX Isolation Valve

2. HA2 D. 1. close CHB-UV-515, Letdown to Regen HX Isolation Valve

2. HA5 Proposed Answer: B Page 47 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible if thought that the fire in the STSC affected the operability of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. Additionally, since HA2 is to the left of HA5, if both EALs were applicable, HA2 would be the correct EAL classification.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible as it is the second action taken at the RSP and is part of the time critical action program, however the crew has 20 minutes to close UV-515. Second part is plausible if thought that the fire in the STSC affected the operability of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown. Additionally, since HA2 is to the left of HA5, if both EALs were applicable, HA2 would be the correct EAL classification.

D. First part is plausible as it is the second action taken at the RSP and is part of the time critical action program, however the crew has 20 minutes to close UV-515. Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40AO-9ZZ19, Control Room Fire Attached w/ Revision # See 40DP-9ZZ04, Time Critical Action Program Comments / Reference HOT EAL Chart, EP-0801 Proposed references to be provided during examination: Hot EAL Chart, EP-0801 Learning Objective: 11126 - Describe how SG Pressure is controlled during a Control Room fire.

57143 - Classify a Control Room Evacuation event.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 1, also on PVNGS SRO Only Master Task List Page 48 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision # 10 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ19, Control Room Fire Revision 32 Since the damage is limited to the STSC, the criteria for Safety Shutdown Systems is not met Page 49 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

NUREG-1021, ES-401 Revision 10 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS SRO Master Task List Revision June 2016 Page 50 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ19, Control Room Fire Revision 32 Page 51 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40AO-9ZZ19, Control Room Fire Revision 32 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9ZZ04, Time Critical Action (TCA) Revision 12 Program Page 52 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 K/A # CE/E09 G 2.2.44 Importance Rating 4.4 Functional Recovery: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions Proposed Question: SRO 85 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 tripped from 100% power.

SPTAs are complete with the following conditions:

The A ESF Transformer, NBN-X03, has relayed on sudden pressure.

The A EDG tripped on low lube oil.

RCS pressure is 1550 psia and lowering.

The B HPSI Pump is running with 0 psia discharge pressure.

RCS Subcooling is 20°F superheated and becoming more superheated.

AFB-P01 has a sheared shaft.

AFA-P01 tripped on overspeed and cannot be reset.

SG #1 level is 35% WR and lowering.

SG #2 level is 40% WR and lowering.

Containment pressure is 6 psig and rising.

The CRS will enter 40EP-9EO09, Functional Recovery, and direct A. energizing PBA-S03 from NBN-X04 per MVAC-1, Offsite Power.

B. performing Appendix 58, Cross-Tie DG B to PBA-S03 per MVAC-2, DGs.

C. depressurizing the RCS to < 220 psia to initiate LPSI injection per IC-2, SI.

D. performing Appendix 44, feeding with Condensate Pumps per HR-2, SG with SI.

Page 53 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer: A Explanation:

A. Correct. Plausible that MVAC-1 would not be selected since the ESF transformer is faulted, however MVAC-1 is still the correct choice to address this event.

B. Plausible since the B EDG is running due to the SIAS and is not loaded since PBB-S04 is still powered from off-site, however MVAC-1 is preferable to MVAC-2.

C. Plausible since this would restore the IC safety function and IC-2 is not satisfied, however MVAC-1 will be addressed first and when power is restored, HPSI Pump A will be started to recover the inventory control safety function.

D. Plausible since there is no feed in this condition making HR-2 not satisfied, however when PBA-S03 is reenergized, AFN-P01 will be available and is a preferred feed source compared to feeding with condensate pumps.

Technical Reference(s) 40EP-9EO09, Functional Recovery Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 57115 - Given the FRP is being performed and specific plant conditions, determine which success paths should be chosen, in accordance with 40EP-9EO9, Functional Recovery Procedure.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 54 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision # 10 Page 55 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO10, Functional Recovery Revision # 52 Page 56 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO10, Functional Recovery Revision # 52 Page 57 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO10, Functional Recovery Revision # 52 Page 58 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO10, Functional Recovery Revision # 52 Page 59 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO10, Functional Recovery Revision # 52 Page 60 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 007 G 2.2.38 Importance Rating 4.5 Pressurizer Relief / Quench Tank: Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license Proposed Question: SRO 86 Given the following conditions:

Unit 2 is in MODE 1 At time = 1000, Engineering informed the control room that 3 Pressurizer Safety Valves on Unit 2 are outside of their TS lift tolerances.

Assuming the lift setpoints cannot be adjusted in the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, what is the LATEST time that the unit must be in MODE 3 to comply with LCO 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves -

MODES 1, 2, and 3?

A. 1600 B. 1615 C. 1700 D. 1715 Proposed Answer: A Page 61 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. Plausible if the 15 minute time allotment in LCO 3.4.10, Condition A, is applied in addition to the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> requirement in Condition B.

C. Plausible if LCO 3.0.3 was incorrectly applied due to Condition A addressing one inoperable PSSV and condition B addressing 2 inoperable PSSVs, however condition B is for 2 OR MORE inoperable PSSVs.

D. Plausible if the 15 minute time allotment in condition A is applied, then LCO 3.0.3 is applied.

Technical Reference(s) Technical Specifications Attached w/ Revision # See Technical Specifications Bases Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: Given conditions when an LCO is not met, apply Tech Spec Section 3.4.10 (PZR Safeties - Mode 1,2 and 3), in accordance with Tech Spec 3.4.10.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 2 Page 62 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision # 10 Page 63 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications Revision 117 Page 64 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications Revision 117 Page 65 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 013 A2.06 Importance Rating 4.0 Engineered Safety Features Actuation: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Inadvertent ESFAS actuation Proposed Question: SRO 87 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.

Essential Cooling Water Train B was declared inoperable at 0800 4/1/16 due to bearing change-out.

All supported equipment was declared inoperable but no actions were entered per LCO 3.0.6.

At 0800 on 4/2/16, an inadvertent A Train AFAS-1 occurred and the CRS immediately directed an operator to override and close Train A Aux Feed Injection Valves to SG

1. 1.

With NO further operator action, the LATEST time and date Unit 1 must be in MODE 3 is A. 1400 on 4/2/16 B. 1500 on 4/2/16 C. 1400 on 4/4/16 D. 1400 on 4/5/16 Proposed Answer: A Page 66 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct. Even though the actions are not taken for Train B AFW being inoperable as a result of Train B EW being inoperable, when Train A AFW becomes inoperable, the required action for condition C, two AFW trains being inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3, still applies, therefore must be in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (1400 on 4/2/16).

B. Plausible if thought that since 3.0.6 was invoked, and one train is inop without needing to take required actions and one train is inop and has to have required actions taken, that this would be a condition not covered by technical specifications and entry into LCO 3.0.3 is required, which would mean MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> (1500 on 4/2/16).

C. Plausible if thought that the inoperability of Train A AFW now requires the actions of condition B to be taken but the start time for the condition B actions was back dated to the actual time condition B was entered (due to the Train B AFW inoperability on 4/1/16 at 0800). This would result in condition C being entered at 0800 on 4/4/16 and MODE 3 entry required no later than 1400 on 4/4/16.

D. Plausible if thought that no actions are required for Train B AFW due to the use of LCO 3.0.6, and therefore condition B actions are only entered for Train A AFW being inoperable. This would result in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from the inoperability of Train A expiring and entry into condition C for not meeting the completion time for condition B. This would mean 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> from 4/2/16 at 0800 plus the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> in condition C for a MODE 3 entry no later than 4/5/16 at 1400.

Technical Reference(s) Technical Specifications Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: LCO 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater, pages 1 and 2 Learning Objective: 190023 - Given conditions when an LCO is not met, apply Tech Spec LCO 3.7.5, in accordance with Tech Specs.

11901 - Describe the application of LCO 3.0.6.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 2 Page 67 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications, LCO 3.7.5 Revision Page 68 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications, LCO 3.0.6 Revision Page 69 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications, LCO 3.0.6 Basis Revision Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Page 70 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 059 A2.04 Importance Rating 3.4 Main Feedwater: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Feeding a dry S/G Proposed Question: SRO 88 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 has experienced a complete loss of feedwater and has tripped from 100%

power.

AFB-P01 has developed a sheared shaft.

AFA-P01 has tripped on overspeed and the AO reports damage to the trip throttle valve.

CTA-HV-4, AFN-P01 Pump Suction From CST, cannot be opened from the control room or locally at the valve.

The CRS has entered 40EP-9EO06, Loss of All Feedwater.

Both SGs have just begun to indicate < 0% WR.

Based on these conditions, the CRS should direct the crew to perform _____(1)_____ to restore feedwater, and when feed is available, should direct feeding _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. Standard Appendix 44, Feeding with Condensate Pumps

2. ONLY one SG at a rate of 1000 gpm B. 1. Standard Appendix 44, Feeding with Condensate Pumps

2. BOTH SGs at a rate of 500 gpm to each SG C. 1. Standard Appendix 42, Aligning Aux Feedwater Pumps Suction to RMWT

2. ONLY one SG at a rate of 1000 gpm D. 1. Standard Appendix 42, Aligning Aux Feedwater Pumps Suction to RMWT

2. BOTH SGs at a rate of 500 gpm to each SG Page 71 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer: A Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the total limit for feed is 1000 gpm, and all other feed restoration procedures allow feeding both SGs simultaneously, however when feeding with condensate pumps, feed is initially only restored to one SG.

C. First part is plausible since the reason for the loss of feed was a problem with the suction path to AFN-P01, and the RMWT can be used as an alternate suction to some Aux Feedwater pumps, however appendix 42 can only be used to align the suctions of AFA-P01 or AFB-P01 to the RMWT. Second part is correct.

D. First part is plausible since the reason for the loss of feed was a problem with the suction path to AFN-P01, and the RMWT can be used as an alternate suction to some Aux Feedwater pumps, however appendix 42 can only be used to align the suctions of AFA-P01 or AFB-P01 to the RMWT. Second part is plausible since the total limit for feed is 1000 gpm, and all other feed restoration procedures allow feeding both SGs simultaneously, however when feeding with condensate pumps, feed is initially only restored to one SG.

