ML16245A394
| ML16245A394 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley, Davis Besse, Oconee, Surry, Crystal River, Maine Yankee, FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1979 |
| From: | Haass W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Ross D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16245A393 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-79-98 NUDOCS 7906250112 | |
| Download: ML16245A394 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES 0 o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 MAY 15 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Denwood F. Ross, Deputy Director Division of Project Management FROM:
Walter P. Haass, Chief, Quality Assurance Branch, Division of Project Management
SUBJECT:
COMMENTS ON R. MCDERMOTT'S RESPONSE TO YOUR NOTE OF MAY 8, 1979 I have reviewed Bob McDermott's response of May 14, 1979 to your note of May 8, 1979, as summarized in the conclusions on page 7, and have the following comments:
- 1. Generally, I do not agree that the items, identified in the conclusions for completion prior to restart of the B&W plants, need to be accomplished within that time frame as qualified in comments 2 and 3 below. I do find one ex ception as noted in comment 4. I believe that, while the items identified should be considered in the overall assessment of the adequacy of the B&W plants with regard to safety, they are more appropriate for consideration under the long-term program as defined on page 7 of the Commission's Order to Duke Power Company. My rationale for this belief is that the staff has already developed, in my view, an acceptable program for the short-term, as described in the Commission Order (Section IV) and as required in the bulletins, that addresses the corrections necessary to provide the assurance that secondary system events are highly unlikely to result in a repeat of the TMI-2 accident. I believe the successful completion of the short-term program to be sufficient to permit restart of the B&W plants. The long term program appears to be a satisfactory approach to treating related problem areas that are important but of a less significant nature.
I note, however, that it is not obvious to me that the items identified in the McDermott response are included in the long-term program. This needs to be reviewed by the appropriate technical personnel.
- 2. Item b in the conclusions of the McDermott response appears to be largely similar to item (1)(d) (Section IV, page 11) of the Commission Order.
This needs to be reviewed by the appropriate technical personnel.
- 3. Item c in the conclusions of the McDermott response appears to be largely similar to, or at least duplicative of to some extent, item (1) (including all its parts except d) of the Commission Order (Section IV, pages 9-12).
This needs to be reviewed by the appropriate technical personnel.
- 4. Item 4 in the conclusions of the McDermott response expresses concern about continued operation of the HPI pumps for 20 minutes following reactor trip.
7 906 2 501/I2
Denwood F. Ross
- 2 Calculations performed by Don Beckham (Note to D. Eisenhut from R. McDermott, item 5, dated 4/23/79) indicate that the code safety valve will lift under these conditions. Speculation is that the valve will then pass water or a water/steam mixture potentially causing damage to the valve to the extent it may not reseat when system pressure drops. This may have happened at TMI-2 effectively resulting in a small break loss-of-coolant accident.
Therefore, I believe that the technical basis for the staff-directed 20 minute HPI pump operation needs to be re-evaluated by our technical personnel prior to restart.
A similar re-evaluation may be necessary of the staff requirement for continued RCS pump operation without any apparent restriction. I am concerned that such an operating directive could possibly exacerbate an already poor situation.
Based on the above comments, I have not concurred in Bob McDermott's response to your note. However, as noted in several places above, the concerns expressed, as well as the information developed, the calculations performed, and the evaluations that resulted, should be brought to the attention of the appropriate technical staff members for further consideration.
Walter P. Haass, Chief Quality Assurance Branch Division of Project Management cc: R. Boyd D. Skovholt R. McDermott