ML16161A902
| ML16161A902 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 10/27/1987 |
| From: | Jape F, Lenahan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML16161A903 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-269-87-39, 50-270-87-39, 50-287-87-39, IEB-80-11, NUDOCS 8711130102 | |
| Download: ML16161A902 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000269/1987039
Text
p
REG,
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
101 MARIETTA STREET,N.V.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-269/87-39, 50-270/87-39, and 50-287/87-39
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242
Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270,
License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, and
and 50-287
Facility Name:
Oconee 1, 2, and 3
Inspection Conducted:
September 28 - October 2, 1987
In
sp ec t or:
' /, ;
dL*~-
/46
A92/
J. J. Lenahan
Date Signed
Approved by: V
. z~ L
/ lAt-
I?
r
F. Jape, Chief, Test Program Section
Date Signed
Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was in the areas of the reactor
building tendon surveillance program, the snubber surveillance program, and IEB
80-11.
Results:
No violations or deviations were identified.
8711130102 871028
PDR ADOCK 05000269
0
REPORT DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
M. Addis, Mechanical Engineer, Maintenance Service
- J. M. Davis, Technical Services Superintendent
F. Linsley, Civil Engineer, Construction
- T. C. Mathews, Assistant Engineer, Compliance
M. S. Tuckman, Station Manager
J. Weir, Civil Engineer, Project Engineering
Other licensee employees contacted included six construction craftsmen,
and one QC inspector.
NRC Resident Inspectors
- J. C. Bryant
P. H. Skinner
- L. D. Wert
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 2, 1987, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did identify some material
as proprietary during this
inspection, but this material is-not included in this inspection report.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4. Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5. Snubber Surveillance Program, Units 1, 2, and 3 (70370)
The inspector examined procedures and quality records related to the
snubber surveillance program and inspected selected snubbers on safety
related piping systems. Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector are
specified in Technical Specifications 3.14 and 4.18.
2
a. Review of Snubber Surveillance Procedures -
Unit 1
The inspector examined the following procedures which control snubber
surveillance activities.
(1) Procedure number MP/O/A/3018/09, Functional Testing of Hydraulic
(2) Procedure
number
MP/O/A/3018/59,
Functional
Testing
of
Mechanical Snubbers
(3) Procedure
number
MP/1/A/3018/10,
Visual
Inspection
of
Inaccessible Hydraulic Snubbers
(4) Procedure number MP/1/A/3018/11, Visual Inspection of Accessible
Hydraulic Snubbers
(5) Procedure
number
MP/1/A/3018/19,
Visual
Inspection
of
Inaccessible Mechanical Snubbers
(6) Procedure number MP/1/A/3018/30, Visual Inspection of Accessible
Mechanical Snubbers
b.
Inspection of Snubbers -
Units 1-3
The inspector performed a visual inspection of the snubbers listed
below and verified that the
snubbers were
not
damaged,
that
attachment to the supporting structure and piping was secured, that
sufficient fluid was present in the hydraulic snubber reservoirs, and
that leakage of fluid was not occurring.
Snubbers examined were as
follows:
(1) Snubber numbers 1-20B-20-515 DE001*
and DE002*
on the Unit 1
reactor building purge system.
(2) Snubber numbers 2-20B-20-515 DEOO1* and DE002*
on the Unit 2
reactor building purge system.
(3) Snubber numbers 3-208-20-515
DE001*
and DE002*
on the Unit 3
reactor building purge system.
(4) Snubber numbers 3-O1A-3-0-2403D DE008* and 3-01A-3-2-2403D-SR8,
SR9, and SR10 on the Unit 3 main steam system.
(5) Snubber number 2-01A-0-550-R14 on the Unit 2 turbine stop
valves.
(6) Snubber numbers 3-01A-0-550-R14 and R15 on the Unit 3 turbine
stop valves.
3
- Denotes mechanical
all
other snubbers listed are
hydraulic.
c.
Review of Quality Records - Units 1-3
The inspector reviewed quality records documenting the results of
functional tests performed on snubbers.
Records examined were as
follows:
(1) Results
of functional tests performed on Unit 1 hydraulic
snubbers in March 1986 and September 1987 and
on Unit 1
mechanical snubbers in February 1986.
(2) Results of functional tests performed
on Unit 2 hydraulic
snubbers in March 1985 and August 1986 and on Unit 2 mechanical
snubbers in September 1986.
(3) Results of functional tests performed on Unit 3 hydraulic
snubbers in January 1987 and on Unit 3 mechanical snubbers in
February 1987.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
6. Post-Tension System Surveillance Program - Unit 1 (61701)
a. Surveillance of Tendons in Exterior Wall of Reactor Containment
Building
The inspector examined procedures and quality records related to the
surveillance of tendons in the exterior wall of the Unit 1
containment building. Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector
appears in Technical Specification 4.4.2.
The inspector reviewed
procedure
number MP/0/A/1400/22,
Tendon -
Reactor
Building
Surveillance, which specifies the requirements for inspection and
surveillance of these tendons.
The inspector reviewed the records
documenting the surveillance inspections performed on dome tendon
numbers
1028,
2D28,
and
3D28 in September 1987.
These records
included tendon lift-off forces and results of anchorage inspections.
The inspector also examined the tendon stressing ram calibration
records.
No deficiencies were identified during the surveillance
inspection of the above listed tendons. The surveillance inspection
of the vertical and horizontal tendons is still in progress.
b. Reactor Building Secondary Shield Wall Tendon Surveillance
The inspector examined procedures and observed work activities
related to surveillance of tendons in the secondary shield wall.