Technical Reference(s) 40EP-9EO06, Loss of All Feedwater Attached w/ Revision # See 40DP-9AP17, Standard Appendices Comments / Reference Technical Guideline 40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendices Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 10506 - Given conditions of a LOAF and the status of plant equipment, determine if feed can be established using the Condensate Pumps, in accordance with 40EP-9EO06, Loss of All Feed Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 72 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision # 10 Page 73 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO06, Loss of All Feedwater Revision 18 Page 74 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9AP17, Standard Appendices Technical Revision 31 Guideline Page 75 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendices Revision 94 Page 76 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendices Revision 94 Only the suctions for AFA and AFB can be aligned to the RMWT.

Page 77 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 073 G 2.1.28 Importance Rating 4.1 Process Radiation Monitoring: Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls Proposed Question: SRO 89 Following the loss of Fuel Building Ventilation Radiation Monitor RU-145 during the movement of irradiated fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool, compliance with TLCO 3.3.108, Fuel Building Emergency Ventilation Actuation Signal, can be achieved by _____(1)_____ , and compliance with the ODCM can be achieved by _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. verifying Spent Fuel Pool Area RM RU-31 is functional

2. taking grab samples at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> B. 1. verifying Spent Fuel Pool Area RM RU-31 is functional

2. verifying Fuel Building Ventilation RM RU-146 is functional C. 1. verifying Fuel Building Ventilation RM RU-146 is functional

2. taking grab samples at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> D. 1. verifying Fuel Building Ventilation RM RU-146 is functional

2. verifying Fuel Building Ventilation RM RU-146 is functional Proposed Answer: A Page 78 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct. TLCO 3.3.108 only required one train of FBEVAS to be functional and Train A is actuated by RU-31, Train B is actuated by RU-145.

B. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since an acceptable action for RU-145 being non-functional is to place moveable air monitors in line, and RU-146 monitors the same ventilation stream, however RU-146 cannot monitor the same range as RU-145 and is therefore not an acceptable substitute.

C. Plausible that the since RU-145 and RU-146 both monitor the FB ventilation line, however RU-146 does not actuate FBEVAS. Second part is correct.

D. Plausible that the since RU-145 and RU-146 both monitor the FB ventilation line, however RU-146 does not actuate FBEVAS. Second part is plausible since an acceptable action for RU-145 being non-functional is to place moveable air monitors in line, and RU-146 monitors the same ventilation stream, however RU-146 cannot monitor the same range as RU-145 and is therefore not an acceptable substitute.

Technical Reference(s) Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Attached w/ Revision # See Technical Requirements Manual Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 89774 - Given a presentation covering the topics in this area, the operator will demonstrate mastery of the knowledge objectives associated with Technical Specification 3.4, by scoring 80% or better on an exam(s) that sample the associated objectives.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 2 Page 79 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Screening for SRO only linked to Revision 10CFR55.43(b)(2)

Page 80 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

TRM 3.3.108, FBEVAS Revision Page 81 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Revision Page 82 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Revision Page 83 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 K/A # 103 G 2.4.41 Importance Rating 4.6 Containment: Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.

Proposed Question: SRO 90 Given the following conditions:

At time = 0500:

o A leak occurred inside Containment requiring a reactor trip.

At time = 0505, ERFDADS indicates the following conditions:

o Pressurizer level is 5% and lowering.

o Pressurizer pressure is 1700 psia and lowering.

o Containment Pressure is 12 psig and slowly rising.

o Containment Spray flow is 3800 gpm.

o Radiation levels are rising inside containment.

At time = 0510:

o The SM classified the event.

Per EP-801, EAL Hot Chart, the event should be classified as EAL _____(1)_____ and per EP-0902, Notifications, the NRC must be notified NO LATER THAN _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. FA1

2. 0525 B. 1. FA1

2. 0610 C. 1. FS1

2. 0525 D. 1. FS1

2. 0610 Page 84 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer: D Explanation:

A. First part is plausible as this would be the correct classification if CS flow was > 4350 gpm, however with containment pressure greater than 8.5 psig and CS flow less than one full train, both the RCS barrier and containment barrier are potentially lost, making the correct EAL FS1.

Additionally, the actual required CS flow is 3500 gpm, however, due to flow uncertainties, the required INDICATED CS flow is 4350 gpm, therefore, the crew cannot determine that 3800 gpm os CS flow is adequate. Second part is plausible since the requirement to notify offsite agencies is 15 minutes from the EAL declaration, however notification to the NRC is specifically stated to be no later than one hour from the declaration.

B. First part is plausible as this would be the correct classification if CS flow was > 4350 gpm, however with containment pressure greater than 8.5 psig and CS flow less than one full train, both the RCS barrier and containment barrier are potentially lost, making the correct EAL FS1. Second part is correct.

C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the requirement to notify offsite agencies is 15 minutes from the EAL declaration, however notification to the NRC is specifically stated to be no later than one hour from the declaration.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) EP-0801, Hot EAL Charts Attached w/ Revision # See EP-0902, Notifications Comments / Reference PVNGS USFAR EOP Setpoint Document Proposed references to be provided during examination: Hot EAL Chart Learning Objective: 12709 - As the Emergency Coordinator, classify an event Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 1, also on PVNGS SRO Only Master Task List Page 85 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision 10 While EAL classification is not specifically listed in the SRO-Only question guidance in NUREG 1021 (other than radiological issues and fuel handling accidents), this is an SRO only job function and is only listed on the SRO Master Task List at PVNGS.

Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS SRO Master Task List Revision June 2016 Page 86 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

EP-0801 EAL Hot Chart Revision Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS UFSAR Revision Page 87 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS EOP Setpoint Document Revision Page 88 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Notifications Revision # 8 Page 89 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 017 G 2.1.27 Importance Rating 4.0 In-Core Temperature Monitor: Knowledge of system purpose and/or function Proposed Question: SRO 91 Per EP-0801, EAL Hot Chart, a POTENTIAL LOSS of the Fuel Cladding Barrier exists when either

1. Representative Core Exit Thermocouple temperature exceeds a MINIMUM of OR

2. Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System indicates less than a MAXIMUM of A. 1. 700°F

2. 16% in the upper head B. 1. 700°F

2. 21% in the outlet plenum C. 1. 1200°F

2. 16% in the upper head D. 1. 1200°F

2. 21% in the outlet plenum Proposed Answer: B Page 90 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since this is the level in the vessel below which SI throttle is not allowed, however a potential loss of the fuel cladding barrier is below 21% in the plenum.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible since 1200°F is the temperature above which the fuel cladding barrier is considered lost, and is the temperature above which the containment barrier is considered a potential loss. Second part is plausible since this is the level in the vessel below which SI throttle is not allowed, however a potential loss of the fuel cladding barrier is below 21% in the plenum.

D. First part is plausible since 1200°F is the temperature above which the fuel cladding barrier is considered lost, and is the temperature above which the containment barrier is considered a potential loss. Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) EAL Hot Chart Attached w/ Revision # See 40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendices Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None - Must have Fuel Cladding Barrier information blacked out for this question to have no reference.

Learning Objective: 3192 - Explain the operation of the Core Exit Thermocouples (CETs) associated with the Incore Instrumentation System.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 1, also on PVNGS SRO Only Master Task List Page 91 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision #10 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS SRO Master Task List Revision June 2016 Page 92 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

EP-0801 EAL Hot Chart Revision #2 Page 93 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendices Revision # 96 Page 94 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 034 K6.01 Importance Rating 3.0 Fuel Handling Equipment: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the Fuel Handling System: Fuel handling equipment Proposed Question: SRO 92 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is in MODE 6 performing a core off-load.

The Refueling Machine currently has a spent fuel assembly grappled and is transferring it to the Upender.

Subsequently:

A fault on the PLC caused the mast bumper to make contact with one of the guide pins actuating the Mast Bumper Interlock.

The grappled spent fuel assembly did NOT make contact with an obstruction.

Prior to clearing/overriding the Mast Bumper Interlock, the Bridge and Trolley _____(1)_____

and completion of a Fuel Handling Event Recovery Checklist _____(2)_____ required.

A. 1. CANNOT be moved in any direction

2. IS B. 1. CANNOT be moved in any direction

2. is NOT C. 1. may be moved using the manual handwheel

2. IS D. 1. may be moved using the manual handwheel

2. is NOT Page 95 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer: C Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since the Mast Bumper Interlock does prevent all movement of the bridge and trolley, and it is plausible that this interlock would actuate a manual brake which would prevent use of the manual handwheel, however the manual handwheel is not locked out by this interlock.

Second part is correct.

B. First part is plausible since the Mast Bumper Interlock does prevent all movement of the bridge and trolley, and it is plausible that this interlock would actuate a manual brake which would prevent use of the manual handwheel, however the manual handwheel is not locked out by this interlock.

Second part is plausible since the fuel assembly did not make contact with any obstruction making the likelihood of any fuel damage extremely unlikely, however any fault of refueling equipment when a fuel assembly is grappled is considered to have placed the fuel at risk, therefore requiring the Fuel Handling Event Recovery Checklist to be completed.

C. Correct.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the fuel assembly did not make contact with any obstruction making the likelihood of any fuel damage extremely unlikely, however any fault of refueling equipment when a fuel assembly is grappled is considered to have placed the fuel at risk, therefore requiring the Fuel Handling Event Recovery Checklist to be completed.

Technical Reference(s) 40DP-9OP02, Conduct of Shift Operations Attached w/ Revision # See LOIT Lesson Plan, Refueling Machines Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 4388 - Discuss LSRO relevant items from the "Conduct of Shift Operations" procedure.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 7, PVNGS SRO Only Master Task List Page 96 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS SRO Only Master Task List Revision Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan, Refueling Machines Revision Page 97 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan, Refueling Machines Revision # 4 Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan, Refueling Machines Revision Page 98 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9OP02, Conduct of Shift Operations Revision # 68 Since fuel was being moved when the malfunction occurred, the LSRO/SM must determine that the fuel was at risk, even though the malfunction was NOT the result of actually colliding with an obstruction.

Page 99 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 K/A # 071 A2.02 Importance Rating 3.6 Waste Gas Disposal: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Waste Gas Disposal System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Use of waste gas release monitors, radiation, gas flow rate, and totalizer Proposed Question: SRO 93 Given the following conditions:

A Waste Gas Decay Tank release is required.

Gaseous Radwaste Radiation Monitor RU-12 has just failed off-scale high.

Which of the following describes the required action(s) in order to perform the release as planned?

