ML16154A659

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Notice of Violation from Insp on 940615-0716.Violation Noted:Licensee Identification of Components Covered by QA Program Inadequate
ML16154A659
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/24/1994
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML16154A658 List:
References
50-269-94-21, 50-270-94-21, 50-287-94-21, EA-94-125, NUDOCS 9409120039
Download: ML16154A659 (2)


Text

ENCLOSURE 3 NOTICE OF VIOLATION Duke Power Company Docket Nos.:

50-269, 270, and 287 Oconee Nuclear Power Station License Nos.: DPR-38, 47 and 55 Units 1, 2 and 3 EA 94-125 During an NRC inspection conducted on June 15 - July 16, 1994, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions, "10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the violation is listed below:

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, "Quality Assurance Program," states in part "The applicant shall identify the structures, systems and components to be covered by the quality assurance program."

Duke Power Company Topical Report 1-A states through reference to ANSI 45.2.11 that all structures, systems and components necessary to mitigate the consequences of an accident are applicable to the quality assurance program, designated QA-1, and a controlled listing of those components are issued under the approval of the site Vice President.

Nuclear System Directive 307, "Quality Standards Manual" provides the mechanism for determining whether or not a given structure, system or component is nuclear safety-related consistent with the Quality Assurance Topical Report. Quality Standards Manual, Section 307.3.3, states in part that an electrical system or component shall be treated as QA Condition 1 (nuclear safety-related) if it is necessary for Emergency Power Systems (AC and DC).

Contrary to the above, as of July 16, 1994, the licensee's identification of components covered by the quality assurance program was inadequate in that the Quality Standards Manual did not reflect that the supporting air system for Keowee Air Circuit Breakers (ACB) 1-4, necessary for the Onsite Emergency Power System to function, were QA Condition 1.

Consequently, the licensee's quality assurance program was not applied to this air system, and therefore:

(1) adequate periodic maintenance was not performed on this system to ensure its quality; (2) a controlled drawing was never developed for this system; and (3) controls had not been placed on activities affecting the quality of the system to an extent consistent with its importance to safety. The inadequate maintenance resulted in excessive ACB check valve leakage and a regulating valve failure that contributed to an inadvertent lockout of the overhead emergency power path on June 14, 1994.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Duke Power Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply 9409120039 940824 PDR ADOCK 05000269 0

PDR*

Notice of Violation 2

to the Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or Demand for Information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extend the response time.

Dated at Atlanta, Georgia thispf'hday of August 1994