The
secondary shield wall consists of removable
reinforced concrete
blocks which contain horizontal and vertical tendons which provide
the strength to resist postulated design loads. The criteria for the
surveillance
inspection
is contained in Duke
Power Design
Specification number OSS-011F-00-00-0001,
Specification for Reactor
4
Building Secondary Shield Wall Post-Tension Tendon Surveillance. The
inspector
reviewed
procedure
number MP/O/A/1400/21,
Tendon
Secondary Shield Wall - Surveillance. This procedure, which is based
on
the
design
specification,
specified
the
inspection
and
surveillance requirements for the secondary shield wall tendons. The
procedure also
contains
the
tendon
surveillance acceptance
requirements.
The inspector witnessed stressing operations
for
verification of the lift-off force in Unit 1 vertical tendon 8V. The
inspector also witnessed detensioning and retensioning of the tendon.
The operations were performed in accordance with the requirements of
procedure MP/O/A/1400/21.
The inspector examined the anchorage
assemblies and buttonheads on tendon 7V and on the lower end of
tendon 8V and the condition of the tendon wires at both ends of
tendon 8V. Corrosion level on tendon wires was noted on Corrosion
Level 1; no visible corrosion.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
7.
(Closed) IE Bulletin 80-11, Masonry Wall Design
a.
Background
The licensee responded to IE Bulletin 80-11 in letters to NRC dated
July 7, October 28, and November 4, 1980.
In the October 28 letter,
the licensee requested an extension until the end of December 1981 to
complete the design reanalysis of the masonry walls.
The licensee
submitted interim progress reports concerning the status of the
masonry wall evaluation to NRC Region II
on February 9, March 9,
June 30, and September 30, 1981.
In letters dated July 13,
1981,
June 15, 1982,
September 7, 1983,
and October 20,
1983, to the NRC
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), the licensee responded to
requests for additional information concerning masonry wall design.
Based on the information provided in these letters, NRR accepted the
design methodology used to qualify 217 of 299 masonry walls.
The
remaining 82 walls had been qualified by use of arching action
theory, which did not meet NRC design evaluation criteria.
In order to resolve the acceptability of the arching criteria, the
licensee proposed to conduct a confirmatory test program. An outline
of the proposed test program was submitted to NRR in a letter dated
October 5, 1984. Based on the licensee's submittal pertaining to
NRC issued a Safety Evaluation Report
(SER)
which was
transmitted to the licensee in a letter dated March 14,
1985.
This
SER documented NRC acceptance of the licensee's criteria used to
evaluate 217 masonry walls and acceptance of the licensee's test
program to provide additional data pertaining to the acceptability of
the use of arching theory to qualify the remaining 82 walls.
The
licensee completed the testing program and submitted the results to
NRC in a letter dated March 10,
1986.
(The arching theory
confirmation test program details and data is considered to be
proprietary information.)
5
In
an
SER attached to a letter dated June 25,
1987,
Subject:
Confirmatory Test Program on the Arching Action Theory for Masonry
Walls, NRR concluded that the licensee's test program validated the
use of arching action theory to qualify the 82 unreinforced concrete
masonry walls.
b.
Inspection of Modifications to Masonry Walls
During the design reevaluation, the licensee decided to initiate a
repair program on "non-typical" masonry walls in order to insure that
an adequate margin of safety would be maintained.
The walls that
were modified were those that were generally taller (approximately 18
to 19 feet) than the typical 12 to 14 foot high walls in the plant
and/or those located in areas anticipated to experience greater
seismic accelerations. The analysis did not indicate these walls
were unsafe in their existing configuration, but an added margin of
safety was provided by the upgrades.
The wall repairs (upgrades)
were completed under Nuclear Station Modification (NSM) 1717.
The inspector examined the completed
NSM 1717 documentation.
The
documentation included the following:
(1) Safety Evaluation Report
(2) Design drawings
showing modifications to be completed for
approximately 50 walls
(3) Variation Notices written against various design drawings
(4) Controlling work /inspection procedures including:
(a) Procedure MP/O/A/1000/03, Dismantling and Erecting of
Seismic Concrete Masonry Walls
(b) Procedure
MP/O/A/1800/35,
Controlling
Procedure
for
Concrete Anchor Installation
(c) Procedure MP/O/A/1800/43,
Repair of Abandoned Drill Holes
Less than Two Inches in Diameter
(d) Procedure MP/O/A/1000/02, Fabrication and Erection of
Miscellaneous Steel for Upgrade of Masonry Walls
(5) Material certification records for structural steel used in
various masonry wall modifications
(6) QC inspection records for inspection of welding related to wall
modifications for wall numbers 527,
642,
656,
688,
695, 696,
699, 644, 676, 686, 1045, 1444, 1450, 1654, 1683, 1684, and 1728
'
6
(7) QC inspection records for inspection of installation of concrete
expansion anchors for modifications to wall numbers 527,
642,
656, 688, 695, 696, and 699.
The inspector also performed a walkdown inspection to examine the
completed modifications to the following masonry walls: wall numbers
14, 23, 522, 534, 686, 1042, 1043, 1047, 1654, and 1671.
During the walkdown inspection, the inspector compared the completed
wall modification with the details shown on the respective design
drawing showing details of the masonry wall stiffeners.
c.
Conclusions
Based on an inspection conducted January 6-9,
1981 (see Inspection
Report 50-269,270,287/87-01), inspection of the
completed wall
modifications during the current inspection, the results of the
licensee's testing program to qualify use of arching action theory
and on Safety Evaluation Reports issued by
NRR (attachments
to
March 14, 1985 and June 25, 1987 letters to Duke Power Company), the
inspector concluded that the licensee has complied with the
requirements of IE Bulletin 80-11.
IEB 80-11 is closed.
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.