In order for the release to be performed, _____(1)_____ as required by _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. the valve galleries associated with the release path must be posted as a high radiation area

2. the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual B. 1. at least two technically qualified personnel must independently verify the discharge valve lineup

2. the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual C. 1. the valve galleries associated with the release path must be posted as a high radiation area

2. 74RM-9EF41, Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Response D. 1. at least two technically qualified personnel must independently verify the discharge valve lineup

2. 74RM-9EF41, Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Response Proposed Answer: B Page 100 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since there is guidance in the alarm response procedure to evaluate changing the radiation postings in the event of a radiation monitor alarm, and since RU-12 has failed high, it would be reasonable to raise the postings as a conservative approach to ALARA, however this is not required in order for the release to commence. Second part is correct.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible since there is guidance in the alarm response procedure to evaluate changing the radiation postings in the event of a radiation monitor alarm, and since RU-12 has failed high, it would be reasonable to raise the postings as a conservative approach to ALARA.

Second part is plausible since the ARP provides contingency actions for alarming or failed RMs, however there are no requirements in the ARP related to gaseous releases.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the ARP provides contingency actions for alarming or failed RMs, however there are no requirements in the ARP related to gaseous releases.

Technical Reference(s) Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Attached w/ Revision # See 74RM-9EF41, Radiation Monitoring System Comments / Reference Alarm Response Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 81675 - After review of 74RM-9EF20, the licensed operator will be enabled to evaluate and authorize a radioactive gas release and ensure compliance with the ODCM, In accordance with 74RM-9EF20.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # x (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 4 Page 101 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision # 10 Comments /

Reference:

Original Question Page 102 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Revision #27 Page 103 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

74RM-9EF41, Radiation Monitoring System Revision # 23 Alarm Response Page 104 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.1.15 Importance Rating 3.4 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management directives, such as standing orders, night orders, Operations memos, etc.

Proposed Question: SRO 94 Given the following condition:

The CRS received a Condition Report which describes an abnormal amount of oil leaking from the A Charging Pump.

The Work Week Manager informed the Control Room that the A Charging Pump is scheduled to be worked on during the outage scheduled 45 days from now.

Per 40DP-9OP26, Operations Condition Reporting Process and Operability Determination/Functional Assessment, a _____(1)_____ shall be performed on the A Charging Pump, and any compensatory measures resulting from the evaluation will be communicated to the crews via a _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. Functional Assessment

2. Night Order B. 1. Functional Assessment

2. Standing Order C. 1. Immediate Operability Determination

2. Night Order D. 1. Immediate Operability Determination

2. Standing Order Proposed Answer: B Page 105 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since night orders are used to convey information to operations personnel in a timely manner; however night orders are typically cancelled after 30 days, so a standing order would be the correct order for this condition.

B. Correct.

C. First part is plausible since Charging Pumps are required to be functional per the Technical Requirements Manual to ensure a boration flowpath is available, however Immediate Operability Determinations are only performed for degraded equipment covered by Technical Specifications.

Second part is plausible since night orders are used to convey information to operations personnel in a timely manner; however night orders are typically cancelled after 30 days, so a standing order would be the correct order for this condition.

D. First part is plausible since Charging Pumps are required to be functional per the Technical Requirements Manual to ensure a boration flowpath is available, however Immediate Operability Determinations are only performed for degraded equipment covered by Technical Specifications.

Second part is correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40DP-9OP26, Operations Condition Attached w/ Revision # See Reporting Process and Operability Comments / Reference Determination/Functional Assessment Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 9825 - Given plant conditions, evaluate plant conditions to determine if if the ODP applies per 40DP-9OP26.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 3, also on the PVNGS SRO-Only Master Task List Page 106 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision #10 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS SRO-Only Master Task List Revision #10 Page 107 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9OP26, Operations Condition Reporting Revision #42 Process and Operability Determination/Functional Assessment Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9OP26, Operations Condition Reporting Revision #42 Process and Operability Determination/Functional Assessment Page 108 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9OP26, Operations Condition Reporting Revision #42 Process and Operability Determination/Functional Assessment Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9OP26, Operations Condition Reporting Revision #42 Process and Operability Determination/Functional Assessment Page 109 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9OP26, Operations Condition Reporting Revision #42 Process and Operability Determination/Functional Assessment Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9OP26, Operations Condition Reporting Revision #42 Process and Operability Determination/Functional Assessment Page 110 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9OP26, Operations Condition Reporting Revision #42 Process and Operability Determination/Functional Assessment Page 111 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9OP02, Conduct of Shift Operations Revision #68 Page 112 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.1.42 Importance Rating 3.4 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures Proposed Question: SRO 95 The transportation of a dry cask from the Unit 2 Fuel Building to its designated storage location at the ISFSI is complete.

Who has ownership of this dry cask concerning the performance of specific conditional surveillances and inspections?

A. Unit 1 Shift Manager B. Unit 2 Shift Manager C. Unit 1 Control Room Supervisor D. Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor Proposed Answer: A Page 113 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Correct.

B. Plausible since the Unit 2 SM has ownership of the dry cask until it is delivered in the ISFSI, at which point it belongs to the Unit 1 SM.

C. Plausible since Unit 1 has ownership of the dry cask, and the CRS is normally responsible for daily surveillances on the ISFSI, however conditional surveillances are specifically listed as the responsibility of the SM.

D. Plausible since the Unit 2 has ownership of the dry cask until the dry cask is delivered to the ISFSI, and the CRS is normally responsible for daily surveillances on the ISFSI, however conditional surveillances are specifically listed as the responsibility of the SM.

Technical Reference(s) 40DP-9OP02, Conduct of Shift Operations, Attached w/ Revision # See Rev. 68 Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 90026 - Describe who is responsible for Dry Cask Storage Operations during the transport to the ISFSI facility.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # x (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? Yes, 2015 SRO Exam (modified from this)

Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 7 Page 114 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision #10 Comments /

Reference:

2015 PVNGS NRC SRO Exam Revision Page 115 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9OP02, Conduct of Shift Operations Revision #68 Page 116 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.2.21 Importance Rating 4.1 Equipment Control: Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements Proposed Question: SRO 96 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is exiting an outage with Tcold 345°F.

Preparations are being made to enter MODE 3.

During the outage, maintenance on AFA-P01 was conducted and the governor was replaced.

All maintenance activities have been completed including all Surveillance Requirements, with the exception of Surveillances needed to be performed at NOP/NOT.

Based on these conditions, AFA-P01 is considered A. OPERABLE, but the mode change is allowed ONLY after performing a risk assessment per SR 3.0.4.

B. OPERABLE, because SR 3.0.1 allows the completion of required surveillances when plant conditions support.

C. INOPERABLE, however the mode change can be made and the required surveillances must be completed within a MAXIMUM of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

D. INOPERABLE, however the mode change can be made and the required surveillances must be completed within a MAXIMUM of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Proposed Answer: B Page 117 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible since AFA-P01 is operable, and its plausible since 3.0.4 addresses changing modes and when to perform a risk assessment.

B. Correct Answer C. Plausible since not all surveillances on AFA-P01 have been completed. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is plausible since when a surveillance is out of periodicity, the time requirement to complete the surveillance is that surveillances completion time or 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, whichever is longer.

D. Plausible since not all surveillances on AFA-P01 have been completed. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is plausible since it is the time requirement to perform SR 3.7.5.3 once at NOT.

Technical Reference(s) Technical Specifications Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 59467 - Given Technical Specifications and plant conditions determine the correct LCO action to be entered.

Question Source: Bank # X - PVNGS Bank Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 2 Page 118 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision #10 Page 119 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications, SR 3.0.1 and Basis Revision Page 120 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications, LCO 3.7.5 Revision Page 121 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.2.38 Importance Rating 4.5 Equipment Control: Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license Proposed Question: SRO 97 At time = 1000 on 9/1/16, the CRS is notified that a Surveillance Requirement (SR) with a frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> was last performed 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> ago.

Per Technical Specifications Section 3.0, Surveillance Requirement Applicability, what is the LATEST time the SR can be completed prior to having to declare the associated LCO not met?

A. 1300 on 9/1/16 B. 2200 on 9/1/16 C. 0100 on 9/2/16 D. 1000 on 9/2/16 Proposed Answer: D Page 122 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible if thought that the 25% extension was the allotted time to complete the SR, however it is the greater of 25% or 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is greater than 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

B. Plausible if thought that the allowable extension was the frequency of the SR, however it is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

C. Plausible if thought that the allowable extension was the frequency plus 25%, however it is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) Technical Specifications Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 11417 - Concerning Technical Specifications, describe the requirements of SR 3.0.3, in accordance with the Tech Specs.

Question Source: Bank # X - PVNGS Bank Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 2 Page 123 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision #10 Page 124 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Technical Specifications SR 3.0.3 Revision Page 125 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.3.11 Importance Rating 4.3 Radiation Control: Ability to control radiation releases Proposed Question: SRO 98 Given the following conditions:

A large break LOCA has occurred.

Emergency Coordinator turnover from the Shift Manager to the TSC and EOF has been completed.

Due to emergency conditions, a gaseous radioactive release from Containment must be performed to relieve pressure in the Containment and bring the plant to a safer condition.

Who may authorize this release without a release permit?

A. Emergency Operations Director B. TSC Operations Manager C. OSC Manager D. Shift Manager Proposed Answer: D Page 126 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. Plausible since the EOD is responsible for overall coordination of onsite and offsite emergency functions, however the SM has the authority for plant operations.

B. Plausible since the TSC Operations Manager relays technical and operational information between the TSC and the control room, however the SM retains the authority for plant operations.

C. Plausible since the OSC manager dispatches emergency teams for emergent operations, however the SM has the authority for plant operations.

D. Correct. The SM remains as the ultimate authority for plant operations during emergencies.

Technical Reference(s) 74RM-9EF20, Gaseous Radioactive Attached w/ Revision # See Release and Offsite Dose Assessment Comments / Reference LOIT Lesson Plan NKASMC070104 Effluent Releases PVNGS Emergency Plan Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 57256 - describe whose authority is needed to exceed requirements and what reporting is necessary Question Source: Bank # x - 2008 & 2012 SRO Exam Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 4 Page 127 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision #10 Page 128 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

74RM-9EF20, Gaseous Radioactive Release Revision #15 and Offsite Dose Assessment Page 129 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

LOIT Lesson Plan NKASMC070104 Effluent Revision #4 Releases Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS Emergency Plan Revision # 56 Page 130 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS Emergency Plan Revision # 56 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS Emergency Plan Revision # 56 Page 131 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS Emergency Plan Revision # 56 Page 132 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.4.8 Importance Rating 4.5 Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs Proposed Question: SRO 99 While directing actions in an AOP, the CRS encounters the following set of steps:

Step 4. Trip the Reactor.

Step 5. Trip all 4 RCPs.

Step 6. GO TO 40EP-9EO01, SPTAs.

Per 40DP-9AP18, Abnormal Operating Procedure Users Guide, the CRS should direct tripping the RCPs _____(1)_____ and the CRS should _____(2)_____ .

A. 1. prior to addressing the Reactivity Control Safety Function

2. exit the AOP and direct SPTAs B. 1. prior to addressing the Reactivity Control Safety Function

2. continue in the AOP while directing SPTAs C. 1. immediately after addressing the Reactivity Control Safety Function.

2. exit the AOP and direct SPTAs D. 1. immediately after addressing the Reactivity Control Safety Function.

2. continue in the AOP while directing SPTAs Proposed Answer: C Page 133 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible since tripping RCPs is directed in the AOP prior to GO TO SPTAs, however when the reactor is tripped, addressing the reactivity control safety function is always performed before other actions are taken. Second part is correct.

B. First part is plausible since tripping RCPs is directed in the AOP prior to GO TO SPTAs, however when the reactor is tripped, addressing the reactivity control safety function is always performed before other actions are taken. Second part is plausible because there are several cases in which the AOP would be performed concurrently with SPTAs, however if that was the case, the AOP would say Perform SPTAs, not GO TO SPTAs.

C. Correct.

D. First part is correct. Second part is plausible because there are several cases in which the AOP would be performed concurrently with SPTAs, however if that was the case, the AOP would say Perform SPTAs, not GO TO SPTAs.

Technical Reference(s) 40DP-9AP18, AOP Users Guide Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 10343 - Given that an ORP is being implemented, describe the use of an AOP or OP when the reactor trips or when performing an EOP, in accordance with 40DP-9AP16 and 40DP-9AP18.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge x Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 5 Page 134 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision #10 Page 135 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40DP-9AP18, AOP Users Guide Revision #4 Page 136 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group #

K/A # G 2.4.9 Importance Rating 4.2 Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies Proposed Question: SRO 100 Given the following conditions:

At time = 0100:

o An event occurred requiring entry into 40EP-9EO09, Functional Recovery.

At time = 0400:

o Unit 1 is in MODE 4, cooling down using Shutdown Cooling.

o 40EP-9EO09, Functional Recovery, is the procedure in use.

o A subsequent event occurred requiring an upgrade to the EAL classification.

At time = 0405, MODE 5 was entered.

At time = 0410, the event was classified.

The CRS will _____(1)_____ , and the event will be classified using the _____(2)_____

Chart.

A. 1. transition to 40EP-9EO11, LMFRP

2. Cold EAL B. 1. transition to 40EP-9EO11, LMFRP

2. Hot EAL C. 1. remain in 40EP-9EO09, Functional Recovery

2. Cold EAL D. 1. remain in 40EP-9EO09, Functional Recovery

2. Hot EAL Proposed Answer: D Explanation:

Page 137 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Page 138 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

A. First part is plausible because the LMFRP is used to mitigate events which occur in MODE 4, 5, or 6 with LTOP in service, and with SDC in service, LTOP is in service, however the LMFRP is not used if an EOP is already in use. Second part is plausible because its reasonable to assume that since the unit is in MODE 5 at the time of the upgrade classification that the Cold EAL chart would apply, however the EAL chart which applies to the MODE when the event occurred is the EAL chart used to classify.

B. First part is plausible because the LMFRP is used to mitigate events which occur in MODE 4, 5, or 6 with LTOP in service, and with SDC in service, LTOP is in service, however the LMFRP is not used if an EOP is already in use. Second part is correct.

C. First part is correct. Second part is plausible because its reasonable to assume that since the unit is in MODE 5 at the time of the classification that the Cold EAL chart would apply, however the EAL chart which applies to the MODE when the event occurred is the EAL chart used to classify.

D. Correct.

Technical Reference(s) 40EP-9EO11, Lower Mode Functional Attached w/ Revision # See Recovery Comments / Reference EP-0801 EAL Hot Chart EP-0901, Classifications Proposed references to be provided during examination: None Learning Objective: 56421 - Given plant conditions, determine whether or not entry into or exit from the LMFRP is appropriate, in accordance with 40EP-9EO11, LMFRP.

Question Source: Bank #

Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent)

New x Question History: Previous 2 NRC Exams? No Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 1 Page 139 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

Clarification Guidance for SRO-Only Questions Revision #10 Comments /

Reference:

EP-0801EAL Hot Chart Revision Page 140 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

PVNGS SRO Master Task List Revision June 2016 Comments /

Reference:

EP-0901, Classifications Revision # 9 Page 141 of 142

ES-401 2016 PVNGS NRC Written Exam Worksheet 76 to 100 Rev 14 Form ES-401-5 Comments /

Reference:

40EP-9EO11, Lower Mode Functional Recovery Revision #29 Page 142 of 142

HOT INITIATING CONDITIONS - MODES 1 3 - 4 RADIOLOGICAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS HAZARDS FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS EFFLUENTS RX and CORE AC/DC POWER ALARMS / COMMUNICATIONS NATURAL / DESTRUCTIVE FIRE / EXPLOSION TOXIC / FLAMMABLE SECURITY CR EVACUATION EC DISCRETION RG1 - Off-site dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous MG2 - Automatic Trip and all manual actions HG1 - HOSTILE ACTION resulting in HG2 - Other conditions exist which in the radioactivity greater than 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual fail to shutdown the reactor and indication of MG1 - Prolonged loss of all Off-site and all loss of physical control of the facility. judgment of the EC warrant declaration of a or projected duration of the release using actual meteorology. POTENTIAL POTENTIAL POTENTIAL an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the On-Site AC power to emergency busses. General Emergency.

LOSS LOSS LOSS core exists. Modes 1 & 2 LOSS LOSS LOSS Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such GENERAL EMERGENCY FUEL CLAD RCS CONTAINMENT 1. Other conditions exist which in the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. If that plant personnel are unable, either judgment of the EC indicate that events are 1.a. Plant Protection System failed to 1.a. Loss of all off-site and all on-site dose assessment results are available, declaration should be based on dose assessment instead AC power to PBA-S03 and PBB-S04. remotely or locally, to operate equipment in progress or have occurred which involve shutdown the reactor.

of radiation monitor values. Do not delay declaration awaiting dose assessment results. required to maintain safety functions. actual or IMMINENT substantial core AND AND GB OR degradation or melting with potential for

b. All Manual actions do NOT shutdown

1. VALID reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the value for 15 the reactor as indicated by: 2. A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE

b. EITHER of the following: Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and minutes or longer: Reactor power is NOT dropping to ACTION that results in an actual loss of 3/3 less than 5% power Restoration of at least one emergency bus IMMINENT fuel damage is likely for a Plant Vent RU-144 CH-1 >1.04E+00 uCi/cc in less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is not likely. physical control of the facility. Releases can All full strength CEAs are NOT freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool.

Fuel Building RU-146 CH-2 >3.50E+01 uCi/cc Loss of at least 2 FG1 - Loss of ANY Two Barriers AND Loss or Potential inserted RCS and Core Heat Removal Safety be reasonably expected to exceed EPA OR -- YES -- GB Protective Action Guideline exposure levels Barriers? Loss of the Third Barrier AND Function Acceptance Criteria NOT

2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 1000 mrem TEDE c. Rep CET greater than 1200 oF. Satisfied per 40EP-9EO08, BLACKOUT. off-site for more than the immediate site OR 5000 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary. area.

OR

3. Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates greater than 1000 mR/hr expected to continue for 60 minutes or longer; or analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5000 mrem for one hour of inhalation, at or beyond site boundary.

RS1 - Off-site dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous radioactivity POTENTIAL POTENTIAL POTENTIAL MS2 - Automatic Trip fails to shutdown the HS2 - Control room evacuation has been HS3 - Other conditions exist which in the LOSS LOSS LOSS MS1 - Loss of all Off-site and all On-Site AC HS4 - HOSTILE ACTION within the greater than 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of LOSS LOSS LOSS reactor and manual actions taken at the reactor MS6 - Inability to monitor a significant initiated and plant control cannot be judgment of the EC warrant declaration of a power to emergency busses for 15 minutes or PROTECTED AREA.

the release. control console are not successful in shutting transient in Progress. established. Site Area Emergency.

FUEL CLAD RCS CONTAINMENT longer.

down the reactor.

1.a. Control Room evacuation has been Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the Modes 1 & 2 Note: The EC should not wait until the Note: The EC should not wait until the initiated.

event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. If 1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has 1. Other conditions exist which in the applicable time has elapsed, but should applicable time has elapsed, but should occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as AND dose assessment results are available, declaration should be based on dose assessment instead judgment of the EC indicate that events are declare the event as soon as it is determined declare the event as soon as it is determined reported by the Security Team. b. Control of the plant cannot be established 1.a. Plant Protection System failed to in progress or have occurred which involve SITE AREA EMERGENCY of radiation monitor values. Do not delay declaration awaiting dose assessment results. at the Remote Shutdown Panel SITE AREA EMERGENCY

-- NO -- that the condition has exceeded, or will likely that the condition has exceeded, or will likely actual or likely major failures of plant shutdown the reactor. within 15 minutes.

exceed, the applicable time exceed, the applicable time functions needed for protection of the public 2/3 AND

b. Manual actions taken on Panels B05 and 1. a. Loss of annunciators on ANY 4 of the or HOSTILE ACTION that results in

1. VALID reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the value for 15 FS1 - Loss or Potential Loss of ANY Two Barriers B01 do NOT shut down the reactor as 1. Loss of all Off-Site and all On-Site AC following B01, B02, B04, B05, B06 intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) minutes or longer: indicated by: power to PBA-S03 and PBB-S04 or GB toward site personnel or equipment that could Plant Vent RU-144 CH-1 >1.04E-01 uCi/cc Reactor power is NOT dropping to for 15 minutes or longer. SESS for 15 minutes or longer.

GB OR lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent Fuel Building RU-146 CH-1 >3.50E+00 uCi/cc less than 5% power Loss of either PNA-D25 or PNB-D26 effective access to equipment needed for the OR POTENTIAL POTENTIAL All full strength CEAs are NOT inserted LOSS LOSS MS3 - Loss of all Vital DC Power for 15 for 15 minutes or longer. protection of the public. Any releases are not

2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than 100 mrem TEDE OR LOSS LOSS minutes or longer. AND expected to result in exposure levels which 500 mrem thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary.

exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline OR FUEL CLAD RCS b. ANY of the following:

Note: The EC should not wait until the exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

3. Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates greater than 100 mR/hr expected to Automatic turbine setback/runback applicable time has elapsed, but should continue for 60 minutes or longer; or analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 25% thermal reactor declare the event as soon as it is determined greater than 500 mrem for one hour of inhalation, at or beyond the site boundary power that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. Reactor Trip VALID ESFAS Actuation

1. Less than 112 VDC on all PKA-M41, AND 1/2 PKB-M42, PKC-M43, and PKD-M44 for 15 minutes or longer. c. Plant computer indications are unavailable.

FA1 - ANY Loss or ANY Potential Loss of EITHER Fuel Clad OR RCS MA2 - Automatic Trip fails to shutdown the MA4 - UNPLANNED Loss of safety system HA2 - FIRE or EXPLOSION affecting the HA3 - Access to a VITAL AREA is HA6 - Other conditions exist which in the EFFLUENTS RAD LEVELS MA5 - AC power capability to emergency HA1 - Natural or destructive phenomena HA4 - HOSTILE ACTION within the Owner HA5 - Control Room evacuation has been reactor and the manual actions taken from the annunciation or indication in the Control operability of plant safety systems required to prohibited due to release of toxic, corrosive, judgment of the EC warrant declaration of an POTENTIAL busses reduced to a single power source for affecting VITAL AREAS. Controlled Area or airborne attack threat initiated.

LOSS reactor control console are successful in Room with EITHER (1) a significant transient establish or maintain safe shutdown. asphyxiant or flammable gases which Alert.

LOSS 15 minutes or longer such that ANY RA2 - Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of shutting down the reactor. Modes 1 and 2 additional single failure would result in in progress, or (2) compensatory indicators are jeopardize operation of systems required to 1. Control Room evacuation is required by: 1. Other conditions exist which in the RA1 - ANY release of gaseous radioactivity water level that has resulted or will result in CONTAINMENT unavailable. maintain safe operations or safely shutdown 1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has judgment of the EC indicate that events are station blackout. 1. FIRE or EXPLOSION resulting in 40AO-9ZZ18, Shutdown Outside Control to the environment greater than 20 times the the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside the GB 1.a. Seismic event greater than VISIBLE the reactor. occurred within the Owner Controlled Area in progress or have occurred which involve ODCM for 15 minutes or longer. 1.a. Plant Protection System failed to Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) Room reactor vessel. Note: The EC should not wait until the Note: The EC should not wait until the DAMAGE to ANY POWER BLOCK as reported by the Security Team. an actual or potential substantial shutdown the reactor. as indicated by ANY Force Balance Note: If the equipment in the stated area was OR applicable time has elapsed, but should applicable time has elapsed, but should OR degradation of the level of safety of the Note: This EAL does not apply to the cask AND Accelerometer reading greater than 0.10g. structure or Control Room indication of already inoperable, or out of service, before 40AO-9ZZ19, Control Room Fire.

Note: The EC should not wait until the declare the event as soon as it is determined declare the event as soon as it is determined AND degraded performance of safety systems. 2. A validated notification from NRC of an plant or a security event that involves loading pit during cask loading operations. b. Manual shutdown actions taken on that the condition has exceeded, or will likely the event occurred, then this EAL should not applicable time has elapsed, but should 1/1 that the condition has exceeded, or will likely b. Earthquake confirmed by ANY of the GB airliner attack threat within 30 minutes of probable life threatening risk to site Panels B05 or B01 are successful as exceed, the applicable time. following: be declared as it will have no adverse impact declare the event as soon as it is determined 1. A water level drop in the reactor refueling exceed, the applicable time. the site. personnel or damage to site equipment indicated by all of the following: Earthquake felt in plant on the ability of the plant to safely operate or that the release duration has exceeded, or will cavity, spent fuel pool, cask loading pit, or OR because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any FU1 - ANY Loss OR ANY Potential Loss of Reactor Power is dropping to 1. a. UNPLANNED Loss of annunciators on National Earthquake Center safely shutdown beyond that already allowed likely exceed, the applicable time. In the fuel transfer canal that will result in 1.a. AC power capability to ANY 4 of the following 3. A HOSTILE ACTION directed toward the releases are expected to be limited to small Containment less than 5% power Control Room indication of degraded by Technical Specifications at the time of the absence of data to the contrary, assume that uncovering irradiated fuel. PBA-S03 and PBB-S04 reduced to a B01, B02, B04, B05, B06 or SESS ISFSI. fractions of the EPA Protective Action Negative Startup rate performance of systems required for the event.

the release duration has exceeded the OR single power source for 15 minutes or for 15 minutes or longer GB Guideline exposure levels.

All full strength CEAs are inserted ALERT OR safe shutdown of the plant.

ALERT applicable time if an ongoing release is 2. A VALID High Alarm on ANY of the longer. 1. Access to a VITAL AREA is prohibited due Note: Multiple events could occur which result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or The Containment Barrier should not be declared lost or potentially lost based on or Boration in progress UNPLANNED Loss of either OR detected and the release start time is unknown. following due to damage to irradiated fuel AND 2. Tornado touching down or high winds to toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable potential loss thresholds is IMMINENT. exceeding Technical Specification action statement criteria, unless there is an PNA-D25 or PNB-D26 or loss of water level: b. Any additional single power source for 15 minutes or longer. reaching 100 mph resulting in gases which jeopardize operation of systems event in progress requiring mitigation by the Containment barrier. When no RU-16 Containment Operating Level Area In this IMMINENT loss situation use judgment and failure will result in station blackout. VISIBLE DAMAGE to ANY required to maintain safe operations or event is in progress (Loss or Potential Loss of either Fuel Clad and/or RCS) the AND RU-17 Incore Instrument Area classify as if the thresholds are exceeded. POWER BLOCK structure OR safely shutdown the reactor.

1. VALID reading on ANY of the following Containment Barrier status is addressed by Technical Specifications.

Control Room indication of degraded GB radiation monitors greater than the value RU-19 New Fuel Area b. ANY of the following:

Automatic turbine setback/runback performance of safety systems.

for 15 minutes or longer: RU-31 Spent Fuel Pool Area OR RU-33 Refueling Machine Area Fuel Clad Barrier RCS Barrier Containment Barrier greater than 25% thermal reactor 3. Internal flooding in ANY POWER BLOCK Plant Vent RU-143 CH-1 > 1.22E-02 uCi/cc RU-143 Plant Vent power structure resulting in an electrical shock Fuel Bldg RU-146 CH-1 >1.13E-01 uCi/cc Reactor Trip hazard that precludes access to operate or RU-145 Fuel Building Vent Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss VALID ESFAS Actuation monitor safety equipment OR OR Control Room indication of degraded

2. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous RA3 - Rise in radiation levels within the Plant computer unavailable

1. A. Coolant activity 1. A. RCS leak rate greater 1. A. RCS leak rate greater 1. A. A containment 1. A. Containment pressure performance of those safety systems.

releases indicates concentrations or release facility that impedes operation of systems OR greater than 300 Ci/gm than available makeup than charging capacity pressure rise followed by greater than 60 psig rates greater than 20 times the ODCM required to maintain plant safety functions. Dose Equivalent I-131. capacity as indicated by with Letdown isolated. a rapid unexplained drop and rising. 4. Vehicle crash resulting in Section 3.0 limits for 15 minutes or longer. a loss of RCS subcooling OR in containment pressure. OR VISIBLE DAMAGE to ANY to saturation (0 oF). OR B. 4.5% H2 inside POWER BLOCK structure OR

1. Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in the B. RCS Pressure Control Control Room indication of degraded Safety Function Status B. Containment pressure containment.

Control Room Area OR Secondary Alarm or sump level response OR performance of safety systems Station. Not Satisfied. not consistent with C. a. Pressure greater than OR LOCA or MSLB 8.5 psig.

C. RCS and Core Heat HU2 - FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA HU5 - Other conditions exist which in the RU1 - ANY release of gaseous radioactivity RU2 - UNPLANNED rise in plant radiation conditions. AND MU2 - Inability to reach required shutdown MU1 - Loss of all Off-site AC power to MU3 - UNPLANNED loss of safety system HU1 - Natural or destructive phenomena HU3 - Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant, HU4 - Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION Removal Safety Function b. Less than one full not extinguished within 15 minutes of judgment of the EC warrant declaration of a to the environment greater than 2 times the within Technical Specification limits. emergency busses for 15 minutes or longer. annunciation or indication in the Control affecting the PROTECTED AREA. or flammable gases deemed detrimental to or threat which indicates a potential ODCM for 60 minutes or longer. levels. Status Not Satisfied. train of Containment detection or EXPLOSION within the UE.

GB Room for 15 minutes or longer. NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS. degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

Spray operating. PROTECTED AREA. GB Note: The EC should not wait until the 1. a. A VALID Alert Alarm on ANY of the 2. A. Rep CET reading 2. A. Rep CET reading 2. A. a. Rep CET greater Note: The EC should not wait until the 1. Seismic event identified by ANY 2 of the Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should currently or previously currently or previously than 1200ºF. 1. Plant is not brought to required operating applicable time has elapsed, but should Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should 1. Toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable 1. Other conditions exist which in the following: following: 1. A SECURITY CONDITION that does declare the event as soon as it is determined greater than 1200 oF greater than 700 oF AND mode within Technical Specifications declare the event as soon as it is determined applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined gases in amounts that have or could NOT involve a HOSTILE ACTION as judgment of the EC indicate that events are

b. Restoration not VALID Seismic Event alarm that the release duration has exceeded, or will RU-16 Containment Operating Level Area LCO Action Statement Time. that the condition has exceeded, or will likely declare the event as soon as it is determined that the duration has exceeded, or will likely adversely affect NORMAL PLANT reported by the Security Team. in progress or have occurred which indicate effective within Earthquake felt in plant likely exceed, the applicable time. In the RU-17 Incore Instrument Area exceed, the applicable time. that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed the applicable time. OPERATIONS. a potential degradation of the level of safety 15 minutes. National Earthquake Center OR absence of data to the contrary, assume that RU-19 New Fuel Area OR exceed, the applicable time. OR OR of the plant or indicate a security threat to RU-31 Spent Fuel Pool Area 2. A credible PVNGS security threat facility protection has been initiated. No the release duration has exceeded the B. a. Rep CET greater than MU5 - RCS Leakage. 1. Loss of all off-site AC power to 2. Tornado touching down within the 1. FIRE in the POWER BLOCK or Turbine 2. Report by local, county or state officials for notification.

applicable time if an ongoing release is RU-33 Refueling Machine Area 700 oF. PBA-S03 and PBB-S04 1. UNPLANNED Loss of annunciators on PROTECTED AREA or high winds Building not extinguished within 15 minutes evacuation or sheltering of site personnel releases of radioactive material requiring AND for 15 minutes or longer. ANY 4 of the following based on an off-site event. OR off-site response or monitoring are expected detected and the release start time is unknown.

AND b. RVLMS less than 21% B01, B02, B04, B05, B06 or SESS GB reaching 100 mph. of a FIRE alarm or Control Room

3. A validated notification from NRC

1. Unidentified or pressure boundary for 15 minutes or longer. OR notification. unless further degradation of safety systems

b. UNPLANNED water level drop in the plenum. providing information of an aircraft threat.

1. VALID reading on ANY of the following AND OR 3. Internal flooding in the POWER BLOCK OR occurs.

reactor refueling cavity, fuel transfer LEAKAGE greater than 10 gpm.

radiation monitors greater than the value for c. Restoration not OR UNPLANNED Loss of either that has the potential to affect safety related 2. EXPLOSION within the canal, cask loading pit, or spent fuel pool 60 minutes or longer: effective within PNA-D25 or PNB-D26 equipment required by Technical as indicated by ANY of the following: 2. Identified LEAKAGE greater than 25 gpm. PROTECTED AREA.

Plant Vent RU-143 CH-1 >1.22E-03 uCi/cc 15 minutes. for 15 minutes or longer.

Visual observation Specifications for the current operating Fuel Bldg RU-145 CH-1 >1.13E-02 uCi/cc UNUSUAL EVENT UNUSUAL EVENT SFP LEVEL HI - LOW (EO204A) 3. A. RVLMS level 3. A. RUPTURED SG 3. A. RUPTURED SG is mode.

OR on PCN-E02 currently or previously results in an SIAS. also FAULTED outside MU4 - Fuel Clad Degradation. MU6 - Loss of all On-site or Off-site OR

2. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous RWLIS less than 21% plenum. of containment. communications capabilities 4. Main Turbine failure resulting in casing releases indicates concentrations or release OR penetration or damage to turbine or Pressurizer level B.a. Primary-to-Secondary 1. RU-155D High Alarm rates greater than 2 times the ODCM Section 3 OR OR Main Generator seals.

leakrate greater than 1. Loss of all of the following on-site limits for 60 minutes or longer. 10 gpm. 2.a. DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

2. UNPLANNED VALID Area Radiation communication methods affecting the Monitor readings or survey results indicate AND greater than 1.0 µCi/gm for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

ability to perform routine operations.

a rise by a factor of 1000 over normal* b. UNISOLABLE steam OR PBX levels. release from the affected SG to the b. DOSE EQUIVALENT Xe-133 specific Plant Page System environment. activity greater than 550 µCi/gm Two-Way Radio

• Normal levels can be considered as the OR highest reading in the past twenty-four hours 4. a. A Failure of all GB for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />

2. Loss of all of the following off-site excluding the current peak value. valves in any one communication methods affecting the line to close MU8 - Inadvertent Criticality. Mode 3 or 4 AND ability to perform off-site notifications.

b. Direct downstream PBX pathway to the 1. UNPLANNED sustained source range FTS ISFSI environment exists Cellular Phones after containment count rise observed on nuclear isolation signal. instrumentation.

5. A. Containment radiation 5. A. Containment radiation 5. A. Containment radiation E-HU1 - Damage to a loaded cask monitor monitor monitor CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY RU-148 > 2.1E+05 mR/hr RU-148 > 5.0E+04 mR/hr RU-148 > 6.8E+06 mR/hr OR OR OR RU-149 > 2.4E+05 mR/hr RU-149 > 5.6E+04 mR/hr. RU-149 > 7.8E+06 mR/hr

1. Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT

6. A. Any condition in the opinion of the EC that indicates 6. A. Any condition in the opinion of the EC that indicates 6. A. Any condition in the opinion of the EC that indicates BOUNDARY.

Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier. Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier. Loss or Potential Loss of the Containment Barrier.

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined actions taken to secure containment and its associated (HG-1) HOSTILE ACTION A freshly offloaded core is applicable when time to boil for the Spent Fuel Pool is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or less.

IMMINENT: Mitigation actions have been ineffective, additional actions are not expected to be successful, and trended POWER BLOCK: Structures, systems or components listed below that contain equipment necessary for safe operation structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release in Modes 5 and 6. UNISOLABLE: A breach or leak that cannot be isolated from the Control Room. Existing guidance for classifying transient events addresses the period of time of event recognition and classification (15 minutes). However, information indicates that the event or condition will occur. and/or shutdown of the reactor.

A. Containment (ALL)Transient Events in cases when EAL declaration criteria may be met momentarily during the normal expected response of the plant, declaration requirements CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The dry storage cask barriers between areas containing radioactive substances and the B. Auxiliary Building should not be considered to be met when the conditions are a part of the designed plant response, or result from appropriate Operator actions.

environment. LEAKAGE shall be:

C. Refueling Water Tank (RWT) UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or (HU3 HA3)Toxic Gas Planned, Controlled activities that may create access restrictions do not meet the intent of HU3 or HA3.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due to combustion, chemical reaction or a. Identified LEAKAGE D. Diesel Generator Building mitigative actions.

over pressurization that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or 1. LEAKAGE, such as that from pump seals or valve packing (except reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal water (HU3, HA3) Toxic Gas Regarding access to areas, the toxic gas should represent an acute hazard vs. a chronic hazard.

E. Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks components. injection or leakoff), that is captured and conducted to collection systems or a sump or collecting tank; HOT F. Fuel Building Safety Systems required for Safe Shutdown. Classification requires you meet the EAL threshold and initiating condition. To meet degraded performance FAULTED: in a steam generator, the existence of secondary side leakage that results in an uncontrolled drop in steam 2. LEAKAGE into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not (HA2, HA3)

G. Spray Pond Definitions to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; or VALID: An indication, report, or condition, is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel of safety systems in the threshold these safety systems would also have to be required to establish or maintain safe shutdown.

generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized H. Condensate Storage Tank (CST) 1. Onsite Emergency Power Systems including 4. CVCS system (portion for boration) 7. Essential Cooling Water

3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) LEAKAGE through a steam generator (SG) to the Secondary System (primary to check, (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt Fire/Explosion Safety Emergency Diesel Generators 5. Essential Spray Pond FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical I. Control Building 8. Shutdown Cooling System secondary LEAKAGE). related to the indicators operability, the conditions existence, or the reports accuracy is removed. Shutdown Systems 2. Auxiliary Feedwater System equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and b. J. Corridor Building 6. Condensate Storage System 9. HVAC systems needed in support Guidance Box (GB)

Unidentified LEAKAGE 3. Atmospheric Steam Dump heat are observed. K. MSSS (Fission Product Matrix -

All LEAKAGE that is not identified LEAKAGE; If 40EP-9EO09, Functional Recovery is entered due to a loss of the RCS or Core Heat removal safety function then the heat removal safety function(s)

RCS Barrier)

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, c. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE Safety Function Status are not considered satisfied and the RCS barrier is potentially lost.

take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, LEAKAGE (except primary to secondary LEAKAGE) through a nonisolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe PROTECTED AREA: The area which encompasses all controlled areas within the security PROTECTED AREA fence. VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or (Fission Product Matrix -

explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall wall, or vessel wall. analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of the affected structure, When the interfacing system becomes part of the reactor coolant system due to the inability to isolate the interfacing system from within the Control Containment) Containment intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts RUPTURED: in a steam generator, existence of primary-to-secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, Room and reactor coolant has a direct transport pathway to the environment, the interfacing system and subsequent release should be considered an Isolation Failure - Direct that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS: Activities at the plant site, excluding the Water Reclamation Facility, associated cause a reactor trip and safety injection cracking, and paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included. incomplete containment isolation that allows direct release to the environment.

Release this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area). with routine testing, maintenance, or equipment operations, in accordance with normal operating or administrative (MU3, MA4, MS6) Both A and B train SESS are considered one component i.e., both trains of SESS would have to be lost to be considered as one of the four to meet the SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a procedures. Entry into abnormal or emergency operating procedures, or deviation from normal security or radiological threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. Loss of Annunciators EAL criteria since the SESS annunciators are such a low percentage of the total annunciator array.

HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and controls posture, is a departure from NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS. VITAL AREAS: Areas, within the PROTECTED AREA, that contains equipment vital to the operations of the plant.

deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION. (MA5, MS1)

On site sources must be energizing or able to energize a class 4.16 Kv bus within 15 minutes to be considered a power source.

AC Power to 4.16 Kv bus EP-0801 G

COLD INITIATING CONDITIONS - MODES 5 DEFUELED RADIOLOGICAL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS HAZARDS EFFLUENTS RX and CORE AC / DC POWER HEAT REMOVAL COMMUNICATIONS NATURAL / DESTRUCTIVE FIRE / EXPLOSION TOXIC / FLAMMABLE SECURITY CR EVACUATION EC DISCRETION RG1 - Off-site dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous radioactivity greater than CG1 - Loss of RCS inventory affecting fuel clad HG1 - HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of HG2 - Other conditions exist which in the judgment 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release using actual integrity with containment challenged. Modes 5 & 6 physical control of the facility. of the EC warrant declaration of a General meteorology. Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable Emergency.

1. A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such that Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon plant personnel are unable, either remotely or 1. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. If dose assessment results are as it is determined that the condition will likely locally, to operate equipment required to maintain the EC indicate that events are in progress or have available, declaration should be based on dose assessment instead of radiation monitor values. Do not delay exceed the applicable time. safety functions. occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT declaration awaiting dose assessment results. 1.a. RCS level less than 99 ft. 7 in. OR substantial core degradation or melting with for 30 minutes or longer. 2. A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of Spent potential for loss of containment integrity or

1. VALID reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the value for AND Fuel Cooling Systems and IMMINENT fuel HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of 15 minutes or longer:

GENERAL EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

b. ANY of the following physical control of the facility. Releases can be Plant Vent RU-144 CH-1 >1.04E+00 uCi/cc CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established. damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor 4.5% H2 inside containment. core in pool. GB reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Fuel Building RU-146 CH-2 >3.50E+01 uCi/cc OR UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure. Action Guideline exposure levels off-site for more

2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than OR than the immediate site area.

2.a. RCS level cannot be monitored with core 1000 mrem TEDE OR 5000 mrem thyroid CDE at OR beyond the site boundary. uncovery indicated by ANY of the following for OR 30 minutes or longer.

3. Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates greater than 1000 mR/hr expected to continue for Erratic source range monitor indication 60 minutes or longer; or analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 5000 mrem for RU-33 greater than 10,000 mR/hr one hour of inhalation, at or beyond site boundary. UNPLANNED level rise in ANY of the following:

Containment Sumps Reactor Cavity Sump Refueling Water Tank CVCS Holdup Tank Reactor Drain Tank ESF Sump AND

b. ANY of the following CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established.

4.5% H2 inside containment.

UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure.

CS1 - Loss of RCS inventory affecting core decay HS4 - HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED HS2 - Control room evacuation has been initiated HS3 - Other conditions exist which in the judgment RS1 - Off-site dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous radioactivity greater than heat removal capability. Modes 5 & 6 AREA. and plant control cannot be established. of the EC warrant declaration of a Site Area 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release Emergency

1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has 1.a. Control Room evacuation has been initiated.

Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as AND 1. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. If dose assessment results are reported by the Security Team. b. Control of the plant cannot be established at the the EC indicate that events are in progress or have as it is determined that the condition will likely available, declaration should be based on dose assessment instead of radiation monitor values. Do not delay Remote Shutdown Panel within 15 minutes. occurred which involve actual or likely major exceed the applicable time.

declaration awaiting dose assessment results. failures of plant functions needed for protection of SITE AREA EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in

1. VALID reading on ANY of the following radiation monitors greater than the value intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site for 15 minutes or longer:

personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely Plant Vent RU-144 CH-1 >1.04E-01 uCi/cc failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to Fuel Building RU-146 CH-1 >3.50E+00 uCi/cc equipment needed for the protection of the public.

OR

2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses greater than Any releases are not expected to result in exposure 100 mrem TEDE OR 500 mrem thyroid CDE at OR beyond the site boundary. levels which exceed EPA Protective Action RCS level cannot be monitored for 30 minutes or Guideline exposure levels beyond the site OR longer with a loss of inventory as indicated by

3. Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates greater than 100 mR/hr expected to continue ANY of the following: boundary.

for 60 minutes or longer; or analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE greater than 500 mrem Erratic Source Range Monitor Indication for one hour of inhalation, at or beyond the site boundary. RU-33 greater than 10,000 mR/hr UNPLANNED level rise in ANY of the following:

Containment Sumps Reactor Cavity Sump Refueling Water Tank CVCS Holdup Tank Reactor Drain Tank ESF Sump EFFLUENTS RAD LEVELS CA1 - Loss of RCS inventory. Modes 5 & 6 CA3 - Loss of all Off-site and all On-Site AC power CA4 - Inability to maintain plant in cold shutdown. HA1 - Natural or destructive phenomena affecting HA2 - FIRE or EXPLOSION affecting the HA3 - Access to a VITAL AREA is prohibited due to HA4 - HOSTILE ACTION within the Owner HA5 - Control Room evacuation has been initiated.

HA6 - Other conditions exist which in the judgment to emergency busses for 15 minutes or longer. Modes 5 & 6 VITAL AREAS. operability of plant safety systems required to release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable Controlled Area or airborne attack threat. of the EC warrant declaration of an Alert.

RA1 - ANY release of gaseous radioactivity to the RA2 - Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable Note: The EC must remain alert to events or conditions establish or maintain safe shutdown. gases which jeopardize operation of systems required 1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has 1. Control Room evacuation is required by: 1. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of environment greater than 20 times the ODCM for 15 level that has resulted or will result in the uncovering that lead to the conclusion that exceeding the 1.a. Seismic event greater than Operating Basis to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the time has elapsed, but should declare the event as Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable Earthquake (OBE) as indicated by ANY Force occurred within the Owner Controlled Area as 40AO-9ZZ18, Shutdown Outside Control Room the EC indicate that events are in progress or have minutes or longer of irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel soon as it is determined that the condition will likely Threshold is IMMINENT. If, in the judgment of the EC, Balance Accelerometer reading reactor. reported by the Security Team. OR occurred which involve an actual or potential time has elapsed, but should declare the event as 1. FIRE or EXPLOSION resulting in VISIBLE Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable Note: This EAL does not apply to the cask loading pit exceed the applicable time. an IMMINENT situation is at hand, the classification greater than 0.10g. OR 40AO-9ZZ19, Control Room Fire. substantial degradation of the level of safety of the soon as it is determined that the condition will likely DAMAGE to ANY POWER BLOCK Note: If the equipment in the stated area was already time has elapsed, but should declare the event as during cask loading operations. should be made as if the threshold has been exceeded. AND 2. A validated notification from NRC of an airliner plant or a security event that involves probable life

1. Inability to restore and maintain RCS level greater exceed the applicable time. b. Earthquake confirmed by ANY of the following: structure or Control Room indication of inoperable, or out of service, before the event soon as it is determined that the release duration has 1. A water level drop in the reactor refueling cavity, 1. An UNPLANNED event results in RCS temperature degraded performance of safety systems. occurred, then this EAL should not be declared as it attack threat within 30 minutes of the site. threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site than 101 ft 4 in 1. Loss of all Off-Site and all On-Site AC Power to Earthquake felt in plant exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. spent fuel pool, cask loading pit, or fuel transfer greater than 210 oF for greater than the specified will have no adverse impact on the ability of the plant OR equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any OR PBA-S03 and PBB-S04 for 15 minutes or longer. National Earthquake Center GB In the absence of data to the contrary, assume that canal that will result in uncovering irradiated fuel. duration on table. to safely operate or safely shutdown beyond that 3. A HOSTILE ACTION directed toward the ISFSI. releases are expected to be limited to small OR 2. RCS level cannot be monitored for 15 minutes or GB Control Room indication of degraded the release duration has exceeded the applicable time longer with a loss of inventory as indicated by an GB performance of systems required for the safe already allowed by Technical Specifications at the fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline if an ongoing release is detected and the release start 2. A VALID High Alarm on ANY of the following RCS Reheat Duration Threshold exposure levels.

due to damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water unexplained level rise in ANY of the following: shutdown of the plant time of the event.

time is unknown. Containment level: Containment Sumps RCS Duration OR Closure 1. Access to a VITAL AREA is prohibited due to

1. VALID reading on ANY of the following RU-16 Containment Operating Level Area Reactor Cavity Sump 2. Tornado touching down or high winds reaching ALERT ALERT RU-17 Incore Instrument Area Refueling Water Tank Not 100 mph resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to ANY toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases radiation monitors greater than the value Not Intact or 0 minutes for 15 minutes or longer: RU-19 New Fuel Area CVCS Holdup Tank RCS Reduced Established POWER BLOCK structure OR Control Room which jeopardize operation of systems required to Reactor Drain Tank indication of degraded performance of safety maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the RU-31 Spent Fuel Pool Area Inventory Plant Vent RU-143 CH-1 >1.22E-02 uCi/cc ESF Sump Established 20 minutes

• systems. reactor.

RU-33 Refueling Machine Area (< 111ft.)

OR GB Fuel Bldg RU-146 CH-1 >1.13E-01 uCi/cc RU-143 Plant Vent 3. Internal flooding in ANY POWER BLOCK RU-145 Fuel Building Vent Intact and not structure resulting in an electrical shock hazard OR in RCS that precludes access to operate or monitor safety

2. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous releases N/A 60 minutes

• equipment OR Control Room indication of RA3 - Rise in radiation levels within the facility that Reduced indicates concentrations or release rates Inventory degraded performance of those safety systems.

impedes operation of systems required to maintain OR greater than 20 times the ODCM Section 3.0 plant safety functions

• If SDC is in operation within this time frame 4. Vehicle crash resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to limits for 15 minutes or longer.

and RCS temperature is being reduced, ANY POWER BLOCK structure OR Control

1. Dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in the Control the Threshold is not applicable Room indication of degraded performance of Room Area OR Secondary Alarm Station. safety systems.

OR

2. An UNPLANNED event results in RCS pressure rise greater than 10 psi due to a loss of SDC.

(This Threshold does not apply in Solid Plant conditions.)

RU1 - ANY release of gaseous radioactivity to the RU2 - UNPLANNED rise in plant radiation levels CU1 - RCS Leakage Mode 5 CU3 - AC power capability to emergency busses CU4 - UNPLANNED loss of decay heat removal CU6 - Loss of all On-site or Off-site communications HU1 - Natural or destructive phenomena affecting HU2 - FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA not HU3 - Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant, or HU4 - Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or HU5 - Other conditions exist which in the judgment environment greater than 2 times the ODCM for 60 reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or capability with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel. capabilities the PROTECTED AREA. flammable gases deemed detrimental to NORMAL threat which indicates a potential degradation in the of the EC warrant declaration of a UE minutes or longer 1. a. A VALID Alert Alarm on ANY of the Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable extinguished within 15 minutes of detection or time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon longer such that ANY additional single failure would Modes 5 & 6 EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA. PLANT OPERATIONS. GB level of safety of the plant.

following: 1. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable as it is determined that the condition will likely result in station blackout. Modes 5 & 6 1. Seismic event identified by ANY 2 of the RU-16 Containment Operating Level Area Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable time 1. Loss of all of the following on-site communication 1. Toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases in the EC indicate that events are in progress or have time has elapsed, but should declare the event as exceed the applicable time. Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable methods affecting the ability to perform routine following: 1. A SECURITY CONDITION that does NOT occurred which indicate a potential degradation of RU-17 Incore Instrument Area has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it VALID Seismic Event alarm amounts that have or could adversely affect soon as it is determined that the release duration has 1. RCS leakage results in Lower Mode Safety Function time has elapsed, but should declare the event as operations: involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the is determined that the condition will likely exceed the Earthquake felt in plant Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS. Security Team. the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security RU-19 New Fuel Area Status Check Acceptance Criteria for Inventory PBX exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. soon as it is determined that the condition will likely applicable time. National Earthquake Center OR threat to facility protection has been initiated. No RU-31 Spent Fuel Pool Area Control not Satisfied for 15 minutes or longer. Plant Page System time has elapsed, but should declare the event as In the absence of data to the contrary, assume that exceed the applicable time. 1. UNPLANNED event results in RCS temperature 2. Report by local, county or state officials for OR releases of radioactive material requiring off-site RU-33 Refueling Machine Area Two-Way Radio soon as it is determined that the duration has the release duration has exceeded the applicable time CU2 - UNPLANNED Loss of RCS inventory 1. a. AC power capability to PBA-S03 and PBB-S04 OR 2. A credible PVNGS security threat notification. response or monitoring are expected unless further AND exceeding 210 oF. GB 2. Tornado touching down within the PROTECTED exceeded, or will likely exceed the applicable time. evacuation or sheltering of site personnel based on if an ongoing release is detected and the release start Mode 6 reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or OR OR an off-site event. degradation of safety systems occurs.

b. UNPLANNED water level drop in the reactor Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable 2. Loss of all of the following off-site communication AREA or high winds reaching 100 mph. OR time is unknown longer. 1. FIRE in the POWER BLOCK or Turbine Building refueling cavity, fuel transfer canal, cask GB 2. Loss of all RCS temperature and RCS level 3. A validated notification from NRC providing UNUSUAL EVENT UNUSUAL EVENT time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon AND indication for 15 minutes or longer. methods affecting the ability to perform offsite OR not extinguished within 15 minutes of a FIRE loading pit, or spent fuel pool as indicated by notifications: information of an aircraft threat.

1. VALID reading on ANY of the following radiation ANY of the following: as it is determined that the condition will likely b. ANY additional single power source failure will 3. Internal flooding in the POWER BLOCK that has alarm or Control Room notification.

monitors greater than the value for 60 minutes or CU8 - Inadvertent Criticality. Modes 5 & 6 PBX Visual observation exceed the applicable time. result in station blackout. the potential to affect safety related equipment FTS required by Technical Specifications for the longer: SFP LEVEL HI - LOW (EO204A) on PCN-E02 Cellular Phones OR

1. UNPLANNED RCS level drop as indicated by CU7 - Loss of required DC power for 15 minutes or 1. UNPLANNED sustained source range count rise current operating mode.

Plant Vent RU-143 CH-1 >1.22E-03 uCi/cc RWLIS either of the following: longer. Modes 5 & 6 observed on nuclear instrumentation. 2. EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA.

Fuel Building RU-145 CH-1 >1.13E-02 uCi/cc Pressurizer level RCS water level drop below the Reactor Vessel OR OR OR Note: The EC should not wait until the applicable 4. Main Turbine failure resulting in casing flange for 15 minutes or longer when the RCS

2. Confirmed sample analyses for gaseous releases 2. UNPLANNED VALID Area Radiation Monitor time has elapsed, but should declare the event as penetration or damage to turbine or level band is established above the Reactor indicates concentrations or release rates greater readings or survey results indicate a rise by a soon as it is determined that the condition will likely Main Generator seals.

Vessel flange.

than 2 times the ODCM Section 3 limits factor of 1000 over normal* levels. exceed the applicable time.

RCS water level drop below the RCS level band for 60 minutes or longer. ISFSI for 15 minutes or longer when operating in 1. Less than 112 VDC for 15 minutes or longer on

• Normal levels can be considered as the highest Reduced Inventory per 40OP-9ZZ16. Train A (PKA-M41 and PKC-M43) or Train B reading in the past twenty-four hours excluding the OR (PKB-M42 and PKD-M44) as required by E-HU1 - Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT current peak value. 2. RCS level cannot be monitored concurrent with a Technical Specifications for monitoring and BOUNDARY loss of RCS inventory as indicated by an unexplained control of decay heat removal.

level rise in ANY of the following:

Containment Sumps Refueling Water Tank 1. Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT Reactor Cavity Sump CVCS Holdup Tank BOUNDARY.

ESF Sump Reactor Drain Tank CONTAINMENT CLOSURE: The procedurally defined actions taken to secure containment and its associated IMMINENT: Mitigation actions have been ineffective, additional actions are not expected to be successful, and trended POWER BLOCK: Structures, systems or components listed below that contain equipment necessary for safe operation UNISOLABLE: A breach or leak that cannot be isolated from the Control Room. (HG1) HOSTILE ACTION A freshly offloaded core is applicable when time to boil for the Spent Fuel Pool is 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or less.

structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release in Modes 5 and 6.

information indicates that the event or condition will occur. and/or shutdown of the reactor. Existing guidance for classifying transient events addresses the period of time of event recognition and classification (15 minutes). However, in cases CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY: The dry storage cask barriers between areas containing radioactive substances and the A. Containment (ALL) Transient Events when EAL declaration criteria may be met momentarily during the normal expected response of the plant, declaration requirements should not be environment. B. Auxiliary Building UNPLANNED: A parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended considered to be met when the conditions are a part of the designed plant response, or result from appropriate Operator actions.

LEAKAGE shall be: C. Refueling Water Tank (RWT) evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, and catastrophic failure of a piece of equipment due to combustion, chemical reaction or (HU3, HA3) Toxic Gas Planned, Controlled activities that may create access restrictions do not meet the intent of HU3 or HA3.

COLD

a. Identified LEAKAGE D. Diesel Generator Building over pressurization that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems or

1. LEAKAGE, such as that from pump seals or valve packing (except reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal water E. Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks (HU3, HA3) Toxic Gas Regarding access to areas, the toxic gas should represent an acute hazard vs. a chronic hazard.

components. VALID: An indication, report, or condition, is considered to be VALID when it is injection or leakoff), that is captured and conducted to collection systems or a sump or collecting tank; F. Fuel Building FAULTED: in a steam generator, the existence of secondary side leakage that results in an uncontrolled drop in steam verified by (1) an instrument channel check, (2) indications on related or redundant

2. LEAKAGE into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not G. Spray Pond Definitions Safety Systems required for Safe Shutdown. Classification requires you meet the EAL threshold and initiating condition. To meet degraded performance of safety generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the (HA2, HA3) to interfere with the operation of leakage detection systems or not to be pressure boundary LEAKAGE; or H. Condensate Storage Tank (CST) systems in the threshold these safety systems would also have to be required to establish or maintain safe shutdown.

Guidance Box (GB) indicators operability, the conditions existence, or the reports accuracy is removed.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical 3. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) LEAKAGE through a steam generator (SG) to the Secondary System (primary to I. Control Building 4. CVCS system (portion for boration)

1. Onsite Emergency Power Systems including Emergency 7. Essential Cooling Water equipment do not constitute FIRES. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and secondary LEAKAGE). J. Corridor Building Fire/Explosion Safety 5. Essential Spray Pond Diesel Generators 9. Shutdown Cooling System heat are observed. b. Unidentified LEAKAGE K. MSSS VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable Shutdown Systems 2. Auxiliary Feedwater System 6. Condensate Storage System 10. HVAC systems needed in support All LEAKAGE that is not identified LEAKAGE; without measurements, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern 3. Atmospheric Steam Dump HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a NPP or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, c. Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE (CU3, CA3 )

regarding the continued operability or reliability of the affected structure, system, or On site sources must be energizing or able to energize a class 4.16 Kv bus within 15 minutes to be considered a power source.

take HOSTAGES, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, LEAKAGE (except primary to secondary LEAKAGE) through a nonisolable fault in an RCS component body, pipe PROTECTED AREA: The area which encompasses all controlled areas within the security PROTECTED AREA fence. Cold Shutdown - AC Power component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, explosives, PROJECTILEs, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall wall, or vessel wall. (CU4, CA4)

RUPTURED: in a steam generator, existence of primary-to-secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or penetration, rupture, cracking, and paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts Cold Shutdown - Decay Heat If RCS temperature instrumentation is not available or inaccurate due to loss of SDC flow then use time to boil information to determine when EAL threshold is met.

cause a reactor trip and safety injection chipping, scratches) should not be included.

that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., Removal NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS: Activities at the plant site, excluding the Water Reclamation Facility, associated this may include violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area).

with routine testing, maintenance, or equipment operations, in accordance with normal operating or administrative SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a VITAL AREAS: Areas, within the PROTECTED AREA, that contains equipment vital HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, procedures. Entry into abnormal or emergency operating procedures, or deviation from normal security or radiological threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant.

to the operations of the plant.

equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction. controls posture, is a departure from NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.

EP-0802 G

Fuel Building Effluent Exhaust Monitor RU 145 Channel 1 180' of Fuel Building Fuel Bldg 1.00 E-01 uCi/cc 1.00 E-01 1.00 E-02 1.00 E-03 1.00 E-04 1.00 E-05 1.00 E-06 1.00 E-07 10:22:00 10:32:00 10:42:00 10:52:00 11:02:00 11:12:00 HIGH HIGH STPT 1.56 E-03 uCi/cc ALERT ALERT STPT 4.13 E-05 uCI/cc Fuel Building High Range Exhaust RU 146 Channel 1 Monitor 180' of Fuel Building Gas Channel 1 2.01 E-01 uCi/cc 1.00 E+03 1.00 E+02 1.00 E+01 1.00 E+00 1.00 E-01 1.00 E-02 10:22:00 10:32:00 10:42:00 10:52:00 11:02:00 11:12:00 HIGH HIGH STPT 3.50 E+00 uCi/cc ALERT ALERT STPT 1.13 E-01 uCI/cc

AFW System 3.7.5 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

---

NOTE----------------------------

Only one AFW train, which includes a motor driven pump, is required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE-------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One steam supply to A.1 Restore affected 7 days turbine driven AFW equipment to OPERABLE pump inoperable. status. AND OR 10 days from

---

NOTE--------- discovery of failure to Only applicable if meet the LCO MODE 2 has not been entered following refueling.

One turbine driven AFW pump inoperable in MODE 3 following refueling.

B. One AFW train B.1 Restore AFW train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inoperable for reasons OPERABLE status.

other than Condition A AND in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO (continued)

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 3.7.5-1 AMENDMENT NO. 134, 165

AFW System 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A AND or B not met.

C.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> OR Two AFW trains inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 D. Three AFW trains D.1 --------NOTE---------

inoperable in MODE 1, LCO 3.0.3 and all 2, or 3. other LCO Required Actions requiring MODE changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.

Initiate action to Immediately restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status.

E. Required AFW train E.1 --------NOTE---------

inoperable in MODE 4. LCO 3.0.3 and all other LCO Required Actions requiring MODE changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.

Initiate action to Immediately restore one AFW train to OPERABLE status.

PALO VERDE UNITS 1,2,3 3.7.5-2 AMENDMENT NO. 117